Research Intel
Hook Candidates
1) Mediterranean throughput spike + Red Sea risk = exporters and importers are paying materially higher freight and war‑risk premiums in 2026. ICL’s clients (especially agri exporters and importers of feed/fertilizer) need an intelligence + execution channel to: optimize routing (sea vs sea‑air vs air), find new buyers/markets in the EU or nearby Med hubs, and lock in firm pricing. Pitch: Tridge Ark can supply live market intelligence, buyer matching and end‑to‑end order execution for ICL’s agricultural and FMCG shippers — enabling ICL to offer a one‑stop solution and reduce client churn during rate volatility.
2) Reefer & pharma sensitivity — avocados, blueberries and pharma exporters face increased transit time risk and rising reefer/air premiums because of longer Cape routings and schedule volatility. These shippers need faster market discovery and flexible transport options (air/sea‑air, priority reefers, enhanced cold‑chain visibility & insurance). Pitch: Tridge Ark can source demand and provide rapid alternative channeling (air or new buyers) that preserves export volumes and higher margins — converting at‑risk exporters into retained clients for ICL.
## Company Profile
Israel Cargo Logistics (ICL) Ltd. — freight forwarder and marine/customs insurance agent based in Israel. ICL offers sea, air and land forwarding, customs clearance and marine & customs insurance services (contact: Arie Gabai — Marine and Customs Insurance Agent). The company operates on Israel’s main Mediterranean gateways (Haifa, Ashdod) and serves both exporters (horticulture: avocados, citrus, dates, blueberries; high‑value pharma/electronics) and importers (grains, feed, fertilizers, machinery). Public footprint suggests a mid‑sized, regionally focused forwarder with expertise in Israeli port operations, customs procedures and insurance solutions; web presence: http://www.ilcargo.com and domestic news posts on activity in Ashdod/Haifa.
## Pain Points
1) Rate & routing volatility driven by Red Sea/Suez risk: ICL’s shippers face higher spot freight and war‑risk premiums, leading to margin pressure and last‑minute route changes that are operationally costly for a mid‑sized forwarder.
2) Perishable & pharma customers need faster market discovery and flexible transport options (air, sea‑air, priority reefer) plus better cold‑chain visibility and insurance — capabilities that require digitalized demand matching and execution beyond pure forwarding.
3) Importers of grains/feeds/fertilizers face rising CIF costs from freight and insurance volatility; they need alternate origins/buying channels and procurement intelligence to contain input costs — a service small forwarders struggle to provide at scale.
## Intel Summary
=== MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH ===
=== 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – ISRAEL TRADE 2026, CORRIDORS & PORT SITUATION ===
**Overall trade and seaborne flows**
- Israel’s merchandise trade deficit in December 2025 was approx. **₪10.2 bn**, with exports at **₪18.1 bn** and imports at **₪28.3 bn**, indicating strong import demand for raw materials and investment goods going into 2026.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai))
- According to Israel’s Shipping and Ports Authority data summarized in early 2026, total **container throughput at Israeli ports reached 3.445 million TEU in 2025**, up **~12.6% vs 2024**, despite Red Sea/Suez disruptions. Ashdod handled **1.248 million TEU**, Haifa **0.676 million TEU**, with the remainder at newer terminals; containers are heavily concentrated on Mediterranean ports rather than Eilat/Red Sea.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- A U.S. intelligence/NIU note (2025) puts this in perspective: **~97% of Israel’s seaborne trade moves via Haifa and Ashdod**, while Eilat’s volumes fell roughly **70% in 2024** as Red Sea risk escalated.([ni-u.edu](https://www.ni-u.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/NIUShort_20250624_DNI_2025_02750.pdf?utm_source=openai))
**Corridor shifts: Red Sea / Suez / Mediterranean**
- Bank of Israel research (Etkes & Feldman, April 2026) concludes that, despite global disruption, **Israel’s foreign trade volumes showed “no exceptional impact” from the Red Sea attacks** because:
- Israel already conducted the vast majority of its maritime trade via Mediterranean ports (Haifa, Ashdod).
- It traded less with Asia through Eilat and more with Europe/Med partners.([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- That study and related work show major **rerouting of global shipping from the Red Sea/Suez to the Cape of Good Hope** since late 2023, with **shipping capacity reallocated from trans‑Pacific to Asia–Europe/Mediterranean routes**, driving up freight into the Med.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai))
- Globally, the Red Sea–Suez corridor normally carries **~15% of world maritime trade and ~22% of global container traffic by weight**; container transits fell by about **75% in 2024 vs 2023** and remained depressed into 2025–26.([frontiersin.org](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2026.1741706/full?utm_source=openai))
**Port performance & congestion – Haifa and Ashdod**
- Recent port statistics and operator reports indicate **record Israeli port throughput** with manageable congestion:
- 2025 had record TEU handled, +12.6% y/y.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- Average **vessel turnaround/port stay at Ashdod in Jan 2026 was reported at around 5.7 days**, with about **1 day average waiting time** (the rest is time at berth / operations), indicating some pressure but not crisis‑level congestion.([cogoport.com](https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/knowledge-center/resources/port-info/ashdod-ilash?utm_source=openai))
- Trade media describe Haifa and Ashdod as **beneficiaries of the broader Hormuz/Red Sea disruption**, gaining:
- Higher throughput and **greater pricing power** for port services.
- Increased strategic relevance as Mediterranean gateways linked to inland logistics/rail.([businessupturn.com](https://www.businessupturn.com/trade-policy/how-israels-ports-are-profiting-from-the-hormuz-crisis-while-the-us-struggles/7991/?utm_source=openai))
**Corridor specifics**
- **Mediterranean–Europe:**
- Core route for Israeli exports (industrial goods, chemicals, agri‑food) and imports (machinery, consumer goods, grains from Black Sea/EU).
- Port2Port notes an expected **increase in import of investment goods and raw materials**, which is “expected to be reflected in growth in the activity of seaports, handling of containers and general cargo” in 2026.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai))
- **Mediterranean–US and Atlantic:**
- Suez issues indirectly tighten capacity and rates on Med–US lanes as carriers rebalance global fleets. Analysts expect the **baseline 2026 outlook to assume continued Cape rerouting**, supporting firmer rates and higher utilization.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai))
- **Asia–Israel:**
- Israeli trade with Asia (China, India, etc.) is impacted by the same Asia–Europe disruptions, but mostly via **Med hub connections** rather than direct Red Sea calls.
- Bank of Israel analysis stresses that Israel had **reduced its use of the Eilat/Red Sea routing** even before the crisis, limiting direct exposure.([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai))
**Regulatory / policy angles**
- No major new **Israel‑specific trade or port restrictions** related solely to the Red Sea crisis were reported in early 2026; instead, the key regulatory frictions are:
- **Higher war‑risk insurance premiums** for vessels in the Red Sea / Eastern Med generally, baked into freight rates.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai))
- **Potential retaliatory trade measures from Europe** in broader Middle‑East tensions are mentioned in shipping outlooks, but these remain speculative as of early 2026.([seatrade-maritime.com](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/containers/container-shipping-market-outlook-for-2026-a-red-sea-return-?utm_source=openai))
**Take‑aways for 2026**
- Israel’s trade pattern has **tilted even more decisively to Mediterranean corridors**, with Haifa and Ashdod handling record volumes.
- **Physical port operations are tight but functioning**; dwell times are elevated yet not at “pandemic‑scale” crisis levels.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai))
- **Red Sea/Suez risk is a structural cost factor**—higher bunker, detours, war‑risk cover—but Israel’s direct exposure via Eilat is limited; impacts are mostly via global freight rate and schedule volatility rather than lost access.
Sources:([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai))
=== 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – FREIGHT FORWARDER DEMAND ISRAEL 2026 ===
*(Note: Few sources isolate Israel‑specific lane data; below combines Israel‑focused trade press, Bank of Israel analysis, and broader eastern Med lane benchmarks.)*
**Container demand & forwarder activity**
- Record **3.445 million TEU handled by Israeli ports in 2025 (+12.6% y/y)** implies higher booking volumes for forwarders into 2026, especially on import flows of raw materials and investment goods signaled by customs/trade data.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai))
- NIU analysis notes that while **Eilat volumes fell ~70%**, flows via Haifa and Ashdod remained robust; forwarders have largely **consolidated routings via Mediterranean gateways**, often through transshipment hubs (Piraeus, Port Said, Turkish ports).([ni-u.edu](https://www.ni-u.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/NIUShort_20250624_DNI_2025_02750.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Bank of Israel paper on the Houthi attacks finds **no exceptional drop in Israel’s foreign trade**, which implies that forwarders saw **more re‑routing and higher rates** rather than true demand destruction.([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai))
**Ocean freight rates – Asia–Israel & Europe–Israel**
- Red Sea/Cape detours have driven a **multi‑phase spike in Asia–Europe and Asia–Med rates**:
- Spot Asia–Europe/Med indices jumped to **$4,000–5,500/FEU** during peak disruption in late 2023–Q1 2024 (premium services even higher), then partially normalized but remain structurally above pre‑crisis by 2026.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai))
- S&P Global / JOC analysis (March 2026) states that the 2026 baseline now **assumes continued Red Sea avoidance**, which “materially strengthens the supply–demand balance” and supports firmer global container rates.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai))
- For an Israel‑specific lens:
- Bank of Israel notes **increased sea freight rates from China to Europe and the Mediterranean**, which are the same main services feeding Israel. While not giving exact $/TEU to Israeli ports, it implies **pass‑through of Asia–Med rate inflation** into Israel‑bound contracts.([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Forwarders serving Israel likely see:
- **Elevated but volatile spot rates** on Asia–Israel (via Med hubs).
- **Slightly firmer but more stable** long‑term contract rates into Europe–Israel lanes, with carriers capitalizing on tighter capacity.
**Airfreight demand – general & pharma**
- Israel is a **pharma and high‑tech export hub**, and air cargo is key for both exports (pharmaceuticals, electronics) and time‑sensitive imports.
- While there is limited Israel‑only 2026 data, broader Middle East/Med air cargo trends show:
- A **shift of some high‑value and urgent shipments from ocean to air** during Red Sea peaks, especially in pharma and electronics, as shippers sought to avoid multi‑week Cape delays.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai))
- For pharmaceuticals:
- Israel hosts major global pharma manufacturers; Red Sea turmoil and longer transit times make **temperature‑controlled airfreight more attractive** for high‑value biologics and APIs.
- Forwarders with strong cold‑chain and airport‑to‑hospital distribution capabilities (e.g., Ben Gurion links) would see **stable to rising pharma air volumes into 2026**, even as general airfreight moderates with weaker global goods demand (inference combining Israel’s role with global pharma‑air patterns).([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai))
**Reefer demand – fresh produce & foodstuffs**
- Israel exports significant volumes of **fresh citrus, avocados, dates and vegetables**—all heavily reliant on reefer containers.
- With overall fruit and vegetable exports in a **multi‑year stagnation / moderate decline**, reefer export growth in TEU terms is likely **flat to slightly down**, even if share of reefers in total boxes remains high.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- However, longer ocean transits via the Cape increase the **risk and cost of relying solely on ocean reefers**, particularly for:
- Sensitive fruits (e.g., early‑season avocados, blueberries to Europe).
- Just‑in‑time shipments to premium EU retailers.
- This pushes some **incremental volume into airfreight for ultra‑perishable or high‑margin SKUs**, while forcing forwarders to **upgrade cold‑chain visibility and insurance packages** on reefer sea shipments (inferred from global perishable trade responses to longer routes).([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai))
**Forwarder operating environment in 2026**
- Key demand‑side signals for Israel‑focused forwarders:
- **Higher booking activity on import lanes** (capital goods, raw materials) versus softer export‑led box growth.([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai))
- **Emphasis on schedule reliability and routing flexibility** over pure rate minimization, due to Cape vs Suez uncertainty.
- **Strong niches in pharma, chemicals and high‑value electronics air and sea‑air solutions**, as shippers pay premiums for risk mitigation.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai))
Sources:([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai))
=== 3. [COMMODITY TRENDS] – ISRAELI AGRI EXPORTS & IMPORTS 2026 ===
**Structure of Israeli agriculture exports**
- An Israeli agriculture sector report (late 2025) shows:
- **Exports of fruits, vegetables and other crops have been broadly stagnant with a multi‑year trend of moderate decline** in volume/value.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Export basket is concentrated: **avocados and dates together account for over 80% of total fruit export value**.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Only about **12% of total agricultural production is exported**, the rest serving domestic demand.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
**Commodity‑specific notes (citrus, avocados, vegetables, blueberries, dates)**
- **Citrus**
- Remain a notable export (oranges, mandarins, grapefruit), but face **intense competition from Spain, Egypt, Turkey and Morocco** into EU markets; this has contributed to the stagnation in export growth.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Price pressure in EU citrus over recent seasons (due to abundant North African/Spanish supply) has **compressed Israeli margins**, making logistics costs and reliability critical.
- **Avocados**
- The OECD‑FAO Outlook (2025–2034) notes that **global avocado exports grew ~2% in 2024 to around 2.8 million tonnes**, with Israel among the producers expanding exports, though at modest rates compared with Latin America.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_3eb15914/601276cd-en.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- The Israeli agriculture report, however, finds **no recorded increase in Israel’s avocado export volume in recent years**, despite global growth—suggesting that Israeli exporters are **losing relative market share** or hitting agronomic/land constraints.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Avocado export season runs roughly **October–April**, with peak shipping in winter months; during this window, **reefer capacity and rate levels into EU ports** (especially Western Med) directly affect realized export volumes and farm‑gate prices (inference from seasonality + logistics).
- **Vegetables / greenhouse crops**
- Israel is a notable exporter of **fresh peppers, tomatoes, herbs and greenhouse vegetables** mainly to Europe.
- The same report characterizes overall fruit & vegetable exports as **stagnant or declining**, tied to:
- Higher domestic costs (water, labor).
- Strong competition from low‑cost Mediterranean and North African suppliers.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- **Blueberries**
- Israel is a **small but emerging blueberry producer**; no major 2026‑specific numbers surfaced, but within global trade blueberries remain far smaller than avocados and citrus.
- Logistically, blueberries are **very time‑and temperature‑sensitive**, so the **combination of longer sea transits and higher reefer costs** likely caps seaborne share and encourages **airfreight or near‑market sourcing** by EU buyers (inference based on commodity characteristics).
- **Dates**
- Dates are a **core Israeli export**, together with avocados forming over 80% of fruit export value.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- UN Comtrade data (via Trading Economics) shows that Israeli exports of “dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, fresh or dried” to the U.S. reached **about US$11.2 million in 2024** within a broader **US$42.5 million** basket of edible fruits, nuts and citrus peels.([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/exports/united-states/edible-fruits-nuts-peel-citrus-fruit-melons?utm_source=openai))
- Date exports are more resilient to longer transit times than soft fruits (better shelf life), so **Red Sea/Cape routing mainly affects freight cost per tonne rather than feasibility**.
**Price & seasonality impacts on export volumes (2025–26 context)**
- Global horticultural markets in 2024–25 were characterized by:
- **Moderate growth in avocado demand/prices**, though off the pandemic highs.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_3eb15914/601276cd-en.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- **Volatile citrus prices** due to weather and competition in Southern Europe/North Africa.
- For Israel:
- Stagnant export volumes amid firm or slightly rising world prices imply **supply‑side or competitiveness constraints**, not demand failure.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Red Sea/Cape disruptions add **USD 500–1,500/FEU equivalent extra cost** on long detour legs at times (inferred from Asia–Europe rate spikes). For high‑value fresh exports, this:
- Raises the **logistics cost share of FOB price**, particularly on longer‑haul markets (e.g., Far East).
- Makes **nearer EU Med markets relatively more attractive** than Asia, preserving volumes to Europe while limiting expansion further afield (inference).
**Import patterns – grains, pulses, animal feed, fertilizers**
- Israel is structurally **import‑dependent for grains, oilseeds, pulses and feedstuffs**, sourcing largely from:
- **Black Sea / EU origins** (wheat, corn, barley, sunflower meal).
- **Americas** (soybeans/meal, corn).
- Up‑to‑date 2026‑specific disaggregated statistics are limited in open web sources, but trade data and sector reports indicate:
- Continued **heavy use of Mediterranean ports** for bulk cargoes; Eilat’s decline means **little grain/pulses now move via the Red Sea route**.([ni-u.edu](https://www.ni-u.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/NIUShort_20250624_DNI_2025_02750.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- The Red Sea crisis has instead increased:
- **Voyage times and bunker costs** for bulk carriers coming from Asia or via Suez,
- **Insurance surcharges** for any vessels transiting near conflict zones.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai))
- For **fertilizers**:
- Israel both **produces and exports certain fertilizers** (e.g., potash and phosphates from the Dead Sea and Negev) and imports others.
- Higher freight and insurance costs on Suez‑linked routes raise the **CIF cost of imported fertilizers** and reduce netbacks on exports shipped via contested corridors, though much of Israel’s fertilizer trade also uses Med routes (inference combining Israel’s known fertilizer industry with current freight conditions).([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai))
**Implications for 2026 agri‑trade**
- **Export side:**
- Avocados and dates remain **dominant in value**, but overall horticultural export volumes are **flat to slightly down**, with structural competitiveness issues more important than short‑term logistics disruptions.([en.toraland.org.il](https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))
- Red Sea disruptions primarily **increase logistics costs and risk**, rather than forcing a collapse in trade; Israeli exporters pivot toward:
- **Med‑oriented markets** (EU) where transit times are shorter.
- **Higher value segments** where they can absorb increased freight.
- **Import side:**
- Israel continues to rely on **large imports of grains, feed and fertilizers**, mostly via Haifa and Ashdod.
- Global freight rate volatility and war‑risk premiums are key cost drivers for import‑dependent feedlots and agro‑industry in 2026, even though physical access to supply remains adequate.
Sources:([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/exports/united-states/edible-fruits-nuts-peel-citrus-fruit-melons?utm_source=openai))
Sources:
• Israel's Trade Deficit Hits 10.2 Billion Shekels in December 2025
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai
• Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai
• RESEARCH SHORT
https://www.ni-u.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/NIUShort_20250624_DNI_2025_02750.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Bank of Israel
https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai
• TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global
https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai
• Frontiers | Why do some limited regional conflicts in the maritime domain have global consequences? Evidence from two Middle Eastern wars
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2026.1741706/full?utm_source=openai
• Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai
• Ashdod (ILASH), Ashdod, Israel - Cogoport
https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/knowledge-center/resources/port-info/ashdod-ilash?utm_source=openai
• How Israel’s ports are profiting from the Hormuz crisis while the US struggles | Business Upturn Trade & Policy
https://www.businessupturn.com/trade-policy/how-israels-ports-are-profiting-from-the-hormuz-crisis-while-the-us-struggles/7991/?utm_source=openai
• Israel's Trade Deficit Hits 10.2 Billion Shekels in December 2025
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai
• TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global
https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai
• Bank of Israel
https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Red Sea Shipping Disruption 2026: Status & Cost Impact — The Middle East Insider
https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai
• Container shipping market outlook for 2026 – a Red Sea return?
https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/containers/container-shipping-market-outlook-for-2026-a-red-sea-return-?utm_source=openai
• Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai
• Israel's Trade Deficit Hits 10.2 Billion Shekels in December 2025
https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Industry-Trade/Industry/Israel-s-Trade-Deficit-Hits-10-2-Billion-Shekels-in-December-2025/?utm_source=openai
• RESEARCH SHORT
https://www.ni-u.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/NIUShort_20250624_DNI_2025_02750.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Bank of Israel
https://www.boi.org.il/media/fiobt4gv/%D7%97%D7%92%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%98%D7%A7%D7%A1-%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%9F-04e.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Red Sea Shipping Disruption 2026: Status & Cost Impact — The Middle East Insider
https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai
• Red Sea Shipping Crisis 2026: Impact on Rate… | Suaid Global
https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai
• Agriculture Report – Torah VeHa’aretz Institute
https://en.toraland.org.il/media/k4aok5rp/israeli-agriculture-report-5785_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai
• Red Sea Shipping Disruption 2026: Status & Cost Impact — The Middle East Insider
https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai
• Red Sea Shipping Disruption 2026: Status & Cost Impact — The Middle East Insider
https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai