## Company Profile Stenzel Logistics E.K. — Germany-based freight forwarder (Founder/CEO: Markus Stenzel). Public evidence places the company on the Global Aircargo Alliance founders/agency list, indicating an air‑cargo network affiliation. No detailed public scale/website found in research; likely a small‑to‑mid sized German forwarder offering airfreight, ocean consolidation, road/FTL, rail intermodal services, customs clearance and value‑added logistics for industrial exporters (automotive parts, machinery, chemicals) and e‑commerce shippers. Operates from Germany and likely serves importers/exporters across EU corridors and key gateways (Hamburg, Frankfurt, Leipzig/Dresden rail hubs). ## Pain Points 1) Margin pressure & corridor volatility on China–Europe rail: rail volumes fell after 2024 rebound and domestic track access charges rose for 2026 (5–6%); forwarders with rail exposure face shrinking volumes and thinner margins and must reconfigure corridor portfolios toward CEE/Türkiye and short‑sea/intermodal options. 2) Immediate CBAM & customs compliance workload (effective 1 Jan 2026): clients importing CBAM‑covered goods require verified emissions data, plant‑level origin evidence, new documentation fields and clearer importer/representative contracts; forwarders risk liability if indirect declaration rules are mishandled. 3) Administrative burden from small‑parcel duty & e‑commerce changes (from July 2026) plus continued freight rate & capacity shocks (Red Sea, sanctions) — necessitating rapid supplier/buyer sourcing, HS classification, and digital interfaces to handle sudden route changes and customs complexity. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – Germany freight forwarding market, container & rail trends, Europe–Asia, nearshoring impact (2026 horizon) === **Germany / Europe freight market structure & nearshoring effects** - Deloitte’s 2026 “Future of Freight – European Executive Brief” highlights three systemic drivers reshaping European freight: nearshoring, data/automation, and decarbonisation. It notes that: - Manufacturing shifts toward Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and Türkiye are *re‑routing flows* and “elevating short‑sea, rail, barge, and road connectivity” versus long-haul deepsea legs. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/de/de/Industries/transportation/perspectives/future-of-freight-european-executive-brief.html?utm_source=openai)) - UNCTAD’s 2025 “Review of Maritime Transport” (cited by Deloitte) sees 2026 marked by changing trade lanes rather than pure volume growth, reinforcing a “rewiring” of European freight corridors. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/de/de/Industries/transportation/perspectives/future-of-freight-european-executive-brief.html?utm_source=openai)) - Deloitte’s separate “Supply Chain Pulse Check 2026” for German industry models corridor shifts 2025–2035 and finds: - Stagnating demand in the US and China pushing German exporters to diversify toward Europe, parts of Asia (ex‑China), South America and Global South markets. - New FTAs and alternative corridors (e.g., via CEE, Türkiye, Middle East) create growth potential outside traditional China- and US‑centric flows. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/de/de/Industries/industrial-construction/research/supply-chain-pulse-check.html?utm_source=openai)) **Container shipping Europe–Asia (incl. impact on Germany)** - China–Europe container rail is still marginal versus ocean, but ocean freight sets the baseline: - China Railway Container Transport data (via New Silkroad Discovery) show **19,392 China–Europe block trains in 2024**, carrying **2.08 million TEU**, up **10.7% (trains)** and **9.2% (TEU)** vs 2023. Germany (Duisburg, Hamburg) remains one of the main European endpoints. ([railmarket.com](https://railmarket.com/news/freight-rail/28943-china-europe-19-000-freight-trains-in-2024?utm_source=openai)) - Red Sea disruptions in 2024 tightened capacity on Asia–Europe container services and pushed up ocean spot rates; Upply notes 2024 rate increases on Asia–Europe routes due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which temporarily improved the relative attractiveness of rail and alternative routings. ([market-insights.upply.com](https://market-insights.upply.com/fr/le-fret-ferroviaire-chine-ue-est-reparti-a-la-hausse-en-2024?utm_source=openai)) - For 2025–2026, multiple sources expect: - Continued **dominance of maritime transport** on Europe–Asia, with rail remaining a niche (high‑value, time‑sensitive, or China+1 trades) despite occasional surges related to geopolitical or capacity shocks. A 2025 review of China–EU rail notes that even after rate spikes, “rail has yet to carve out a firm, long‑lasting role” on the main corridor vs sea. ([blog.gettransport.com](https://blog.gettransport.com/news/china-eu-rail-freight-decline/?utm_source=openai)) **Rail freight Germany–Asia (China) and domestic rail cost environment** - After a strong 2024: - European Rail Alliance data (via Upply) show China–EU rail freight rebounded sharply in 2024 after two years of decline, approaching 2021’s peak levels. Volumes to Germany (Duisburg) more than doubled in 1H 2024 vs 1H 2023. ([market-insights.upply.com](https://market-insights.upply.com/en/the-development-of-china-eu-rail-freight-in-the-first-half-of-2024?utm_source=openai)) - But in 2025 volumes contracted again: - According to Upply’s March 2025 update, China–EU rail volumes on the northern corridor **fell 27% year‑on‑year in 1H 2025** (both directions) vs 1H 2024. Westbound (China→EU) and eastbound (EU→China) both saw double‑digit percentage drops. ([blog.gettransport.com](https://blog.gettransport.com/news/china-eu-rail-freight-decline/?utm_source=openai)) - A 2025 article focused on China–Germany traffic reports that after a mild rebound in 2024, **China–Germany rail traffic fell 43% in 2025 to about 13,552 TEU**, illustrating shrinking reliance on that corridor by German shippers. ([market-insights.upply.com](https://market-insights.upply.com/en/china-eu-rail-freight-volumes-fell-again-in-2025?hs_amp=true&utm_source=openai)) - Domestic rail economics 2026: - Germany’s Federal Network Agency approved DB Infrago’s track access charges for 2026 with a **5–6% increase in freight rail track prices** vs 2025, a compromise that averted an even steeper hike but still adds cost pressure for rail‑centric forwarders. ([transport-online.de](https://transport-online.de/en/news/rail-freight-transport-drastic-increase-track-prices-averted-now-least-186702.html?utm_source=openai)) - Deutsche Bahn’s 2025 outlook expects **“a positive trend in train‑path demand” for 2026** in rail freight, assuming a catch‑up effect in transport demand and noting that infrastructure works and corridor modernisations (Hamburg–Berlin, Hagen–Wuppertal–Cologne, Nuremberg–Regensburg, Obertraubling–Passau, Troisdorf–Wiesbaden) will constrain capacity and reliability during the build‑out phase. ([ibir.deutschebahn.com](https://ibir.deutschebahn.com/2025/en/combined-management-report/outlook/transport-markets/infrastructure/?utm_source=openai)) **Nearshoring / “de‑risking from China” and implications for German forwarders** - Strategic trade shifts: - McKinsey’s 2025 update on the “geometry of global trade” notes a **steady downward trend since 2020 in Germany’s share of trade with China** across leading export sectors (automotive, machinery, chemicals), within a broader pattern of regionalisation. ([mckinsey.com](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/mckinsey%20global%20institute/our%20research/geopolitics%20and%20the%20geometry%20of%20global%20trade%202025%20update/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2025-update.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - China Briefing’s “China–Germany Trade and Investment Outlook 2026” characterises Berlin’s China Strategy as *de‑risking*: diversifying supply chains and export destinations while avoiding full decoupling. It expects: - Selective engagement and continued importance of China as a profit centre for German automotive OEMs (especially EVs), but slower, more quality‑focused growth rather than volume expansion. - Strong ongoing demand in China for German robotics, precision machinery and industrial software, but with higher scrutiny and export‑control risk. ([china-briefing.com](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-germany-trade-investment-outlook-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Freight & corridor impact for German forwarders: - As German OEMs shift marginal production and sourcing to CEE, Türkiye and parts of Southeast Asia/India, freight flows are expected to: - Tilt from **deep‑sea China–Europe** to **intra‑European road/rail/barge** and **short‑sea** from Eastern Med / Black Sea into North Europe. - Increase demand for **intermodal solutions (rail+road, barge+truck)** serving EU‑based final assembly and distribution hubs. - Deloitte’s freight brief explicitly ties nearshoring to elevated demand for **regional rail and barge** capacity within Europe, which advantages German forwarders with strong CEE networks and multimodal capabilities. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/de/de/Industries/transportation/perspectives/future-of-freight-european-executive-brief.html?utm_source=openai)) **Key implications / signals for 2026** - Germany‑based forwarders with heavy China–Europe rail exposure face: - Lower China–Germany block‑train volumes vs 2024, plus **5–6% higher domestic track access charges in 2026**, pressuring margins on rail offerings. - A need to reposition capacity toward **CEE/Türkiye corridors and short‑sea + rail/road combinations**, and to deepen value‑added services (customs, CBAM/carbon reporting, digital visibility) to remain competitive. - Containerised maritime flows on Asia–Europe remain structurally dominant, but: - Geopolitical shocks (Red Sea, sanctions) periodically boost rail and alternative routings; hence, German forwarders will likely maintain a **“portfolio”** of corridors rather than rely on one main route. **Sources (Market Events)** Deloitte Supply Chain Pulse Check 2026; Deloitte Future of Freight – European Executive Brief; Deutsche Bahn Annual Report 2025 outlook; New Silkroad/CRCT China–Europe trains 2024; Upply/European Rail Alliance rail freight 2024–2025; Gettransport rail volume analysis 2025; rail freight track‑price ruling (Transport‑Online); McKinsey Global Institute 2025 trade geometry update; China–Germany Trade & Investment Outlook 2026. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/de/de/Industries/industrial-construction/research/supply-chain-pulse-check.html?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – German export sectors 2026 (automotive, chemicals, machinery), trade volumes & “away from China” shifts === **Macro export picture & regional rebalancing** - Germany’s economy remains export‑driven: - In 2024 Germany recorded a **trade surplus of c. US$255 bn**, with industry contributing ~29% of GDP. Main export categories remain vehicles, machinery, chemicals, electronics, and pharmaceuticals. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Germany?utm_source=openai)) - OSW’s January 2026 analysis of German exports notes: - **Real goods exports fell 1.4% year‑on‑year in the first three quarters of 2025**, while **service exports rose 1.6%**, partially offsetting goods weakness. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) - Weak demand and protectionist measures in the US and slower Chinese demand have hurt German **automotive and machinery** exports in particular; chemicals are also affected but somewhat less so. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) - Europe (intra‑EU) has “compensated for losses” in extra‑EU markets, underscoring a **shift toward European customers** as a demand stabiliser. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) **Automotive: demand signals & China exposure** - Market & policy headwinds: - PwC’s 2026 outlook for German Industrials & Services notes the German automotive subsector continues to face: - Macroeconomic softness, high interest rates, and pricing pressure. - Intense competition from Chinese OEMs in Europe, especially EVs. - Slower‑than‑expected EV adoption in key markets. ([pwc.de](https://www.pwc.de/en/deals/german-m-and-a-trends-in-the-industrials-and-services-sector.html?utm_source=openai)) - OSW points out that despite VW Group retaining the largest share of EU new‑car registrations in 2025, **Chinese manufacturers such as BYD are posting very high growth rates in Europe**, eroding incumbents’ growth prospects. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) - China‑related demand: - China Briefing’s 2026 China–Germany outlook expects: - China to remain a **core profit and volume market** for German OEMs, especially for high‑end vehicles and EVs, but with **slower volume growth** and higher regulatory risk. - More localised production in China (e.g., JV or wholly owned plants) reduces German **finished‑vehicle export volumes** from Germany to China, while maintaining or increasing shipments of components, capital goods and technology. ([china-briefing.com](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-germany-trade-investment-outlook-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Freight demand implication: - For German forwarders, this suggests **less growth in outbound finished‑vehicle volumes to China**, more intra‑European (EU+UK+CEE) flows, and continued—though more selective—high‑value parts and machinery movements into China and other Asian hubs. **Chemicals: energy, China competition, destination mix** - Pressure on exports & capacity: - The same OSW analysis flags chemicals as exposed to both: - Weak external demand. - **Cheap Chinese production surpluses** in chemicals and steel, which threaten EU market share and prompt calls for greater trade defence. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) - Trade geometry: - McKinsey’s 2025 trade‑geometry report highlights a **downward trend in Germany–China trade share** in chemicals (as in autos and machinery) since 2020, within a broader pattern of regionalisation and “friend‑shoring”. ([mckinsey.com](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/mckinsey%20global%20institute/our%20research/geopolitics%20and%20the%20geometry%20of%20global%20trade%202025%20update/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2025-update.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Demand signals for logistics: - Freight flows for chemicals are increasingly **regional (intra‑EU)** and oriented toward high‑spec, specialty segments rather than bulk. This favours: - Tank container, rail tank‑car and barge movements inside Europe. - More stringent compliance (ADR, SEVESO, CBAM where relevant) and documentation services by forwarders. **Machinery & industrial equipment** - China as both key market and competitor: - China Briefing and McKinsey both emphasise that German machinery and industrial technology remain in demand as China upgrades manufacturing (“New Quality Productive Forces”); German firms are key suppliers of robotics, precision machinery, and industrial software. ([china-briefing.com](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-germany-trade-investment-outlook-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - However, **China’s rising domestic capabilities** and export strength in machinery are eroding German market share and changing the product mix toward higher‑end, customised solutions. - Regional shifts: - Deloitte’s Supply Chain Pulse Check notes **clear opportunities in Asia outside China, South America and the Global South** for German industrial exporters, driven by new FTAs and shifting corridors. This aligns with a trend toward **diversification to ASEAN, India, and Latin America**, reducing dependence on China as a single growth engine. ([deloitte.com](https://www.deloitte.com/de/de/Industries/industrial-construction/research/supply-chain-pulse-check.html?utm_source=openai)) **Evidence of “supply chain shifts away from China” rather than full decoupling** - Policy framing: - Germany’s 2023 China Strategy (summarised by China Briefing) centres on “de‑risking,” including: - Supply‑chain diversification. - Export controls and investment screening in strategic sectors (e.g., semiconductors, critical infrastructure), but **no explicit decoupling objective**. ([china-briefing.com](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-germany-trade-investment-outlook-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Trade data trend: - McKinsey quantifies that **Germany’s share of its total trade conducted with China has declined steadily since 2020**, across autos, chemicals, machinery, and electronics. ([mckinsey.com](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/mckinsey%20global%20institute/our%20research/geopolitics%20and%20the%20geometry%20of%20global%20trade%202025%20update/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2025-update.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - OSW stresses that both the US and China have become less attractive as German export destinations due to protectionism and slower growth, which is **intensifying Berlin’s push for the EU–Mercosur agreement** and other diversification plays. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) **Demand signals for freight forwarders (2026)** - Sector mix: - **Automotive**: flat‑to‑weak volume growth in mature export routes; more intra‑European parts and finished‑vehicle moves; selective premium exports and CKD kits to China and other emerging markets. - **Chemicals**: modest export prospects, with stronger relative demand for compliant intra‑EU bulk/specialty logistics and supply of inputs to EU green‑industry build‑out. - **Machinery**: resilient demand from industrial upgrading in Asia (incl. China), CEE, and other emerging markets, but more fragmented and high‑spec; logistics demand is skewed to project cargo, heavy‑lift, and multimodal. - Geography: - **More European & Global South‑oriented** flows, with China still critical but losing share. - For forwarders, growth likely lies in **intra‑European and near‑market corridors (CEE, Türkiye)** and selected emerging‑market lanes, rather than incremental deep‑sea trade exclusively with China. **Sources (Demand Signals)** OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) export analysis Jan 2026; Economy of Germany overview; PwC German Industrials & Services M&A / sector outlook 2026; China–Germany Trade & Investment Outlook 2026; McKinsey 2025 trade geometry report; Deloitte Supply Chain Pulse Check 2026. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-01-09/europe-compensates-losses-german-exports?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] – EU CBAM 2026: impact on logistics, carbon costs & customs/CBAM documentation for German forwarders === **Regulatory timeline & scope moving into 2026** - CBAM is in a **transitional phase 1 October 2023 – 31 December 2025**, during which: - EU importers of CBAM‑covered goods (initially cement, iron & steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity, hydrogen, and certain downstream products) must submit **quarterly CBAM reports** with embedded emissions but **no financial adjustment yet**. ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - From **1 January 2026**: - The definitive system starts; **CBAM certificates must be surrendered annually** to cover the embedded emissions of imported goods. - Financial liability attaches to the importer (authorised CBAM declarant). Carbon costs will be linked to the EU ETS carbon price (minus any carbon price paid in the origin country). ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - The European Commission is considering an **extension of CBAM to additional sectors (e.g., polymers, organic chemicals, possibly more downstream products)** in early 2026, which would broaden the set of affected cargo types handled by forwarders. ([pwc.com](https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/2025/docs/eu-cbam-implications-for-fertilisers-and-possible-extension-to-other-sectors.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Customs and CBAM process – role of freight forwarders** - CBAM and customs are tightly interlinked: - The Commission’s 2025 “CBAM Compliance Essentials for Importers and Customs Representatives” guidance clarifies that from **1 January 2026**: - Only **authorised CBAM declarants** can import CBAM‑covered goods “in their own name and on their own behalf.” - **Indirect customs representatives** (often freight forwarders) may be held liable if they act as declarants without proper CBAM registration or if they misdeclare. ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - The Council of the EU’s April 2025 decision (confirmed by a September 2025 press release) simplifies some CBAM processes but **tightens rules on indirect customs representatives** and sets conditions under which imports of CBAM goods will be allowed **in 2026 while CBAM registration is still being finalised**. ([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/09/29/cbam-council-signs-off-simplification-to-the-eu-carbon-leakage-instrument/pdf/?utm_source=openai)) - For German freight forwarders this implies: - Increased **KYC and contract‑structuring work**: ensuring that the importer of record is an authorised CBAM declarant or understanding when the forwarder might be considered the declarant. - New **data‑collection and documentation workflows**: - Product classification and CBAM coverage (CN/HS codes). - Collection of emissions data from non‑EU producers (direct + indirect emissions), or use of default values where allowed. - Transmission of CBAM‑relevant data to clients and/or customs brokers for inclusion in CBAM reports and annual declarations. **Carbon cost exposure & pricing for logistics chains** - Direct vs indirect impact: - Academic modelling suggests CBAM **marginally increases EU Gross National Expenditure** and nudges trade toward cleaner and more domestic production, implying modest but non‑negligible price pass‑through along supply chains. ([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23341?utm_source=openai)) - For logistics players, the direct CBAM liability lies with the importer, but: - **CIF values including freight** matter for customs valuation; higher freight costs on carbon‑intensive modes (e.g., air) can indirectly raise the base for CBAM calculations where ad‑valorem customs duties and other charges interact with CBAM exposure. - Non‑EU producers may embed CBAM‑related costs into ex‑works pricing, impacting logistics spend budgets and contract negotiations. - Anticipated cost levels: - With EU ETS prices historically fluctuating between ~€60–100/tCO₂ in recent years, CBAM‑covered imports with high embedded emissions (e.g., primary steel ~1.8–2.2 tCO₂/t) could imply **carbon cost add‑ons of roughly €100–200 per tonne of material** at similar price levels, net of any recognised carbon price in the origin country (illustrative order of magnitude, not an official figure). - These costs will amplify the **competitiveness of low‑carbon supply routes and local EU production**, potentially reducing long‑haul imports of some CBAM commodities over time and shifting freight patterns. **Additional customs & small‑parcel rules relevant from mid‑2026** - The Council of the EU approved new rules on **customs duties for small parcels** in February 2026: - From **1 July 2026**, customs duty will be levied on **all small parcels entering the EU**, ending the low‑value exemption regime. - Around **4.6 billion such packages entered the EU in 2024**, **91% originating from China**, meaning a very large share of e‑commerce parcels will face customs duties and, where in scope, potential CBAM‑related checks for covered goods. ([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/11/council-gives-final-green-light-to-new-customs-duty-rules-for-small-parcels/pdf/?utm_source=openai)) - For German forwarders and parcel‑integrators: - This raises the **administrative burden on e‑commerce logistics** (HS classification, duty calculation, potential CBAM interaction for any covered goods shipped as small consignments). - It further entrenches the need for robust data interfaces between shippers, platforms, customs, and CBAM systems. **Specific documentation and operational pain points (2026)** Based on current EU guidance and Council decisions, freight forwarders in Germany should expect: 1. **Stricter product classification & origin data** - Precise CN/HS codes for CBAM‑covered goods to determine scope. - Verified non‑EU plant of production (not just export country), as CBAM emissions factors are plant‑specific. ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) 2. **Emissions data and evidence trail** - Collection of: - Direct emissions data per product type (tCO₂e per tonne or per unit). - Indirect electricity‑related emissions when in scope. - Documentation from third‑country installations following CBAM methodology (verification, calculation rules). ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) 3. **Coordination with authorised CBAM declarants** - Contractual clarity whether the **importer** or the **forwarder** acts as the CBAM declarant. - Processes for transmitting accurate emissions and quantity data so clients can: - File **quarterly reports** through 2025. - Purchase and surrender the correct volume of **CBAM certificates** annually from 2026. ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) 4. **Systems and training needs** - IT changes to integrate CBAM fields into booking, documentation and customs‑filing systems. - Staff training on: - CBAM product scope. - Interaction between CBAM and standard customs declarations (e.g., when and how CBAM IDs and emissions data are supplied). ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai)) **Strategic framing for 2026** - CBAM reinforces: - A **shift in competitive advantage toward lower‑carbon supply chains and nearer‑production** (inside the EU or in countries with robust carbon pricing), aligning with observed nearshoring and regionalisation trends that already benefit intra‑European freight. - A growing role for freight forwarders as **carbon‑data orchestrators** and compliance partners, not just capacity providers. - For German forwarders, being able to: - Offer **CBAM‑ready documentation flows**, - Quantify emissions at shipment level, and - Advise exporters/importers on **route and sourcing choices that mitigate CBAM exposure**, will be a tangible differentiator in 2026 and beyond. **Sources (Problem Framing – CBAM)** European Commission CBAM Compliance Essentials for Importers & Customs Representatives (2025); Council of the EU press release on CBAM simplification & indirect representatives (2025); Council of the EU press release on customs duties on small parcels (Feb 2026); PwC note on CBAM implications and possible sector extensions; quantitative trade‑model evaluation of CBAM. ([taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f1876575-56ae-44d9-b530-2a93a41eeb29_en?filename=Guideline+Document+for+External+Stakeholdersrev2.pdf&utm_source=openai))