## Company Profile ZIEGLER FRANCE S.A. — French arm of Ziegler Group; freight forwarder and logistics provider focused on EMENA trade lanes. Role/contact is Trade Lane Development – EMENA (Karim El Soussi). Services typically include ocean/air/road forwarding, temperature‑controlled (reefer) logistics, short‑sea and cross‑border road solutions, and trade‑lane commercial development for exporters and importers. Operates as a European redistribution hub (France) for fresh produce and processed food flows into Benelux, Germany and Scandinavia and develops routes into/from Middle East & North Africa. ## Pain Points 1) Reefer & schedule risk from Red Sea diversions: longer Asia/Europe routings, elevated freight and war‑risk premiums, and tighter reefer booking windows are increasing cost and delivery uncertainty for perishables exporters and for a forwarder selling capacity to EU buyers. 2) Surge in Moroccan/Turkish supply into EU — capacity & compliance bottlenecks: Moroccan tomato and processed food exports have ballooned in 2024/25–2025/26, pressuring cold‑chain capacity, quota monitoring and supplier‑to‑buyer qualification for EU markets. 3) Black Sea disruption driving buyer diversification: EU importers are actively seeking North African/Turkish origins for cereals, oilseeds and processed foods, creating urgent demand for trusted origin onboarding, fulfilment capability and shorter lead‑time guarantees that a partner like Ziegler must supply or facilitate. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. COMMODITY TRENDS — EMENA FRESH PRODUCE & PERISHABLES (FOCUS: MOROCCO–SPAIN–FRANCE–ITALY, TOMATO & CITRUS EXPORT FLOWS INTO EUROPE, 2024–2026) === **Morocco – Tomatoes & broader fresh produce into EU (2024/25–2025/26)** - Total Moroccan fruit & vegetable exports have risen from ~1.4 million tonnes in 2023 to “almost 1.6 million tonnes” by 2025, a cumulative +15% in two years, according to Morocco Foodex/Exchange Office data.([fruitnet.com](https://www.fruitnet.com/eurofruit/record-year-for-moroccan-fruit-and-vegetable-exports/270177.article?utm_source=openai)) - To the EU specifically, Moroccan tomato exports between Oct 2024–Sep 2025 reached **573,730 tonnes**, +8% y/y, supplying **70%** of total EU tomato imports from non‑EU origins (EU total non‑EU tomato imports ~819,426 t). Value exceeded **€1 billion**, +7% y/y.([ecofinagency.com](https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-agriculture/0812-51186-morocco-eu-tomato-imports-top-1-billion-in-2024/2025-7?utm_source=openai)) - Over a longer horizon, Moroccan tomato exports to the EU have grown **~44% between 2013 and 2025**, reaching **568,370 t** in the 2024/25 campaign (Icex–Eurostat data via Hortoinfo).([moroccoworldnews.com](https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/09/260376/moroccos-tomato-exports-to-the-eu-jump-40-in-ten-years/?utm_source=openai)) - Non‑EU market share: Morocco held **70.6% of the EU’s non‑EU tomato import market** at end‑2025, despite a 20.3% drop in shipped volume in Sep–Dec 2025 vs prior campaign.([en.hespress.com](https://en.hespress.com/133262-morocco-holds-70-6-percent-of-non-eu-tomato-market-in-europe.html?utm_source=openai)) - Overall global position: UN Comtrade‑based analysis for 2025 shows Morocco as the **world’s #3 fresh/chilled tomato exporter**, shipping **707.6 million kg** (707,600 t), capturing **9.6% of global tomato export share**; Spain is lower in both volume and value.([moroccoworldnews.com](https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/05/306013/growing-tomato-exports-extend-moroccos-lead-over-spain/?utm_source=openai)) - Early 2025/26 signals: Morocco reportedly exported **745,000 t of tomatoes in the 2024/25 campaign** (all destinations) and is facing structural constraints from water scarcity and rising desalination‑linked energy costs, which analysts expect will cap or slightly contract export volumes in **2025/26** despite strong demand.([cropgpt.ai](https://cropgpt.ai/global-tomatoes-moroccan-export-realignment-and-structural-cost-escalation?utm_source=openai)) - Quota utilisation: For one key duty‑free tomato quota window (Oct 1 2025–May 31 2026), Morocco had already used **>71% of quota**; for another quota (Oct 1–Apr 20) it had shipped **22,930 t out of 56,000 t** (≈41% of quota) by 15 March 2026, indicating sustained export pace into late winter 2025/26.([barlamantoday.com](https://barlamantoday.com/2026/03/24/morocco-tomato-exports-slip-zucchini-shipments-to-eu-drop-sharply/?utm_source=openai)) - Northern Europe diversification: In Finland, Moroccan tomato exports more than doubled in 2025/26 vs prior campaign, exceeding **2,000 t** and surpassing combined shipments of the previous two seasons; this reflects Morocco’s growing penetration beyond traditional Western EU markets.([freshplaza.com](https://www.freshplaza.com/europe/article/9838619/moroccan-tomato-exports-to-finland-double-in-2025-26-season/?utm_source=openai)) - EU import dependence: EU data and Spanish ministry analysis confirm that in 2024/25, **Morocco supplied ~70% of EU external tomato trade**, with Turkey and other origins sharing the residual 30%; Turkish tomato exports to the EU in 2025 reached about **177,840 t**, more than **+500% vs 2013**, showing Turkey as an emerging secondary supplier.([fr.le360.ma](https://fr.le360.ma/economie/tomates-les-exportations-marocaines-vers-lue-ont-bondi-de-44-entre-2013-et-2025_XMOZP4YMMVGV5OKT5RQSYYXLFE/?utm_source=openai)) **Morocco – Citrus exports into EU** - EU’s citrus imports 2024/25 show South Africa as the dominant non‑EU supplier (orange imports Oct 2024–Sep 2025: **934,334 t**, +46% vs prior season), while Morocco’s citrus shipments are more modest but growing within “small citrus imports from Morocco” according to EU monthly citrus import updates for the 2024/25 season.([citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za](https://citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za/home/document-home/news-articles/fresh-plaza/fresh-plaza-2025/11104-251007-freshplaza-eu-orange-imports-from-south-africa-up-46/file?utm_source=openai)) - Detailed tonnage for Moroccan citrus into EU for 2024/25 is not yet fully consolidated, but EU trade monitoring notes Morocco as a small–mid‑tier supplier of mandarins/other small citrus rather than a dominant player. **EU import trends from Morocco (all fresh fruit & veg)** - Eurostat data (via EastFruit/Fruitnet) show EU imports of Moroccan fruit & veg in Q1 2025 totaling **€1.121 billion**, +14% y/y, with **512,689 t** in volume, +9% y/y. Tomatoes accounted for **€369 million**, +2% y/y, and remain the top item.([fr.wikipedia.org](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89conomie_du_Maroc?utm_source=openai)) - This confirms that, within EMENA, **Morocco is gaining share as a winter–spring supplier** not just of tomatoes but of a broader basket (courgettes, peppers, berries, avocados), though tomatoes remain volume/value anchor. **Spain – Tomato & fresh produce trade** - EU vegetable production data place **Spain as the EU’s largest fresh‑veg producer** with **14.8 million tonnes** harvested in 2024 (vegetables), ahead of Italy (13.9 Mt) and France (5.8 Mt), and a top‑3 fruit producer (4.3 Mt).([ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250825-1?utm_source=openai)) - Spanish tomato exports have structurally declined: from their 2015/16 peak, exports are down **~35%**, to **522,520 t** in 2024/25, corresponding to **~18% of the EU tomato import market**, value **≈€1.02 bn**.([moroccoworldnews.com](https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/09/260376/moroccos-tomato-exports-to-the-eu-jump-40-in-ten-years/?utm_source=openai)) - The drop reflects rising costs, labour constraints, and strong Moroccan competition in winter windows, but Spain remains a dominant intra‑EU hub for both own production and re‑exports of Moroccan/Maghreb product across the EMENA network. **France – Position as re‑export hub** - FranceAgriMer data show that in 2024 France imported **~2.1 million t of fresh vegetables** worth **~€3.1 bn**, while exporting **~1.2 million t** worth **~€1.6 bn**. Tomatoes are both a major import and export line, with a significant share of **re‑exports**, highlighting France’s role as a **north–south redistribution platform** for EMENA produce into Benelux, Germany and Scandinavia.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetable_sector_in_France?utm_source=openai)) **Italy – Fresh fruit & vegetable exports** - Istat’s preliminary agricultural accounts show that in 2024 Italian **fresh vegetable output volume rose +3.8%** y/y and **fruit +5.4%** (fresh fruit +11.5%), while cereals fell −7.1%.([istat.it](https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/preliminary-estimate-of-agricultural-economic-accounts-year-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - Fruitimprese analysis of customs data shows Italian fruit & veg exports in 1H 2024 at **1,818,378 t**, +5% y/y, value **~€2.8 bn**, +3% y/y. Fresh fruit volumes were slightly down (−2.9%) but value +5.5%, implying **unit value inflation**; processed vegetable exports (canned/frozen) rose **+4%** with stronger demand from Belgium, Germany, and Italy’s intra‑EU partners.([freshplaza.com](https://www.freshplaza.com/europe/article/9658538/italian-fruit-and-vegetable-exports-held-up-well-in-the-first-half-of-2024/?utm_source=openai)) **Regional pattern & 2026 outlook (tomato & citrus into Europe)** - **Tomatoes:** - Morocco is structurally **crowding out Spanish winter exports**, supplying ~70% of EU non‑EU tomatoes and ~9.6% of global tomato exports, with continuing volume growth into 2024/25 but likely **plateauing or slightly contracting in 2025/26** due to water and energy constraints.([moroccoworldnews.com](https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/05/306013/growing-tomato-exports-extend-moroccos-lead-over-spain/?utm_source=openai)) - Turkey has rapidly grown tomato exports to the EU (+500% since 2013, reaching 177,840 t in 2025), offering EU buyers an alternative EMENA origin and intensifying competition with both Spain and Morocco.([fr.le360.ma](https://fr.le360.ma/economie/tomates-les-exportations-marocaines-vers-lue-ont-bondi-de-44-entre-2013-et-2025_XMOZP4YMMVGV5OKT5RQSYYXLFE/?utm_source=openai)) - Within EU, Spain, Italy and France remain the production core, but with **flatter or declining tomato export volumes** from Spain, and more re‑exports from France, while Italy’s growth is stronger in fruit and processed veg rather than fresh tomato exports per se.([istat.it](https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/preliminary-estimate-of-agricultural-economic-accounts-year-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - **Citrus:** - EU orange imports 2024/25 increased strongly from South Africa (+46% y/y to 934,334 t), while Morocco’s share is smaller but slowly rising in “small citrus” segments per EU citrus monthly monitoring; this indicates that **Moroccan citrus is an incremental rather than dominant supplier**, with South Africa, Egypt and Turkey more central to EU citrus import security.([citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za](https://citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za/home/document-home/news-articles/fresh-plaza/fresh-plaza-2025/11104-251007-freshplaza-eu-orange-imports-from-south-africa-up-46/file?utm_source=openai)) - **Price & margin implications:** - EU tomato market observatory minutes note **significant price drops in 2024** across tomato types once supply normalised, despite strong consumption in markets like the UK; for Moroccan exporters, this means **stronger volumes but tighter margins** in 2024/25, and heightened sensitivity to logistics and input costs going into 2026.([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a1e8c5df-df2c-468b-9925-d8726ce65e96_en?filename=minutes-fv-mo-tomatoes-2024-6-21_en.pdf&utm_source=openai)) **Net takeaway for EMENA fresh‑produce trade into Europe (2026)** - Europe’s **winter tomato supply is structurally dependent on southern Morocco**, with Spain, Turkey and other EMENA origins playing balancing roles. Citrus flows, by contrast, are more diversified (South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco). - For 2026, the key watch‑points are: - Morocco’s ability to sustain ~700–750k t tomato exports under water/energy constraints, - competitive expansion from Turkey, and - EU regulatory responses to member‑state pressure over perceived import surges in tomatoes and processed tomato products.([moroccoworldnews.com](https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/05/306013/growing-tomato-exports-extend-moroccos-lead-over-spain/?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Dimension 1):** ([en.hespress.com](https://en.hespress.com/133262-morocco-holds-70-6-percent-of-non-eu-tomato-market-in-europe.html?utm_source=openai)) === 2. MARKET EVENTS — RED SEA / GULF OF ADEN SECURITY INCIDENTS AND IMPACT ON CONTAINER & REEFER FREIGHT, REROUTING & ALTERNATIVE CORRIDORS (2024–2026) === **Security situation & traffic shifts (2024–early 2026)** - Armed attacks by Houthi forces on commercial shipping in the Red Sea/Bab el‑Mandeb from late 2023 onward caused a sharp reduction in Suez‑transiting traffic. UNCTAD estimates: - **Suez Canal ship transits fell from 2,068 in Nov 2023 to ~877 in Oct 2024** (≈−58%).([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Container vessel traffic via Suez in 2024 was down **≈75% vs 2023** as carriers rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - Rerouting around the Cape adds about **4,575 nautical miles and ~12 days** to a Shanghai–Rotterdam voyage, increasing fuel consumption and **CO₂ emissions per voyage by ~40%**, potentially +14% extra if speeds are increased to claw back time.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - Despite some reports of partial return to the Red Sea in early 2026, shipping and insurance industry commentary indicates that **most container traffic normally using Suez remains on Cape routes**, pending sustained security improvements; war‑risk premiums remain elevated.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) **Impact on container & reefer freight rates (Asia–Europe/Mediterranean)** - OECD analysis (Dec 2024) notes that following Red Sea attacks, **Shanghai–Europe container spot rates increased by more than 300%**, reaching about **US$5,000/FEU (40') to Rotterdam** and **US$6,000/FEU to Genoa** in early 2024, compared with pre‑crisis levels around US$1,500/FEU.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - UNCTAD’s 2025 maritime transport review confirms that by end‑2024, **spot container freight rates on routes transiting Suez had recorded strong spikes** due to the Red Sea crisis, though they eased from their early‑2024 peaks as new capacity entered the market and carriers adjusted rotations.([unctad.org](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025ch3_en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Independent freight analytics (e.g., Freightos FBX) show that Red Sea diversions in 2024–25 **absorbed global container capacity and set a new “elevated floor”** for long‑haul rates (US$3,000–5,000/FEU) even during low‑demand periods, compared with sub‑US$2,000 floors pre‑crisis.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai)) - As of April–May 2026, with the Red Sea still not fully normalised and additional Middle East risk (e.g., higher bunker costs due to Hormuz tensions), freight updates indicate: - Asia–Europe rates are **>15% higher y/y** and more than **50% above the previous low‑demand trough (Oct 2025)**; - Transpacific lanes show modest movements (Asia–US WC and EC ±1–3%), but commentary notes that Red Sea‑related longer routings on Asia–Europe continue to **keep global box‑ship utilisation and rates elevated relative to underlying demand**.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1ti4x5c/freightos_weekly_update_may_19_2026_excerpts/?utm_source=openai)) - Refrigerated (reefer) containers are disproportionately affected as: - longer transits require **more plug‑capacity and port power**, increasing slot premiums; and - exporters of perishables (e.g., fresh produce from East Africa or Asia to EU) face higher **all‑in reefer surcharges** and tighter booking windows. (Reefer‑specific numbers are limited, but market reports consistently describe reefer premiums widening over dry‑box rates during disruptions.)([unctad.org](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025ch3_en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Insurance costs & risk premiums** - War‑risk insurance premia for vessels entering the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden corridor increased sharply in 2024 and remained **elevated into 2026**, with insurers citing continued sporadic attacks and high‑profile missile/drone incidents.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) - Industry commentary in early 2026 stresses that **even when some lines tentatively return to the Red Sea, higher insurance costs and risk surcharges persist**, making the Suez route economically unattractive relative to the Cape for many services unless rate spreads widen significantly.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Demand for alternative corridors & modal shifts (impacting EMENA–Europe flows)** - **Maritime rerouting (Cape of Good Hope):** - By mid‑2024, roughly **30% of global container volumes** that normally transited Suez were estimated to be rerouted around the Cape, absorbing capacity and driving rates higher.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai)) - For Asia–Mediterranean lanes (key for reefer flows into EMENA and Southern Europe), extended transits increasingly conflict with peak‑season windows (e.g., EU Christmas/New Year, Ramadan, and northern‑hemisphere summer produce peaks). Importers have **brought orders forward by several weeks** in 2024–25 to compensate for 7–12 extra sailing days.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1ti4x5c/freightos_weekly_update_may_19_2026_excerpts/?utm_source=openai)) - **Overland & short‑sea alternatives into Europe:** - Geopolitical risk in the Red Sea has revived interest in **overland Eurasian corridors**, but security and sanctions constraints through Russia/Belt‑and‑Road rail options limit their role, especially for agro‑food products requiring controlled cold‑chain and predictable customs regimes.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Within EMENA, shippers have increasingly used **short‑sea Mediterranean services** and **Ro‑Ro links** (e.g., Turkey–Italy/France/Spain, North Africa–Spain/France) as part of network redesign, though quantitative data for 2025–26 volumes is still sparse. The strategic implication is **more “med‑centric” routing** for perishables bound for EU, partly decoupled from Asia–Europe mainline schedules.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Modal shifts for perishables:** - High‑value perishables particularly sensitive to transit time (e.g., berries, high‑value chilled meat) have seen **selective modal shift to airfreight**, though at substantial cost; container‑ship disruptions push some cargo to **rail and road via Turkey and the Balkans** for intra‑regional EMENA–EU movements.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Key 2026 implications for container & reefer users (agri/food)** - Baseline ocean freight from Asia to Europe/Mediterranean in 2026 is: - structurally **higher than pre‑Red Sea crisis** (multi‑year floor uplift), - combined with **longer, less predictable transit times**.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For exporters from EMENA into Europe using feeder legs tied to Asia–Europe mainlines (e.g., transshipment in East Med hubs), the risk is **schedule bunching and rolled bookings**, especially for reefers at peak. - These conditions strengthen the commercial case for **origin diversification closer to EU consuming markets (North Africa, Turkey, intra‑EU)** and **more regionalised, Med‑centric logistics chains** for perishables, even if FOB prices are higher, because they reduce total supply‑chain risk and working‑capital tied in longer pipelines.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Dimension 2):** ([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) === 3. DEMAND SIGNALS — EUROPEAN IMPORTERS DIVERSIFYING FROM BLACK SEA ORIGINS TO NORTH AFRICA & TURKEY (CEREALS, OILSEEDS, PROCESSED FOODS, 2024–2026) === **Macro context: Black Sea risk & EU import behaviour** - Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022) and subsequent volatility in Black Sea export corridors, EU cereal and oilseed buyers have **rebalanced sourcing portfolios**, actively adding origins in **North Africa (notably Morocco for processed foods; Algeria/Tunisia for durum; Egypt as buyer hub) and Turkey**, while also increasing North and South American volumes. - COCERAL (EU grain trade association) highlights in its March 2026 crop‑forecast communication the ongoing **“logistical challenges (including Ukraine and the Black Sea)”** and explicitly frames supply‑security risk as a driver of diversified trade flows and investment in alternative corridors.([coceral.com](https://www.coceral.com/?utm_source=openai)) - OECD’s 2024 “Risks and Resilience in Global Trade” report generalises that **supply shocks and transport disruptions (Ukraine war, Red Sea crisis)** are prompting firms to adopt “friend‑shoring” and multi‑origin strategies, particularly for food and fertilisers.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Cereals & oilseeds – diversification patterns** - EU agri‑food trade monitoring (March 2025, published June 2025) notes a **“strong reduction in the volume of cereals exports”** from the EU amid volatile Black Sea flows, while EU imports of some cereals and oilseeds show higher shares from **non‑traditional origins**, with Mediterranean suppliers gaining on specific lines (durum, some pulses and niche oilseeds).([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c35497b9-235f-46c4-b737-918cec4b1abf_en?filename=monitoring-agri-food-trad_june2025_en.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - Trade statistics by origin are still catching up for 2025–26, but observable signals include: - **Turkey** strengthening its role not only in fruit & vegetables but also as a **processing and transshipment hub for wheat flour, pasta, and bakery products** into the EU, leveraging competitive wheat access from Russia/Kazakhstan plus domestic milling; - **North African millers and crushers** (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) benefiting from risk‑premium spreads on Black Sea grains and sunflower oil, incentivising forward purchases and blending strategies that ultimately feed EU imports of **processed foods, canned vegetables, olive oil, table olives and confectionery**.([coceral.com](https://www.coceral.com/?utm_source=openai)) *(inferred from sector‑wide exports and investment flows)* **Processed foods & EMENA origin gains (Morocco, Turkey, others)** - Moroccan agri‑food export data show: - A projected **US$5.2 bn** in processed food export value by 2033, with table olives already at **~53,000 t exports in 2024** (+6% vs 2023) and a strong 2024 performance in Gulf and non‑EU markets, but continued growth into the EU as well.([foodmagazine.ma](https://www.foodmagazine.ma/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/FOOD-Magazine-175-January-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - More broadly, Moroccan processed fruit & veg (canned vegetables, frozen vegetables, juices) have been growing mid‑single to high‑single digits annually, giving EU buyers **non‑Black‑Sea alternatives** for processed tomato products, canned pulses and other ambient‑stable items.([fruitnet.com](https://www.fruitnet.com/eurofruit/record-year-for-moroccan-fruit-and-vegetable-exports/270177.article?utm_source=openai)) - France’s 2024 export data show **+4% y/y for processed vegetables (canned & frozen)**, mainly to Belgium, Germany and Italy – an intra‑EU signal that **downstream processors in Western Europe are sourcing more raw/semiprocessed inputs both from southern EU and EMENA** to hedge against upstream grain and veg‑oil volatility.([agriculture-dromoise.fr](https://www.agriculture-dromoise.fr/articles/davantage-de-volumes-de-legumes-exportes-en-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - Turkey’s agri‑food exports (notably flour, pasta, biscuits, confectionery, vegetable oils) have continued to rise since 2022, with EU buyers often **locking in term contracts** to reduce exposure to Ukrainian port interruptions and Russian export restrictions; Turkey simultaneously sources Black Sea grains but converts them into value‑added products with **shorter lead times into EU via Med short‑sea lanes**.([coceral.com](https://www.coceral.com/?utm_source=openai)) *(pattern inferred from trade association and logistics literature)* **Lead‑time and inventory behaviour (2024–26)** - Freightos and other logistics commentary indicate that, under combined Red Sea and Black Sea risk: - European importers **advanced order cycles** for Asia–Europe shipments by 1–3 weeks in 2024–25 to compensate for longer Cape routes; - This behaviour spilled over into agri‑food, where buyers of containers for ambient and refrigerated cargo booked space **earlier in the season** and **favoured nearer origins** (eastern Med, North Africa) to reduce pipeline days and working‑capital requirements.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai)) - OECD and UNCTAD both describe a shift from “just‑in‑time” to **“just‑in‑case” inventory strategies**, especially for critical foodstuffs and inputs, with average days of stock held increasing and **multi‑origin supplier rosters becoming the norm** for large European food manufacturers.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Concrete demand signals for EMENA origins (2025–26)** - Rising **EU imports of Moroccan and Turkish fruit & vegetables**, documented above, are one visible component; similar dynamics are reported for: - **Canned tomato products and tomato paste** (where EU tomato imports from non‑EU countries increased sharply in late 2025; one European Parliament question notes an **+85.8% increase in tomato product imports from non‑EU countries** in 2H 2025, with Morocco among key suppliers).([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2026-000720_EN.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Vegetable oils and olive products**, where Moroccan and Turkish exporters are filling gaps created by erratic Black Sea sunflower oil flows and climate‑hit EU olive harvests (Italy’s olive oil volumes fell −5% in 2024; table olive exports from Morocco grew +6% in 2024).([istat.it](https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/preliminary-estimate-of-agricultural-economic-accounts-year-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - **Pulses and niche cereals**, where droughts and export controls in Black Sea exporters have nudged European buyers toward Mediterranean suppliers (e.g., durum from North Africa, pulses from Turkey and Mediterranean basin), though hard numbers for 2025–26 by origin are still being consolidated.([coceral.com](https://www.coceral.com/?utm_source=openai)) **Strategic implications for 2026 sourcing** - For European millers, crushers, and food manufacturers, the combined effect of: - Black Sea corridor disruptions, - elevated Red Sea freight and insurance costs, and - climate shocks in key EU producing regions is to push toward **shorter, more resilient supply chains**, with **North Africa and Turkey** increasingly acting as: - **“near‑shore” raw material origins** (cereals, oilseeds, pulses), and - **processing hubs** turning imported or local commodities into finished/semifinished foods destined for the EU.([coceral.com](https://www.coceral.com/?utm_source=openai)) - Lead‑time pressure and higher working‑capital costs (from longer Asia/Black Sea routes) structurally favour: - **contracting with EMENA suppliers on shorter lead times**, - **building safety‑stock buffers closer to EU consumption markets** (e.g., warehousing in Spain, Italy, France), and - a move away from single‑origin dependence (e.g., exclusive reliance on Ukraine/Russia for wheat or sunflower oil). **Sources (Dimension 3):** ([coceral.com](https://www.coceral.com/?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Record year for Moroccan fruit and vegetable exports | News | Fruitnet https://www.fruitnet.com/eurofruit/record-year-for-moroccan-fruit-and-vegetable-exports/270177.article?utm_source=openai • Morocco: EU Tomato Imports Top $1 Billion in 2024/2025 (+7%) - Ecofin Agency https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-agriculture/0812-51186-morocco-eu-tomato-imports-top-1-billion-in-2024/2025-7?utm_source=openai • Morocco’s Tomato Exports to the EU Jump 40% in Ten Years https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/09/260376/moroccos-tomato-exports-to-the-eu-jump-40-in-ten-years/?utm_source=openai • Morocco holds 70.6 percent of non EU tomato market in Europe https://en.hespress.com/133262-morocco-holds-70-6-percent-of-non-eu-tomato-market-in-europe.html?utm_source=openai • Growing Tomato Exports Extend Morocco’s Lead Over Spain https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/05/306013/growing-tomato-exports-extend-moroccos-lead-over-spain/?utm_source=openai • Global – Tomatoes: Moroccan Export Realignment and Structural Cost Escalation https://cropgpt.ai/global-tomatoes-moroccan-export-realignment-and-structural-cost-escalation?utm_source=openai • Morocco Tomato Exports Slip; Zucchini Shipments to EU Drop Sharply https://barlamantoday.com/2026/03/24/morocco-tomato-exports-slip-zucchini-shipments-to-eu-drop-sharply/?utm_source=openai • Moroccan tomato exports to Finland double in 2025/26 season https://www.freshplaza.com/europe/article/9838619/moroccan-tomato-exports-to-finland-double-in-2025-26-season/?utm_source=openai • Tomates: les exportations marocaines vers l’UE ont bondi de 44% entre 2013 et 2025 | le360.ma https://fr.le360.ma/economie/tomates-les-exportations-marocaines-vers-lue-ont-bondi-de-44-entre-2013-et-2025_XMOZP4YMMVGV5OKT5RQSYYXLFE/?utm_source=openai • 10/13/25, 10:12 AM https://citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za/home/document-home/news-articles/fresh-plaza/fresh-plaza-2025/11104-251007-freshplaza-eu-orange-imports-from-south-africa-up-46/file?utm_source=openai • Économie du Maroc https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89conomie_du_Maroc?utm_source=openai • How much fruit and vegetables does the EU harvest? - News articles - Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250825-1?utm_source=openai • Morocco’s Tomato Exports to the EU Jump 40% in Ten Years https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/09/260376/moroccos-tomato-exports-to-the-eu-jump-40-in-ten-years/?utm_source=openai • Vegetable sector in France https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetable_sector_in_France?utm_source=openai • Preliminary estimate of agricultural economic accounts – Year 2024 – Istat https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/preliminary-estimate-of-agricultural-economic-accounts-year-2024/?utm_source=openai • Italian fruit and vegetable exports held up well in the first half of 2024 https://www.freshplaza.com/europe/article/9658538/italian-fruit-and-vegetable-exports-held-up-well-in-the-first-half-of-2024/?utm_source=openai • Growing Tomato Exports Extend Morocco’s Lead Over Spain https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/05/306013/growing-tomato-exports-extend-moroccos-lead-over-spain/?utm_source=openai • Tomates: les exportations marocaines vers l’UE ont bondi de 44% entre 2013 et 2025 | le360.ma https://fr.le360.ma/economie/tomates-les-exportations-marocaines-vers-lue-ont-bondi-de-44-entre-2013-et-2025_XMOZP4YMMVGV5OKT5RQSYYXLFE/?utm_source=openai • Preliminary estimate of agricultural economic accounts – Year 2024 – Istat https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/preliminary-estimate-of-agricultural-economic-accounts-year-2024/?utm_source=openai • 10/13/25, 10:12 AM https://citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za/home/document-home/news-articles/fresh-plaza/fresh-plaza-2025/11104-251007-freshplaza-eu-orange-imports-from-south-africa-up-46/file?utm_source=openai • Ref. Ares(2024)4821146 - 04/07/2024 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a1e8c5df-df2c-468b-9925-d8726ce65e96_en?filename=minutes-fv-mo-tomatoes-2024-6-21_en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Growing Tomato Exports Extend Morocco’s Lead Over Spain https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/05/306013/growing-tomato-exports-extend-moroccos-lead-over-spain/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai • Red Sea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai • 🚢 Red Sea Shipping Insurance Costs Surge Again: Trade risks rise 👇 https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai • Risks and Resilience https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Review of maritime transport 2025 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025ch3_en.pdf?utm_source=openai • FREIGHTOS WEEKLY UPDATE - November 25, 2025 | Excerpt: “…US could enter a restocking cycle in 2026 as frontloaded inventories wind down. This restocking could mean stronger freight demand than some have anticipated for next year.” https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai • FREIGHTOS WEEKLY UPDATE - May 19, 2026 | Excerpts: ”Asia-US West Coast prices (FBX01 Weekly) decreased 1%.” | “Asia-US East Coast prices (FBX03 Weekly) decreased 1%.” https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1ti4x5c/freightos_weekly_update_may_19_2026_excerpts/?utm_source=openai • Risks and Resilience https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • FREIGHTOS WEEKLY UPDATE - November 25, 2025 | Excerpt: “…US could enter a restocking cycle in 2026 as frontloaded inventories wind down. This restocking could mean stronger freight demand than some have anticipated for next year.” https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai • Risks and Resilience https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai