## Company Profile SEAWAY NETWORK LOGISTICS — freight forwarder based in Iran (website: seawayco.com). Listed contact: Solmaz Dolatkhah, Sales Director. Offers standard forwarding services for importers and exporters: container & breakbulk booking, customs clearance, inland trucking, project/oversized cargo, and port handling at Iran’s main gateways (Bandar Abbas, regional feeders such as Chabahar). Position: regional forwarder focused on Iran’s overland and short‑sea corridors into Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey; likely client base includes food & FMCG exporters, construction materials, petrochemical derivatives, and importers of agri inputs. Scale: SME forwarder (no public scale figures), operating on domestic gateways and regional cross‑border routes. ## Pain Points 1) Margin compression and booking risk due to volatile war‑risk/insurance premia: Seaway’s clients (exporters to Iraq/Afghanistan/Turkey) face sudden freight and insurance surcharges that erode margins and make pricing to buyers uncertain. 2) Documentation, payment and over‑compliance friction: bank de‑risking, rejected LCs and insurance refusals slow deals and increase working capital needs for exporters/importers Seaway serves. 3) Need for alternative routing and buyer/supplier matching: clients need help identifying alternative buyers or alternative origins/markets (e.g., routing through Chabahar/INSTC or overland to Turkey/Central Asia) and closing deals quickly under compliance complexity. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. MARKET EVENTS – IRAN NON‑OIL EXPORT FLOWS TO IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, TURKEY (FOCUS ON 2025–EARLY 2026 TRENDS) === **Overall non‑oil export context** - Iran’s total non‑oil exports in the first 11 months of the Iranian year Mar 20, 2024–Feb 18, 2025 reached **141 million tons valued at USD 53.4 billion**, per Iran Customs (IRICA).([en.trend.az](https://en.trend.az/iran/4015143.html?utm_source=openai)) - Iraq remains Iran’s **#2 non‑oil export market**: for the year ending 20 March 2025, Iran exported **USD 11.9 billion** of non‑oil goods to Iraq.([tehrantimes.com](https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511553/Iraq-2nd-top-destination-of-Iranian-non-oil-goods-in-a-year?utm_source=openai)) - In 2024, Afghanistan and Turkey were among Iran’s top five export destinations by value; Pakistan is smaller but growing.([visualcapitalist.com](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/irans-top-export-destinations/?utm_source=openai)) **Iran → Iraq (non‑oil)** - Latest full‑year customs figure: **USD 11.9 billion** non‑oil exports to Iraq in the Iranian year ending March 20, 2025, confirming Iraq as the second‑largest destination after China/UAE.([tehrantimes.com](https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511553/Iraq-2nd-top-destination-of-Iranian-non-oil-goods-in-a-year?utm_source=openai)) - Khosravi border (Kermanshah) – indicative of overland trade trend: exports via this crossing to Iraq **grew 7% in value and 6% in volume** in Mar 20, 2024–Feb 18, 2025 vs the previous year.([en.trend.az](https://en.trend.az/iran/4015143.html?utm_source=openai)) - Product structure (2025 Iraqi demand view): food and FMCG dominate—construction materials, steel products, ceramics and tiles, agro‑food (dairy, poultry, processed foods), plastics, and household goods are listed as the **most demanded Iranian exports in Iraq in 2025**, with exporters noting **“stable and upward”** export trends due to Iraq’s import dependence.([sharmarket.co](https://sharmarket.co/blog/the-most-demanded-products-exported-from-iran-to-iraq-in-1404?utm_source=openai)) **Iran → Afghanistan** - Trade is increasingly routed via Iran as an alternative to Pakistan: Afghanistan’s total trade in 2025 was **USD 13.9 billion**, with a rising share moving via Iran and Central Asia because of repeated Pakistan border closures.([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40400880/afghan-trade-resilient-in-2025-as-iran-central-asia-routes-offset-pakistan-closures?utm_source=openai)) - Afghan authorities reported **bilateral trade with Iran at ~USD 3.5 billion in 2025** (all goods, both ways); Afghan exports to Iran were **USD 53 million** (lead ingots, sesame, vegetable seeds, cotton, dried fruits, gemstones), implying Iranian exports making up the bulk of the corridor.([iranpress.com](https://iranpress.com/content/314801/iran-afghanistan-trade-surges-%2435-billion?utm_source=openai)) - A customs‑based dataset (Feb 2025–Jan 2026) pegs **Iranian exports to Afghanistan at about USD 2.9 billion** over that rolling 12‑month period, concentrated in fuel and energy (HS 27), foodstuffs, construction materials, plastics, and consumer goods.([marketinsidedata.com](https://www.marketinsidedata.com/en/cntry/iran-export-afghanistan?utm_source=openai)) - Directionally, **2025–early 2026 shows growth and diversification**: more manufacturing and processed food, not just fuels, aligning with Kabul’s shift to Iran/Central Asia routes. **Iran → Pakistan** - Hard, recent quantitative data for **non‑oil only** is limited in English‑language open sources in the last 90 days; available trade structure analyses note that exports to Pakistan remain **smaller than to Iraq/Afghanistan/Turkey but strategically important**, centered on petrochemical derivatives, cement/clinker, fruits and nuts, and steel products.([visualcapitalist.com](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/irans-top-export-destinations/?utm_source=openai)) - Pakistan’s own energy crisis in early 2026 (linked to Gulf shipping disruptions) makes Iran’s overland/pipeline and short‑sea trade politically sensitive but potentially more valuable, especially for fuel, LPG, and basic foodstuffs as freight costs spike.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war_fuel_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Overall signal: 2025–26 is **not a volume break‑out market** like Iraq or Afghanistan, but Iran–Pakistan flows gain **strategic weight** as alternative supplies to Gulf‑origin cargoes constrained by maritime risk. **Iran → Turkey** - Turkey was Iran’s **4th‑largest export destination in 2024**, receiving about **USD 6.1 billion** in total exports (oil + non‑oil); Turkey, Iraq, UAE are the main regional trade partners after China.([visualcapitalist.com](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/irans-top-export-destinations/?utm_source=openai)) - Structure of non‑oil exports to Turkey: petrochemicals (polymers, aromatics), steel and semi‑finished metals, minerals and ores, agricultural goods (pistachios, raisins, fresh produce), and intermediate industrial inputs. - Recent 2025–early 2026 commentary emphasizes Turkey as both **end‑market and transit hub**: Iranian exports routed via Turkey benefit from Turkish logistics into the EU, especially while Red Sea/Suez disruptions raise costs on direct Asia–EU routes.([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) **Cross‑cutting 2026 trend signals** - **Growth trajectory:** Non‑oil exports overall are on an upward path—USD 53.4 billion in 11 months of 2024–25 vs earlier years—despite sanctions, suggesting volumes to Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey are either stable or rising heading into 2026.([en.trend.az](https://en.trend.az/iran/4015143.html?utm_source=openai)) - **Modal shift:** Land corridors (to Iraq and Afghanistan) and short‑sea routes (to Iraq’s ports, Pakistan, Turkey’s Mediterranean ports) are increasingly important as Red Sea and Hormuz risks increase voyage times and insurance costs on blue‑water routes (see sections 2 and 3).([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) **Key implications for 2026 non‑oil exports to the four neighbors** - Iraq: **High‑volume, diversified, still growing**, with >USD 11–12 billion level likely to hold or increase if security at land borders is maintained. - Afghanistan: **Fast‑growing corridor (~USD 3.5 billion two‑way trade in 2025)**, with Iran positioned as primary overland trade partner as Pakistan route reliability erodes. - Pakistan: **Strategically important but smaller**; potential upside in energy and food supplies as Gulf maritime disruptions drive demand for closer, overland or short‑sea sources. - Turkey: **Large, partly oil‑linked partner**; non‑oil exports benefit from Turkey’s role as a **logistics and re‑export platform into Europe**, especially under persistent Red Sea/Suez volatility. Sources for this section: ([tehrantimes.com](https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511553/Iraq-2nd-top-destination-of-Iranian-non-oil-goods-in-a-year?utm_source=openai)) --- === 2. DEMAND SIGNALS – FREIGHT FORWARDING CHALLENGES, SANCTIONS, ROUTING THROUGH CHABAHAR & BANDAR ABBAS (EARLY 2026) === **Sanctions, banking, and payments constraints** - Tightened sanctions since late 2025 have **intensified banking and insurance complications** for Iran‑related trade, especially via Persian Gulf ports. Many international banks refuse Iran‑linked letters of credit; freight forwarders report having to rely on **informal FX, third‑country intermediaries, and cash‑against‑documents** arrangements, which lengthen transaction cycles and raise costs.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - Even when cargo is non‑sanctioned (e.g., food, medicine), trade often faces **“over‑compliance”** by foreign banks and P&I clubs, leading to rejected payments and cancelled marine insurance for Iran‑bound or Iran‑origin cargo.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) **Port and corridor specifics – Bandar Abbas vs Chabahar** - **Bandar Abbas / Shahid Rajaee** - As of January 2026, the Shahid Rajaee port complex at Bandar Abbas handles **~85% of Iran’s container traffic**, confirming it as the dominant gateway for both imports and non‑oil exports.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - Exposure: located on the Strait of Hormuz / Persian Gulf; more directly exposed to maritime security and insurance risk. - Freight forwarders report: - Periods in late 2025 where **freight rates on routes touching the Persian Gulf jumped ~467%** due to mines/drone risk plus higher war‑risk premiums and deviation costs.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - Congestion episodes—nearly **1,000 ships waiting** in or near the Persian Gulf in June 2025 as many owners restricted transits to daylight hours; VLCC benchmark PG–China rates rose from **Worldscale 48 to 80** within a week.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/062325-ship-collision-risks-heighten-as-congestion-builds-up-in-persian-gulf?utm_source=openai)) - **Chabahar** - Situated on the Gulf of Oman, **outside the Strait of Hormuz**, and operating under a **specific U.S. sanctions waiver** mainly for humanitarian flows to Afghanistan/Central Asia.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - Serves as the southern maritime node of the **International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)**, connecting to Iran’s rail/road up to the Caspian and Russia.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - From a freight‑forwarding perspective, Chabahar offers: - Reduced sanctions risk vs Bandar Abbas (for defined cargoes). - A way to **bypass Pakistan** for Afghan trade; Afghan commerce ministry data show resilient trade in 2025 as flows via Iran & Central Asia offset Pakistan border closures.([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40400880/afghan-trade-resilient-in-2025-as-iran-central-asia-routes-offset-pakistan-closures?utm_source=openai)) - Constraints: smaller capacity and fewer mainline services than Bandar Abbas; many global liners remain risk‑averse about Iran calls, so most volumes are feeder/regionally transshipped. **Insurance and war‑risk premia** - For voyages touching the Persian Gulf and, by extension, Iran’s main ports, war‑risk premium surcharges, security measures and the need for armed guards have raised all‑in freight costs. - Reports from late 2025–early 2026 describe **war‑risk insurance premium hikes of 50–60%+** on Gulf‑related sailings during peaks in regional tension, with some owners simply refusing Gulf calls.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - For containerized trade, Red Sea + Gulf risk has driven Asia–Europe rates to spikes of **>250% over pre‑crisis levels** at various points since early 2024, which filters back into Iran’s import costs via transshipment hubs (Jebel Ali, Turkish ports).([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/learn/modules/red-sea-alternative-routes/?utm_source=openai)) **Routing & alternative corridor demand signals (2025–early 2026)** - **Shift away from Pakistan for Afghan trade:** - Afghanistan’s trade resilience in 2025 is explicitly attributed to **greater use of Iranian and Central Asian corridors** as Pakistan repeatedly closed key crossings.([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40400880/afghan-trade-resilient-in-2025-as-iran-central-asia-routes-offset-pakistan-closures?utm_source=openai)) - This boosts demand for Iranian overland and Chabahar‑linked services (trucking, rail, transit warehousing) handling Afghan cargo (coal, dried fruits, carpets outbound; fuel, food, manufactured goods inbound).([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40400880/afghan-trade-resilient-in-2025-as-iran-central-asia-routes-offset-pakistan-closures?utm_source=openai)) - **Demand for INSTC / north–south routes:** - Red Sea/Suez disruptions have pushed shippers to look at **Persian Gulf–Caspian–Russia/Europe** routings; Chabahar and Bandar Abbas both serve as southern gateways into INSTC. Freight forwarders marketing the corridor highlight **time savings vs Cape of Good Hope routings** despite sanctions complexity.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - **Modal diversification:** - With container rates and tanker/VLCC rates swinging sharply (VLCC MEG–China spot up to **>$170–220k/day in early 2026**), cargo owners are re‑evaluating whether to ship via sea from or via the Gulf versus **shorter sea legs plus overland trucking/rail via Iran and neighboring states**.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/SeaEmploy/comments/1ryvidc/vlcc_freight_on_td3c_still_looks_like_a_supply/?utm_source=openai)) **Operational challenges for freight forwarders** - **Documentation & compliance:** - Complex layering of U.N., U.S., and EU sanctions means freight forwarders need enhanced due diligence on shippers, consignees, banks, and cargo description (dual‑use, petrochemicals). This raises transaction costs per shipment and increases lead times.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - **Capacity & congestion:** - At peak tension in mid‑2025, Persian Gulf congestion reached **~300% of normal waiting times** at some chokepoints as vessels queued, with 10‑day delays not unusual; this propagates upstream to inland trucking, chassis availability, and warehouse space in Iranian ports.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/062325-ship-collision-risks-heighten-as-congestion-builds-up-in-persian-gulf?utm_source=openai)) - **Pricing volatility:** - Spot‑freight quotations into/out of Iran can shift by **double‑digit percentages in a few days** as war‑risk levels are updated; forwarders are often forced to build **short‑validity or index‑linked rate clauses** into contracts to share risk with shippers.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/062325-ship-collision-risks-heighten-as-congestion-builds-up-in-persian-gulf?utm_source=openai)) **Net demand signal** - Demand is **shifting, not collapsing**: despite the sanctions and risk premia, there is clear and rising demand for: - Chabahar‑based and Hormuz‑bypassing services (for Afghanistan, Central Asia). - Iran‑linked overland corridors feeding into Turkey, Russia, and Central Asia as alternatives to high‑risk maritime segments. - Freight‑forwarding services that can structure **compliant payment/insurance solutions** around Iran trade, including multi‑jurisdictional routing. Sources for this section: ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/062325-ship-collision-risks-heighten-as-congestion-builds-up-in-persian-gulf?utm_source=openai)) --- === 3. PROBLEM FRAMING – RED SEA & REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY IMPACT ON PERSIAN GULF ROUTES & FREIGHT RATES (2024–EARLY 2026) === **Red Sea / Bab el‑Mandeb disruption – baseline** - Red Sea attacks starting late 2023 (Houthi operations) cut Suez/Red Sea container traffic sharply; by 2024, **container vessel traffic through the Suez Canal was down ~75% vs 2023**, as most lines rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Asia–Europe container rates: - Shanghai–Europe rates increased **~256%** from Dec 2023 baseline by Feb 2024.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Some analyses report FEU spot rates jumping from **~USD 2,000/FEU pre‑crisis to USD 5,500–8,400/FEU at various peaks**, i.e., +175–320%.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Spillover into Persian Gulf / Hormuz (2025–2026)** - **Congestion and collision risk:** - June 2025 S&P Global: Persian Gulf shipping faced **severe congestion**, with **nearly 1,000 ships backed up**, and higher collision risks due to GPS jamming and restricted night‑time transits. VLCC freight on PG–China jumped from **WS48 to WS80** (approx +67%) within one week.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/062325-ship-collision-risks-heighten-as-congestion-builds-up-in-persian-gulf?utm_source=openai)) - **Hormuz disruption & 2026 Iran war crisis:** - 2026 crisis scenarios describe partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with fears of broader Gulf shipping disruption; fuel prices spiked toward **USD 80/bbl** whilst Gulf import‑dependent economies (Qatar >90% food import reliance) saw heightened food security risks.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war_fuel_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Pakistan responds to disrupted Gulf flows with emergency measures (shorter workweek, school closures) to conserve fuel, highlighting how **maritime disruptions in the Gulf transmit directly into regional energy and trade crises**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_in_the_2026_Iran_war?utm_source=openai)) - **War‑risk insurance and freight rates:** - Freighting commentary notes war‑risk premiums and owner caution pushing **VLCC daily earnings on Middle East–China (TD3C) to >USD 170,000–220,000/day** in early 2026, roughly **three‑fold increases vs early‑year levels**.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/SeaEmploy/comments/1ryvidc/vlcc_freight_on_td3c_still_looks_like_a_supply/?utm_source=openai)) - Some estimates suggest war‑risk and deviation‑driven cost additions can push **transport costs to ~20% of cargo value** for certain Gulf crude trades, significantly altering refinery economics and trade flows.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/SeaEmploy/comments/1ryvidc/vlcc_freight_on_td3c_still_looks_like_a_supply/?utm_source=openai)) **Interaction between Red Sea and Persian Gulf for Iran‑related trade** - **Rerouting dynamics:** - With Red Sea/Suez restricted, more Asia–Europe traffic diverts around Africa, increasing voyage times by **10–14 days** and adding **USD 1.5–2.5 million** per round voyage for large container vessels.([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363&utm_source=openai)) - For Iran, which already relies on transshipment via UAE, Oman, or Turkish ports, these extra costs and transit times **raise import prices, lengthen lead times, and complicate export scheduling**, especially for time‑sensitive non‑oil cargoes (food, perishables, FMCG).([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) - **Risk‑adjusted routing choices:** - Cargo owners must weigh: - Red Sea risk (attack probability, insurance premiums, delay) vs - Persian Gulf/Hormuz risk (closure threats, GPS jamming, military escalation) - As a result, some shippers **reduce direct exposure to both corridors** by using: - Overland rail/road via Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, and Central Asia; - Southern corridors via **Chabahar and then inland**, bypassing Hormuz and, for certain routings, the Red Sea entirely.([blogs.tarangya.com](https://blogs.tarangya.com/impact-on-irans-ports-navigating-the-new-logistics-landscape/?utm_source=openai)) **Macro trade and price impacts** - Global trade volumes: Red Sea disruptions contributed to a **~1.3% month‑on‑month fall in global trade** in one late‑2023/early‑2024 episode; subsequent crises sustain elevated freight costs through 2025.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - For food‑importing MENA and South Asian states (including Iran’s neighbors), higher freight and insurance costs on Black Sea, Red Sea and Gulf routes feed into **imported inflation** for cereals, edible oils, and fertilizers.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war_fuel_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - For Iran specifically, higher tanker and container rates plus sanctions surcharges mean: - **Higher CIF costs** on essential imports (wheat, soymeal, vegetable oils, inputs for agro‑industry). - **Compressed margins** on non‑oil exports, as freight costs take a larger share of delivered price into Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and further‑afield markets. **Problem framing summary for 2026** - The Red Sea crisis is no longer a localized choke‑point issue; combined with Hormuz tensions it creates a **dual‑chokepoint environment** in which: - Routing risk is **structural**, not episodic—owners price in chronic war‑risk and volatility; - Freight rates for both containers and tankers out of the Persian Gulf are **highly volatile and often structurally above pre‑2023 averages**; - Demand for **alternative corridors across Iran (north–south and east–west)** grows as cargo owners try to diversify away from pure maritime exposure. - For market analysis of Iranian non‑oil exports, this implies that **logistics and insurance conditions – not just demand in Iraq/Afghanistan/Pakistan/Turkey – are now key constraints and drivers** of trade volume and pricing. Sources for this section: ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/062325-ship-collision-risks-heighten-as-congestion-builds-up-in-persian-gulf?utm_source=openai))