## Company Profile MANNA CARGO LLC is a UAE-based freight forwarder (Managing Director: Bino Thomas). Public contact evidence (mannacargo.com/contact.php) lists it as a forwarder operating out of the UAE. Typical services for firms of this profile in Dubai include sea and air freight forwarding, customs clearance, consolidation/FCL-LCL, door-to-door logistics, and re-export/transshipment handling via Jebel Ali/JAFZA. Scale and client roster were not publicly found in the quick search; assume small-to-mid local forwarder focused on regional trade corridors (GCC–South Asia–Africa). ## Pain Points 1) Rising transport & insurance costs and schedule risk from the Red Sea crisis: MANNA’s customers (food traders, re‑exporters) face higher war‑risk premiums, longer transit times via the Cape, and port congestion — creating tender delays, margin compression, and higher working‑capital needs. 2) Rapidly shifting demand from West Africa and South Asia for rice, wheat, sugar and oils: buyers are price‑sensitive and shifting sourcing/route preferences; MANNA needs faster access to supplier options, consolidated lots, and alternate routing to win tenders. 3) Competitive pressure & operational scale: as Jebel Ali expands (rail terminal, automation, new feeder services), large consolidators and digital trading platforms are capturing margin‑rich re‑export flows; a smaller forwarder must scale origination (customer leads, supplier matching, compliance documents) quickly or risk losing deals to bigger players. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. MARKET EVENTS — UAE TRANSSHIPMENT & RE‑EXPORT (JEBEL ALI) === **Throughput levels & growth (context for 2026)** - DP World handled **93.36 million TEU globally in 2025**, up **5.8% YoY** vs 2024. The Europe–Middle East–Africa region (which includes Jebel Ali) grew **8.3%** to **34.52 million TEU**. Jebel Ali itself handled **15.6 million TEU in 2025**, slightly up from **15.53 million TEU in 2024**, and remains the Middle East’s busiest container port. ([voiceofemirates.com](https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/emirates/2026/01/27/during-2025-5-8-increase-in-container-handling-at-dp-world/?utm_source=openai)) - Dubai government communications describe 2024 as Jebel Ali’s **highest container and breakbulk volumes since 2015**, with volume growth explicitly linked to **new shipping services** and regional demand from Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) - A March 2026 freight‑forwarding guide notes Jebel Ali as the **world’s 9th‑largest container port**, handling “**15+ million TEU each year**,” and emphasizes its role as a **duty‑free re‑export and transshipment hub** via JAFZA. ([deltaglobal.ae](https://deltaglobal.ae/2026/03/12/freight-forwarding-jebel-ali-port/?utm_source=openai)) **Transshipment & re‑export orientation** - Jebel Ali’s model remains heavily transshipment‑driven: regional commentary highlights that **re‑export traffic through Jebel Ali and JAFZA is central to UAE’s role as a gateway to the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia**; >9,500 firms in JAFZA leverage duty‑free re‑export to surrounding markets. ([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/dp-world-2026-port-empire/?utm_source=openai)) - Supply‑chain practitioners in March 2026 describe **Jebel Ali and Salalah as “huge ports used as major transshipping hubs”** for exports (consumer electronics, machinery, autos) onward to **Africa and Central Asia**. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/supplychain/comments/1rpajmb/msc_is_invoking_end_of_voyage_for_all_exports_ex/?utm_source=openai)) **New / intensified services linking Jebel Ali to Africa (relevant to 2026)** - **Jebel Ali–Berbera service (Horn of Africa)**: - DP World launched a **dedicated Jebel Ali–Berbera feeder service** in 2025, running roughly **every 9 days**. The service is positioned to strengthen Berbera (Somaliland) as a regional gateway for **Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa**, with Jebel Ali as the mother‑hub. ([tradearabia.com](https://www.tradearabia.com/News/329355/DP-World-launches-new-Jebel-Ali-Berbera-shipping-route?utm_source=openai)) - **East–Southern Africa connectivity via Jebel Ali** (slightly older but structurally important): Unifeeder/ONE’s MJI service links **Jebel Ali–Mundra–Nhava Sheva–Mombasa–Beira–Maputo**, promoting Jebel Ali as a consolidation hub for **East and Southern Africa** flows. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/u_ITLogisticsNews123/comments/17kjri1?utm_source=openai)) - DP World’s 2024 annual report and 2025–26 commentary emphasize **Africa as one of the fastest‑growing regions**, with **sub‑Saharan container trade up ~6.4% CAGR (2018‑2024), vs ~3.1% globally**, which is driving network and capacity additions, including new intra‑Africa and Middle East–Africa loops, many hubbing on Jebel Ali. ([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/dp-world-2026-port-empire/?utm_source=openai)) **Infrastructure & capacity moves at Jebel Ali (supporting future transshipment growth)** - **Rail terminal launch (March 2026):** - DP World started operations at the **Jebel Ali Rail Terminal** with tariffs effective **1 March 2026**. The facility supports intermodal movements between the port and UAE’s rail network, with a new **Port Receiving/Releasing Charge (PRC)** on containers and bulk/general cargo using the rail terminal. This enhances hinterland connectivity for re‑exports to GCC and inland markets, potentially freeing quay and yard capacity for more transshipment. ([tradingview.com](https://www.tradingview.com/news/reuters.com%2C2026-03-13%3Anewsml_Zaw7wnBK7%3A0-zawya-projects-dp-world-begins-operations-at-jebel-ali-rail-terminal/?utm_source=openai)) - **Ongoing CAPEX and automation:** - Media and investor coverage reports DP World invested **US$3.1bn in CAPEX in 2025** (vs **US$2.2bn in 2024**) to support capacity expansion across its portfolio, including Jebel Ali. ([gulftime.ae](https://gulftime.ae/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GT_MARCH-13-15.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - A February 2026 ports report cites **“record 2025 throughput”** at Jebel Ali and highlights increased **yard and quay automation**, aimed at handling larger mainline vessels and high‑velocity transshipment flows. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/jebel-ali-port-achieves-record-2025-container-throughput-boosts-automation-investment?utm_source=openai)) - **Terminal 2 expansion / new capacity:** - A (recently re‑circulated) DP World Jebel Ali T2 document notes a **400‑m berth expansion** supporting additional capacity for 14k‑TEU‑class ships, explicitly tied to increasing throughput and new services (including for MSC). Though the PDF itself is older, it is referenced in 2026 coverage as part of the port’s cumulative expansion. ([joc.com](https://www.joc.com/sites/default/files/u52092/Jebel_Ali_T2_expansion_opening_En.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Implications & trendline into 2026** - **Volume trend:** modest but positive growth in Jebel Ali TEU volumes (15.53m → 15.6m TEU, +0.5% YoY in 2025), outpacing global container trade’s stagnation/softness, suggests **share gains as a transshipment hub**. ([voiceofemirates.com](https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/emirates/2026/01/27/during-2025-5-8-increase-in-container-handling-at-dp-world/?utm_source=openai)) - **Network role:** new links such as Jebel Ali–Berbera and established Jebel Ali–East/Southern Africa loops strengthen the **hub‑and‑spoke pattern for Africa‑bound cargo**, particularly for consumer goods, construction equipment, and autos. ([tradearabia.com](https://www.tradearabia.com/News/329355/DP-World-launches-new-Jebel-Ali-Berbera-shipping-route?utm_source=openai)) - **Red Sea disruption (see Dimension 2) is diverting some Asia–Africa and Asia–Europe cargo to hub‑and‑spoke routings via the Gulf**, with Jebel Ali functioning as a key pivot point; Dubai media credit **“new shipping services” and demand from the Indian Subcontinent and Africa** as key drivers of the 2024–25 volume lift. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Dimension 1):** ([voiceofemirates.com](https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/emirates/2026/01/27/during-2025-5-8-increase-in-container-handling-at-dp-world/?utm_source=openai)) === 2. PROBLEM FRAMING — RED SEA & GULF OF ADEN SECURITY, IMPACT ON UAE SHIPPERS (2026) === **Security situation (Red Sea / Gulf of Aden, early–mid 2026)** - The **Red Sea crisis that began in late 2023** (Houthi missile/drone attacks on commercial vessels transiting Bab el‑Mandeb) has persisted through 2024–2026, causing a structural rerouting of traffic. ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) - Estimates for 2024 show container traffic through Suez/Red Sea routes **down ~75% vs 2023**, with many carriers continuing to route **via the Cape of Good Hope** as of 2025–26. This detour adds roughly **3,000 nautical miles**, **10–14 days** and **US$1.5–2.5m** per voyage (fuel + time + insurance). ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) **War‑risk insurance premiums & cost impacts** - A Gulf‑based marine insurance briefing notes that in **July 2025**, **war‑risk premiums for Red Sea transits more than doubled**, moving from **~0.3% → ~0.7% of hull value**, with some quotes near **1%** for higher‑risk vessels/ownership profiles. ([orion-group.ae](https://www.orion-group.ae/news/marine-war-risks-2025?utm_source=openai)) - By **March 2026**, a regional insurtech analysis reports **current war‑risk add‑ons at roughly 1.0–1.5% of hull value** for Red Sea transits — equivalent to a **4,900–7,400% increase** from pre‑crisis levels (which were a fraction of 0.03% in some cases). Market consensus is that **elevated war‑risk premiums will persist through 2026**. ([insurtechgulf.com](https://www.insurtechgulf.com/blog/red-sea-war-risk-premiums-houthi-attacks-march-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Macro studies of the disruption suggest that **Red Sea‑linked freight and insurance surcharges contributed a measurable component to global goods inflation in 2024–25**, with **food prices in import‑dependent regions disproportionately affected**. ([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Rerouting patterns & schedule reliability** - Independent route analysis modules estimate that **70–75% of Asia–Europe container vessels** have been rerouting via the **Cape of Good Hope**, with the **10–14‑day extra transit** effectively **removing 15–20% of capacity** from the market. ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) - For **UAE shippers** (exporters using Jebel Ali / Khalifa), implications are twofold: - **Exports to Europe & Mediterranean**: even if loaded in Jebel Ali, many mainline services are now structured **around the Cape**, extending transit times by roughly **7–10 days vs pre‑crisis Suez routings** (less than Asia‑Europe because UAE is geographically closer to the Cape entry point, but still material). - **Exports to Red Sea / East Africa (Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen)**: direct calls are constrained; some services rely on **shuttle feedering from Gulf hubs** under heightened risk controls or route around Africa then back, adding significant time/uncertainty. - Shipping and logistics commentary points out that **schedule reliability has deteriorated**, with delays not just from detours but also from **port congestion and bunching** at alternative bunkering/transshipment points around the Cape and in the Gulf. ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) **Operational and risk‑management responses in the UAE logistics ecosystem** - Dubai’s port and freight‑forwarding materials emphasize that **Jebel Ali maintained “efficient operations” despite the Red Sea crisis**, positioning itself as a **reliable alternative gateway** and staging point for **relay services to Africa and the Middle East**. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) - Market and advisory reports for 2026 note: - Greater **voyage‑specific underwriting scrutiny** (flag, ownership, cargo type, and whether vessel calls at high‑risk ports) for policies covering **Red Sea / Gulf of Aden**. ([orion-group.ae](https://www.orion-group.ae/news/marine-war-risks-2025?utm_source=openai)) - Shippers paying **higher all‑in freight rates** even on routes not directly transiting the Red Sea, because **global vessel supply is tied up on longer round‑voyages**. - Some GCC exporters **front‑loading shipments** or **adjusting Incoterms** to push war‑risk and delay exposure onto buyers. ([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Impact on UAE‑based food and agri shippers (directionally)** - Import‑dependent GCC economies (including UAE) are flagged by Deloitte as **particularly exposed to imported inflation** from **higher freight and insurance premiums** and potential bottlenecks if regional chokepoints (Red Sea, Hormuz) are stressed. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/assets-zone2/middle-east/en/docs/services/consulting/2026/Economic-bulletin-March-26.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For UAE‑origin exports of food (e.g., re‑exported rice, wheat flour, sugar, edible oils) to **East & North Africa**, the combination of: - **War‑risk premiums of 1–1.5% of hull value**, ([insurtechgulf.com](https://www.insurtechgulf.com/blog/red-sea-war-risk-premiums-houthi-attacks-march-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Longer **Cape routings on many Europe / North Africa services**, ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) - and **port/berth congestion at alternative hubs**, is translating into **higher CIF prices and longer delivery windows** — raising working‑capital needs and complicating tender commitments (e.g., for government grain tenders in North/West Africa). **Strategic framing for 2026** - The Red Sea / Gulf of Aden security environment is now treated by insurers and carriers as a **“structural risk factor” rather than a short‑term shock**; pricing and service design for 2026 reflect an assumption of **continued volatility**. ([orion-group.ae](https://www.orion-group.ae/news/marine-war-risks-2025?utm_source=openai)) - For UAE shippers, this means: - **Sustained higher transport/insurance costs** on any routing touching the Red Sea (directly or via freight‑rate contagion). - Continued incentives to **use Jebel Ali as a consolidation and relay hub**, even if mainline legs avoid Suez, because hub‑and‑spoke via the Gulf can partially mitigate risks and exploit DP World’s network (e.g., Berbera, Sokhna, African terminals). ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Dimension 2):** ([orion-group.ae](https://www.orion-group.ae/news/marine-war-risks-2025?utm_source=openai)) === 3. DEMAND SIGNALS — WEST AFRICA & SOUTH ASIA FOOD IMPORT DEMAND 2026 & SOURCING SHIFTS (TOWARD UAE / INDIA /THAILAND) === #### 3.1 West Africa — current food import demand & sourcing shifts **Structural import dependence (pre‑ and post‑shock)** - OECD’s 2025 “Intra‑regional Food Trade in West Africa” report shows that for many ECOWAS members, **import‑to‑domestic‑supply ratios for rice, wheat, sugar and oils are high**, particularly in **Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire** — rice imports in several coastal economies account for **40–60%+ of apparent consumption** on a 2018–20 average basis. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/intra-regional-food-trade-in-west-africa_e58ed22e/3f5fd54a-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - These structural gaps underpin continued **strong import demand in 2025–26**, especially for: - **Rice (parboiled and 25% broken)** - **Wheat and wheat flour** - **Sugar** - **Vegetable oils (palm, soya, sunflower)** **Rice: Africa‑wide demand & supplier competition into 2026** - Ecofin Agency (Sept 2025) reports a **“global flood of rice exports”** meeting African demand, pushing prices lower into 2026. India is projected to export **~25 million tonnes of rice in 2025/26**, retaining its status as the **dominant supplier** to Africa, while Thailand and Vietnam compete more aggressively on price and quality; the article highlights Africa as the **single largest import region** for Asian exporters. ([ecofinagency.com](https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-agriculture/1209-48627-a-global-flood-of-rice-exports-to-meet-africa-s-demand-depressing-prices-into-2026?utm_source=openai)) - A May 2026 African business note (linked via Reddit) reports **new or tightened rice‑import restrictions** in some West African countries to protect domestic production; however, it still characterizes West Africa as **highly dependent on Asian imports**, with policy shifting **where and how rice is imported (e.g., duty structures, licensing, inspection requirements)** rather than eliminating imports. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/AfricanBusinessCircle/comments/1td4dzm/west_africas_rice_trade_routes_tighten_amid_new/?utm_source=openai)) **Thailand’s positioning into West Africa (2025–26)** - Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce set a **2026 rice export target of 7m tonnes** (vs an expected **7.8–8.0m tonnes in 2025**). Officials explicitly name the **Middle East and Africa** as priority markets for maintaining volumes amid stronger competition from India and Vietnam. ([nationthailand.com](https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40060395?utm_source=openai)) - Trade data for **January 2026** show Thai rice exports of **530,287 tonnes**, **17.5% lower YoY**, but West African markets remain significant: key buyers include **South Africa, Angola, Cameroon, Senegal**, alongside Iraq, Malaysia, the US, etc. ([nationthailand.com](https://www.nationthailand.com/business/trade/40062995?utm_source=openai)) - A Thai exporter’s 2026 how‑to guide for African buyers lists **5% parboiled as the “top‑selling grade for West Africa”** and quotes recent FOB benchmarks in the **US$430/mt** range for mainstream grades, with strong interest from **Nigeria and Ghana**. ([tbsricemills.com](https://tbsricemills.com/es/blog/how-to-import-rice-from-thailand-to-africa?utm_source=openai)) **India’s role & policy overhang for West Africa** - India’s export policy has been volatile, but recent OECD/USDA updates show that: - The **14‑month ban on non‑basmati white rice** was lifted on **28 Sept 2024**, with exports allowed subject to a **minimum export price (MEP) of US$490/mt**. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2025_a80ac398-en/full-report/india_a08610a6?utm_source=openai)) - By **2025**, India’s rice exports rose **~19–20% to ~21.5m tonnes**, with **non‑basmati shipments up ~25%**, according to trade reporting — a large share still destined for Africa and West Asia. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/exportersindia/comments/1q8zi19/indias_rice_exports_jump_nearly_20_in_2025_after/?utm_source=openai)) - Policy monitoring notes that **various rice, wheat, and sugar export restrictions and quotas remain tools for domestic price control**; while recent easing has boosted availability, **buyers in West Africa perceive India as a high‑policy‑risk but low‑price supplier** and increasingly diversify part of their procurement to **Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and UAE‑based re‑exporters**. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2025_a80ac398-en/full-report/india_a08610a6?utm_source=openai)) **Signals of sourcing via UAE (re‑export hub effect)** - Dubai media highlight that Jebel Ali supported **large humanitarian and food cargoes to the Middle East and Africa in 2024**, including **45,000 tonnes of bagged wheat flour** and multiple Africa‑bound project cargoes, underscoring its role as a **consolidation platform for cereal and food shipments**. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) - Freight‑forwarding and supply‑chain commentary (2025–26) describe **Jebel Ali and Oman’s Salalah as major re‑export/transshipment hubs** for consumer goods and increasingly for **containerized foodstuffs** into Africa; UAE traders consolidate cargoes (including rice and sugar from India/Thailand) then re‑export under **UAE documents, often in mixed‑commodity containers**. ([deltaglobal.ae](https://deltaglobal.ae/2026/03/12/freight-forwarding-jebel-ali-port/?utm_source=openai)) **Overall West Africa 2026 signal:** - **Demand: structurally high and growing** for rice, wheat, sugar, and oils; OECD/FAO and regional commentary point to **continued import growth** despite nascent protectionist measures. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/intra-regional-food-trade-in-west-africa_e58ed22e/3f5fd54a-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Suppliers:** - **India** remains the volume anchor (especially non‑basmati rice), but with **policy‑risk premium**. - **Thailand & Vietnam** are actively targeting African markets, quoting competitive FOB prices (~US$430/mt for key grades) and seeking to offset losses elsewhere. - **UAE** increasingly operates as a **logistics and trading interface**, not a primary origin, but buyers in West Africa are engaging with **Dubai‑based traders** to secure flexible blends, financing, and shorter‑lead‑time deliveries via Jebel Ali. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) #### 3.2 South Asia — food import demand & sourcing **Bangladesh — rising wheat (and steady rice) imports** - USDA (via Dhaka GAIN report, April 2026): - **Wheat:** Bangladesh’s **wheat imports for MY 2025/26** are estimated at **~7.4 million tonnes**, up sharply vs prior year, driven by strong demand in food, seed, and industrial use. A USDA country note cites a **7.4% upward revision** in the wheat import forecast to “**72 lakh tonnes (7.2m t)**” for the 2025–26 trade year. ([thedailystar.net](https://www.thedailystar.net/business/economy/news/usda-raises-bangladeshs-wheat-import-forecast-4106136?utm_source=openai)) - **Rice:** With domestic production at **~37.4m tonnes**, **rice imports are forecast at ~1.4–1.5m tonnes in MY 2025/26–2026/27**, relatively modest vs domestic output but still a non‑trivial import pull for low‑priced Asian origin. ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Dhaka_Bangladesh_BG2026-0002.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - FAO/market analysis notes that between Nov 2024 and Sept 2025, **retail wheat‑flour prices in Bangladesh were below coarse rice**, incentivizing substitution toward **imported wheat** (from Russia, Ukraine, Canada, India when available). ([graincentral.com](https://www.graincentral.com/markets/bangladeshs-food-grain-imports-surge/?utm_source=openai)) **Pakistan, Sri Lanka and regional patterns** - Broader South Asia food security work shows **import reliance on wheat, pulses, and edible oils** for Pakistan and Sri Lanka continuing in 2025–26, with buyers diversifying between **Black Sea (wheat) and Asian suppliers (rice, sugar, oils)**. Recent Red Sea disruptions add freight/insurance costs, but not enough to reverse structural import needs. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/11/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2024_b4c72370/74da57ed-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Supplier shifts toward India, Thailand and UAE‑based traders** - **India:** - With partial normalization of rice export policies (MEP instead of ban), India’s **rice export volumes have rebounded**; trade sources indicate **~21.5m tonnes in 2025 (+19.4% YoY)**, with **non‑basmati up ~25%**. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2025_a80ac398-en/full-report/india_a08610a6?utm_source=openai)) - For South Asian neighbours (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka), India remains a **key supplier of rice and occasionally wheat**, subject to episodic restrictions. OECD notes export policy as a **major risk factor**: bans/duties on wheat, rice, sugar can be re‑imposed quickly if domestic inflation rises. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2025_a80ac398-en/full-report/india_a08610a6?utm_source=openai)) - **Thailand:** - Thai rice exporters report **softening prices and rising stocks in 2026**, as India and Vietnam undercut Thai offers in price‑sensitive markets, including **South Asia and Africa**. This is pushing Thai exporters to look for **niche segments (higher‑quality jasmine, specialty parboiled grades)** and to improve logistics (including via Gulf‑based consolidation points) to remain competitive. ([commodity-board.com](https://commodity-board.com/thai-rice-market-softening-prices-but-emerging-weather-and-currency-risks/?utm_source=openai)) - **UAE (Dubai / Jebel Ali) as sourcing platform:** - Commodity trade and freight‑forwarding commentary shows **growing use of UAE as a procurement and transshipment hub** for South Asian importers needing **small to mid‑size parcels** or mixed loads (e.g., **rice + sugar + edible oil in the same container**), especially where direct bulk shipments from origins are disrupted or uneconomic. - The same logistics channels used for **Asia–Africa** routes (via Jebel Ali) can be inverted for **re‑exports back into South Asia**, though trade statistics still record origin as India/Thailand/Vietnam; UAE’s value‑add is **financing, inventory buffering, and flexible repack**. ([deltaglobal.ae](https://deltaglobal.ae/2026/03/12/freight-forwarding-jebel-ali-port/?utm_source=openai)) **Price environment (2025–26) supporting demand** - World‑Bank‑linked commodity data (reported in Bangladesh media) indicate **international wheat prices falling ~42%** from US$340.4/mt (2023) to **US$219.6/mt in 2025**, encouraging larger wheat imports into South Asia (Bangladesh in particular). ([thedailystar.net](https://www.thedailystar.net/business/economy/news/usda-raises-bangladeshs-wheat-import-forecast-4106136?utm_source=openai)) - Rice markets into 2026 are described as **oversupplied relative to Africa’s demand**", with prices gradually easing after the 2023–24 spike driven by India’s export bans; this environment is pulling in additional demand from **price‑sensitive African and South Asian buyers**, and increasing competition among **India, Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Myanmar**. ([ecofinagency.com](https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-agriculture/1209-48627-a-global-flood-of-rice-exports-to-meet-africa-s-demand-depressing-prices-into-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Overall South Asia 2026 signal:** - **Demand:** - **Bangladesh** is the clearest growth story, with **wheat imports ~7.2–7.4m t in 2025/26** and rice imports around **1.4–1.5m t**, supported by lower world prices. ([thedailystar.net](https://www.thedailystar.net/business/economy/news/usda-raises-bangladeshs-wheat-import-forecast-4106136?utm_source=openai)) - Other South Asian states remain **structurally import‑dependent** for wheat, pulses, edible oils and some sugar, despite periodic policy interventions. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/11/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2024_b4c72370/74da57ed-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Sourcing shifts:** - **India** has regained share in rice exports after relaxing bans, but remains a **policy‑volatile supplier**. - **Thailand and Vietnam** are defending and in some cases expanding niches by adjusting price and product mix, with a deliberate focus on **Africa and parts of South Asia**. ([nationthailand.com](https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40060395?utm_source=openai)) - **UAE** plays a **growing intermediary role** rather than origin — its **Jebel Ali hub and trading ecosystem** channel Indian/Thai/Vietnamese product toward both **West Africa and South Asia**, with re‑exports attractive where **cargo consolidation, credit terms, or route risk management** matter more than pure FOB cost. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Dimension 3):** ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/intra-regional-food-trade-in-west-africa_e58ed22e/3f5fd54a-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • During 2025.. 5.8% increase in container handling at «DP World" https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/emirates/2026/01/27/during-2025-5-8-increase-in-container-handling-at-dp-world/?utm_source=openai • DP World records highest cargo volumes at Jebel Ali Port since 2015 https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai • Freight Forwarding at Jebel Ali Port | FCL Export & Customs | Delta Global https://deltaglobal.ae/2026/03/12/freight-forwarding-jebel-ali-port/?utm_source=openai • DP World 2026: Inside the Global Port Empire — The Middle East Insider https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/dp-world-2026-port-empire/?utm_source=openai • MSC is invoking end of voyage for all exports ex Arabian and Persian gulf area https://www.reddit.com/r/supplychain/comments/1rpajmb/msc_is_invoking_end_of_voyage_for_all_exports_ex/?utm_source=openai • DP World launches new Jebel Ali-Berbera shipping route https://www.tradearabia.com/News/329355/DP-World-launches-new-Jebel-Ali-Berbera-shipping-route?utm_source=openai • DP World welcomes weekly MJI service in Nhava Sheva https://www.reddit.com/r/u_ITLogisticsNews123/comments/17kjri1?utm_source=openai • DP World 2026: Inside the Global Port Empire — The Middle East Insider https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/dp-world-2026-port-empire/?utm_source=openai • ZAWYA: DP World begins operations at Jebel Ali Rail Terminal — TradingView News https://www.tradingview.com/news/reuters.com%2C2026-03-13%3Anewsml_Zaw7wnBK7%3A0-zawya-projects-dp-world-begins-operations-at-jebel-ali-rail-terminal/?utm_source=openai • www.gulftime.ae https://gulftime.ae/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GT_MARCH-13-15.pdf?utm_source=openai • Jebel Ali Port Achieves Record 2025 Container Throughput, Boosts Automation Investment - Ports Directory https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/jebel-ali-port-achieves-record-2025-container-throughput-boosts-automation-investment?utm_source=openai • JEBEL ALI LAUNCHES NEW CAPACITY https://www.joc.com/sites/default/files/u52092/Jebel_Ali_T2_expansion_opening_En.pdf?utm_source=openai • During 2025.. 5.8% increase in container handling at «DP World" https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/emirates/2026/01/27/during-2025-5-8-increase-in-container-handling-at-dp-world/?utm_source=openai • DP World launches new Jebel Ali-Berbera shipping route https://www.tradearabia.com/News/329355/DP-World-launches-new-Jebel-Ali-Berbera-shipping-route?utm_source=openai • DP World records highest cargo volumes at Jebel Ali Port since 2015 https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai