## Company Profile PLASKE JSC is a Ukraine-based freight forwarder and logistics services provider (website: plaske.ua). Public facing evidence positions them as an export-focused forwarder handling cargo moving through Ukrainian seaports (Odesa region) and overland corridors to EU neighbours. Typical service lines are freight forwarding (bulk and container), cross-border trucking and rail coordination, port/stevedoring interface, export documentation and customs support. Scale is not published; assume small-to-mid-sized national forwarder with clients in the agricultural (grain, oilseed, vegetable oil) sector given Ukraine's export mix and PLASKE’s cargo email contact. ## Pain Points 1) Black Sea corridor volatility: PLASKE’s grain/oilseed shippers rely on the Odesa/Chornomorsk/Pivdennyi maritime corridor, which is dominant in 2025–26 but subject to periodic strikes, war‑risk insurance surcharges and schedule/port disruptions — forcing forwarders to find rapid rerouting and price-protection solutions. 2) Overland/border bottlenecks and regulatory friction: frequent Poland/Romania/other border congestion, gauge-transshipment limits, and ad‑hoc EU national import restrictions produce unpredictable lead times, demurrage, re-documentation and higher trucking/insurance costs for their clients. 3) Commercial/market access for exporters: rising demand from MENA/Asia is being served directly from ports; forwarders must match exporters to reliable buyers quickly and ensure order execution (contracts, compliance, shipping) — a capability many small forwarders lack in-house. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – UKRAINE GRAIN EXPORTS, BLACK SEA CORRIDOR & PORT/INSURANCE STATUS (2026) === • Status of the “Ukrainian sea corridor” (post‑grain‑deal Black Sea route) – Ukraine’s nationally managed maritime corridor from Odesa region ports (primarily Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi) has remained operational through early 2026 and is described by the government as “operating steadily” and the *key export route*.([interfax.com.ua](https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai)) – Cumulative shipments via this corridor since launch in August 2023 reached about **100 million tonnes of cargo by January 2026**, including **38.1 MMT of grain in 2025 alone**.([interfax.com.ua](https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai)) – Earlier government figures (Dec 2025) indicated ~98 MMT of grain out of ~162 MMT of *total* cargo moved since August 2023, showing that grain accounts for roughly **60%** of total corridor cargo by weight.([interfax.com.ua](https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai)) • Modal split vs. Solidarity Lanes (current structure of export flows) – As of **February 2026**, the EU‑Ukraine “Solidarity Lanes” (rail/road/inland waterways via EU neighbors) have handled an accumulated **~209 MMT** of Ukrainian goods since May 2022.([railmarket.com](https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai)) – For **grain, oilseeds and related agri products**, about **85% of volumes now move via Black Sea ports** and **~15% via Solidarity Lanes** (rail/road/Danube) – indicating the Black Sea route has effectively re‑emerged as the dominant channel in 2025–26.([railmarket.com](https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai)) • Use of Danube and secondary sea routes – Danube ports (Izmail, Reni, Ust‑Dunaisk) handled **8.2 MMT of cargo in 2025**, down sharply from **17.3 MMT in 2024** as flows shifted back to deep‑sea Odesa region ports.([interfax.com.ua](https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai)) – The Danube/Solidarity Lane corridor still carries ~40% of total traffic going into Romania’s port of Constanța, but Ukrainian river ports (Reni, Izmail) are reported as structurally “overloaded,” constraining any rapid scale‑up if the Black Sea route were again disrupted.([uga.ua](https://uga.ua/en/news/the-bottlenecks-on-alternative-routes-to-export-ukrainian-grain/?utm_source=openai)) • Security and risk environment (relevant to insurance) – Ukrainian and independent analytic reporting in late 2025–early 2026 highlight continued **Russian missile and drone strikes on “Greater Odesa” and Danube port infrastructure**, which periodically interrupt operations and lower effective capacity.([pravda.com.ua](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/01/23/8017610/?utm_source=openai)) – A February 2026 policy brief on the Black Sea notes that regional military threats remain “multi‑faceted,” with Odesa singled out as a strategic grain hub under persistent risk, implying ongoing **war‑risk surcharges and tight insurance conditions** for vessels calling at Ukrainian ports.([carleton.ca](https://carleton.ca/eetn/wp-content/uploads/sites/44/2026/02/The-Black-Sea-in-2026-Strategic-Manoeuvres-and-Economic-Opportunity.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • Maritime insurance / freight economics (directional) – While current premium quotes are not public, several recent macro and logistics analyses indicate: • Ships using the Ukrainian maritime corridor typically require **specialized war‑risk insurance and additional security clauses**, raising freight rates vs. pre‑war levels.([carleton.ca](https://carleton.ca/eetn/wp-content/uploads/sites/44/2026/02/The-Black-Sea-in-2026-Strategic-Manoeuvres-and-Economic-Opportunity.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • The renewed dominance of the Black Sea route (85% of grain/oilseeds exports) even under elevated insurance costs suggests that—net of war‑risk premiums—deep‑sea shipments from Odesa/Chornomorsk remain **more cost‑competitive** than overland/Danube alternatives for bulk flows to MENA and Southern Europe.([railmarket.com](https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai)) Net framing for 2026: – The **Ukrainian maritime grain corridor is functioning and central**, handling the majority of grain exports, but is periodically degraded by attacks and remains dependent on expensive war‑risk cover. – **Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi** are working, but capacity is constrained by infrastructure damage and security‑driven scheduling/insurance limits, keeping alternative Danube/EU land routes strategically important as a back‑up. === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – UKRAINE EXPORT VOLUMES & FLOWS TO EU / MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING POLAND & ROMANIA (2024–26) === • Overall export rebound & destination mix – Ukraine’s **total goods exports in 2024** reached about **131.2 MMT**, up **+30.9 MMT** vs. 2023, with export value at **US$41.7 bn** (+15% y/y).([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-17/ukraines-trade-2024-restoration-logistical-routes?utm_source=openai)) – Regional demand growth in 2024: exports to • **EU**: **+6% y/y** • **Middle East**: **+25% y/y** • **Southeast Asia**: **+31% y/y** • “Other states”: **+42% y/y**([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-17/ukraines-trade-2024-restoration-logistical-routes?utm_source=openai)) – Agri‑food (cereals, oilseeds, veg oils) remains the dominant export complex, with cereals alone making up roughly **46–47%** of Ukraine’s imports into non‑EU markets by volume, and oils/oilseeds another ~36%.([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) • Grain export volumes and EU/Middle East share – USDA’s **Grain and Feed Annual 2025** estimates: • MY 2023/24 (July–June) **corn exports**: **28.6 MMT**, +6% vs. prior MY, with the EU absorbing a substantial share (notably Poland, Germany, Romania as principal markets).([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Quarterly_Kyiv_Ukraine_UP2024-0022&utm_source=openai)) – An OSW analysis suggests that by 2024 the **EU market absorbed ~36% of Ukraine’s wheat exports**, with the remainder primarily destined for MENA and Asia.([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) – UN macro reporting (WESP‑2025) notes that in the **second half of 2024**, Ukraine was consistently shipping **4–5 MMT of grain per month**, still below pre‑war peaks but well above mid‑2023 troughs.([un.org](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP-2025_WEB.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • Role of EU “Solidarity Lanes” in 2026 demand – As of early 2026, Solidarity Lanes account for about **15% of grain/oilseed exports**, mostly **destined to EU buyers** (either as final consumption in Central/Eastern Europe or as transit to EU seaports).([railmarket.com](https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai)) – The EU Council’s 2026 update stresses that for **agri commodities** the Black Sea is dominant, but **Solidarity Lanes remain essential** for: • Containerized / higher‑value food exports, • Deliveries to nearby EU markets under ongoing import restrictions, and • Back‑up capacity when maritime risk spikes.([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ukraine-solidarity-supporting-ukraine-trade/?utm_source=openai)) • Flows via Poland, Romania and other neighbors (esp. for EU & MENA demand) – Western rail/road exports of **corn, wheat, barley, oilseeds** via land borders to EU ports (Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova) amounted to **~3.75 MMT in 2024**, down from **7.0 MMT in 2023**, as traffic migrated back to Black Sea routes.([ams.usda.gov](https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/UkraineJune2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • Breakdown 2024 (1,000 tonnes) via land: Poland 1,945.5; Romania 523.2; Slovakia 961.2; Hungary 284.1; Moldova 31.3; total 3,745.3.([ams.usda.gov](https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/UkraineJune2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – Interfax reporting on border crossings shows that by **Dec 2024**, monthly agri exports via: • **Romania border** had fallen 8.2× from their Aug 2023 peak to **0.3 MMT**, • **Poland border** were down 1.9× to **0.3 MMT**, • **Hungary** down to 0.2 MMT, **Moldova & Slovakia** to ~0.01 MMT each.([interfax.com](https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/109856/?utm_source=openai)) – A late‑2025 logistics report notes that **Ukrainian rail exports are increasingly routed toward Hungary and Romania**, leveraging expanded Danube and Constanța capacity, while flows via Poland and Slovakia have fallen sharply because of import bans and congestion; Polish rail crossings mainly carry **transit** to other EU destinations, not local consumption.([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-from-ukraine-is-increasingly-reaching--xaxhvw?utm_source=openai)) • Inland transshipment patterns to EU ports and MENA – Grain/oilseeds transiting via **Romania and Hungary** typically move by broad‑gauge to border transshipment hubs, then **standard‑gauge rail or truck** to: • Danube ports (Reni/Izmail → barge → Constanța), • Romanian Black Sea ports for onward shipment to **Middle East & North Africa**.([danubecommission.org](https://www.danubecommission.org/dc/en/danube-solidarity-lane-for-eu-ukraine-trade/?utm_source=openai)) – Structural limits: Ukraine’s wagons are wider/heavier than EU norms, which, coupled with gauge breaks, caps transshipment throughput and keeps these western corridors relatively **volume‑constrained** despite demand.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_Ukraine?utm_source=openai)) Demand‑side implication: – **EU demand remains solid but growing more slowly (+6% y/y in 2024)** as import restrictions and local political pressure limit further expansion. – **Middle East (and parts of Asia) show faster growth (+25–30% y/y)**, with most incremental demand served via the **Black Sea deep‑sea corridor** rather than via EU overland routes. – Overland flows via **Poland/Romania are still strategically important for containerized, higher‑value, and specialty flows**, but bulk grain/oilseed demand to MENA is increasingly satisfied directly from Odesa‑region ports. === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] – LOGISTICS BOTTLENECKS & FREIGHT FORWARDING CHALLENGES (2026) === • Border delays & congestion (2026 conditions) – A 2026 logistics advisory from a Ukrainian freight company reports **border crossing times ranging from several hours to several days**, with **overloaded checkpoints** as the primary bottleneck; such delays erode EU buyers’ confidence and can trigger contract penalties.([rapid.com.ua](https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai)) – Real‑time accounts from operators and observers in early 2026 describe: • **Poland‑Ukraine border carrier protests** causing extreme queues, with wait times in some cases **exceeding 30 days**, • Rerouting adding **~500 km and ~2 extra days** to some truck routes.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/PolPal/comments/1skx7ie/network_status_delays_realtime_logistics/?utm_source=openai)) • Truck and rail capacity constraints – While **Ukrzaliznytsia** increased overall rail freight by **+17.9% in 2024** to **174.9 MMT**, only **4.9 MMT of grain** moved via land border crossings (‑41.6% vs 2023), highlighting both a **modal shift back to sea** and **limited practical capacity on western exits** when borders are congested.([open4business.com.ua](https://open4business.com.ua/en/ukrzaliznytsia-increased-freight-transportation-by-17-9-in-2024/?utm_source=openai)) – Gauge differences and wagon dimension/axle‑load incompatibilities (Ukraine vs EU) mean that **most wagons cannot roll through to EU networks**; grain must be **transshipped at border terminals**, which become chronic bottlenecks in peak season.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_Ukraine?utm_source=openai)) – Industry commentary points to recurring **truck shortages**, as: • Long waits at borders keep rolling stock idle, • Higher risk and insurance premiums push some EU hauliers to avoid Ukrainian lanes, tightening available capacity and raising spot trucking rates.([rapid.com.ua](https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai)) • Customs & regulatory changes – The EU’s **Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) renewed in May 2024** maintain tariff‑free access but allow **frontline states (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia)** to impose **import restrictions or licensing on specific grains and oilseeds**, forcing Ukrainian exporters and forwarders to constantly adjust routings and documentation.([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-17/ukraines-trade-2024-restoration-logistical-routes?utm_source=openai)) – National restrictions in these states have led to: • More cargoes designated explicitly as **“transit only”**, adding compliance and supervision requirements, • **Re‑documentation and re‑routing** at border points when cargo is re‑classified or denied entry, increasing dwell time and administrative cost.([interfax.com](https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/109856/?utm_source=openai)) – Forwarders also report the need for **closer customs IT integration**; current partial interoperability means duplicated data entry and manual checks, whereas full digital pre‑clearance (still under development) would cut delays substantially.([rapid.com.ua](https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai)) • Insurance & cost escalation – Longer transit times through congested borders directly **increase cargo insurance costs**; Ukrainian logistics firms note premium uplifts due to increased risk exposure while cargo is in transit for extended periods.([rapid.com.ua](https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai)) – On the maritime side, continued **war‑risk premia for Black Sea sailings** keep freight rates elevated; when risk perceptions spike (after port strikes), some shippers temporarily switch to **Danube + EU rail/road**, but this usually comes at a **USD‑per‑ton cost penalty** compared with the direct deep‑sea route.([un.org](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP-2025_WEB.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • Rerouting via Danube and rail – structural bottlenecks – Even after the Black Sea corridor reopened, Ukraine moved **8.2 MMT via Danube ports in 2025** (vs 17.3 MMT in 2024), underscoring that **Danube capacity is finite** and easily saturated when maritime flows are disrupted.([interfax.com.ua](https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai)) – Constanța remains the biggest Black Sea port (~65 MMT total cargo/yr), with **~40% of its goods arriving by Danube barge**, but Ukrainian feeder ports Reni and Izmail are described as “overloaded,” implying: quay congestion, limited storage, and tug/barge shortages when volumes surge.([uga.ua](https://uga.ua/en/news/the-bottlenecks-on-alternative-routes-to-export-ukrainian-grain/?utm_source=openai)) – For rail, differences in gauge, wagon width and axle load vs EU standards directly **limit train lengths and wagon types** that can cross into EU networks, forcing: • Wagon exchanges at the border, • Partial unloading/reloading (especially for grain), which reduce effective throughput and increase per‑ton handling costs.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_Ukraine?utm_source=openai)) • Digitalization & mitigation efforts (forwarder response) – 2026‑dated Ukrainian logistics guidance recommends: • **Dynamic route planning** using digital tools that monitor border congestion in real time and proactively divert trucks/rail to less crowded crossings, • **Pre‑booking customs slots** and maximizing use of available electronic pre‑clearance channels, • Consolidating loads and planning around **peak harvest periods** to avoid the worst congestion.([rapid.com.ua](https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai)) Problem framing for 2026: – The physical **Black Sea sea‑corridor has largely solved the macro export capacity issue**, but **risk, insurance and vulnerability to attacks** remain high. – Overland and Danube routes are **structurally constrained** (border capacity, rail gauge, overloaded river ports) and exposed to **political and regulatory shocks** (protests, national grain bans), which manifests for freight forwarders as: • Unpredictable lead times, • Elevated trucking and insurance costs, • Complex and shifting customs/compliance requirements, • Need for sophisticated, flexible routing and strong EU‑side partnerships to secure capacity and manage risk. Sources: • Some 100 mln tonnes of grain transported via Ukrainian sea corridor since its launch in Aug 2023 https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai • Some 100 mln tonnes of grain transported via Ukrainian sea corridor since its launch in Aug 2023 https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai • Some 100 mln tonnes of grain transported via Ukrainian sea corridor since its launch in Aug 2023 https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai • EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes carry 209m tonnes | Latest Railway News https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai • EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes carry 209m tonnes | Latest Railway News https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai • Some 100 mln tonnes of grain transported via Ukrainian sea corridor since its launch in Aug 2023 https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1139057-amp.html?utm_source=openai • The bottlenecks on alternative routes to export Ukrainian grain - https://uga.ua/en/news/the-bottlenecks-on-alternative-routes-to-export-ukrainian-grain/?utm_source=openai • Grain exports via Ukrainian maritime corridor reach 100 million tonnes | Ukrainska Pravda https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/01/23/8017610/?utm_source=openai • POLICY BRIEF https://carleton.ca/eetn/wp-content/uploads/sites/44/2026/02/The-Black-Sea-in-2026-Strategic-Manoeuvres-and-Economic-Opportunity.pdf?utm_source=openai • POLICY BRIEF https://carleton.ca/eetn/wp-content/uploads/sites/44/2026/02/The-Black-Sea-in-2026-Strategic-Manoeuvres-and-Economic-Opportunity.pdf?utm_source=openai • EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes carry 209m tonnes | Latest Railway News https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai • Ukraine’s trade in 2024: restoration of logistical routes | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-17/ukraines-trade-2024-restoration-logistical-routes?utm_source=openai • Ukraine’s trade in 2024: restoration of logistical routes | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-17/ukraines-trade-2024-restoration-logistical-routes?utm_source=openai • Large volumes, limited significance | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai • Required Report: Required - Public Distribution https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Quarterly_Kyiv_Ukraine_UP2024-0022&utm_source=openai • Large volumes, limited significance | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai • World Economic https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP-2025_WEB.pdf?utm_source=openai • EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes carry 209m tonnes | Latest Railway News https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/53047-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-carry-209m-tonnes?utm_source=openai • Ukraine Grain Transportation, Published June 2025 https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/UkraineJune2025.pdf?utm_source=openai • Ukraine Grain Transportation, Published June 2025 https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/UkraineJune2025.pdf?utm_source=openai • Ukraine cuts its agriculture export flow via EU countries in H2 2024 https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/109856/?utm_source=openai • Grain from Ukraine is increasingly reaching Hungary and Romania. https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-from-ukraine-is-increasingly-reaching--xaxhvw?utm_source=openai • Danube Solidarity Lane for EU-Ukraine trade , Danube Commission - Donaukommission - Commission du Danube - Дунайская Комиссия https://www.danubecommission.org/dc/en/danube-solidarity-lane-for-eu-ukraine-trade/?utm_source=openai • Rail transport in Ukraine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_Ukraine?utm_source=openai • Logistics and delays at the border: how businesses can avoid downtime and losses in 2026 - JSC Kyiv Production Company RAPID" https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai • Network Status & Delays Real-time logistics disruptions in Poland and Europe https://www.reddit.com/r/PolPal/comments/1skx7ie/network_status_delays_realtime-logistics/?utm_source=openai • “Ukrzaliznytsia” increased freight transportation by 17.9% in 2024 – Ukraine open for business https://open4business.com.ua/en/ukrzaliznytsia-increased-freight-transportation-by-17-9-in-2024/?utm_source=openai • Rail transport in Ukraine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_Ukraine?utm_source=openai • Logistics and delays at the border: how businesses can avoid downtime and losses in 2026 - JSC Kyiv Production Company RAPID" https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai • Logistics and delays at the border: how businesses can avoid downtime and losses in 2026 - JSC Kyiv Production Company RAPID" https://rapid.com.ua/en/articles/lohistyka-and-zatrymky-na-kordoni-yak-biznesu-unyknuty-prostoyiv-i-vtrat-u-2026-rotsi?utm_source=openai