Research Intel
Hook Candidates
1) Red-Sea rerouting & longer Asia–Med transit times are increasing freight, bunker and war-risk surcharges and forcing many small growers/exporters to consolidate and seek reliable block-space or multimodal alternatives. Pitch angle: TFC can introduce its agri-export clients to Tridge Ark as a turnkey buyer-sourcing + logistics orchestration channel that secures sales and guaranteed block-space, reducing exposure to volatile spot rates and in-transit quality risk.
2) Rising SPS/documentation complexity (ePhyto rollout, stricter EU MRL/SPS checks) and increased inspection/dwell time are squeezing small forwarders’ margins and delaying shipments. Pitch angle: TFC can package Tridge Ark’s end-to-end export orchestration (compliance workflows, pre-cool/packhouse coordination, and automated document matching) as a value-added service for growers—enabling TFC to win and retain higher-margin agricultural clients without building in-house compliance teams.
## Company Profile
TFC-TOAM FORWARDING AND CUSTOMS CLEARANCE LTD is an Israel-based freight forwarder and customs-clearance service provider (listed in FIATA’s Israel directory). Public company-specific data is scarce; contact is Marcelle Noussimovitch (Manager). As an Israeli forwarder it likely handles ocean and air shipments via Ashdod/Haifa and Ben Gurion, and provides customs clearance, phytosanitary/documentation support and local consolidation for exporters and importers. The firm appears to be a small-to-mid sized local forwarder focused on serving agricultural exporters and general cargo clients, rather than a large multinational 3PL (no corporate website was available in the record).
## Pain Points
1) Volatile ocean and air rates plus war-risk and rerouting surcharges make it hard for a small forwarder to promise reliable, margin-protecting prices to agri-export clients—blocking growth and encouraging clients to seek larger 3PLs or direct-booking platforms.
2) Increased SPS and documentation burdens (ePhyto, MRL checks, destination-specific phytosanitary rules) create administrative overhead, longer dwell times and higher rejection risk for small forwarders lacking compliance teams.
3) Small growers and exporters are consolidating (fewer, higher-value reefer loads) and need coordinated pre-cooling/packhouse/consolidation + guaranteed block-space; TFC may lack the buyer-sourcing and global market access to offer end-to-end sales-to-shipment solutions on its own.
## Intel Summary
=== MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH ===
=== 1. [MARKET EVENTS] 6 ISRAEL TRADE FLOWS, CORRIDORS & RED SEA/SUEZ DISRUPTION IMPACT (2024 62026) ===
• Container throughput and port mix
- Israels ports handled a record 3.445 million TEU in the last reported year (2025 data), up about 12.6% vs 2024, despite Red Sea tensions and the Gaza/Iron Swords war.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- Within this, Ashdod handled ~1.248 million TEU; Haifa ~676,000 TEU. Private terminals Haifa Bay (SIPG) and HCT together captured about 50% of the national container market.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- Ashdod is currently Israels largest container port; Lloyds List reports 2024 Ashdod throughput at 1.848 million TEU, up 15.7% from 1.597 million TEU in 2023, putting it back into the global top 100 ports.([lloydslist.com](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154199/99-Ashdod-Israel?utm_source=openai))
• Collapse of Eilat / Red Sea access
- Eilat historically handled ~5 67% of Israeli seaborne trade, focused on cars and some bulk from Asia without using Suez.([irishtimes.com](https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2025/07/20/israels-red-sea-port-of-eilat-halts-operations-due-to-yemeni-houthi-blockade/?utm_source=openai))
- Houthi attacks in the Red Sea starting late 2023 drove an 85% fall in Eilat shipping by December 2023; by March 2024 about half the ports staff were laid off.([irishtimes.com](https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2025/07/20/israels-red-sea-port-of-eilat-halts-operations-due-to-yemeni-houthi-blockade/?utm_source=openai))
- In 2024 the Red Sea route closure caused Eilats revenues to collapse from NIS 212m (2023) to just NIS 42m ( 680%); by January 2026 Eilats container throughput was effectively zero and policymakers were debating forced diversion of some vehicle imports or direct subsidies to keep it alive.([en.globes.co.il](https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1001531858?utm_source=openai))
• Israels exposure to Asia/Red Sea trade
- Bank of Israel analysis finds that only about US$3.4 6billion of goods 6roughly 5% of Israels total goods exportsare shipped by sea to Asia & Oceania, limiting direct export exposure to the Red Sea corridor; import exposure from Asia is larger and more affected.([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception/?utm_source=openai))
- Globally, about 22% of world maritime container traffic by weight transits Suez; during peak Houthi attacks container shipping via the Red Sea dropped ~90% from Dec 6mid 2Feb, with most services rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope.([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception/?utm_source=openai))
• Main 2024 62026 trade corridors and rerouting patterns
- Pre 1crisis, Israels main corridors were:
- Asia (China, India, SE Asia) via Red Sea/Suez to Eilat & Med ports,
- Europe via Med direct services to Haifa/Ashdod,
- North America via Med transhipment (e.g., Piraeus, Algeciras).
- Since late 2023:
- Asia 6Israel services increasingly sail Asia 6Cape of Good Hope 6Med adding 10 614 days vs normal Suez routing, higher bunker consumption, and more volatile schedules.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/picture-this-houthi-renew-attacks-shipping-routes?utm_source=openai))
- Most Asian container traffic that previously touched Eilat has been diverted to Ashdod, Haifa Port, and the new Haifa Bay terminal. Ashdod reported a surge in vehicle imports (125k units in 2024 vs 114k in 2023) explicitly following the cessation of activity at Eilat Port.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Ashdod-Port/Ashdod-Port-Reports-Net-Profit-of-168-Million-Shekels-for-2024/?utm_source=openai))
• Capacity vs demand at Mediterranean ports
- Total container capacity across Israels Med terminals (two Ashdod terminals, legacy Haifa, and Haifa Bay) is now estimated at ~5 6million TEU, versus ~3 6million TEU of actual activity; this over 6capacity is expected to sustain intense price and service competition among terminals.([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/port-haifa-3-years/?utm_source=openai))
- 2025 data show >1,100 merchant vessels (tankers, bulk, container, general cargo) called at Israeli ports despite continued security tensions, indicating lines have broadly maintained connectivity using rerouted services.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/picture-this-houthi-renew-attacks-shipping-routes?utm_source=openai))
• Macro trade and balance impacts
- Israels goods trade deficit increased 8.1% in 2024 according to CBS, reflecting higher import costs and weaker export values; Red Sea rerouting, Turkeys 2024 decision to cease trade with Israel, and warrelated demand shocks all contributed.([veritas.co.il](https://www.veritas.co.il/article/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%98%D7%A1/%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%B4%D7%A1-%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-8-1-%D7%91%D7%92%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%97%D7%A8-%D7%91-%D7%AA%D7%A6%D7%A8-16-01-2025/?utm_source=openai))
- Shipping cost increases from Asia to Israel in 2024 625 are often in the range of US$2,000 63,000 extra per 40 container vs pre 6crisis baselines, based on Israeli and global freight commentary; some sources cite 2024 Asia 6Med spot rates rising from roughly US$4,000 65,000 up to US$6,000 67,500 at peaks (directional, not Israelspecific).([unitedxp.co.il](https://www.unitedxp.co.il/global-trade-route-shifts-following-the-red-sea-blockages/?utm_source=openai))
• Air cargo / modal shift
- Ben Gurion Airport handled 380,780tons of air cargo in 2025, up 9.5% vs 2024. Cargo on foreign airlines passenger flights rose 7.6%, to ~102,000tons, as more carriers returned. This reflects some substitution from sea to air for high 6value and time 6sensitive goods amid maritime disruptions.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Air-Transport/Airports/Ben-Gurion-Airport-9-5-Increase-in-Cargo-Activity-in-2025/?utm_source=openai))
Sources for this section: ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
=== 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] 6 ISRAEL REEFER EXPORTS, FRESH PRODUCE & CONSOLIDATION DEMAND (TOWARD 2026) ===
• Structure of Israels fresh & frozen export basket
- Agriculture is a relatively small share of Israels total exports but dominant within food exports; fruit (citrus + non 6citrus) and dates are key reefer commodities.
- World Bank/UN Comtrade data show Israel exported ~60,555tons of dates (HS 080410) in 2024 with a value of about US$313million (average unit value
• Citrus exports and shipping challenges
- Planet Israel (a leading citrus exporter) reported that in the 2023/24 citrus season export volumes were ~35% lower, at ~78,000tons vs about 120,000tons in the comparable period of the prior season (to week 14 of 2024). Causes: labor shortages due to the Gaza war, lower yields, and market/price pressure in the EU.([federcitrus.org](https://www.federcitrus.org/betsalel-ohana-de-planet-israel-los-volumenes-de-exportacion-de-citricos-israelies-son-alrededor-de-un-35-mas-bajos-esta-temporada/?utm_source=openai))
- Trade press in late 2024 notes that the 2024 citrus season started positively but there are strong concerns that extended routes around Africa (skipping Suez/Red Sea) could damage fruit quality and raise reefer costs, especially to East markets (Asia, Gulf).([foodbusinessmea.com](https://www.foodbusinessmea.com/israel-faces-challenges-in-citrus-fruit-exports-to-east-markets/?utm_source=openai))
- A fresh USDA FAS Citrus Annual (April 2026, MY 2024/25) projects citrus planted area at ~3,860ha and discusses continued pressure in EU orange markets and exporters efforts to reposition volumes and varieties.([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Citrus+Annual_Tel+Aviv_Israel_IS2024-0011.pdf&utm_source=openai))
• Other key fresh 6produce export flows (indirect demand signal for reefers)
- Export mix has been shifting away from citrus toward higher 6value fresh fruit (avocado, exotics) and dates. The 2024 Agriculture Ministry data cited in Ynet show:
- Citrus exports down by ~33% 2023 62024.
- Other fruit exports (non 6citrus, led by avocado) up by roughly one 6third over the same period.([ynetnews.com](https://www.ynetnews.com/business/article/skzx8mhxbl?utm_source=openai))
• Dairy and frozen categories
- Official statistics distinguish dairy and frozen prepared foods but up 1todate, productlevel reefer tonnages by category are not yet published for 2025/26. Directionally:
- Israel remains a net importer in several dairy segments (cheeses, milk powders) but has niche exports (e.g., specialty cheeses, ice cream) mainly to nearby EU markets; these mostly move in refrigerated trucks/short 6sea units rather than deep 6sea reefer containers.
- Frozen vegetables and processed foods (frozen potato products, readymeals, kosher frozen lines) are usually shipped as FCL reefers to North America and Europe; available trade data point to steady to mildly growing value exports, but with volumes constrained by logistics costs and security premiums since late 2023. (This is an inference based on broader food export trends rather than explicit 2026 forecasts.)
• Quantitative reefer container signals
- Direct HS 6coded reefer container statistics for Israel are sparse; generic B2B directories that list reefer container exports from Israel record only a handful of equipment 6type shipments and are not representative of total reefer cargo trade. (Per your sourcing rule, these AI 2summaries are lowreliability for product volumes and are not used to quantify food cargo.)([volza.com](https://www.volza.com/p/reefer-container/export/export-from-israel/?utm_source=openai))
- However, combining cargo structure with air 6freight and seaport data suggests:
- A large share of horticultural exports (avocado, citrus, mango, pomegranate, vegetables) continues to move in 40 high 6cube reefers via Ashdod/Haifa to EU and UK, with smaller flows to North America, Russia/Eurasia, and Gulf markets.
- Some high 6value perishables (fresh herbs, cherries, berries, premium vegetables) increasingly move via air through Ben Gurion; the 9.5% rise in total air cargo in 2025, following a maritime disruption year, points to incremental reefer/temperature 6sensitive demand being absorbed by airfreight.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Air-Transport/Airports/Ben-Gurion-Airport-9-5-Increase-in-Cargo-Activity-in-2025/?utm_source=openai))
• Demand for packing, pre 6cooling & consolidation services
- Drivers of consolidation demand toward 2026:
- Fragmentation of the grower base: many small and mid 6size farms lack scale for direct FCL loading and rely on cooperative packing houses and third 6party export service providers.
- Extended transit times around the Cape of Good Hope require tighter cold 6chain control (pre 6cooling, atmosphere 6controlled packing, better insulation) to maintain quality, raising the value of professional pack houses and reefer 6specialist forwarders.([foodbusinessmea.com](https://www.foodbusinessmea.com/israel-faces-challenges-in-citrus-fruit-exports-to-east-markets/?utm_source=openai))
- EU remains the dominant destination under the IsraelEU Association Agreement, which provides tariff preferences; this encourages continued fresh 6produce export programs, but with stricter SPS and MRL standards that small growers typically meet via integrated exporters/packers.([embassies.gov.il](https://embassies.gov.il/nato/en/the-mission/departments/agricultural-affairs?utm_source=openai))
- Practical implications for 2026:
- Consolidation centers located near major production clusters (e.g., in the coastal plain and northern valleys) that can offer:
should see growing demand as individual growers and small exporters struggle with freight volatility and documentation complexity.
- The downsizing of citrus volumes ( 635% in some seasons) but growth in higher 6value fruit implies fewer, but higher 6revenue, reefer loads, with more emphasis on service quality and flexibility rather than pure volume.([federcitrus.org](https://www.federcitrus.org/betsalel-ohana-de-planet-israel-los-volumenes-de-exportacion-de-citricos-israelies-son-alrededor-de-un-35-mas-bajos-esta-temporada/?utm_source=openai))
Sources for this section: ([wits.worldbank.org](https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/ISR/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ALL/product/080410?utm_source=openai))
=== 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] 6 ISRAEL FREIGHT FORWARDING, RATES, CAPACITY & REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2024 62026) ===
• Ocean freight rates & capacity for Israel
- Red Sea disruptions and the Gaza/Iron Swords war have turned Israel into a 6risk 6adjusted destination:
- A 2024 analysis of global trade route shifts notes that container traffic on the Asia 6Europe/Med corridor dropped >25% in 2024; shippers rerouting around the Cape saw sharp increases in transit time and fuel costs. Average freight on key east 6west corridors in 2024 rose from about US$4,000 65,000/FEU to US$6,000 67,500 at peaks.([unitedxp.co.il](https://www.unitedxp.co.il/global-trade-route-shifts-following-the-red-sea-blockages/?utm_source=openai))
- Israeli importers and exporters pay additional war 6risk and security surcharges; some lines briefly stopped direct calls to Israel in late 2023 but by 2025 over 1,100 merchant vessels had called, indicating capacity has returned, albeit at higher price points.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/picture-this-houthi-renew-attacks-shipping-routes?utm_source=openai))
- Capacity picture:
- Nominal Med port capacity (~5 6million TEU) exceeds actual throughput (~3 6million TEU in 2025), so at the port/terminal level there is no structural capacity shortage.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- The effective constraint is on 6 risk 6willing carrier capacity and schedule reliability, particularly on Asia 6Israel loops and any services touching the eastern Med near conflict zones.
• Airfreight demand and pricing
- Sea disruption and occasional security incidents (e.g., 2025 Houthi missile attack near Ben Gurion) increase demand for airfreight, especially for high 6value electronics, pharma, and perishables.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Houthi_attack_on_Tel_Aviv_airport?utm_source=openai))
- 2025 cargo throughput at Ben Gurion was up 9.5% to ~381k tons; with more foreign carriers returning, belly 6capacity has grown, tempering 6but not eliminating 6rate inflation.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Air-Transport/Airports/Ben-Gurion-Airport-9-5-Increase-in-Cargo-Activity-in-2025/?utm_source=openai))
- Forwarders report strong Q on Q volatility: spot air rates spike in periods of heightened regional tension or when ocean carriers temporarily omit Israeli calls. (This is an inference based on the traffic and risk data; direct tariff curves are not published openly.)
• Small and mid 6sized forwarder challenges
- A 2024 625 Israeli logistics commentary on Red Sea blockages highlights:
- Small importers relying on LCL were hit hardest because fixed costs and surcharges spread over small volumes; similar dynamics apply to small forwarders that lack volume contracts with shipping lines.([unitedxp.co.il](https://www.unitedxp.co.il/global-trade-route-shifts-following-the-red-sea-blockages/?utm_source=openai))
- War 6risk premiums, congestion at alternative hubs (e.g., South Africa) and extended sailing times raised working capital needs (higher in 6transit inventory) which smaller players struggle to finance.([unitedxp.co.il](https://www.unitedxp.co.il/global-trade-route-shifts-following-the-red-sea-blockages/?utm_source=openai))
- At the same time, Israels port sector is now highly competitive: multiple terminals chase the same container volume, which encourages shipping lines to negotiate directly and bundle services. This tends to favor large, integrated forwarders and carriers over small, independent forwarders who have less negotiating leverage on rates and space.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- Turkeys 2024 decision to cease all trade with Israel removed a key regional hub and cross 6dock route for small forwarders that used Turkish ports or trucking as gateways, forcing them to re 6engineer routings via Greece/Cyprus or direct Med calls.([dsv.com](https://www.dsv.com/en-gb/insights/global-sea-freight/update-mei-2024?utm_source=openai))
• Customs clearance & documentation complexity
- Tighter security and SPS oversight since October 2023 have increased documentation and inspection intensity:
- The Plant Protection and Inspection Services (PPIS) of the Ministry of Agriculture has rolled out the ePhyto electronic phytosanitary certificate system for plant and plant 6product trade. Exporters and importers must obtain, manage, and match these digital certificates with shipments, which can be administratively heavy for small forwarders without in 6house compliance teams.([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/en/service/electronic-health-certificates?utm_source=openai))
- Israels WTO quantitative 6restrictions notification lists plant 6export supervision under the Law for the Supervision of Export of Plants and Their Products (1954), administered by PPIS and the Foreign Trade Center 6meaning that any plant 6exporting forwarder must align with these statutory export controls.([qr.wto.org](https://qr.wto.org/en/qrs/8616?utm_source=openai))
- Import clearance for plants and plant products requires: advance import permits, valid phytosanitary certificates or certificates of origin per internal regulations, physical inspection at the port, and release authorisation before customs clearance 6steps that increase dwell time and cost if documentation is incomplete.([portal.psc.ps](https://www.portal.psc.ps/en/import/94.html?utm_source=openai))
• Phytosanitary and SPS 6related issues for fresh 6produce forwarders
- For exports to the EU and other high 6standard markets, forwarders must coordinate:
- phytosanitary inspections and certificates aligned with each destinations pest lists,
- residue (MRL) compliance, often one sample per consignment per export certificate as per Israels general MRL monitoring policy,
- organic certification where relevant, with PPIS responsible for verifying compliance if the Israeli organic seal is used.([nwhort.org](https://nwhort.org/export-manual/countries-toc/israel/?utm_source=openai))
- These SPS and documentation requirements create entry barriers for small forwarders trying to specialise in agricultural exports; many are forced to subcontract regulatory handling to niche brokers or larger forwarders, compressing their margins.
• Rate and margin pressures toward 2026
- With port over 6capacity and intensifying terminal competition, base handling tariffs are under downward pressure, but security, war 6risk, and rerouting costs keep ocean freight rate floors higher than pre 2020 norms. This compresses forwarder margins unless they can add value in:
- complex SPS/customs handling,
- cold 6chain management and quality assurance,
- multimodal routing (e.g., combining air/sea or using alternative Med hubs).([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- Small forwarders in particular face:
- higher credit and collateral requirements from shipping lines and insurers,
- difficulty accessing long 6term rate contracts or guaranteed capacity on key Asia 6Israel lanes,
- risk that customers bypass them for direct booking platforms or large 3PLs. (These points synthesize market 6structure data and are consistent with the documented shift toward larger players in times of geopolitical stress.)
Sources for this section: ([unitedxp.co.il](https://www.unitedxp.co.il/global-trade-route-shifts-following-the-red-sea-blockages/?utm_source=openai))
Sources:
• Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai
• Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai
• 99 Ashdod (Israel) :: Lloyd's List
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154199/99-Ashdod-Israel?utm_source=openai
• Israels Red Sea port of Eilat halts operations due to Yemeni-Houthi blockade 6 The Irish Times
https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2025/07/20/israels-red-sea-port-of-eilat-halts-operations-due-to-yemeni-houthi-blockade/?utm_source=openai
• Israels Red Sea port of Eilat halts operations due to Yemeni-Houthi blockade 6 The Irish Times
https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2025/07/20/israels-red-sea-port-of-eilat-halts-operations-due-to-yemeni-houthi-blockade/?utm_source=openai
• Eilat Port remains empty despite end of war - Globes
https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1001531858?utm_source=openai
• The Impact of Houthi Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception? | בנק ישראל - הבנק המרכזי של ישראל
https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception/?utm_source=openai
• The Impact of Houthi Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception? | בנק ישראל - הבנק המרכזי של ישראל
https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception/?utm_source=openai
• Picture This: Houthis Renew Vessel Attacks, Making Shipping Route Changes Unlikely | S&P Global
https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/picture-this-houthi-renew-attacks-shipping-routes?utm_source=openai
• Ashdod Port Reports Net Profit of 168 Million Shekels for 2024
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Ashdod-Port/Ashdod-Port-Reports-Net-Profit-Of-168-Million-Shekels-For-2024/?utm_source=openai
• Three Years of the Bay Port: A Status Report | INSS
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/port-haifa-3-years/?utm_source=openai
• Picture This: Houthis Renew Vessel Attacks, Making Shipping Route Changes Unlikely | S&P Global
https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/picture-this-houthi-renew-attacks-shipping-routes?utm_source=openai
•