## Company Profile SAVINO DEL BENE NAKLIYAT A.S is the Turkish affiliate of the Savino Del Bene global forwarding and logistics group. Operating across major Turkish gateways (Istanbul/Bosphorus, Izmir, Mersin and Black Sea feeder ports), the office handles ocean and air freight, customs brokerage, project and breakbulk, and regional inbound/outbound flows for agri-food exporters (refined oils, flour/pasta, grains) and industrial shippers. As a national contact for “Turkey All Ports” the contact handles multimodal routing and cross‑border corridor solutions for exporters and importers moving between Turkey, EU, MENA and Eurasia. ## Pain Points 1) Volatile routing & insurance costs on Black Sea and Asia–Europe lanes (war risk premiums, Red Sea/Cape re‑routing) are creating unpredictable landed costs for Turkish agri exporters (sunflower oil, flour/pasta), forcing last‑minute re‑routing, higher margins and buyer renegotiation. 2) Mediterranean feeder and transshipment bottlenecks (blank sailings, depot congestion) are reducing effective capacity for Turkish exporters who rely on feeders via Istanbul/Izmir/Mersin, increasing demurrage, delays and missed contracts. 3) Sourcing concentration risk for sunflower oil and grains (dependence on Black Sea origins and Russian export policy) means Turkish refiners and millers need faster buyer matches, alternative origin sourcing and price hedging options to preserve export margins. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] === (Turkey exports 2026 – Black Sea corridor shifts – Red Sea/Suez impact – trade routes to EU/MENA – Russia/Ukraine) **1.1. Structural role of Turkey in Black Sea / Eurasian trade (2025–26 data)**n- The Turkish Straits (Bosporus + Dardanelles) handled about **3.7 million b/d of crude and products in 1H 2025**, equal to **~5% of global seaborne oil trade**, underlining Turkey’s systemic importance as a chokepoint between the Black Sea and Mediterranean.([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai)) - After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European trade patterns shifted to reduce direct exposure to Russia. A recent gravity‑model paper shows **trade with Russia collapsed on many routes**, with EU trade reallocated internally and toward less‑exposed partners; this increases the value of intermediary hubs such as Turkey for “indirect” access to Eurasian markets.([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16334?utm_source=openai)) **1.2. Black Sea corridor and war‑related risks (2025–26)**n- The original UN‑Turkey‑brokered **Black Sea Grain Initiative** (allowing Ukraine grain exports via Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi) collapsed in mid‑2023; since then, Ukraine has shifted to “alternative corridors” including the Danube and coastal routes under its own naval guarantees, while Russia continues to ship via its own Black Sea ports.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Grain_Initiative?utm_source=openai)) - In **2025–26**, the Black Sea has seen repeated drone and missile incidents affecting Russian‑linked tankers and critical energy infrastructure: - In **March 2026**, a **Suezmax tanker carrying ~1 million bbl of Urals crude** from Novorossiysk was damaged in a suspected sea‑drone attack within or near Turkey’s exclusive economic zone; several similar incidents have been reported over the past year, increasing war‑risk premiums and insurance costs for Black Sea calls.([worldoil.com](https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/3/26/black-sea-tanker-carrying-russian-oil-damaged-in-suspected-sea-drone-attack/?utm_source=openai)) - Russia reported repelling attacks near **TurkStream and Blue Stream** gas pipelines to Turkey, underscoring the vulnerability of energy export infrastructure that feeds into Turkey and then the EU/Balkans.([worldoil.com](https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/3/26/black-sea-tanker-carrying-russian-oil-damaged-in-suspected-sea-drone-attack/?utm_source=openai)) - Policy analysts highlight that sanctions on Russia and security risks have created a **“policy‑induced trade void”** around Russia, accelerating re‑routing through other corridors (Danube, overland EU rail, Middle Corridor via Turkey, and Med ports).([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16334?utm_source=openai)) **1.3. Red Sea / Suez disruptions and spillover for Turkey (late 2025–early 2026)**n- Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since late 2024/early 2025 prompted significant **rerouting of Asia–EU container and tanker flows around the Cape of Good Hope**, reducing effective capacity and raising transit times/fuel costs. - By **February 2026**, S&P Global notes that **some Red Sea container traffic has resumed**, but threats remain; freight rates and schedules remain volatile as carriers toggle between Suez and Cape routings.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) - This has **two key impacts for Turkey‑linked trade**: 1. **Bunker and transit cost pass‑through** into East Asia–Mediterranean lanes, affecting Turkey’s import costs (fertilizer, palm oil, packaging materials) and export competitiveness for Europe/MENA. 2. **Increased strategic interest in Mediterranean and alternative Eurasian corridors**, with Turkey promoting itself as a logistics and energy hub to capture diverted trade (see 1.4).([fdd.org](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/11/turkeys-corridor-dream-wont-beat-imec-but-it-could-still-reshape-eurasian-trade/?utm_source=openai)) **1.4. Corridor re‑orientation via Turkey (Middle Corridor, Iraq route, IMEC context)**n- The **Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (TITR / “Middle Corridor”)**, linking China–Central Asia–Caspian–Caucasus–Turkey–Europe, is shifting from a niche alternative to a **“necessary component”** of Eurasian trade under simultaneous Black Sea and Red Sea stress.([thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-middle-corridor-in-an-era-of-supply-chain-disruption/?utm_source=openai)) - Since 2022, China has redirected part of China–EU rail volumes away from the traditional **Northern Corridor via Russia** toward the Middle Corridor, increasing flows through Caucasus and Turkey.([thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-middle-corridor-in-an-era-of-supply-chain-disruption/?utm_source=openai)) - A May 2026 analysis of Turkey’s “corridor strategy” notes Ankara’s push for: - A **“Development Road”** via Iraq to the Gulf; - Greater role in **IMEC‑related discussions** (India–Middle East–Europe Corridor); and - Deeper anchoring of Turkey in **Trans‑Caspian and Caucasus** connectivity. While these may not overtake IMEC, they are expected to **reshape trade geography** by strengthening Turkey as a bridge between EU, MENA, and Eurasia.([fdd.org](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/11/turkeys-corridor-dream-wont-beat-imec-but-it-could-still-reshape-eurasian-trade/?utm_source=openai)) **1.5. Implications specifically for Turkey’s agro‑exports to EU & MENA (2026)**n- For bulk grains and veg‑oil exports from Turkish and Russian Black Sea ports into the Med/EU: - **Black Sea risk premiums** (insurance, war risk) and security issues are raising voyage costs and sometimes pushing charterers toward alternative loading points (e.g., Romanian and Bulgarian ports on the EU side), but Turkish Straits throughput is still growing in oil and remains critical in dry bulk.([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai)) - **Longer Asia–EU container routing via the Cape** raises inbound freight costs for inputs and outbound costs for higher‑value food products (processed foods, packaged oils, flour and pasta), but bulk commodity flows (wheat, sunflower oil in tankers/bulk) are more affected by Black Sea/insurance dynamics than by Suez directly.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai)) - Net effect in 2026: Turkey’s geographic role as **energy and trade hub is reinforced, but with higher risk and cost volatility**; exporters of grains, flour, pasta and oils to EU/North Africa need to factor in: - Premiums for Black Sea crossings; - Possible diversion to Danube/EU ports in extreme risk scenarios; - Increased competition from alternative origins (EU, Black Sea EU members) benefiting from intra‑EU trade reallocation.([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16334?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Market Events)** ([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [PROBLEM FRAMING] === (Mediterranean container capacity 2026 – congestion – Istanbul/Europe/MENA – blank sailings – freight volatility) **2.1. Effective vs nominal capacity in the Mediterranean (2026)**n- The **Sogese Monthly Container Market Update (May 2026)** characterizes the Mediterranean not as suffering from an absolute surplus or deficit of boxes, but from a **“reduction in effective capacity”** caused by slower circulation and network disruption: - **Inland bottlenecks and depot congestion** are extending container dwell times and delaying release/re‑use of equipment. - This translates into **lower effective capacity** even if fleet and box numbers are ample on paper.([sogeseitalia.it](https://www.sogeseitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sogese_May2026_Market_Update_FINAL-1-1.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Sogese and AJOT note that **Mediterranean feeder networks** have emerged as **“Europe’s new container bottleneck”**, particularly affecting secondary ports that rely on feeders from main hubs such as Algeciras, Piraeus, Gioia Tauro and Turkish gateways.([ajot.com](https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai)) **2.2. Congestion patterns and Istanbul/Turkey’s position**n- The same update highlights **multi‑day delays** reported at several Med gateways (e.g., Genoa, Gioia Tauro, Adriatic ports) due to inland congestion and yard pressure; these issues also resonate at Turkish ports which act as regional hubs for Black Sea and East Med feedering, although quantitative wait‑time figures are limited in public sources.([sogeseitalia.it](https://www.sogeseitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sogese_May2026_Market_Update_FINAL-1-1.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For Turkey/Istanbul specifically: - High transshipment volumes between Black Sea, East Med and mainline Asia–Europe services mean **even moderate schedule unreliability or feeder omission can disrupt flows to/from Turkey’s hinterland** (Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East). - As mainline carriers reshuffle rotations to cope with Red Sea/Cape diversions, some **port calls in the Eastern Med are consolidated or skipped**, increasing dependence on feeders and raising delay risk for Turkey‑bound cargo. (This is synthesized from S&P Global and Sogese commentary on network adjustments in response to Red Sea risk.)([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) **2.3. Blank sailings and schedule adjustments (2025–26)**n- Sogese notes that in the Med in early‑to‑mid‑2026: - **Blank sailings** remain a key carrier lever to balance demand/supply and mitigate higher operating costs from rerouting and fuel. - Network adjustments are **“further tightening availability”** in certain corridors despite no physical container shortage.([ajot.com](https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai)) - S&P Global’s 2026 ocean freight outlook indicates: - Headline freight rates are expected to be **softer than the 2021–22 peak**, but **volatility remains structurally high** due to geopolitical routing risks and strategic carrier behavior (capacity withdrawals, service reshaping).([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai)) **2.4. Freight rate volatility – Europe/MENA lanes**n- According to Sogese summarizing **Drewry’s World Container Index**, **Asia–Europe spot rates stabilized in early March 2026**, but at elevated levels versus pre‑crisis norms; volatility is driven by: - Uncertainty over when to revert fully to Suez versus Cape; - Bunker price swings; - Demand seasonality (pre‑Ramadan and summer peaks into MENA/EU).([sogeseitalia.it](https://www.sogeseitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sogese_May2026_Market_Update_FINAL-1-1.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Xeneta‑referenced updates in the AJOT piece report **continued short‑term rate swings** across key Med corridors, confirming that shippers in 2026 face: - **Short booking validity windows**; - Surcharges and GRIs linked to war‑risk and route changes; - A need to diversify carriers and routings (e.g., via different Med hubs) to manage risk.([ajot.com](https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai)) **2.5. Framing the logistics problem for Turkey‑linked agri flows**n- For Turkish exporters of agri/food products (oils, flour, pasta, fresh produce) into **EU and MENA** in 2026, the logistics “problem statement” can be framed as: - **High schedule and rate volatility** on Asia–Europe mainlines that serve as backhaul/feeder sources for Turkey; - **Feeder bottlenecks in the Med**, creating disproportionate risk for smaller regional ports and for shipments relying on transshipment via Istanbul/Izmir/Mersin and other hubs; - **Inland congestion** (depots, trucking, customs) that amplifies the impact of even modest seaborne disruption; - An environment where **nominal capacity is ample, but effective capacity is constrained**, forcing exporters to prioritize reliability strategies (multi‑port options, buffer stocks closer to EU/MENA markets, more flexible Incoterms) over simply chasing the lowest freight quote.([ajot.com](https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Problem Framing)** ([ajot.com](https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [COMMODITY TRENDS] === (Sunflower oil, wheat, durum wheat – Turkey exports 2026 – prices – export restrictions) **3.1. Sunflower oil – global and Turkey‑linked context (2026)**n *Global/regional price levels* - A 2026 wholesale price guide indicates **European sunflower oil prices around USD 1,100–1,250/ton FOB** for mainstream refined grades in early 2026; it also notes the **IMF sunflower oil price index at ~USD 1,739/ton in April 2026**, the highest since mid‑2023.([ub-market.com](https://ub-market.com/en/blog/sunflower-oil-prices-europe-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Price strength is attributed to: - Ongoing constraints on **Ukrainian exports** (war‑related risks and corridor uncertainty); - Russia’s continued use of **export duties and regulation** on both seeds and oil; - Reduced confidence in long‑term availability from the Black Sea for EU buyers.([tass.com](https://tass.com/economy/1829727?utm_source=openai)) *Russian export policy – knock‑on for Turkey* - Russia has extended **floating export duties on sunflower seeds and oil** through **August 31, 2026**: - Duty on sunflower seeds: **50% of customs value, but at least 32,000 RUB/ton**; - Duties on sunflower oil and meal continue under the floating mechanism based on reference prices.([tass.com](https://tass.com/economy/1829727?utm_source=openai)) - In **February 2026**, the export duty on sunflower oil is reported at **9,495 RUB/ton**, up **2.1%** from January (9,298.6 RUB/ton), equal to **70% of the difference between base and indicative prices**.([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/the-export-duty-on-sunflower-oil-from-russia-muqnxz?utm_source=openai)) - For Turkey, a major **importer of Black Sea sunflower oil and seeds** and also a **re‑exporter of bottled and refined oils**, these Russian policies: - Tighten upstream supply and raise import costs; - Support higher export prices from Turkish refiners into **MENA, the Balkans and some EU markets**; - Increase incentives for Turkey to diversify sourcing (Ukraine, EU, Argentina) and to support domestic oilseed production. *Turkey‑specific 2026 data points* - A **January 2026 Tridge update on Turkey** reports: - Export sample transactions for sunflower oil in January show **unit prices from USD 0.92–2.58/kg (USD 920–2,580/ton)** across 12 export transactions and 3 destination markets. - The Southeastern Anatolia region saw **a 7.1% y/y value drop** and **12.3% y/y volume drop** in combined cereals‑legumes‑oilseeds exports in January, totaling **USD 279.9 million and 355.5 thousand tons** respectively, indicating softer volumes but still high unit values.([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/product-country-monthly-update-market-insights/sunflower-oil/TR/2026-01?utm_source=openai)) - Turkish provincial production planning for 2026 (example: Eskişehir) explicitly prioritizes **sunflower (oilseed)** along with wheat, barley, and maize, signaling policy support to reduce import dependence in key veg‑oil inputs.([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/product-country-monthly-update-market-insights/sunflower-oil/TR/2026-01?utm_source=openai)) **3.2. Wheat and durum wheat – supply, prices, and export orientation (2025–26)**n *Black Sea and regulatory backdrop* - Turkey is structurally a **large wheat importer** (often from Russia) and a **net exporter of wheat flour and pasta/durum products**. While no major new Turkish wheat export ban is reported in the last 90 days, its export capacity in 2026 is shaped by: - Russian wheat export behavior (export taxes, informal floor prices, quotas); - Freight and insurance costs in the Black Sea; - Red Sea/Suez routing costs for exports to **MENA, East Africa and Asia**.([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai)) - On the regulatory side, Russia’s use of floating export duties for sunflower and other agri commodities, combined with periodic **wheat export quotas (2024–26 policy framework)**, effectively floors Black Sea FOB values, which feeds through into Turkish import and re‑export pricing.([tass.com](https://tass.com/economy/1829727?utm_source=openai)) *Durum wheat and pasta segment* - Durum prices globally tightened in 2023–24 due to crop problems in Canada and parts of Europe; by 2025–26, improved harvests in some origins and demand rationing have eased the spike, but prices remain **above pre‑2021 averages** (this is a synthesis from multi‑year FAO/USDA and trade reporting, although not all are within the 90‑day window). - For Turkey, **durum wheat is central to its pasta export industry**: - Higher durum costs in 2024–25 pushed Turkish pasta export prices upward, especially into **MENA and West Africa** where Turkey competes with EU and local millers. - The 2026 picture combines slightly more comfortable global supplies with higher freight and corridor risk premiums, meaning **CIF levels for MENA buyers stay elevated** even if farm‑gate durum prices flatten.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai)) **3.3. Net implications for 2026 Turkey agro‑export strategy**n - **Sunflower oil** - Input costs elevated by Russian duties and corridor risks; - European reference values ~USD **1,100–1,250/ton FOB**, with IMF index at **USD ~1,739/ton** as of April 2026; - Turkey can capture margin in **value‑added refined/bottled exports** if it secures supply at competitive basis levels, but faces strong price sensitivity in MENA markets.([ub-market.com](https://ub-market.com/en/blog/sunflower-oil-prices-europe-2026?utm_source=openai)) - **Common wheat and flour** - Import‑parity prices tied to Russian Black Sea FOB plus freight and war‑risk premiums; - Turkey’s flour exports into **Iraq, Syria, North Africa** remain competitive, but any fresh tightening of Russian export controls or major Black Sea incident would quickly translate into higher CIFs and possible ad‑hoc policy actions (tariff adjustments, temporary restrictions).([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai)) - **Durum and pasta** - Durum prices are no longer at crisis highs, but remain structurally higher than pre‑COVID era; - Elevated container/bulk freight into MENA (driven by Med bottlenecks and Red Sea disruptions) keeps **delivered pasta prices firm**, which can erode Turkey’s price advantage versus local and EU suppliers if logistics are not managed aggressively.([ajot.com](https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Commodity Trends)** ([ub-market.com](https://ub-market.com/en/blog/sunflower-oil-prices-europe-2026?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai • How War Distorts International Trade: Gravity-Model Evidence from Europe after the Russia-Ukraine Conflict https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16334?utm_source=openai • Black Sea Grain Initiative https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Grain_Initiative?utm_source=openai • Black Sea tanker carrying Russian oil damaged in suspected sea drone attack https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/3/26/black-sea-tanker-carrying-russian-oil-damaged-in-suspected-sea-drone-attack/?utm_source=openai • Black Sea tanker carrying Russian oil damaged in suspected sea drone attack https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/3/26/black-sea-tanker-carrying-russian-oil-damaged-in-suspected-sea-drone-attack/?utm_source=openai • How War Distorts International Trade: Gravity-Model Evidence from Europe after the Russia-Ukraine Conflict https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16334?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Turkey’s corridor dream won’t beat IMEC – but it could still reshape Eurasian trade https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/11/turkeys-corridor-dream-wont-beat-imec-but-it-could-still-reshape-eurasian-trade/?utm_source=openai • The Middle Corridor in an Era of Supply Chain Disruption – The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-middle-corridor-in-an-era-of-supply-chain-disruption/?utm_source=openai • The Middle Corridor in an Era of Supply Chain Disruption – The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-middle-corridor-in-an-era-of-supply-chain-disruption/?utm_source=openai • Turkey’s corridor dream won’t beat IMEC – but it could still reshape Eurasian trade https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/11/turkeys-corridor-dream-wont-beat-imec-but-it-could-still-reshape-eurasian-trade/?utm_source=openai • International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai • 2026 Ocean Freight Outlook: Softer Rates Ahead, but Volatility Isn’t Going Anywhere | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai • How War Distorts International Trade: Gravity-Model Evidence from Europe after the Russia-Ukraine Conflict https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16334?utm_source=openai • International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints?utm_source=openai • SOGESE Monthly Container Market Update | May 202 https://www.sogeseitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sogese_May2026_Market_UPDATE_FINAL-1-1.pdf?utm_source=openai • Mediterranean feeder networks emerge as Europe’s new container bottleneck; Sogese Report | AJOT.COM https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai • SOGESE Monthly Container Market Update | May 202 https://www.sogeseitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sogese_May2026_Market_UPDATE_FINAL-1-1.pdf?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Mediterranean feeder networks emerge as Europe’s new container bottleneck; Sogese Report | AJOT.COM https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai • 2026 Ocean Freight Outlook: Softer Rates Ahead, but Volatility Isn’t Going Anywhere | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai • SOGESE Monthly Container Market Update | May 202 https://www.sogeseitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sogese_May2026_Market_UPDATE_FINAL-1-1.pdf?utm_source=openai • Mediterranean feeder networks emerge as Europe’s new container bottleneck; Sogese Report | AJOT.COM https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai • Mediterranean feeder networks emerge as Europe’s new container bottleneck; Sogese Report | AJOT.COM https://www.ajot.com/news/mediterranean-feeder-networks-emerge-as-europes-new-container-bottleneck-sogese-report?utm_source=openai