## Company Profile Allcargo Logistic Services Ltd. (Israel) — freight forwarder and logistics provider. Public web presence (http://www.allcargo.co.il) lists the company as an Israel-based forwarding and logistics firm; contact lead is Id0 (עידו בוקובזה), Business Development Manager. Likely SME/regional player offering international freight forwarding (ocean/air), customs clearance, warehousing/distribution and related supply‑chain services to Israeli importers and exporters. Focus appears to be B2B clients (retailers, food/agri importers, manufacturers) moving containerized and breakbulk cargo through Haifa/Ashdod and previously Eilat. ## Pain Points 1) Route and lead‑time uncertainty from Red Sea/Hormuz disruptions: clients face 10–14 day longer transits via Cape, forcing earlier bookings, higher safety stocks, and lost price competitiveness. Allcargo needs a fast channel to originate clients into alternative‑origin sourcing and secure bookings. 2) Rising freight & war‑risk insurance costs plus modal constraints: spot container rates and war‑risk surcharges are volatile (e.g., +26% MoM on Far East–Med), squeezing margins and complicating client quotes; Allcargo must offer low‑friction alternatives (sea–air, feeder/short‑sea) and help clients model landed cost. 3) Port & compliance complexity at home (Eilat collapse; Ashdod DG restrictions): clients need port‑choice advice, DG routing, customs/SII compliance and contingency plans—work that consumes Allcargo’s operations team and can be packaged as a resilience service. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. ISRAEL FREIGHT FORWARDING MARKET 2026: CONTAINER VOLUMES, PORT CONGESTION, AND MODAL SHIFTS === **Overall container and trade context** - Around 99.6% of Israel’s foreign trade by weight and 65% by value moves by sea, underscoring the centrality of ocean freight and container ports (Haifa, Ashdod, Haifa Bay, South Port; Eilat is marginal for containers).([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) - World Bank container port traffic data for Israel (latest update April 2026) provides national TEU series through 2022 plus model‑based forecasts for 2023‑2026; it indicates continued growth in port container traffic into the mid‑2020s, but does not yet fully reflect the most recent Red Sea and Hormuz disruptions in 2026.([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/container-port-traffic-teu-20-foot-equivalent-units-wb-data.html?utm_source=openai)) **Port‑specific operational performance / congestion (2025–2026)** - **Haifa / Haifa Bay Port** - Port congestion trackers (e.g., Portcast) show current average waiting times at Haifa during 3–9 May 2026 at low single‑digit days, with congestion in the lower half of global percentiles – i.e., **no systemic congestion**, more a pattern of isolated longer waits for a minority of vessels while most traffic turns around relatively normally.([portcast.io](https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/haifa?utm_source=openai)) - ZIM’s March 2026 customer update stated that **Haifa and Ashdod were “operating as usual”** despite regional conflict, supporting the view that operational bottlenecks are limited, with shipping constraints more on the sea‑leg routing side than at the Israeli terminals themselves.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1rivwws/israel_situation_update_excerpt_further_to_the/?utm_source=openai)) - **Ashdod Port** - Port analytics for Ashdod (ILASH) show monthly average container dwell/port stay around **5.7 days in January–February 2026**, suggesting moderate but manageable congestion in line with a stressed but functioning gateway port.([cogoport.com](https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/knowledge-center/resources/port-info/ashdod-ilash?utm_source=openai)) - Security‑driven operational constraints remain: an October 2025 container‑shipping risk note reported that Ashdod **stopped accepting dangerous cargo (DG)** bookings due to security concerns, even while describing Haifa and Ashdod as otherwise “operating normally.” This constraint persists into 2026 and affects certain chemical and hazardous inputs.([olgn.org](https://www.olgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2.Container-News-Israel-Hamas-war-Impact-on-shipping-and-port-operations-potential-risks.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Eilat Port (Red Sea gateway)** - Eilat is effectively **collapsed as a commercial gateway in 2025–2026** because of Red Sea attacks on shipping. A January 13, 2026 Globes report noted that with the “closure” of the Red Sea trade route, **Eilat’s 2024 revenues dropped ~80%, from NIS 212m (2023) to NIS 42m (2024)**, and described the port as “empty.”([en.globes.co.il](https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai)) - The vice president of finance said revenues had fallen to **“nearly zero”** due to Red Sea disruption, and the port is “almost completely paralyzed”; much of the prior car import traffic has been diverted to northern ports.([en.globes.co.il](https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai)) **Modal shifts: sea ↔ air ↔ road / short‑sea** - **Sea to alternative sea routes (Cape of Good Hope)** - The 2024–26 Red Sea crisis and the 2026 Iran/Hormuz conflict have driven a large share of East Asia–to–Mediterranean container flows away from the Suez/Red Sea corridor. A February 2026 strategic assessment notes that Suez Canal transits remain **about 60% below pre‑crisis levels**, with operators increasingly favoring the longer Cape route.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For China–Israel container traffic, a 2026 logistics guide describes **two main routings**: - via Suez/Red Sea: ~30–35 days **but with high war‑risk surcharges**; - via Cape of Good Hope: **+10–14 days** transit, requiring importers to book **~8 weeks in advance for seasonal cargo** to buffer the extra lead time.([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) - **Sea to air cargo** - IATA’s January 2026 air cargo analysis highlights continued “emergency sea‑to‑air” shifts on lanes affected by maritime instability. While not Israel‑specific, this indicates that some high‑value/time‑sensitive cargoes (pharma, electronics, critical components) into/out of Israel are likely moving via air rather than disrupted sea routes, especially when Red Sea and Hormuz risks spike.([iata.org](https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/air-cargo-market-analysis-january-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Air capacity through Gulf hubs (Doha, Dubai) has been constrained by the 2026 US‑Israel‑Iran war, complicating indirect routings that Israeli forwarders often use; S&P Global notes network challenges from halts or reductions at these hubs.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/us-israel-iran-war-provokes-shipping-lane-shifts?utm_source=openai)) - **Road and short‑sea / land bridges** - Xeneta commentary quoted by DC Velocity (April 2026) notes shippers “exploring every available solution… whether through **land bridges, rerouting or alternative networks** now being offered by carriers and forwarders,” with about **800,000 TEU per month** previously moving into the region now directly affected by the crisis.([dcvelocity.com](https://www.dcvelocity.com/transportation/maritime-ocean/ocean-container-shipping-sees-massive-uncertainty-from-iran-war?utm_source=openai)) - For Israel, that has translated into: - greater reliance on **short‑sea Mediterranean feeders** from European hubs (Piraeus, Algeciras, Gioia Tauro) into Haifa/Ashdod; - increased use of **truck corridors via neighboring states** for selected cargoes that can be transshipped regionally, though specific 2026 Israel‑only road‑freight volume data are not yet published in open sources. **Implications for freight forwarders in Israel (2026)** - Freight forwarders are focusing on: - **Schedule/routing engineering** rather than merely spot rate negotiation—choosing between Suez, Cape, alternative transshipment hubs, and mixed sea–air solutions.([bfglogistics.com](https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai)) - Managing **port choice** within Israel (Haifa vs Ashdod) based on cargo profile (DG restrictions), hinterland road haulage cost, and vessel calls.([cogoport.com](https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/knowledge-center/resources/port-info/ashdod-ilash?utm_source=openai)) - Planning around **Eilat’s functional shutdown**, which removes a Red Sea‑side option for ro‑ro cars and certain bulk/neo‑bulk flows.([en.globes.co.il](https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai)) **Evidence gaps & notes** - Within the last 90 days, there is no public dataset yet reporting **2025–2026 Israel TEU volumes by port**; we instead infer conditions from congestion and operational reports, revenue changes (Eilat), and global TEU diversions from Red Sea/Suez. - Official 2025 port statistics will likely be released later in 2026 by the Israel Ports Company and national statistics office. === 2. RED SEA / SUEZ CORRIDOR DISRUPTIONS 2026 AND IMPACT ON ISRAEL TRADE === **Nature of the 2026 disruptions** - The **Red Sea crisis**, initially driven by Houthi attacks starting late 2023, has extended into 2026 and is now compounded by the **US‑Israel–Iran war** and the **Strait of Hormuz crisis** (Hormuz largely blocked by Iran since 28 February 2026).([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Houthis signaled in February–March 2026 that they may **resume or escalate attacks in the Red Sea** and target vessels linked to “aggressor countries,” explicitly including Israel; they have also threatened a naval blockade.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Houthi_strikes_on_Israel?utm_source=openai)) **Route diversions and voyage times** - By March 2024, over **2,000 ships had already diverted away from the Red Sea**, and the level of diversion has persisted into 2025–26.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - A February 2026 maritime‑geopolitics analysis estimates that **Suez Canal transits are ~60% below pre‑crisis levels**, indicating a structural and prolonged diversion effect.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For East Asia–to–Israel services: - Red Sea/Suez route: **~30–35 days** transit when used, but exposed to attack and elevated war‑risk surcharges. - Cape of Good Hope rerouting: adds **~10–14 days**, driving total transit into the **40–50 day** range and forcing importers to extend lead times (e.g., book **8+ weeks** ahead for seasonal shipments).([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) **Freight rates and cost impacts** - Xeneta’s April 2026 commentary reports that for the **Far East–Mediterranean trade lane most directly affected by Red Sea closure**, spot container rates have risen **26% month‑on‑month to about USD 4,211/FEU**, reflecting the cost of longer voyages and risk premia.([dcvelocity.com](https://www.dcvelocity.com/transportation/maritime-ocean/ocean-container-shipping-sees-massive-uncertainty-from-iran-war?utm_source=openai)) - The February 2026 Red Sea factor study finds that container shipping cost increases attributable to the crisis **contributed measurably to global inflation in 2024–25**, with a notable effect on **food prices**—relevant for Israel, a high‑import food market.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **War‑risk insurance and security surcharges** - The same 2026 assessment notes that **insurance risk premiums “remained elevated” for Red Sea transits** into early 2026, despite some temporary lulls in attacks.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Earlier INSS work on Israel’s ports during the Gaza war describes a pattern where London’s Joint War Committee upgrades Israel and parts of the Eastern Mediterranean to higher risk categories, leading insurers to **cancel existing policies and reissue them at higher hull & machinery and war‑risk premiums** for ships calling at Israeli ports.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 China–Israel logistics guide reflects this on the ground: carriers using the Suez/Red Sea corridor into Haifa/Ashdod face **“significantly higher insurance premiums and ‘War Risk’ surcharges”**, often making the Cape route more economical despite extra fuel and time.([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) **Impact on Israeli ports and trade patterns** - **Eilat (Red Sea)** - Direct victim of Houthi/Yemeni operations and Red Sea risk: revenues fell ~80% in 2024; traffic in 2025–26 is described as “nearly zero,” essentially removing Eilat as a viable import/export node for cars and certain bulk commodities.([en.globes.co.il](https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai)) - **Haifa & Ashdod (Mediterranean)** - Remain the main gateways: ZIM’s March 2026 note to customers said both ports were **“operating as usual”**, confirming that **land‑side port capacity is not the primary bottleneck**; issues are on the maritime access side (routes, security zones, insurance, schedules).([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1rivwws/israel_situation_update_excerpt_further_to_the/?utm_source=openai)) - INSS emphasizes that containerization’s share in Israel is **~15% of overall seaborne trade (by tonnage), about twice the global average**, intensifying the impact of any container‑specific disruptions in Red Sea/Suez on the wider economy.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) **Broader regional context relevant to Israel** - S&P Global’s March 2026 analysis of the “US‑Israel Iran war” notes that container shipping now faces **simultaneous challenges in the Red Sea and at Hormuz**, with major carriers (Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag‑Lloyd) adjusting line networks. Air freight networks are also strained because of constraints through Gulf hubs.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/us-israel-iran-war-provokes-shipping-lane-shifts?utm_source=openai)) - Reddit‑sourced industry commentary citing Drewry’s Red Sea Diversion Tracker in March 2026 signals that the industry is bracing for **possible simultaneous disruptions at both Bab el‑Mandeb and Hormuz**, implying that the Cape route may remain the default for Asia–Israel container flows for some time, locking in higher cost and longer transit profiles.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1s66fah/houthis_threaten_red_sea_escalation_as_iran_war/?utm_source=openai)) **Net effect on Israel trade (2026)** - **Longer lead times** for imports of consumer goods, industrial inputs, and food (10–14 extra days vs pre‑crisis Suez routings).([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) - **Higher freight costs**—e.g., +26% MoM spot rate hikes into the Med; elevated war‑risk and hull insurance for any vessel transiting Red Sea and calling Israel.([dcvelocity.com](https://www.dcvelocity.com/transportation/maritime-ocean/ocean-container-shipping-sees-massive-uncertainty-from-iran-war?utm_source=openai)) - **Modal and routing shifts**: from Suez to Cape, from Eilat to Mediterranean ports, and partial sea‑to‑air substitution for urgent or high‑value cargo.([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) - **Strategic vulnerability**: Israel’s dependence on sea‑borne trade (≈99.6% by weight) magnifies the macroeconomic impact of these disruptions, especially on food prices and just‑in‑time manufacturing supply chains.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) === 3. ISRAELI IMPORTERS 2026: SOURCING BEHAVIOR & DEMAND FOR END‑TO‑END SERVICES === Direct, quantitative surveys of 2026 Israeli importer behavior are limited in open sources as of May 13, 2026, but several policy and analytical reports allow for well‑grounded inferences. **Origin diversification for agri‑food and manufacturing inputs** - The **OECD Economic Survey of Israel 2025** notes that, even before the 2026 crises, Israel had been actively **diversifying food import sources** via new trade agreements and market access efforts. It highlights that recent reforms and FTAs (including those covering agriculture) are expected to **“help diversify food import sources”** and mitigate price shocks.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - INSS’s analysis of national supply chains emphasizes Israel’s high external dependency and the importance of **diversifying suppliers and routes** for both food and industrial inputs, arguing that the pre‑2023 pattern of relying on a limited set of origins and corridors (including Suez/Red Sea) created systemic vulnerability.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) - In practice, since late 2023 and into 2026: - Grain and feed importers have reportedly shifted incremental volumes from traditional Black Sea suppliers to **alternative origins such as the US, South America, and EU** when risk premia or logistics barriers increase (e.g., Red Sea attacks, Black Sea corridor volatility). Specific 2026 tonnage splits are not yet public, but trade policy documents and USDA FAS reporting through 2024 confirm this diversification trend.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For manufacturing inputs (chemicals, machinery, electronics), Israel’s long‑standing FTA network (US, EU, EFTA, regional partners, and newer deals in Asia) provides a legal framework that **facilitates switching origin**, which is now being used more actively due to route and insurance disruptions.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Stockpiling vs just‑in‑time** - INSS’s national supply chain study discusses the **trade‑off between high inventories and vulnerability**, noting that: - large stockpiles require expensive storage and are potential strategic targets; - but low inventories amplify exposure to route disruptions like those in the Red Sea.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) - While it does not give quantitative inventory ratios, the policy recommendation is clear: for **critical goods** (food, energy, essential pharmaceuticals, some defense‑related inputs), Israel should **increase safety stocks and diversify storage locations**. - Anecdotal and analyst commentary from late 2024–2026 indicates that: - **Major food importers and retailers** in Israel have raised buffer stocks of key staples (grains, oils, sugar) ahead of religious festivals and expected disruption windows, often targeting **several weeks to a couple of months of cover** rather than traditional just‑in‑time replenishment from nearby hubs.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) - **Industrial and tech manufacturers** are more selective, stockpiling long‑lead electronics and specialty components while still running lean inventories for commoditized inputs. Such behavior is consistent with global trends outlined by logistics market updates and is particularly rational for Israel given current routing risk.([bfglogistics.com](https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai)) **Spot buying vs longer‑term contracts** - With freight conditions described as “massive uncertainty” and “route and schedule uncertainty” in early 2026, many shippers along affected corridors have increased their use of the **spot market for freight**, even when they maintain some long‑term contracts.([bfglogistics.com](https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai)) - For Israeli importers, implications likely include: - **More spot buying for ocean freight** on Asia–Med corridors (to arbitrage between Suez and Cape offerings and react to sudden closures/reopenings). - **Mixed strategies for commodities**: large grain or oilseed tenders may still be done on term or pooled contracts, but physical execution (vessels, routes) is more opportunistic, especially when war‑risk premiums jump. - No Israel‑specific 2026 survey data are yet available publically that splits spot vs contract volumes, so this remains an inference grounded in regional freight analysis. **Demand for end‑to‑end sourcing, supplier discovery, and risk‑management services** Multiple recent analyses and market updates point toward a **rising premium on integrated logistics and sourcing solutions**: - A January 2026 global freight market update frames 2026 as a year where logistics decisions revolve around **“route and schedule uncertainty in ocean freight”** and **air cargo reliability**, making professional planning and modal optimization more valuable.([bfglogistics.com](https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai)) - The 2026 China–Israel logistics guide (written by a forwarder) describes shipping to Israel as a **“high‑stakes chess match”** involving: - dynamic Red Sea security variables, - compliance with the Standards Institution of Israel (SII), - and smart‑port operations at Haifa and Ashdod. It explicitly promotes **end‑to‑end logistics design**, including route choice, customs/SII compliance, and port selection, indicating that importers are seeking turnkey solutions rather than just port‑to‑port freight.([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) - INSS and other policy reports on supply chain resilience argue that Israel needs to improve **supply‑chain visibility, multi‑sourcing, and contingency planning**, implicitly creating demand for: - supplier discovery and qualification across more origins; - scenario planning for corridor closures (e.g., sudden loss of Hormuz or Bab el‑Mandeb); - digital tools for tracking shipments and risk events.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) **What this likely means for agri‑food and manufacturing importers** Based on the above evidence and the structural characteristics of Israel’s trade: - **Agri‑food importers (grains, oils, sugar, feed, frozen proteins, consumer foods)** - Increasing **origin diversification**, using Israel’s FTA network to balance supply from Black Sea, Americas, EU, and occasionally Asia.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Higher strategic stocks** ahead of known seasonal peaks and potential disruption periods.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai)) - Stronger appetite for **end‑to‑end services** that bundle ocean freight, warehousing, customs clearance, and compliance (e.g., sanitary/phytosanitary and SII standards), as well as route contingency options.([vlefooena.com](https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai)) - **Manufacturing importers (chemicals, metals, machinery, electronics, automotive)** - Increasing use of **dual‑or multi‑sourcing**, especially where suppliers can ship via different corridors (e.g., sourcing from both Asian and European vendors).([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Selective **stockpiling** of critical components with long lead times or single‑source risk.([bfglogistics.com](https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai)) - Demand for **integrated logistics and risk‑management solutions**, including: - dynamic routing between Suez and Cape; - sea–air or rail‑sea combinations via alternative hubs; - insurance advisory on war‑risk cover and policy wording.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/us-israel-iran-war-provokes-shipping-lane-shifts?utm_source=openai)) **Evidence gaps** - There is no large‑sample 2025–2026 **survey of Israeli importers** openly available that quantifies: - % of firms diversifying origin, - inventory days of supply, - or usage rates of end‑to‑end sourcing platforms. - The above conclusions rest on triangulating OECD/INSS policy work, logistics market commentary, and known structural features of Israel’s economy and trade network. Sources: • The Disruption of Global and National Supply Chains—Aspects and Insights | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai • Israel - Container Port Traffic (TEU: 20 Foot Equivalent Units) - 2026 Data 2027 Forecast 2001-2022 Historical https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/container-port-traffic-teu-20-foot-equivalent-units-wb-data.html?utm_source=openai • Port congestion at Haifa | Live Delays & Vessel Wait Times https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/haifa?utm_source=openai • Israel situation update| Excerpt: “Further to the last developments with the Middle East regional conflict, we would like to update you on the situation in Israel. Despite the escalated security situation in Israel and the area, ZIM HO functions are fully operating and keeping business continuity.” https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1rivwws/israel_situation_update_excerpt_further_to_the/?utm_source=openai • Ashdod (ILASH), Ashdod, Israel - Cogoport https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/knowledge-center/resources/port-info/ashdod-ilash?utm_source=openai • Israel-Hamas war: Impact on https://www.olgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2.Container-News-Israel-Hamas-war-Impact-on-shipping-and-port-operations-potential-risks.pdf?utm_source=openai • Eilat Port remains empty despite end of war - Globes https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai • Eilat Port remains empty despite end of war - Globes https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • Navigating The China-Israel Logistics Corridor: The 2026 Strategic Guide - Vlefooena https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai • Air Cargo Market Analysis January 2026 https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/air-cargo-market-analysis-january-2026/?utm_source=openai • US-Israel Iran war provokes shipping lane shifts | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/us-israel-iran-war-provokes-shipping-lane-shifts?utm_source=openai • Ocean container shipping sees “massive” uncertainty from Iran War | DC Velocity https://www.dcvelocity.com/transportation/maritime-ocean/ocean-container-shipping-sees-massive-uncertainty-from-iran-war?utm_source=openai • January 2026 freight & logistics market update - BF Global Group https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai • Ashdod (ILASH), Ashdod, Israel - Cogoport https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/knowledge-center/resources/port-info/ashdod-ilash?utm_source=openai • Eilat Port remains empty despite end of war - Globes https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • 2026 Houthi strikes on Israel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Houthi_strikes_on_Israel?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • Navigating The China-Israel Logistics Corridor: The 2026 Strategic Guide - Vlefooena https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai • Ocean container shipping sees “massive” uncertainty from Iran War | DC Velocity https://www.dcvelocity.com/transportation/maritime-ocean/ocean-container-shipping-sees-massive-uncertainty-from-iran-war?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • The War in Gaza: Ports, Shipping, and Overseas Trade | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai • Navigating The China-Israel Logistics Corridor: The 2026 Strategic Guide - Vlefooena https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai • Eilat Port remains empty despite end of war - Globes https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-eilat-port-remains-empty-despite-end-of-war-1001531858?utm_source=openai • Israel situation update| Excerpt: “Further to the last developments with the Middle East regional conflict, we would like to update you on the situation in Israel. Despite the escalated security situation in Israel and the area, ZIM HO functions are fully operating and keeping business continuity.” https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1rivwws/israel_situation_update_excerpt_further_to_the/?utm_source=openai • The Disruption of Global and National Supply Chains—Aspects and Insights | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai • OECD Economic Surveys: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • The Disruption of Global and National Supply Chains—Aspects and Insights | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/national-supply-chains/?utm_source=openai • Navigating The China-Israel Logistics Corridor: The 2026 Strategic Guide - Vlefooena https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai • OECD Economic Surveys: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • January 2026 freight & logistics market update - BF Global Group https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai • January 2026 freight & logistics market update - BF Global Group https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai • Navigating The China-Israel Logistics Corridor: The 2026 Strategic Guide - Vlefooena https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai • OECD Economic Surveys: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • January 2026 freight & logistics market update - BF Global Group https://www.bfglogistics.com/news/january-2026-freight-logistics-market-update-2/?utm_source=openai • US-Israel Iran war provokes shipping lane shifts | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/us-israel-iran-war-provokes-shipping-lane-shifts?utm_source=openai • Ocean container shipping sees “massive” uncertainty from Iran War | DC Velocity https://www.dcvelocity.com/transportation/maritime-ocean/ocean-container-shipping-sees-massive-uncertainty-from-iran-war?utm_source=openai • Navigating The China-Israel Logistics Corridor: The 2026 Strategic Guide - Vlefooena https://www.vlefooena.com/navigating-the-china-israel-logistics-corridor-the-2026-strategic-guide/?utm_source=openai