## Company Profile FORTUNE SHIPPING AND LOGISTICS L.L.C — UAE-based freight forwarder and logistics provider (website: https://www.fsldubai.com). Core services listed on the site and typical for the firm: international sea freight (FCL/LCL), air freight, customs clearance, door‑to‑door logistics, warehousing and distribution, project cargo handling and inland trucking. Operates out of Dubai (Jebel Ali/Khor Fakkan gateway markets) and positions itself as a regional freight forwarding and customs/clearance partner for importers, exporters and re‑export customers. Scale: small‑to‑mid sized freight forwarder (no public traffic/tonnage data on site); evidence of client servicing and standard forwarder product set rather than large NVOCC carrier operations. ## Pain Points 1) Route & cost volatility from Red Sea/Hormuz disruptions: clients importing staples (rice, wheat, flour) face sharply higher Gulf surcharges, war‑risk premiums and 20–30+ day longer door‑to‑door lead times on many Asia/Gulf lanes. This increases complaints, price disputes and margin erosion for low‑margin agri cargoes that pass through FSL as forwarder/re‑exporter. 2) Demand for multi‑origin sourcing & faster alternative procurement: GCC buyers are adding optional origins/shorter‑validity tenders and asking forwarders to support supplier discovery and CIF offers; smaller forwarders lack in‑house global supplier networks and procurement tooling to respond quickly. 3) Pressure on working capital and inventory management: longer transit times and schedule unreliability force importers to hold more inventory or accept delivery delays — forwarders are being asked to offer staging, short‑term warehousing and integrated logistics+procurement solutions, which strains operational capacity and commercial capability. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] Red Sea & Gulf shipping security – impact on Suez Canal & UAE (Jebel Ali), 2026 === • Security backdrop (Q1–Q2 2026) – Since late Feb 2026, the *Strait of Hormuz* has been largely blocked by Iran in the context of the 2026 Iran war, disrupting Gulf oil and container flows.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis?utm_source=openai)) – Houthi forces signaled resumption of attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea in parallel with the Iran conflict escalation, reinforcing carrier risk aversion to Bab el‑Mandeb/Suez routings.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai)) • Suez Canal vs Cape of Good Hope in 2026 – In 2024, container traffic via Suez fell ~75% vs 2023 as lines rerouted around the Cape; 2025–early 2026 patterns are still heavily shaped by that structural diversion.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) – Drewry’s Red Sea Diversion Tracker (10 Feb 2026) shows: • **Suez Canal containerships:** 61 vs 60 sailings in consecutive two‑week periods (i.e., still very depressed in absolute terms). • **Cape of Good Hope routings:** 303 sailings, only 4% lower across those same periods, confirming that **~80–85% of Asia–Europe box capacity remains on the Cape route**.([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/signal/cape-diversions-ease-slightly-but-europe-asia-networks-are-still-built-around-the-long-way/?utm_source=openai)) – Ocean Alliance has explicitly committed to **maintain Cape routings for Asia–Europe through 2026**, citing continued Red Sea instability, which locks in lower Suez utilization.([gloap.net](https://gloap.net/en/news/item/2532/?utm_source=openai)) – ING/Drewry analysis (May 2026) notes carriers are “testing” limited Red Sea/Suez transits on backhaul legs but continue to build their networks primarily around the Cape, highlighting **persistent structural uncertainty** rather than a full reversion to Suez.([think.ing.com](https://think.ing.com/downloads/pdf/article/returning-to-the-red-sea-a-key-event-to-watch-in-container-shipping-for-2026?utm_source=openai)) • Transit time & cost impacts – Rerouting Asia–Europe services via the Cape of Good Hope adds **~25–30 days** vs traditional 30–35‑day Suez routings (total 55–65 days), tripling lead times for many lanes and tying up vessel capacity.([valuechainasia.com](https://valuechainasia.com/articles/logistics/asia-ocean-freight-rates-2026-cape-reroute?utm_source=openai)) – Typical Cape detours increase voyage distance by ~3,500–4,000 nautical miles and emissions per weekly Asia–North Europe service by **~67% CO₂** vs a Red Sea route.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) – Various analyses (Drewry, others) show Asia–Europe spot rates stabilizing at a **persistent premium of about USD 1,800–2,000/FEU above pre‑crisis levels**, even after the initial spike.([luyiss.com](https://www.luyiss.com/news/logistics/freight/Red-Sea-Diversion-Normalized--Asia-Europe-Freight-Premium-at--1-850-TEU_615855.html?utm_source=openai)) • Latest rate signals (May 2026) – Drewry World Container Index (7 May 2026): **USD 2,286/FEU average**, up 3% w/w; Asia–Europe remains one of the main contributors to recent increases despite some earlier easing.([drewry.co.uk](https://www.drewry.co.uk/maritime-research-opinion-browser/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry?utm_source=openai)) – ING/Drewry commentaries (March–May 2026) emphasize that although spot rates corrected sharply in 2025, 2026 still starts from a substantially higher base vs pre‑Red Sea crisis, especially when war‑risk premiums and bunker surcharges are included.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) • Impact on UAE hubs (Jebel Ali & regional re‑exports) – Jebel Ali remains the key Middle East transshipment node in Drewry’s Middle East & South Asia port sample and is central to East–West and North–South routings.([drewry.co.uk](https://www.drewry.co.uk/AcuCustom/Sitename/DAM/031/DREWRY_CCI_WK04_20261.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – With Hormuz constrained since late Feb 2026, cargoes bound for the Gulf and Levant that would normally move via **Gulf mainline calls + feeder** are increasingly: • Routed via **Cape‑served hub ports** (e.g., Jebel Ali, Salalah, Sohar) with longer trunk legs; and • Utilizing **alternative multimodal solutions** (sea‑rail‑truck) through UAE and neighboring states to reach inland GCC destinations.([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – S&P Global (Feb 2026) notes that reopening of partial Red Sea transits has not materially reduced risk pricing; Jebel Ali and other UAE ports are acting as **re‑export and buffer hubs** absorbing schedule volatility and redistributing cargo into the Gulf via feeders and land transport.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) – For food and agri cargoes, this translates to: • Extended lead times from Black Sea, EU and Indian Subcontinent origins to GCC. • **Higher landed CIF costs** into Jebel Ali and Khor Fakkan due to Cape detours and war‑risk surcharges on any cargo still attempting the Red Sea/Hormuz corridors.([luyiss.com](https://www.luyiss.com/news/logistics/freight/Red-Sea-Diversion-Normalized--Asia-Europe-Freight-Premium-at--1-850-TEU_615855.html?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for UAE‑focused stakeholders** – Strategic assumption for 2026: treat Cape routings as **baseline** for Asia–Europe and Asia–Med lanes, with Suez/Red Sea reopening viewed as an *option, not a base case*. – Expect: (i) 20–30+ extra days door‑to‑door for Europe/GCC flows, (ii) sustained war‑risk and diversion surcharges, (iii) increased hub‑and‑spoke dependence on Jebel Ali for Gulf distribution, and (iv) elevated inventory requirements for grain/rice importers due to longer supply chains and schedule risk.([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/signal/cape-diversions-ease-slightly-but-europe-asia-networks-are-still-built-around-the-long-way/?utm_source=openai)) **Sources for this section:** ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [COMMODITY TRENDS] Wheat & rice imports into UAE & GCC – prices, origins & diversification (2025–Q2 2026) === *Note: Most official trade statistics lag by several months; 2025 data are the latest comprehensive numbers. 2026 trends are inferred from early‑year price and policy signals.* • **Global price environment heading into 2026** – FEWS NET’s Global Price Watch (Dec 2025): • International **wheat prices** slightly up m/m in Dec 2025, with lower prices in Russia/Ukraine on large harvests, but strength in US and some exporters due to strong demand. • **Rice markets** remained tight, driven by export restrictions and strong demand, particularly from India, Pakistan, Vietnam and Thailand.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) • **Rice into UAE (micro, but timely data)** – Trade‑oriented Pakistani exporter data (May 2026) indicates: • UAE is **Pakistan’s largest basmati market**, centered on Jebel Ali. • Dominant grades: **1121 basmati & Super Kernel**; transit time Karachi → Jebel Ali **4–6 days** (when Hormuz open). • Indicative May 2026 CIF Jebel Ali price levels (Pakistani basmati) are quoted in the **USD 1,200–1,400/ton** range depending on grade and specification.([pakistanrice.com](https://pakistanrice.com/markets/rice-importers-uae/?utm_source=openai)) – With Hormuz disruptions since late Feb 2026, actual voyage time and insurance costs for these short‑haul flows have risen; Thai and Indian exporters report additional **war‑risk and congestion surcharges** on Gulf‑bound rice cargoes, though public, quantified surcharges are limited.([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Role of India, Pakistan, Turkey & others in GCC rice supply** – Prior to India’s export restrictions (2023–2024), India accounted for **>40% of global rice trade** and a dominant share of GCC imports. Export bans on non‑basmati white rice and export floors on basmati forced GCC buyers to diversify.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) – Pakistan and Thailand have expanded their footprint in **premium and parboiled segments** into GCC markets, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, with Pakistan particularly strong in basmati and parboiled 5% broken into Jebel Ali and Jeddah.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) – Turkey is a **secondary rice origin** for GCC (more active in wheat & flour), but some re‑exports of packaged rice and processed products from Mersin/Izmir to Gulf retail channels are reported in trade press; these remain small in volume compared to South Asian suppliers and are not yet robustly captured in 2026‑dated statistics.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) • **Wheat imports into UAE & GCC – origins and shifts** – GCC wheat imports are structurally high due to limited domestic production; Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman together import **>10 million tonnes per year** (all forms) in recent pre‑2026 campaigns, heavily from **Russia, Australia, Canada, EU (France, Germany), plus some Kazakhstan wheat moving via Iran/Caspian–Gulf routes when available.**([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) – Large Russian and Ukrainian crops in 2024–25 (record or near‑record production in India as well) kept global exportable supplies ample, restraining outright price spikes even as freight costs rose.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) – For UAE in particular, industry reports describe: • **Core wheat grain origins:** Russia, Australia, Canada, EU (France, Germany), plus some Kazakhstan wheat moving via Iran/Caspian–Gulf routes when available. • **Flour & processed wheat products:** imports and re‑exports via Jebel Ali and other UAE ports to Oman, Yemen, East Africa and other GCC states, leveraging UAE’s role as a milling and re‑export hub.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) • **Impact of 2026 shipping disruptions on wheat & rice into GCC** – Cape rerouting and Hormuz tensions are adding **USD 40–100/ton** to freight on some long‑haul bulk and containerized food cargoes into the Middle East vs pre‑crisis baselines, per synthesis of freight rate uplift vs average FOB values (derived from Drewry/SCFI indices plus FEWS NET price levels).([luyiss.com](https://www.luyiss.com/news/logistics/freight/Red-Sea-Diversion-Normalized--Asia-Europe-Freight-Premium-at--1-850-TEU_615855.html?utm_source=openai)) – Higher freight and insurance disproportionately affect low‑margin staples (wheat, non‑basmati rice). Where governments subsidize bread/rice, **importing agencies in GCC are tendering more frequently and seeking shorter validity** to manage volatility; some tenders specify alternative discharge ports (e.g., Red Sea vs Gulf) or optional origins to mitigate routing risk. (Inference based on past Gulf tender behavior and current logistics conditions.)([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – Analysts covering Middle East logistics for Q1 2026 note: • Container shipping to/from the Middle East faces “difficulties” but only **~3% of global container traffic** transits Hormuz; the bigger impact on food staples is cost and schedule reliability rather than physical availability so far. • Freight rates into the Persian Gulf up **~150% vs late Feb 2026 baseline** on key lanes tracked in SCFI, while overall SCFI up ~28%, EU component +15%.([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Origin diversification signals for GCC buyers (2025–2026)** – **Rice:** • Continued reliance on India for basmati where export floors allow, but **greater volumes from Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam** into GCC, especially for non‑basmati and parboiled, to hedge policy risk.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) • Some GCC buyers exploring **Brazilian and US long‑grain rice** for food security buffers, though high freight cost via Cape limits scale.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) – **Wheat:** • Black Sea origins (Russia, Ukraine) remain price‑competitive, but logistical risk in the Black Sea and insurance costs push GCC buyers to **keep optional origin clauses** that include EU, Australia and North/South America.([fews.net](https://fews.net/global/price-watch/january-2026/print?utm_source=openai)) • Inland corridor options (e.g., Russian/Kazakh wheat moving overland towards Iranian ports, then by sea to Gulf) are under evaluation as a partial hedge against Red Sea/Hormuz volatility, though capacity is limited.([supplychainandlogistics.org](https://supplychainandlogistics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/annual-review-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for UAE/GCC grain & rice importers** – Expect **CIF volatility dominated by freight and surcharge swings** in 2026, given relatively comfortable global wheat and mixed‑tightness in rice fundamentals. – Policy and logistics risk (India export curbs, Black Sea security, Red Sea/Hormuz) continue to drive **multi‑origin procurement strategies**, with UAE’s Jebel Ali playing a central role in staging and re‑export into the wider GCC and East Africa. – Operationally, importers should plan for higher working capital (more inventory days) and maintain flexible discharge port and shipment window clauses in contracts through at least end‑2026.([supplychainandlogistics.org](https://supplychainandlogistics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/annual-review-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Sources for this section:** ([pakistanrice.com](https://pakistanrice.com/markets/rice-importers-uae/?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [TIMING SIGNALS] Container freight rates & capacity – Asia–Middle East–Africa, Q1–Q2 2026 === • **Macro capacity & rate backdrop entering 2026** – S&P Global “Containers Quarterly” (early 2026) describes Asia–Europe entering 2026 with “seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty,” driven by Lunar New Year demand and Red Sea diversions. • Spot rates rose sharply into early Jan 2026, while **Platts Long‑Term Container Rate 1 (PLCR1) stayed ~USD 1,700/FEU**, highlighting a disconnect between short‑term spikes and contract levels.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) – A shipping annual review (April 2026) notes that **fleet overcapacity of ~30–35% vs demand** persists globally, but Red Sea diversions temporarily absorb tonnage on Asia–Europe and Asia–Middle East routes, supporting rates.([supplychainandlogistics.org](https://supplychainandlogistics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/annual-review-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Asia–Middle East rate & volatility signals (Q1–Q2 2026)** – A Q1 2026 economic outlook summarizing SCFI performance reports: • Since 27 Feb 2026, **SCFI overall up ~28%**, but the **“Persian Gulf” component up ~150%**, Europe +15%, ASEAN +6%, USWC +11%.([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • This indicates a **disproportionate rate shock on Middle East‑bound containers** after the Hormuz crisis escalated, compared with other lanes. – A Middle East logistics report (March 2026) highlights: • Rising bunker and war‑risk costs being passed through as **Gulf surcharges**, with heavier surcharges on Hormuz‑exposed ports. • Network changes and diversion to multi‑modal land/rail options within the Middle East to maintain service to inland GCC markets.([assets-eu-01.kc-usercontent.com](https://assets-eu-01.kc-usercontent.com/4192440f-b944-0135-c768-e05d36ed3e93/b697dadb-657c-4446-8adc-5e267ea02498/26_Q1%20Logistics%20Report_VF.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – A regional logistics article (April 2026) notes **Asia–Middle East rates “surging”** as carriers: • Suspend or curtail Hormuz/Suez transits, routing via Cape of Good Hope; • **Tripling rates on some key Asia–Gulf lanes** versus pre‑crisis levels; • Impose war‑risk surcharges and congestion fees on Gulf calls.([valuechainasia.com](https://valuechainasia.com/articles/logistics/asia-ocean-freight-rates-2026-cape-reroute?utm_source=openai)) • **Asia–East Africa & broader Africa corridors** – Drewry’s Container Capacity Insight (week 4, 2026) shows East Africa ports such as Mombasa, Djibouti, Port Sudan and Dar es Salaam integrated into the same capacity cluster as Middle East hubs (Jebel Ali, Salalah, Jeddah).([drewry.co.uk](https://www.drewry.co.uk/AcuCustom/Sitename/DAM/031/DREWRY_CCI_WK04_20261.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – With Cape routings normalized for Asia–Europe, many Asia–East Africa strings are: • Experiencing **higher schedule unreliability** as ships arrive “out of window” after longer trunk legs; • Facing knock‑on congestion at transshipment hubs feeding East African ports. (Based on container network analyses linking Cape diversions to hub congestion.)([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/signal/cape-diversions-ease-slightly-but-europe-asia-networks-are-still-built-around-the-long-way/?utm_source=openai)) • **Schedule reliability & service patterns relevant to UAE forwarders** – Industry reports and UPS/other logistics updates for Q1 2026 point to: • **Network changes** on key Asia–US and Asia–Europe lanes reducing schedule reliability and lengthening transit times; although these focus on US and EU destinations, the same vessels and alliances operate Asia–Middle East services, meaning **spillover unreliability** for Gulf feeders and mainlines.([developer.ups.com](https://developer.ups.com/us/en/supplychain/resources/news-and-market-updates/quarterly-freight-and-logistics-trends?utm_source=openai)) – A Q1 2026 logistics report focused on the Middle East notes: • Carriers are shifting to **multi‑modal routings** within the Middle East (sea + rail + truck) to avoid sensitive choke points and maintain last‑mile reliability. • Container shipping to/from the Middle East is “difficult” but not halted; capacity is available, but **blank sailings and port omits** are more frequent.([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – Drewry and carrier guidance (Jan–Mar 2026) emphasize that although some Red Sea transits resumed, **schedule reliability remains well below pre‑2023 norms**, and carriers continue to plan around potential sudden route closures.([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/signal/cape-diversions-ease-slightly-but-europe-asia-networks-are-still-built-around-the-long-way/?utm_source=openai)) • **Concrete price/rate levels & recent movement** – Drewry World Container Index (7 May 2026): global composite **USD 2,286/FEU, +3% w/w**. While WCI does not publish a specific Asia–Gulf corridor, the strong uplift in Middle East components of SCFI (Persian Gulf +150% since late Feb) indicates Gulf‑bound lanes are **running significantly above the global average** in percentage terms.([drewry.co.uk](https://www.drewry.co.uk/maritime-research-opinion-browser/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry?utm_source=openai)) – March–April 2026 analyses suggest that freight from major Asian load ports to the Middle East has, in some cases, **doubled to tripled** vs mid‑2025 lows, especially where additional Cape distance and war‑risk costs compound an already elevated base.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) • **Demand signals and timing for UAE‑focused freight forwarders** – Early‑year demand: • Pre‑Lunar New Year 2026 cargo front‑loading supported strong Asia export volumes, including to the Middle East, contributing to early‑Q1 rate strength.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) – Post‑holiday and war‑driven pattern (late Q1 into Q2 2026): • Underlying demand growth remains modest, but **geopolitical shocks (Hormuz, renewed Red Sea threat)** are the primary drivers of volatility. • Oversupply of vessels globally means that if security risks ease, **rates could correct quickly**, especially into the Gulf where demand does not fully absorb added tonnage.([supplychainandlogistics.org](https://supplychainandlogistics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/annual-review-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – For timing decisions in 2026: • Short‑term (next 1–3 months): scenario risk skewed to **further spikes** if conflict escalates or if additional attacks occur in Red Sea/Bab el‑Mandeb or around Hormuz. • Medium‑term (Q3–Q4 2026): high probability of **rate normalization** if (a) diversions stabilize, (b) security risk premia compress, and (c) latent fleet capacity re‑enters Middle East services. This would favor **shorter contract tenors** and a blend of index‑linked and spot exposure for UAE shippers.([minsheng-logistics.com](https://minsheng-logistics.com/article/430ADC5B212077EA55E7?utm_source=openai)) **Operational takeaways for UAE freight forwarders** – Expect **above‑trend volatility on Asia–Middle East–Africa lanes through at least end‑2026**, with the Middle East leg (especially Persian Gulf) showing the greatest percentage premium vs 2025 baselines.([scbeic.com](https://www.scbeic.com/en/detail/file/product/10057/hhos8zastn/Outlook-1Q26-FullReport-EN-20260417.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – Service reliability: plan for **longer buffer times, more transshipment risk, and increased use of alternate routings** (via Red Sea hubs, Cape routes, or inland corridors) for both GCC and East Africa destinations.([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/signal/cape-diversions-ease-slightly-but-europe-asia-networks-are-still-built-around-the-long-way/?utm_source=openai)) – Commercial strategy: stagger contract commitments (e.g., partial 12‑month fixed + partial quarterly/index‑linked) and maintain flexibility across carriers/alliances to arbitrage sudden rate dislocations.([minsheng-logistics.com](https://minsheng-logistics.com/article/430ADC5B212077EA55E7?utm_source=openai)) **Sources for this section:** ([drewry.co.uk](https://www.drewry.co.uk/maritime-research-opinion-browser/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry?utm_source=openai))