## Company Profile Orbit Shipping Services (UAE) — UAE-headquartered freight forwarder operating from key Gulf hubs (website: https://www.orbit-shipping.com). Contact: Arun Kumar, Partner & General Manager. Core services (typical for regional forwarder): ocean and air freight forwarding, customs clearance, warehousing, project and bulk cargo handling, and transshipment facilitation through UAE ports (Jebel Ali / Khalifa). Market position: local/regional SME forwarder positioned to serve importers, distributors, and re-exporters in the UAE/GCC—especially clients moving staple foods, packaged edible oils, and processed food lines through UAE hub ports. ## Pain Points 1) Route and cost volatility from Red Sea security: clients face longer, irregular lead times and higher freight + insurance (bunker/war-risk) that squeeze margins and force last-minute routing and origin changes. Orbit must deliver alternative routes and faster sourcing options but likely lacks deep, on-demand exporter origination capability across diversified origins. 2) Rising staple import volumes + strategic reserve policies: UAE importers are increasing onshore stocks for wheat, rice and edible oils — creating demand for coordinated sourcing, bonded storage and timed deliveries; Orbit may lack an integrated channel that originates exporters and guarantees delivery on schedule. 3) Growing re-export/transshipment opportunity: Jebel Ali and Khalifa throughput is rising, creating opportunities to scale re-export volumes into GCC/East Africa, but Orbit needs a steady pipeline of verified exporters and a low-friction execution partner to win and manage those flows without expanding sourcing teams. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. COMMODITY TRENDS — UAE STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS (WHEAT, RICE, VEGETABLE OIL) === **Overall food import dependency & value** - The UAE still imports **>90% of its food**, with agricultural imports around **USD 15 billion/year** as of 2025–26. ([casiaconsulting.com](https://casiaconsulting.com/briefs/uae-food-security.html?utm_source=openai)) - Food security policy in 2025–26 remains focused on diversifying origins (especially Africa, Black Sea, South Asia) and expanding strategic reserves (4–6 months cover for key staples). ([theatlantic.com](https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/03/the-iran-wars-next-threat-is-to-food-and-water/686435/?utm_source=openai)) **Wheat & rice – demand and import outlook 2025/26** USDA FAS Grain & Feed Annual (Dubai, March 2026) gives the most concrete recent view: ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Dubai_United+Arab+Emirates_TC2025-0001.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - **Drivers:** population growth, tourism recovery, food processing expansion → **wheat and rice consumption are forecast‑to‑grow in MY 2025/26**. - **Wheat:** - Domestic production is negligible; the UAE is structurally import‑dependent. - USDA projects **higher wheat imports in MY 2025/26** versus 2024/25, supported by demand from the **milling, baking, and poultry feed industries**. - Poultry feed demand is specifically cited as a contributor to rising imports, implying continued use of low‑quality wheat as a feed grain. ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Dubai_United+Arab+Emirates_TC2025-0001.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - **Rice:** - Consumption is forecast to **increase in MY 2025/26**, with imports rising to meet demand. - The report underlines strong demand for **premium basmati and parboiled varieties**, in line with 2024–25 trade commentary that highlights high‑grade basmati as a key import segment. ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Dubai_United+Arab+Emirates_TC2025-0001.pdf&utm_source=openai)) **Price and policy environment** - The UAE is adjusting its **food price control system in 2025/26** to limit retail price increases on staples despite higher import and freight costs. USDA notes that updated controls are expected to **cap domestic price pass‑through even as import prices rise**, especially for wheat and rice under subsidy schemes. ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Dubai_United+Arab+Emirates_TC2025-0001.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - Regional geopolitical shocks (Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Iran conflict) have raised freight, insurance and some commodity prices. Governments (including UAE) responded by tapping **strategic food reserves** and reinforcing import diversification rather than cutting import volumes. ([theatlantic.com](https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/03/the-iran-wars-next-threat-is-to-food-and-water/686435/?utm_source=openai)) **Origin shifts & diversification (2024–26)** - African agricultural exports to the Gulf (including the UAE) grew **23% year‑on‑year in 2025**, driven by horticulture, pulses, coffee, and cocoa—but also contributing to diversification of grain and edible oil origins. ([casiaconsulting.com](https://casiaconsulting.com/briefs/uae-food-security.html?utm_source=openai)) - In cereals, global patterns show stronger reliance on **Black Sea suppliers** for wheat (Russia, Ukraine, other CIS), and sustained imports of **rice from South Asia** (India, Pakistan, others). OECD‑FAO’s July 2025 outlook projects continued growth in wheat and rice trade to Asia and MENA, with imports accounting for an increasing share of cereal availability in net‑importing regions like the Gulf through 2034. ([apps.fas.usda.gov/PSDOnline/Circulars/2025/07/Grain.pdf?utm_source=openai](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/PSDOnline/Circulars/2025/07/Grain.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Vegetable oils — consumption & trade trends** - IMARC estimates the **UAE vegetable oil market** at **USD 1.5 billion in 2025**, with a growth forecast through 2034. Consumption growth is driven by foodservice, packaged foods, and a large expatriate base. ([imarcgroup.com](https://www.imarcgroup.com/uae-vegetable-oil-market?utm_source=openai)) - The UAE is a net importer of edible oils (palm, sunflower, soybean) but also acts as a **re‑exporter to the wider GCC and sometimes the EU**. In 2023, **EU imports of vegetable oils from the UAE reached about EUR 22 million, 27.7% of the EU’s total agri‑food imports from the UAE**, implying a role in value‑added processing or transshipment. ([imarcgroup.com](https://www.imarcgroup.com/uae-vegetable-oil-market?utm_source=openai)) - Given limited agriculture and crushing capacity domestically, almost all vegetable oil demand and re‑exports are met by imported crude and refined oils from Asia (Malaysia/Indonesia for palm; Black Sea for sunflower). The 2025–26 trend is **steady‑to‑rising import volumes**, with higher value due to price and freight. **Summary signals for 2026 planning** - **Volumes:** Wheat, rice and vegetable oil imports are **rising into MY 2025/26**, with growth in both food and feed use. - **Risk:** Logistics disruptions (Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz) put upward pressure on **CIF costs** but have not reduced volumetric import requirements; instead, they increase the strategic premium on diversified origins and UAE‑based storage. ([theatlantic.com](https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/03/the-iran-wars-next-threat-is-to-food-and-water/686435/?utm_source=openai)) - **Policy:** Expect continued **retail price caps/subsidies** on core staples, but more flexibility on premium rice and value‑added oil products, which can see fuller pass‑through of import prices. Sources for this section: ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Dubai_United+Arab+Emirates_TC2025-0001.pdf&utm_source=openai)) === 2. MARKET EVENTS — RED SEA SECURITY & SHIPPING REROUTING (IMPACT ON GULF–EUROPE & ASIA–MIDDLE EAST ROUTES) === **Status of Red Sea / Suez traffic into early 2026** - UNCTAD and other trackers show that container traffic through the Suez Canal fell by about **75% in 2024 vs. 2023**, as lines routed ships around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Houthi attacks. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - An analytical paper on early‑2026 maritime geopolitics reports that as of **January 2026, Red Sea traffic remained ~60% below pre‑crisis levels**, indicating only a partial recovery despite some carriers cautiously returning. ([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Shipping intelligence cited in late‑2024 and 2025 analyses notes **15–20% effective capacity loss** on Far East–North Europe and Mediterranean trades due to longer routes and extra vessel days, consistent with Maersk’s estimates. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) **Rerouting impacts on transit times and costs** - Detours around the Cape of Good Hope add roughly **4,500–6,000 nautical miles** and **10–12 extra days** to an Asia–Europe voyage compared with the Suez route. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - J.P. Morgan’s analysis describes this as roughly a **30% increase in transit times** and an effective **9–10% reduction in available global container capacity**, which tightens markets and supports higher freight rates. ([jpmorgan.com](https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/supply-chain/red-sea-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - UNCTAD estimates from the first phase of the crisis showed **Shanghai–Europe spot container rates up ~256% between Dec 2023 and Feb 2024**; later 2024–early 2025 data show Asia–Europe all‑in rates settling around **USD 3,300–3,500/FEU**—well above pre‑crisis but below early‑spike peaks. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) **Specific implications for Gulf–Europe and Asia–Middle East lanes** - Major Asia–Middle East strings often **bypass Israel entirely** and some carriers have continued to transit the Red Sea when risk assessments allowed, especially regional and Gulf‑linked operators. S&P Global notes that many Asia–Middle East services resumed or maintained Red Sea use earlier than flagship Asia–Europe services, as their port calls are perceived as lower‑risk. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/red-sea-revival-regional-carriers?utm_source=openai)) - However, a significant share of **Asia–Gulf–Europe cargo** still gets caught in the broader re‑routing dynamic, particularly on services that extend from Gulf hubs (Jebel Ali, Khalifa, Dammam) to North Europe or the Med via Suez. For those strings: - **Lead times to North Europe** lengthen by roughly **7–10 days** when rerouted around the Cape. - **Freight and insurance costs** rise via war‑risk premiums and bunker consumption; S&P Global’s bunker analysis highlights tightness and earlier nominations at **Eastern Med and Gulf ports** as ships bunker more heavily before or after long detours. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/070725-red-sea-disruptions-reshaping-global-bunker-demand-as-ships-navigate-longer-routes?utm_source=openai)) **Capacity and bunker/fuel market effects** - S&P Global Commodity Insights notes that rerouting is **reshaping bunker demand**, with higher demand at **Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean ports** as vessels prepare for—or recover from—longer Cape routes. This creates intermittent fuel tightness and premium pricing in these bunkering hubs. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/070725-red-sea-disruptions-reshaping-global-bunker-demand-as-ships-navigate-longer-routes?utm_source=openai)) - The longer voyages absorb part of the global fleet expansion (est. **10.6% y/y increase in container fleet capacity in 2024**), effectively tightening markets despite delivery of new ships. ([rusi.org](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/sounion-attack-brings-red-sea-shipping-crisis-back-fore?utm_source=openai)) **Early‑2026 “reset”: partial return to Red Sea** - By **January 2026**, some major global carriers **began routing more vessels back through the Red Sea**, cautiously reopening Asia–Europe and Asia–Gulf–Europe strings, but at still‑elevated insurance and security costs. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) - Industry commentary in early 2026 frames this as a **“reset” rather than full normalization**: - Insurance premia for Red Sea transits remain significantly higher than pre‑October 2023. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) - Many carriers maintain contingency routings around the Cape and flexible schedules, so effective capacity and schedule reliability on Gulf‑Europe and Asia–Middle East corridors remain volatile. **Implications for food & agri supply chains into the Gulf** - For bulk and containerized **staple foods** (wheat, rice, edible oils, sugar) moving from Black Sea/Europe or Asia to the UAE and wider GCC, the key effects in 2025–26 are: - **Higher CIF prices:** freight, fuel and insurance embedded in import costs, especially for Europe‑ and Black Sea‑origin product. - **Longer and more variable lead times:** 1–2 week variability increases the importance of **larger on‑shore stocks** and **flexible origin options** (e.g., switching from EU/Black Sea wheat to alternative origins when freight spreads widen). - **Modal and routing diversification:** greater use of **non‑Suez routes**, alternative transshipment hubs, and in some cases, overland corridors (e.g., via Saudi Arabia for GCC internal distribution), although these are still marginal in volume terms. ([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Sources for this section: ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) === 3. DEMAND SIGNALS — UAE RE‑EXPORT HUBS & TRANSSHIPMENT (JEBEL ALI & KHALIFA PORT) === **Jebel Ali Port — throughput and transshipment profile** - Jebel Ali is the **largest container port in the Middle East** and DP World’s flagship hub. It serves as the core transshipment node for the Gulf, Indian Subcontinent, East Africa, and parts of the Levant. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jebel_Ali?utm_source=openai)) - DP World handled **15.5 million TEU in 2024** at Jebel Ali, the **highest volume since 2015**. This confirms strong post‑COVID growth and resilience despite Red Sea disruptions. ([transportjournal.com](https://www.transportjournal.com/en/home/news/artikeldetail/jebel-ali-port-records-highest-volumes-since-2015.html?utm_source=openai)) - Recent industry analysis of the Gulf port system indicates that roughly **10 million TEU of Jebel Ali’s 15.5 million TEU are transshipment cargo**, with the remainder gateway (local import/export). This implies a **transshipment share of ~65%**. ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/ports/khalifa-port-abu-dhabi/?utm_source=openai)) - S&P Global’s fuel‑demand study notes that, during Red Sea disruptions and regional tensions, **Jebel Ali remained “relatively stable” as a hub for container and tanker traffic**, while Fujairah saw more direct disruption. This underscores its role as a **reliable regional relay hub** during crises. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/070725-red-sea-disruptions-reshaping-global-bunker-demand-as-ships-navigate-longer-routes?utm_source=openai)) **Khalifa Port — growth as a secondary hub** - Khalifa Port (Abu Dhabi) has rapidly grown into the UAE’s second‑largest container gateway: - A recent port intelligence brief reports **4.91 million TEU handled in 2024**, making it a significant competitor to other Gulf ports and a key node in future corridors such as the **India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)**. ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/ports/khalifa-port-abu-dhabi/?utm_source=openai)) - AD Ports Group describes Khalifa as combining **gateway cargo** (Abu Dhabi‑focused) with a growing **transshipment role** anchored by alliances with major lines: - A 35‑year concession with **CMA CGM** to run a dedicated terminal, designed to turn Khalifa into a hub for three of the world’s top four carriers. ([adports.ae](https://www.adports.ae/ports-terminals/commercial-ports/khalifa-port/?noredirect=en-US&utm_source=openai)) - CMA Terminals Khalifa Port began operations in **Dec 2024** and has seen **“rapidly growing” throughput**; plans call for expanding that terminal’s capacity from **250,000 TEU to 625,000 TEU by 2026**, indicating a targeted **>150% increase in capacity** over two years. ([jctrans.com](https://www.jctrans.com/en/news/12570?utm_source=openai)) - AD Ports’ **Q1 2025 earnings presentation** indicates that at Khalifa’s main container terminal, the mix is approximately **65% transshipment / 35% origin & destination (O&D)**, revealing a clear shift toward hub‑and‑spoke operations. ([adportsgroup.com](https://www.adportsgroup.com/-/media/sites/adports/investors/2025/downloads/adpg-earnings-presentation-q1-2025.pdf?rev=-1&utm_source=openai)) - A 2025 capital markets day deck shows management targeting an increase in **Khalifa’s regional market share from 13% to 21% over five years**, underscoring long‑term ambitions to capture more transshipment flows in the Arabian Gulf. ([adportsgroup.com](https://www.adportsgroup.com/-/media/sites/adports/investors/2025/downloads/adpg--2025-capital-market-day-consolidated.pdf?rev=6136544ae4164200b522ef2c802c4cc2&utm_source=openai)) **Re‑export and transshipment demand signals for 2026** - Structural positioning: - Jebel Ali’s **~65% transshipment share** (≈10M TEU out of 15.5M TEU) plus Khalifa’s **65% transshipment share** (on ~5M TEU) implies that **well over 60% of combined UAE container volume is hub‑and‑spoke traffic**, not pure domestic demand. ([content.ballastmarkets.com](https://content.ballastmarkets.com/ports/khalifa-port-abu-dhabi/?utm_source=openai)) - This underlines the UAE’s role as a **regional re‑export platform** for food and agri products into GCC, Iraq, East Africa, and South Asia (including breakbulk and containerized staples). - Growth trajectory: - Jebel Ali’s return to pre‑2015‑level volumes in 2024 and new concessions/expansion at Khalifa (CMA CGM terminal, IMEC positioning) together signal **rising containerized trade into and via the UAE in 2025–26**, even under adverse Red Sea conditions. ([transportjournal.com](https://www.transportjournal.com/en/home/news/artikeldetail/jebel-ali-port-records-highest-volumes-since-2015.html?utm_source=openai)) - Impact of Red Sea disruptions: - Some Europe‑bound cargo that would normally transship via Jebel Ali or Khalifa and then move through Suez has been delayed or rerouted, but **overall volumes at Jebel Ali reached multi‑year highs in 2024**, suggesting that the UAE hubs **benefited from cargo consolidation and contingency routings**. ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai)) - As carriers cautiously increase Red Sea transits in 2026, **UAE hub volumes are likely to remain strong**, with slightly improved schedule reliability and reduced round‑trip times compared with the peak of the Cape‑routing period, but still at structurally higher freight/insurance cost levels. **Implications for food & agri commodities** - For wheat, rice, edible oils, sugar, pulses, and other agri‑food commodities, the UAE ports’ 2024–26 trajectory sends several signals: - **Resilient demand for regional redistribution:** Rising container throughput and high transshipment shares show that **re‑export demand into GCC/East Africa remains robust**, supporting volume growth in bulk and containerized staples. - **Value in port‑based storage and processing:** The combination of strategic reserves policy and hub status increases the commercial logic of **storage, blending, and light processing (e.g., packing, bottling, milling) in UAE free zones** for onward export. - **Route optionality:** As Jebel Ali and Khalifa maintain stable operations during Red Sea disruptions, they become even more central as **flexible pivot points**—able to feed cargo into either Suez‑based or Cape‑routed services and, in future, potentially into IMEC land‑sea corridors. Sources for this section: ([mediaoffice.ae](https://www.mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/february/19-01/dp-world-records-highest-cargo-volumes-at-jebel-ali-port?utm_source=openai))