Research Intel
Hook Candidates
1) ‘‘China+1’ sourcing push for seafood & processed agri (2025–26): Position WELCO to offer clients immediate access to verified ASEAN suppliers and ready‑to‑ship lots via Tridge Ark — Tridge Ark can originate and qualify exporters (Vietnam/Thailand/Indonesia) and hand over logistics‑ready contracts and documents that plug into WELCO’s forwarding operations, shortening supplier discovery and reducing the need for ad‑hoc re‑routing during seasonal shortages.
2) NACCS small‑cargo & e‑commerce compliance: Offer WELCO a value proposition around reducing NACCS exceptions — Tridge Ark supplies pre‑validated trade data, HS codes and packing manifests for small‑sea shipments so WELCO can file accurate pre‑arrival NACCS messages and speed clearance for B2C/LCL customers, converting digitalization into a service sale rather than a compliance cost.
(Alternate angle) Rate volatility contingency: Tridge Ark’s sourcing flexibility helps WELCO clients switch to alternative origins or split shipments fast when mainline schedules or rates spike — positioning WELCO as a proactive logistics partner that avoids blank‑sailing shocks for key agri/seafood customers.
## Company Profile
WELCO EXPRESS CO.,LTD. — Japan-based freight forwarder (category: freight_forwarder). Public-facing evidence limited to a company recruitment page; no detailed company financials available. Operates in Japanese export/import forwarding using major national gateways (Tokyo/Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka/Kobe). Likely services: international freight forwarding (FCL/LCL), customs handling, consolidation for small cargo/e‑commerce, and regional logistics for agri/seafood exporters and importers. Scale not publicly listed; positioned as a Japan domestic/Asia regional forwarder serving exporters and importers across common Japan corridors.
## Pain Points
1) Client origin‑diversification & routing complexity: Japanese importers/exporters are shifting sourcing (China→China+1 to Vietnam/Thailand/Indonesia) for seafood, processed poultry and horticulture—forwarder clients need faster supplier discovery, alternate lanes and consolidated routing options.
2) NACCS small‑cargo digitalization & data demands: Japan Customs’ Oct 12, 2025 simplified small‑sea‑cargo regime increases need for accurate pre‑arrival data, EDI/NACCS integration and standardized documentation; errors create holds and manual work.
3) Rate & schedule volatility / contingency planning: 2026 Red Sea/Suez risk and mainline blank sailings drive sudden capacity shortages and ±20–30% rate swings, forcing clients to find alternate suppliers/routes or accept costly rollovers.
(Secondary) Growth of small‑parcel/e‑commerce sea traffic: creates margin pressure and need to automate low‑value clearance.
## Intel Summary
=== MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH ===
=== 1. MARKET EVENTS – JAPAN CONTAINER TRADE 2026 (CHINA / ASEAN; TOKYO–OSAKA–NAGOYA) ===
**Overall 2024–26 container trade context**
- Japan’s containerized trade remained in mild growth through 2024, with Japan’s 12 major ports handling 3.89m TEU of foreign‑trade containers in Q3 2024, up **0.6% YoY**. Tokyo, Yokohama and Nagoya saw modest export gains, while Osaka and Kobe were slightly negative, indicating an ongoing hub/feeder reshuffle rather than a volume collapse. ([jiffa.or.jp](https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-9345.html?utm_source=openai))
- A container‑based analysis of 2024 MoF data shows Japan’s overall 2024 trade deficit at **¥5.5 trillion (≈US$36.8bn)**, but export containers grew strongly, led by autos to North America/Middle East and machinery to China/ASEAN. Export growth slowed through the year (Q1 +10.7% YoY, Q2 +6.7%, Q3 +4.4%), implying a maturing rebound entering 2025–26. ([vizionapi.com](https://www.vizionapi.com/blog/japan-container-trade-2024?utm_source=openai))
**Port-level trends: Tokyo / Osaka / Nagoya and other majors**
- In Q3 2024, exports by port (foreign trade containers) were approximately: Yokohama **269,492 TEU** (+0.6% YoY), Nagoya **256,051 TEU** (‑2.2%), Kobe **220,570 TEU** (‑4.9%), Tokyo **201,277 TEU** (‑0.2%), Osaka **91,032 TEU** (‑5.1%). These are important baselines for 2025–26 planning. ([jiffa.or.jp](https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-9345.html?utm_source=openai))
- Tokyo has been gaining relative share: Q3 2024 container throughput at Tokyo reached record levels, with imports at **202,664 TEU** (+6.0% YoY) and exports **155,169 TEU** (+3.5% YoY), indicating growing use of Tokyo as a mainline call for North America and intra‑Asia. ([vizionapi.com](https://www.vizionapi.com/blog/japan-container-trade-2024?utm_source=openai))
- Nagoya remains Japan’s largest port by total cargo: 2024 throughput was **157m tons**, roughly flat YoY. Port statistics for containerized international trade show China as Nagoya’s top partner, with ASEAN (notably Thailand, Vietnam) also key; provisional data suggest container trade with China held broadly steady in 2024 despite geopolitical noise. ([port-of-nagoya.jp](https://www.port-of-nagoya.jp/english/aboutport/statistics/1004140/index.html?utm_source=openai))
**China vs ASEAN routing / volume signals**
- 2025–26 global forecasts expect **2.5–3.5% growth in containerized trade in 2026**, with intra‑Asia and Asia–Europe lanes showing **double‑digit growth** as China shifts exports away from the US towards regional and European markets. That supports continued strong flows on China–Japan and ASEAN–Japan legs, even if some US‑bound manufacturing leaves China. ([maritimegateway.com](https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai))
- A Q1 2026 import analysis of Japan points to a “gradual diversification away from China toward Southeast Asian hubs such as Vietnam and Thailand” as part of a multi‑year strategy. It characterizes 2025–26 as a **rebalancing, not a decoupling**: China remains the single largest origin, but its import share is slowly ceded to ASEAN suppliers across manufactured goods and some food categories. ([tendata.com](https://www.tendata.com/blogs/import/10834.html?utm_source=openai))
- The 2025–26 China–Japan diplomatic crisis (including China’s halt of imports of Japanese seafood in late 2025) increases political risk on the Japan–China corridor but does not directly restrict containerized Japan imports from China. However, Japanese shippers are increasingly building **“China+1” routing**, adding Vietnam/Thailand/Indonesia calls to reduce dependency. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_China%E2%80%93Japan_diplomatic_crisis?utm_source=openai))
**Congestion / operational patterns into 2026**
- Major Japan gateways have **not** reported Red‑Sea‑style chronic congestion in early 2026. Industry updates characterize global congestion as localized to certain tranship hubs and Gulf/Suez‑affected ports, with Far East hubs seeing “much less significant” backlogs than during the initial Red Sea shock; Japan’s big six ports (Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Fukuoka/Hakata) are absorbing some re‑routed Asia–Europe volumes but remain operational. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1rq4z0k/freightos_weekly_update_march_10_2026_excerpts/?utm_source=openai))
- Rate risk remains elevated: 2026 scenario analysis suggests Red Sea resolutions or escalations could swing Asia–Europe rates by **±20–30% within weeks**, indirectly affecting east Asia mainline capacity available to Japan and potentially leading to more **blank sailings** and schedule unreliability on China/ASEAN–Japan loops, especially for lower‑yield cargo. ([maritimegateway.com](https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai))
**Implications / signals for 2026**
- Expect **modest positive growth** in Japan’s container imports from both China and ASEAN in 2026, but with:
- Slight **share erosion of China** in favor of ASEAN origins.
- Ongoing **hub concentration** at Tokyo/Yokohama and Nagoya, with somewhat weaker relative growth at Osaka/Kobe.
- Elevated schedule and rate volatility due to shifting Suez/Red Sea dynamics and new capacity entering the market, rather than domestic Japanese constraints. ([jiffa.or.jp](https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-9345.html?utm_source=openai))
=== 2. COMMODITY TRENDS – JAPAN SEAFOOD & AGRI IMPORTS 2026 (CHINA / USA / SE ASIA) ===
**Macro agri‑food import picture**
- USDA ERS estimates Japan imported **US$65.8bn** of agricultural products in 2025, cementing its role as one of the world’s largest agri importers. The US remains a primary supplier of grains (corn, wheat), beef and pork; diversification is most visible in processed foods, some horticulture, and certain bulk commodities. ([ers.usda.gov](https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-us-trade/countries-regions/japan-south-korea?utm_source=openai))
- A French Treasury agricultural bulletin for Feb 2026 notes that Japanese agri‑food imports from France totaled **€1.32bn** in 2025, down **2.7% YoY**, and highlights the impact of weak yen and lower household real incomes on premium food imports. ([tresor.economie.gouv.fr](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai))
**Seafood: structure and 2025–26 shifts**
- China–Japan tensions: As part of the 2025–26 diplomatic crisis, China informed Japan in Nov 2025 that it would **temporarily halt imports of Japanese seafood**, following earlier restrictions linked to Fukushima water releases. While this primarily hits Japanese exports, the political spat also incentivizes Japanese buyers to **de‑risk China** as a seafood processing base, with more sourcing from Vietnam, Thailand and domestic producers for re‑export. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_China%E2%80%93Japan_diplomatic_crisis?utm_source=openai))
- Although comprehensive 2025 Japan seafood import statistics are not yet fully consolidated, trade and industry commentary point to:
- **Steady or slightly higher volumes of frozen whitefish and pelagics**, with **more product routed via ASEAN processors** (Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) instead of directly from China, to hedge geopolitical and regulatory risk.
- Strong demand recovery from inbound tourism (record **42.7m visitors in 2025**), which boosted foodservice demand for seafood in H2 2025 and is expected to keep import demand firm through 2026, especially for frozen shrimp, squid, salmon and value‑added products. ([wusata.org](https://www.wusata.org/downloads/files/Marketing%20Intelligence%20Reports/WUSATA_Contractor_Market_Intelligence_Report_January-2026_Japan.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- On the export side (relevant for two‑way flows and supplier relationships), smaller Japanese exporters report robust regional demand, especially to Taiwan and the US, underscoring Japan’s role as a high‑value seafood supplier within Asia even as it remains a large net importer in volume terms. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/Seafood/comments/1tclesn/seafood_exportimport_advice_struggling_to_connect/?utm_source=openai))
**Meat & livestock imports (context for US/China/ASEAS)**n
- Beef: Japan’s beef imports in Dec 2025 reached **43,015 mt**, up **9.7% YoY** and **11.1% MoM**, partly supported by yen depreciation making imports more attractive than domestic beef. The US and Australia remain the dominant suppliers; Brazilian and other South American origins are important for poultry. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/agriculture/021026-japan-data-yen-depreciation-spurs-beef-imports-in-dec-chicken-and-pork-face-challenges?utm_source=openai))
- Chicken: Brazilian exports of boneless chicken legs (Japan’s preferred cut) were **below the desired 35–40k mt/month for most of 2025**, leaving tight stocks and underpinning higher import demand and firm prices into early 2026. ASEAN producers (Thailand in particular) benefit from this tightness, gaining incremental share in processed poultry products. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/agriculture/021026-japan-data-yen-depreciation-spurs-beef-imports-in-dec-chicken-and-pork-face-challenges?utm_source=openai))
**Grains, feed and other agriculture**
- A January 2026 market intelligence update for Japan notes:
- The US will remain Japan’s **anchor supplier for feed grains and red meat in 2026**, though feed formulators are optimizing to cheaper origins when arbitrage allows (e.g., corn competition from Brazil).
- Rice imports “normalized” after the 2024–25 spike, but Minimum Access (WTO quota) volumes remain fully used. ([wusata.org](https://www.wusata.org/downloads/files/Marketing%20Intelligence%20Reports/WUSATA_Contractor_Market_Intelligence_Report_January-2026_Japan.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Rice: MoF data cited in January 2026 show **private‑sector rice imports surged 95‑fold in 2025** to **96,834 tons**, driven by domestic price spikes. Even with normalization in 2026, that experience encourages traders and retailers to:
- Maintain **standing import channels** (notably from the US, Australia and some ASEAN origins).
- Lobby for more flexibility in emergency imports, making future spikes more likely to be covered by imports rather than stock drawdowns alone. ([japantimes.co.jp](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/01/29/economy/japan-private-sector-rice-imports/?utm_source=openai))
- Vegetables: The 2026 French bulletin reports a “perception of domestic vegetable shortages” and price rises in 2025 leading to a **13% increase in onion imports** (from 270,000 t to 305,700 t) and a **tripling of cabbage imports**, signaling structural reliance on foreign suppliers when domestic weather shocks hit. Many of these volumes come from China and Korea, but ASEAN suppliers are increasing participation for onions, frozen vegetables and processed items. ([tresor.economie.gouv.fr](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai))
**Diversification of origins: China vs USA vs Southeast Asia**
- Multiple recent analyses describe Japan’s 2025–26 strategy as **“gradual diversification away from China”**:
- China remains the largest single source of many processed foods, vegetables and fish/seafood products.
- However, import shares are gradually shifting toward **Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia** in frozen seafood, processed poultry, canned fruits, and some horticultural lines. ([tendata.com](https://www.tendata.com/blogs/import/10834.html?utm_source=openai))
- For US suppliers:
- 2025–26 outlooks suggest stable‑to‑higher US shares in **feed grains, red meat and some high‑value processed foods**, leveraging the weak yen’s effect on Japanese retail prices and the relative competitiveness of US bulk exports. ([wusata.org](https://www.wusata.org/downloads/files/Marketing%20Intelligence%20Reports/WUSATA_Contractor_Market_Intelligence_Report_January-2026_Japan.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Overall 2026 signals:
- **Seafood**: demand underpinned by tourism and foodservice; political risk with China nudges more processing and sourcing via ASEAN.
- **Agri‑bulk**: US retains core role; diversification is more about risk management than displacing key suppliers.
- **Horticulture & veg**: clear pattern of turning to imports (often China/ASEAN) during domestic supply shocks, with the 2025 onion/cabbage surge as a case study. ([tresor.economie.gouv.fr](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai))
=== 3. TIMING SIGNALS – JAPAN CUSTOMS DIGITALIZATION & NACCS MODERNIZATION (2025–26) ===
**Current NACCS / Single Window set‑up**
- Japan’s customs and border‑agency procedures are integrated through the **Nippon Automated Cargo and Port Consolidated System (NACCS)**, which functions as Japan’s trade Single Window, handling online customs, port, quarantine and related regulatory processes. ([unescap.org](https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf?utm_source=openai))
**Recent digitalization steps & 2025–26 changes**
- Japan Customs introduced a new **simplified customs clearance for small sea cargo** scheme, with:
- **Start date: 12 October 2025** for items transacted via e‑commerce and shipped by sea.
- A dedicated NACCS operation for simplified small‑cargo clearance, with **advance cargo information** submitted through NACCS prior to import or pre‑arrival declaration. ([customs.go.jp](https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai))
- The scheme builds on earlier air‑cargo and postal e‑commerce facilitation measures and is explicitly framed as a digital/streamlined procedure rather than a paper‑based special regime, signaling:
- More **pre‑arrival risk assessment**.
- Automated handling of low‑value consignments.
- Reduced need for manual documentation for freight forwarders handling B2C flows. ([customs.go.jp](https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai))
**Impacts on freight forwarders & compliance**
- Operational implications (from customs guidance and system design):
- **Data quality and timeliness** become more critical: forwarders and NVOCCs must ensure accurate advance data (HS codes, consignee, value) in NACCS to benefit from simplified clearance; errors may trigger holds or revert shipments to standard procedures. ([customs.go.jp](https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai))
- For low‑value sea cargo, there is a potential **reduction in physical document handling and clearance time**, though Japan Customs has not yet published quantified average time‑savings. Precedent from air small‑parcel schemes suggests cuts of **hours to a full day** for compliant consignments, which is directionally relevant for LCL and e‑commerce flows. (This magnitude is an inference based on earlier NACCS single‑window performance, not an official metric.) ([unescap.org](https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Forwarders may need to **upgrade in‑house systems or EDI links to NACCS**, including:
- Mapping new message types for small‑cargo operations.
- Adjusting internal workflows for pre‑arrival filing rather than post‑arrival documentation.
- Medium‑term, the Japanese government’s broader trade‑facilitation agenda positions NACCS modernization as a way to:
- Lower overall **border compliance costs**.
- Maintain Japan’s competitive position as a logistics hub despite relatively high labor costs.
- Support the structural shift towards **more fragmented, smaller shipments** (e‑commerce, just‑in‑time parts) in parallel with traditional FCL flows. ([unescap.org](https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf?utm_source=openai))
**Timing signals for 2026 execution**
- **Key date already fixed**:
- 12 October 2025: go‑live for simplified customs clearance for small sea cargo via NACCS. Systems and procedures are already in effect in 2026, with trial use and refinements ongoing. ([customs.go.jp](https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai))
- For freight forwarders and shippers, 2025–26 is the window to:
- Complete **IT integration** with the updated NACCS functions.
- Review **master data governance** (product classifications, HTS coding) to minimize exceptions.
- Re‑evaluate **service offerings and pricing** for e‑commerce and LCL traffic, reflecting potentially faster clearance and lower per‑shipment handling costs for compliant cargo.
- No major public announcements yet signal a full‑scale “NACCS 2.0” replacement during 2026, but the incremental reforms around small cargo and continued Single Window alignment indicate a **gradual modernization path** rather than a single cut‑over event. ([customs.go.jp](https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai))
If you want, I can next translate these directional signals into concrete sourcing / routing scenarios (e.g., “how would a frozen seafood exporter in Vietnam practically adjust routing and documentation for Japan in 2026?”).
Sources:
• Containers to/from Japan's 12 Major Ports Increase 0.6% to 3.89 Mil. TEUs | News | JIFFA - Japan International Freight Forwarders Association Inc
https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-9345.html?utm_source=openai
• Japan's Container Trade in 2024: Export Excellence Amid Persistent Trade Deficits | VIZION
https://www.vizionapi.com/blog/japan-container-trade-2024?utm_source=openai
• Containers to/from Japan's 12 Major Ports Increase 0.6% to 3.89 Mil. TEUs | News | JIFFA - Japan International Freight Forwarders Association Inc
https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-9345.html?utm_source=openai
• Japan's Container Trade in 2024: Export Excellence Amid Persistent Trade Deficits | VIZION
https://www.vizionapi.com/blog/japan-container-trade-2024?utm_source=openai
• Statistics 2024|名古屋港管理組合公式ウェブサイト
https://www.port-of-nagoya.jp/english/aboutport/statistics/1004140/index.html?utm_source=openai
• Container Shipping Forecast 2026: Rates, Routes & Risk | Maritime Gateway
https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai
• Japan Major Imports Market Analysis 2026Q1 - by Country & Company | Tendata| Tendata
https://www.tendata.com/blogs/import/10834.html?utm_source=openai
• 2025–2026 China–Japan diplomatic crisis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_China%E2%80%93Japan_diplomatic_crisis?utm_source=openai
• FREIGHTOS WEEKLY UPDATE - March 10, 2026 | Excerpts: “Asia-US West Coast prices (FBX01 Weekly) increased 10%.” | “Asia-US East Coast prices (FBX03 Weekly) decreased 9%.”
https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1rq4z0k/freightos_weekly_update_march_10_2026_excerpts/?utm_source=openai
• Container Shipping Forecast 2026: Rates, Routes & Risk | Maritime Gateway
https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai
• Containers to/from Japan's 12 Major Ports Increase 0.6% to 3.89 Mil. TEUs | News | JIFFA - Japan International Freight Forwarders Association Inc
https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-9345.html?utm_source=openai
• Japan & South Korea | Economic Research Service
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-us-trade/countries-regions/japan-south-korea?utm_source=openai
• Lettre Agro Japon-Corée du Sud — Février 2026 | Direction générale du Trésor
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai
• 2025–2026 China–Japan diplomatic crisis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_China%E2%80%93Japan_diplomatic_crisis?utm_source=openai
• 2026 MONTHLY PROGRAM UPDATE
https://www.wusata.org/downloads/files/Marketing%20Intelligence%20Reports/WUSATA_Contractor_Market_Intelligence_Report_January-2026_Japan.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Seafood export/import advice — struggling to connect with serious international buyers
https://www.reddit.com/r/Seafood/comments/1tclesn/seafood_exportimport_advice_struggling_to_connect/?utm_source=openai
• JAPAN DATA: Yen depreciation spurs beef imports in Dec; chicken and pork face challenges | S&P Global
https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/agriculture/021026-japan-data-yen-depreciation-spurs-beef-imports-in-dec-chicken-and-pork-face-challenges?utm_source=openai
• JAPAN DATA: Yen depreciation spurs beef imports in Dec; chicken and pork face challenges | S&P Global
https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/agriculture/021026-japan-data-yen-depreciation-spurs-beef-imports-in-dec-chicken-and-pork-face-challenges?utm_source=openai
• 2026 MONTHLY PROGRAM UPDATE
https://www.wusata.org/downloads/files/Marketing%20Intelligence%20Reports/WUSATA_Contractor_Market_Intelligence_Report_January-2026_Japan.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Lettre Agro Japon-Corée du Sud — Février 2026 | Direction générale du Trésor
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai
• Japan's private-sector rice imports jump by 95 times in 2025 - The Japan Times
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/01/29/economy/japan-private-sector-rice-imports/?utm_source=openai
• Lettre Agro Japon-Corée du Sud — Février 2026 | Direction générale du Trésor
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai
• Japan Major Imports Market Analysis 2026Q1 - by Country & Company | Tendata| Tendata
https://www.tendata.com/blogs/import/10834.html?utm_source=openai
• 2026 MONTHLY PROGRAM UPDATE
https://www.wusata.org/downloads/files/Marketing%20Intelligence%20Reports/WUSATA_Contractor_Market_Intelligence_Report_January-2026_Japan.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Lettre Agro Japon-Corée du Sud — Février 2026 | Direction générale du Trésor
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/lettre-agro-japon-coree-du-sud-fervier-2026?utm_source=openai
• Single Window for Trade Facilitation:
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf?utm_source=openai
• 1007 Simplified customs clearance for small sea cargo (FAQ) : Japan Customs
https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai
• 1007 Simplified customs clearance for small sea cargo (FAQ) : Japan Customs
https://www.customs.go.jp/english/c-answer_e/imtsukan/1007_e.htm?utm_source=openai