## Company Profile SCHENKER ARKAS NAKLIYAT VE TIC. A.S. — Turkish freight forwarder and project‑logistics specialist (DB Schenker/Arkas network). Offers sea, air, road, rail forwarding, heavy‑lift and project cargo handling, customs brokerage and industry solutions for large EPC, manufacturing and trade customers. Head of Global Projects & Industry Solutions (Umut Yüksel) indicates a focus on large industrial and renewable projects. Operates across Turkey’s main ports and inland corridors and is positioned to serve EU, MENA, Africa and Central Asia flows. ## Pain Points ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] === Turkey 2026 export/import flow shifts; container & project cargo volumes to EU, MENA, Africa, Central Asia; effects of Black Sea & Red Sea disruptions **1.1 Macro trade and routing shifts (2025–2026 context for 2026 planning)** - EU remains Turkey’s largest trade partner, taking roughly 40–41% of exports and supplying ~25–27% of imports as of 2023–24, with no structural reversal reported in early‑2026; but the *composition* is shifting more toward machinery, vehicles, renewable‑energy equipment and away from some traditional low‑value textiles/consumer goods (CBAM and EU Green Deal pressures). ([tuiosb.org.tr](https://tuiosb.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Balta_Lara_CBAM_Turkiye_Trade_Exposure_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Policy documents for 2025–2027 emphasize deepening EU customs‑union integration while building alternative corridors to the Caucasus, Central Asia and Iraq to hedge against Black Sea / Red Sea risks. ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) **1.2 Container & general cargo flows – EU vs MENA/Africa/Central Asia** (Recent public data are directional; concrete TEU numbers by corridor for 2026 are not yet published, but 2025–early‑2026 policy and investment signals are clear.) - **EU‑bound containers:** - Turkey is pushing rail/ro‑ro capacity via the *“green energy corridor” Azerbaijan–Georgia–Nakhchivan–Europe* to move both electricity and high‑value manufactured goods toward the EU, explicitly framed as a diversification away from congested Black Sea and Red Sea exposure. ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) - The government projects a record year for renewable‑capacity build in 2026 (over 8 GW new capacity), which will raise two‑way flows of project components (turbines, blades, towers, PV modules, transformers) between Turkey and the EU. ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) - **MENA & Africa trade corridors:** - Turkey’s energy minister highlighted plans to “boost power exports to Syria and Iraq,” implying incremental cross‑border electricity and equipment trade southward, complementing existing construction and defense exports into MENA. ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) - Red Sea disruption (see 1.4) has pushed part of east‑west container flows to longer Cape routes and alternative land‑sea combos via Turkey; this is raising demand for Turkish ports as **relay and consolidation hubs** for MENA and East Africa, though exact TEU rerouted is not yet quantified in official statistics. This is inferred from insurer and shipper commentary on diversions and from Turkey’s own push to market itself as a “logistics superpower” in the 12th Development Plan and 2025–27 programs. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Central Asia & Caucasus:** - Corridor strategies explicitly prioritize *Trans‑Caspian / Middle Corridor* routes through Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan–Caspian–Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan to move containers and bulk commodities between Europe and Central Asia/China, as an alternative to Russia‑transiting routes affected by sanctions and Black Sea risk. 2025–26 national planning documents frame this as a growth area, especially for rail‑borne containerized and project cargo (machinery, rolling stock, energy equipment). ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **1.3 Black Sea grain disruptions – impact on Turkish corridors** - The UN‑Turkey‑brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative collapsed in mid‑2023, with Ukraine later operating a unilateral corridor to and from Odesa/Chornomorsk using a coastal route and Danube/Sulina–Constanta alternatives. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Grain_Initiative?utm_source=openai)) - Since then, **EU “solidarity corridors”** (rail, road, inland waterway) have carried roughly **60% of Ukrainian grain exports**, with the balance via the remaining Black Sea ports. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Grain_Initiative?utm_source=openai)) - For Turkey: - Loss of predictable Ukrainian grain flows through the Istanbul‑controlled corridor has reduced transshipment and inspection‑related port activity, but Turkey has compensated partially through **higher use of Danube–Constanta–Marmara routings** and increased imports/through‑transit of Russian and other Black Sea grain. - Policy focus has shifted to: - Developing *alternative agri‑export routes* via overland links to EU and MENA. - Reinforcing Turkey’s own cereal export capacity when harvests allow (e.g., flour, pasta, processed foods), supported by renewed investments in milling and food processing noted in economic reform documents. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **1.4 Red Sea security issues & insurance – implications for Turkey in 2026** - Ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea / Bab el‑Mandeb since late‑2023 have led major carriers to divert Asia–Europe strings around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing **voyage lengths up by 30–50% and freight plus war‑risk premiums sharply higher** on affected lanes. (Exact current premium % varies by insurer and risk category.) - For Turkey’s trade and corridors in 2025–26: - **Asia–Turkey container flows** that would normally route via Suez are partially: - Re‑routed via longer Cape services directly to Mediterranean ports including Turkish hubs; - Or shifted onto **intermodal rail via the Middle Corridor** and Russia‑bypassing Eurasian routes, which increases the strategic importance of Turkey as a **land bridge and consolidation node**. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Project cargo for Turkey‑bound renewable and industrial projects (turbines, large transformers, plant equipment) from East Asia is seeing **higher CIF pricing** and longer lead times into Turkish ports, spurring some *near‑shoring* and local manufacturing moves (e.g., Enercon and Nordex investments – see Dimension 2). ([turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/05/14/enercon-to-build-e50-million-wind-turbine-blade-factory-in-western-turkey/?utm_source=openai)) **1.5 Implications for 2026 container & project cargo volumes by region (directional)** - **EU:** Expect *continued growth* in two‑way container flows, with a notable uptick in higher‑value machinery, vehicle parts, and renewable‑energy hardware linked to the 2035 renewable roadmap and CBAM‑driven investments. - **MENA & Africa:** Directionally increasing project and break‑bulk flows (power, construction, defense, transport infrastructure) via Turkish contractors, with Turkey leveraging its ports for relay cargo as Red Sea risk persists. - **Central Asia:** Rising volumes on intermodal and rail corridors through Turkey as sanctions and security risks constrain Black Sea/Russian options; much of this will be non‑containerized project cargo (rail, mining, energy) plus growing containerized trade. *(Current public sources stop short of giving quantified 2026 TEU forecasts by corridor; they instead provide policy and investment indicators. Any volume percentages or TEU forecasts used in internal work will necessarily rely on proprietary port/carrier data.)* **Sources – Dimension 1:** ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] === 2026 Turkish manufacturing & construction project cargo demand; renewable EPC (wind/solar) equipment imports; project logistics trends **2.1 Headline: 2026 is positioned as a record year for renewables and related project logistics** - The energy minister publicly targets **>8 GW of new renewable capacity in 2026**, including about **6 GW solar and nearly 2 GW wind**, described as a *record year* for capacity additions. ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 review of Turkey’s electricity system by Ember and others, cited in multiple industry pieces, notes that Turkey aims to deploy **around 8 GW/year of new wind + solar** to reach a combined **120 GW of wind & solar capacity by 2035**, up from just over 40 GW in early‑2026. ([enerdata.net](https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/turkiye-aim-increase-solar-and-wind-capacity-120-gw-2035.html?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for project cargo:** sustained multi‑GW annual build implies **thousands of MW per year of imported turbines, blades, towers, PV modules, inverters, transformers, cables**, moving mainly through Izmir, Mersin, Iskenderun, Tekirdag, Aliaga and other heavy‑lift capable ports. --- **2.2 Wind power – manufacturing base & imports (2026–2035 pipeline)** - TÜREB’s January 2026 statistics show installed wind capacity at **15,934 MW**, up **15.5% vs previous year**, underlining 2025 as the strongest year on record (2,141 MW added). ([turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/05/14/enercon-to-build-e50-million-wind-turbine-blade-factory-in-western-turkey/?utm_source=openai)) - GWEC’s 2026 Global Wind Report highlights Turkey as a **top Mediterranean wind market** with an expanding manufacturing base, and a significant **project pipeline of storage‑linked wind capacity around 19 GW**. ([ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr](https://www.ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr/en/turkiyes-wind-energy-capacity-approaches-16-gw/?utm_source=openai)) - Recent manufacturing and investment news: - **Enercon** announced a **€50 million wind turbine blade factory** in western Turkey in May 2026 to supply the E‑175 EP5 platform, deepening local industrial content and reducing imported blade volumes after 2027. ([turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/05/14/enercon-to-build-e50-million-wind-turbine-blade-factory-in-western-turkey/?utm_source=openai)) - **Nordex** has secured **750 MW of wind orders** in Turkey for 2026–27 projects and partnered with Enerjisa Üretim to produce 108 turbines locally, pointing to sizeable **tower, nacelle, and component shipments** into Turkey through 2026 as the supply chain ramps up. ([windinsider.com](https://windinsider.com/2025/04/02/nordex-group-secures-750-mw-wind-energy-orders-in-turkey-for-2026-2027-projects/?utm_source=openai)) **Project‑cargo characteristics:** - Continued **large‑component imports in 2026–27** (blades, generators, gearboxes) even as local capacity expands. - Growth in **outbound project cargo** (export of towers, nacelles, blades) into the broader region (EU, MENA, Balkans) as Turkey consolidates its rank as Europe’s 5th largest wind equipment manufacturer. ([ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr](https://www.ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr/en/turkiyes-wind-energy-capacity-approaches-16-gw/?utm_source=openai)) --- **2.3 Solar PV – EPC pipeline, manufacturing and imports** - Solar power capacity reached almost **25 GW by 2025**, generating about **6%** of Turkey’s electricity, with the vast majority (around **22 GW**) in commercial & industrial (C&I) systems rather than residential or utility‑scale projects. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_power_in_Turkey?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 market brief describes Turkey as **“one of the most active and accessible” solar EPC markets in the region**, with: - Strong growth in **unlicensed industrial rooftop and on‑site systems** in organized industrial zones (OSBs) around Izmir, Mersin, Adana, Bursa etc. - Continuing YEKA and YEKDEM‑backed utility‑scale pipeline, though more lumpy. ([surgepv.com](https://www.surgepv.com/blog/solar-energy-turkey-2026?utm_source=openai)) - The revised 2035 Renewable Roadmap (Oct 2024) plus 2025–27 macro programs envision **sustained multi‑GW PV additions per year**, driving ongoing imports of: modules (where domestic prices remain above EU‑competitive levels), inverters, mounting systems, trackers, transformers, and medium‑voltage switchgear. ([surgepv.com](https://www.surgepv.com/blog/solar-energy-turkey-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Major upstream manufacturing project: **Elin Energy’s $400m, 5‑GW solar‑cell plant in Sivas**, aiming to start mass production in **Q4 2026** and to cover “nearly 70%” of Turkey’s cell imports once fully online, with a strong export orientation toward the US. ([energytrend.com](https://www.energytrend.com/news/20250519-49634.html?utm_source=openai)) **Project‑cargo implications for 2026:** - Inbound heavy and high‑value cargo for the Sivas cell plant (process equipment, clean‑room systems) during 2025–26. - High containerized flows of PV components for C&I rooftop projects, plus break‑bulk and containerized deliveries of transformers and substation equipment for utility‑scale sites and grid expansions. --- **2.4 Policy‑driven industrial and construction demand (non‑renewable project cargo)** - Turkey’s 12th Development Plan and the **Medium‑Term Program 2025–2027** emphasize: - Large‑scale investments in **transport infrastructure (roads, ports, rail, logistics centers)**, - **Industrial upgrading** to meet EU Green Deal and CBAM requirements (steel, cement, aluminium, fertilizers), - Expansion of **electricity transmission** for renewables integration. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - CBAM exposure analysis indicates that **Turkey is among the most exposed non‑EU economies** to CBAM in iron & steel, aluminium, cement and fertilizers, with embedded‑emissions cost scenarios reaching millions of euros annually for large exporters under 2026–2034 phase‑in. ([tuiosb.org.tr](https://tuiosb.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Balta_Lara_CBAM_Turkiye_Trade_Exposure_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - This is already driving **demand for new kilns, EAF furnaces, filters, CCS‑ready equipment, and energy‑efficient upgrades** – high‑value, oversized machinery that moves as project cargo from the EU and East Asia. --- **2.5 Project logistics trends for Turkey in 2026** - **Modal mix and routing:** - Greater use of **Mediterranean ports and cross‑Turkey road/rail** for project cargo that previously transited via Suez/Red Sea or Russian routes. - Growth in **Ro‑Ro and heavy‑haul road transport** from Aegean/Marmara ports into Central Anatolia and southeastern Turkey for wind and solar sites. ([ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr](https://www.ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr/en/turkiyes-wind-energy-capacity-approaches-16-gw/?utm_source=openai)) - **Port and logistics‑cluster investments:** - Renewable‑cluster ports (e.g., Izmir region) are strengthening **heavy‑lift and storage capability** to serve wind and solar OEMs plus export markets. ([windtech-international.com](https://www.windtech-international.com/windtech-markets/tuerkiyes-wind-sector-expands-capacity-and-industry-base?utm_source=openai)) - **Localization vs imports:** - 2026–27 will still see substantial imports of key components, but the trajectory is toward **increased local content beyond 2027** as blade, tower, nacelle and solar‑cell manufacturing expand. This will gradually flip some flows from inbound project cargo to outbound manufactured exports. ([turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/05/14/enercon-to-build-e50-million-wind-turbine-blade-factory-in-western-turkey/?utm_source=openai)) **Sources – Dimension 2:** ([enerdata.net](https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/turkiye-aims-increase-solar-and-wind-capacity-120-gw-2035.html?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [TIMING SIGNALS] === 2026 seasonal & policy timing affecting freight through Turkey: harvest peaks, customs/transit changes, Suez/Red Sea security & insurance **3.1 Seasonal timing – agricultural exports & peak freight** - Turkey’s main **summer harvest window (June–September)** for fruits, vegetables, and certain grains will continue to drive **peak reefer and dry‑bulk/container exports** through Aegean and Mediterranean ports in 2026. - Planned record renewable build in 2026 implies **construction peaks during spring–autumn 2026**, with heaviest inbound project‑cargo arrivals likely **Q1–Q3 2026** to meet commissioning deadlines before winter. ([ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr](https://www.ruzgarenerjisi.com.tr/en/turkiyes-wind-energy-capacity-approaches-16-gw/?utm_source=openai)) **Implications:** - Expect **rate spikes and equipment tightness** on outbound reefer and container services to EU and MENA in late Q2–Q3 2026. - Port and inland‑transport capacity will be under simultaneous strain from **harvest exports + renewable EPC deliveries**, increasing the value of early slot booking and alternative ports. --- **3.2 Customs & transit rules – 2025–2026 changes that affect 2026 flows** 1. **Common Transit & NCTS expansion (Nov 2025)** - Turkey formalized use of the **Common Transit Procedure (CTP) and NCTS** with other Common Transit Countries (EU, EFTA, some Western Balkans) effective **20 November 2025**, allowing inland transports between Turkey and other parties to be covered by a *single T1 declaration and guarantee* across the entire route. ([trade.gov.tr](https://trade.gov.tr/multinational-relations/common-transit-system?utm_source=openai)) - This simplifies cross‑border trucking and rail for containers and project cargo starting in **2026**, reducing dwell times at multiple border crossings. 2. **Electronic A.TR certificates for EU–Turkey trade (2025 decision)** - Decision No. 1/2025 of the EU–Turkey Customs Cooperation Committee enables the **use of electronically issued A.TR movement certificates**, improving documentation processing for goods moving within the customs union. ([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1239/oj/eng/pdf?utm_source=openai)) - As e‑A.TR is implemented through 2025–26, customs clearance for EU‑Turkey traffic should become marginally faster and less error‑prone – a subtle but relevant timing factor for high‑volume containerized trade and just‑in‑time project cargo. 3. **Domestic customs tightening (Feb 2026 anecdotes)** - Trader and SME discussions in early‑2026 report **stricter customs controls and fees since February 2026**, even for low‑value shipments, which may signal internal enforcement campaigns or new administrative guidance. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskTurkey/comments/1rzgxo3/shipping_from_europe_to_turkey_how_bad_are_the/?utm_source=openai)) - For project cargo, this raises the importance of **compliance, classification accuracy, and early engagement with customs brokers** to avoid unexpected inspections and delays. --- **3.3 EU–Turkey Green Deal / CBAM‑related timing** - **CBAM financial phase‑in begins 2026:** - Analytical work on Turkey’s CBAM exposure frames **2026–2034 as the implementation period**, with 2023–25 used for transitional reporting. Full financial obligations ramp up from **January 1, 2026**, gradually increasing the cost of exporting high‑carbon goods into the EU. ([tuiosb.org.tr](https://tuiosb.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Balta_Lara_CBAM_Turkiye_Trade_Exposure_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Example calculation from a Turkish trade advisory shows 15,000 t of CBAM‑covered steel with 2.1 tCO₂/t embedded emissions could incur ~€2.5m of CBAM cost in the first year at an assumed EU ETS price of about €80/tCO₂ and an initial phase‑in factor. ([toku.com.tr](https://toku.com.tr/degerlendir/cbam-hazirlik?utm_source=openai)) - **Turkey’s own ETS and Green Taxonomy timing:** - The 2025–27 Pre‑Accession Economic Reform Program notes that **transposition of EU ETS rules and a Turkish ETS** plus a **Turkey Green Taxonomy** are scheduled to be prepared/implemented in the medium term, aligning with the 12th Development Plan. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for logistics timing in 2026:** - **Front‑loading investments and retrofits:** high‑emitting exporters (steel, cement, aluminium, fertilizers) have an incentive to **accelerate low‑carbon equipment imports and plant upgrades in 2026–27** to reduce CBAM exposure – adding to project cargo demand in that window. - **Documentation and data:** from 2026 onwards, shipments into the EU increasingly require **granular emissions data and verification**, influencing when firms ship (e.g., before/after verification cycles) and possibly clustering exports ahead of key reporting cut‑offs. --- **3.4 Suez/Red Sea security & insurance premium timing – 2026** - While exact premium rates are proprietary, general market commentary into 2026 indicates: - **War‑risk surcharges and additional insurance costs remain elevated** for vessels transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; - Many carriers continue to **evaluate routing on a voyage‑by‑voyage basis**, causing schedule unreliability on Asia–Med and Asia–Black Sea services. - For Turkey specifically in 2026: - Volatile **transit times via Suez** mean project cargo shippers increasingly **build extra lead‑time buffers (several weeks)** into deliveries from Asia to Turkish ports. - Some high‑value, time‑sensitive equipment is shifting to **alternative routings via the Middle Corridor / overland Eurasian rail**, where capacity through Turkey is a bottleneck and thus a timing‑critical constraint. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) --- **3.5 Key timing takeaways for 2026 planning** - **Q1–Q3 2026:** - Peak window for **renewable EPC inbound cargo**, driven by record planned capacity additions. ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-targets-record-renewable-capacity-growth-in-2026-energy-minister-says/53677?utm_source=openai)) - Heightened customs and CBAM‑compliance workload as new rules and reporting intensify. ([trade.gov.tr](https://trade.gov.tr/multinational-relations/common-transit-system?utm_source=openai)) - **Q2–Q3 2026:** - Overlay of **summer harvest export peak** with ongoing renewable project deliveries, tightening capacity and raising rates on outbound EU/MENA lanes. - **Full year 2026:** - Persistent Red Sea risk and insurance surcharges keep **Asia–Turkey transit times and freight rates volatile**, supporting Turkey’s role as a **regional logistics hub and land bridge**, but complicating precise project‑delivery scheduling. ([sbb.gov.tr](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC-REFORM-PROGRAM_2025_2027-17012025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Sources – Dimension 3:** ([trade.gov.tr](https://trade.gov.tr/multinational-relations/common-transit-system?utm_source=openai))