## Company Profile FRIDENSON AIR & OCEAN LTD is an Israel‑based freight forwarder and customs brokerage firm offering air and ocean freight services, customs clearance, and related supply‑chain solutions. Contact: Sharon Cohen, Customs Brokerage Department Manager. The company provides cargo consolidation, door‑to‑door forwarding, and customs & phytosanitary handling for importers and exporters (per service page evidence). Likely a regional/mid‑sized operator serving agricultural exporters (fresh produce), industrial importers (electronics, pharma inputs), and e‑commerce/retail clients into/from Israel. ## Pain Points 1) Perishable cargo risk and longer/less‑predictable transit times due to Red Sea/Suez/Hormuz security: higher quality loss, pressure to move cargo by air, and need for fast transshipment or short‑sea options. 2) Customs/phytosanitary friction: inconsistent certificate formats from new origin suppliers, multi‑agency sequential inspections, and limited inspection capacity at peak seasons cause holds and demurrage for agri‑food shipments. 3) Volatile freight and insurance surcharges and rapidly changing sanctions/compliance lists: pricing opacity, last‑minute reroutes, and increased screening workload that strain operations and client promises. 4) Cross‑border e‑commerce and parcel compliance: frequent rule changes on VAT/exemptions and need for high‑quality parcel‑level data for rapid clearance. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] Israel freight forwarding 2026 – latest import/export trends, corridors, Red Sea security impact === **Red Sea / Suez situation and impact on Israel-linked flows (2026)** - Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea have repeatedly targeted or threatened ships linked to Israel, triggering large‑scale diversion of global container traffic away from the Suez/Red Sea corridor to the Cape of Good Hope. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai)) - In early 2026, several major carriers (e.g., Maersk) tested a **partial return** to the Red Sea. Maersk’s U.S.-flagged *Maersk Denver* completed a Bab el‑Mandeb transit 11–12 January 2026, but lines overall have kept most East–West sailings on the Cape route. ([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/news/maersk-edges-back-into-the-red-sea-and-completes-another-bab-el-mandeb-transit/?utm_source=openai)) - S&P Global and other analysts in February–April 2026 note a **“stop–start” reopening**: Suez transits are recovering from the 2024 trough but are still expected to reach only about **90–95% of 2023 volumes in a best‑case 2026 scenario**, constrained by renewed Houthi threats and broader Iran–Israel tensions. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) - The late‑February 2026 Iran–Hormuz crisis and associated Houthi threats to “close Bab al‑Mandeb again” have reinforced risk perceptions for Israel‑linked cargoes specifically; ships with any Israel nexus are among those most likely to continue avoiding the Red Sea, even if some generic Asia–Europe loops cautiously return. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis?utm_source=openai)) **Route and corridor adjustments affecting Israel freight forwarders** _Maritime container flows_ - **Asia–Israel import legs** (consumer goods, electronics, inputs) that would normally route Asia–Suez–Med–East Med/Israel are still widely using **Cape of Good Hope routings in 2026**, adding roughly **10–14 days** to transit times and keeping bunker and charter costs elevated. Forwarders are reporting Red‑Sea‑related surcharges of **10–25% above pre‑crisis base rates** on some Asia–Mediterranean lanes. ([metro.global](https://metro.global/2026/02/04/carriers-pause-plans-to-restore-suez-routes/?utm_source=openai)) - Because of the longer routing and bunching of arrivals, **North European hubs (Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg)** have seen congestion spikes as Cape‑routed vessels arrive in waves, adding **an additional 4–7 days** dwell/port‑stay to many strings. This pushes some Israel‑bound containers to transship via North Europe, then short‑sea or feeder to East Med, rather than direct Suez calls. ([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - For Israel’s own national carrier ZIM, whose network has relatively limited Suez exposure (one main Suez service per a January 2026 industry discussion), the direct volume impact of Red Sea closures is smaller; however, **system‑wide rate pressure** from capacity absorbed on Cape routings still affects its pricing and schedule reliability. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1qdnl2j/how_will_this_affect_zim/?utm_source=openai)) _Air cargo and multimodal shifts_ - Ben Gurion Airport’s cargo throughput in 2025 reached **~381,000 tons**, a **9.5% y/y increase**, with dedicated freighters still carrying ~**73% of total cargo**. “Belly” cargo on passenger flights surged, with December 2025 belly volumes up about **50% y/y**, reflecting more wide‑body capacity returning. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Air-Transport/Airports/Ben-Gurion-Airport-9-5-Increase-in-Cargo-Activity-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - With maritime lead times and reliability under pressure, higher‑value Israeli imports (pharmaceutical inputs, semiconductors, time‑sensitive e‑commerce, perishables from Europe/Africa) have **leaned further into airfreight**, supporting continued growth into 2026 despite security‑related interruptions at Ben Gurion in March 2026. ([ice.it](https://www.ice.it/it/news/notizie-dal-mondo/299080?utm_source=openai)) - Civil Aviation Authority updates from late 2025 show about **30 airlines operating to/from Ben Gurion**, with daily passenger flows averaging **~55,000**; the resurgence of passenger services improves belly‑cargo options, giving forwarders more flexibility to mitigate seafreight delays for urgent shipments. ([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/current-situation/en/Conflict%20Update%20-%20May%2028th%202025%20-%20CAA%20Israel.pdf?utm_source=openai)) _Overland / regional alternatives_ - For trade with nearby markets (Jordan, Egypt, Gulf via Jordan/Saudi), forwarders are using **trucking plus regional feeder shipping** as hedges against Red Sea volatility. While hard numbers are scarce, regional analyses on maritime geopolitics in early 2026 describe logistics planners deliberately **diversifying routings across Red Sea, Cape, regional pipelines and overland corridors** to reduce single‑chokepoint exposure. ([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for Israel’s import/export trends and freight forwarding in 2026** - **Cost structure:** Red Sea security premiums and Cape diversions continue to embed a structural cost uplift in Israel‑related seaborne trade in 2026, particularly for Asia-sourced containers (electronics, textiles, consumer goods, some agri‑inputs). - **Time‑sensitivity:** Higher‑value or time‑critical segments (pharma, high‑tech, some perishables) are increasingly **bifurcating**: routine flows still by sea via longer routings, urgent SKUs shifting to air or fast multimodal solutions. - **Network design:** Freight forwarders are actively building in **greater transshipment via Europe** and using **air–sea hybrids** (e.g., air into European hub then sea/road to Israel) where security or sanction concerns make direct Red Sea or Hormuz transits difficult. **Sources (Dimension 1)**: ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [COMMODITY TRENDS] Israel 2026 import/export trends – fresh produce, grains, fertilizers, pharma, electronics === **Macro trade pattern (2025–early 2026)** - Recent monthly data (through February 2026) show Israel’s goods imports trending upward but still volatile; imports in Feb 2026 remain below the August 2025 peak of **ILS 9.3 bn**, with composition shifts showing **slightly higher shares for electronics (+0.8 percentage points)** in the import basket. ([sigmanomics.com](https://sigmanomics.com/il/imports?utm_source=openai)) - On the export side, 2024/2025 data (latest UN Comtrade / TradingEconomics aggregation) confirm that **high‑tech manufactures dominate**: electronic integrated circuits (9.4% of total exports), unmounted diamonds (9.2%), electro‑medical equipment (4.3%), phones (3.8%), medicines in dosage (2.3%), and fertilizer mixes (2.0%). ([worldstopexports.com](https://www.worldstopexports.com/israels-top-10-exports/?utm_source=openai)) **Fresh produce (fruits, vegetables, citrus)**n _Production & domestic market_ - Israel’s fruit and vegetable market was valued at **USD 6.6 bn in 2025** and is projected to grow to **USD 6.85 bn in 2026** and **USD 7.95 bn by 2031**, implying a **3.8% CAGR (2026–2031)**. Drivers include population growth, health‑consumption trends and continued greenhouse expansion. ([mordorintelligence.com](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/israel-fruits-and-vegetables-market?utm_source=openai)) - The national statistics office’s 2025/26 agriculture release shows stable or slightly declining planted areas for some **northern citrus and avocado** orchards, as **rising water salinity** in the Sea of Galilee basin damages yields; farmers in affected zones are scaling back or switching crops, which tightens medium‑term export availability for certain citrus and avocado categories. ([mordorintelligence.com](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/israel-fruits-and-vegetables-market?utm_source=openai)) _Exports, seasonality and destinations_ - Israel remains a **net exporter** of several specialty fruits and vegetables (e.g., citrus, avocados, peppers, carrots, herbs) to the EU and UK, with 2025 export values (UN Comtrade/TradingEconomics) of roughly **USD 336m for prepared fruits & vegetables** and **USD 245m for oilseeds and related categories**; fresh categories (HS 07/08) add further volumes not fully disaggregated in the high‑level table. ([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/exports-by-category?utm_source=openai)) - Seasonally, Israel fills **winter–spring supply gaps** in European markets (citrus, avocados, vegetables). Red Sea / Suez disruptions extend shipping times to Northern Europe by up to two weeks, making **shelf‑life margins tighter** and pushing exporters and EU importers to rely more on **refrigerated trucks and short‑sea links via Mediterranean hubs** rather than long Asia‑linked loops. ([metro.global](https://metro.global/2026/02/04/carriers-pause-plans-to-restore-suez-routes/?utm_source=openai)) _Import side_ - For off‑season and varieties not grown locally, Israel imports fruits and vegetables from **Turkey, Egypt, EU, South Africa and Latin America**; recent OECD and national policy reforms since 2022 have been **cutting tariffs on many fruits and vegetables to about 10% of their January 2022 levels over five years**, explicitly to diversify food import sources and increase competition. This accelerates origin diversification in 2024–2026. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Grains** - Israel is structurally **import‑dependent** for grains (wheat, corn, barley). Import patterns in 2024–2025 already shifted away from the Black Sea because of the Russia–Ukraine war, with a higher share from **EU, US and South American origins**; Red Sea and Hormuz risks in early 2026 further encourage **Atlantic‑basin sourcing (EU/US/Argentina/Brazil)** that does not rely on Suez. (Inference based on global routing constraints and Israel’s limited domestic production.) ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - USDA and OECD longer‑term outlooks describe Israel as part of a broader MENA demand hub where grain import growth is more a function of population and feed demand than prices, but also note **volatility in delivered prices** due to freight and insurance premia when Suez/Red Sea or Hormuz are threatened. ([ers.usda.gov](https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/outlooks/113817/OCE-2026-1.pdf?v=83882&utm_source=openai)) **Fertilizers** - Israel is both an exporter (notably potash and specialty fertilizers via companies like ICL) and importer of certain fertilizer types and raw materials. At the 4‑digit HS level, **fertilizer mixes account for about 2% of total exports**, ranking among the country’s top product groups. ([worldstopexports.com](https://www.worldstopexports.com/israels-top-10-exports/?utm_source=openai)) - The fruits & vegetables market analysis notes that **fertilizer prices “jumped in early 2026”** due to Gulf and Red Sea shipping disruptions tightening supply of **potassium nitrate and phosphorus** in Eastern Mediterranean markets. For Israel’s growers, this translates into **input‑cost inflation** and could reduce application rates or accelerate adoption of precision fertigation. ([mordorintelligence.com](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/israel-fruits-and-vegetables-market?utm_source=openai)) **Pharmaceuticals** - Trade data for 2025 show **pharmaceutical products exports at about USD 1.76 bn**, making pharma one of Israel’s most important export categories. At finer detail, “medication mixes in dosage” represent **2.3% of total exports**, alongside strong exports of electro‑medical devices (4.3%). ([worldstopexports.com](https://www.worldstopexports.com/israels-top-10-exports/?utm_source=openai)) - On the **import** side, business guides for 2026 highlight **pharmaceuticals and medical supplies** as a top import sector from the EU and US into Israel, reflecting reliance on foreign‑manufactured originator drugs, biologics, and advanced medical equipment. ([auren.com](https://auren.com/il/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/publication-1.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Given the high value‑to‑weight ratio and sensitivity to delay, a significant share of pharma trade is **air‑shipped** via Ben Gurion; stronger belly capacity and dedicated freighters in 2025–26 help offset seafreight disruptions but also **lock in a structurally higher logistics cost base** for critical medicines. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Air-Transport/Airports/Ben-Gurion-Airport-9-5-Increase-in-Cargo-Activity-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) **Electronics** - Electronics and electrical machinery are a **core pillar of Israel’s exports**, with electrical machinery shipments showing a **+5.6% y/y value gain** in the latest 2024/25 dataset. Electronic integrated circuits and phones together contribute over **13% of total exports** (9.4% and 3.8% respectively). ([worldstopexports.com](https://www.worldstopexports.com/israels-top-10-exports/?utm_source=openai)) - On the **import side**, analytics for March 2025–February 2026 show electronics’ share of Israel’s import basket **rising by about 0.8 percentage points**, suggesting sustained demand for components and finished devices even in a volatile macro context. ([sigmanomics.com](https://sigmanomics.com/il/imports?utm_source=openai)) - Supply‑chain wise, the dominant pattern is **Asia‑origin electronics moving by sea**, now largely via the Cape route. High‑value semiconductors and critical components are increasingly shipped by air (especially for the domestic high‑tech sector), leveraging the rebound in Ben Gurion airfreight. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Air-Transport/Airports/Ben-Gurion-Airport-9-5-Increase-in-Cargo-Activity-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) **Origin diversification and seasonal demand – cross‑cutting points** - **Origin diversification** for food (especially fruits, vegetables and dairy) is an explicit policy goal. Tariff reforms since 2022 have reduced applied duties on many food items to around **10% of their early‑2022 levels over a 5‑year horizon**, encouraging more EU, Turkish, American and other suppliers to enter. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Seasonal demand peaks**: - Fresh produce exports peak in **European winter–spring**, when Israel supplies citrus, avocados and vegetables to the EU/UK. - Grain imports are more evenly spread but cluster around **harvest windows in key origins** (Black Sea/US/EU). - Fertilizer imports and domestic production for export spike ahead of local planting seasons and export campaigns. - 2026 security and freight conditions (Red Sea and Hormuz risks) are encouraging **greater reliance on Atlantic‑side origins** and flexible routing to ensure key commodities (grains, fertilizers, pharma) avoid chokepoints where possible. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Dimension 2)**: ([worldstopexports.com](https://www.worldstopexports.com/israels-top-10-exports/?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] Customs clearance, regulatory and operational pain points for freight forwarders in Israel (2026) === **Customs clearance delays & documentation** - Israel applies **standardized electronic customs clearance** aligned with WCO norms, but sector reports and practitioner commentary (2024–2025) highlight **delays driven more by security profiling and documentation quality than by IT limitations**. For high‑risk or Israel‑sensitive cargoes transiting via Red Sea/Hormuz, more intensive screening and documentation checks can extend clearance times. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For agri‑food, customs clearance is tightly coupled with **Ministry of Agriculture and phytosanitary controls**. Any mismatch or late submission of **phytosanitary certificates, veterinary permits or lab test results** typically results in cargo being held in port or at inland depots, with reefer demurrage accumulating quickly. ([cbs.gov.il](https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2026/agriculture_q202503/e_print.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Phytosanitary and other certificates – agri‑food bottlenecks** - The national agricultural statistics and regulatory materials emphasize stringent controls on **plant pests and animal diseases**; imports of fresh produce, seeds, and planting materials must be accompanied by **official phytosanitary certificates** and in some cases pre‑shipment cold‑treatment proof. ([cbs.gov.il](https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2026/agriculture_q202503/e_print.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Key pain points for forwarders handling perishables: - **Inconsistent certificate formats** from diverse origins (especially when importing from newer supplier countries encouraged by tariff‑cut reforms) cause re‑queries and, in some cases, re‑inspection. - **Limited inspection capacity** at peak seasons (e.g., citrus export + winter import peaks) can create bottlenecks for both import and export flows at ports and Ben Gurion. - Coordination across multiple agencies (Customs, Agriculture, Health, Standards Institute) can lead to **sequential rather than parallel clearance**, lengthening dwell times. (This is partially inferred from Israel’s multi‑agency setup as described in OECD materials.) ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Port and workforce congestion / security‑related disruptions** - Red Sea instability and longer routings have led to **irregular arrival patterns** in Mediterranean and European hubs; when Cape‑routed vessels bunch into Israel‑serving ports and transshipment hubs, terminal capacity is strained, leading to: - Higher yard utilization and longer **container availability delays** for importers. - More **roll‑overs and missed connections** on export transshipment services. ([metro.global](https://metro.global/2026/02/04/carriers-pause-plans-to-restore-suez-routes/?utm_source=openai)) - Early 2026 also saw **security incidents at Ben Gurion Airport** (e.g., missile damage to aircraft in March 2026), which temporarily reduced departing flights and could disrupt cargo schedules, requiring rapid rebooking and sometimes emergency trucking to alternative gateways. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Gurion_Airport?utm_source=openai)) - Labour‑side: while there are no fresh, widely‑reported nationwide port strikes in the last 90 days, chronic issues include **limited flex staffing for peak volumes** and tight security rules governing who can access certain port and airport zones, which complicates 24/7 operations and can lead to weekend/holiday bottlenecks (inference grounded in Israel’s high‑security environment and existing CAA and port procedures). ([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/current-situation/en/Conflict%20Update%20-%20May%2028th%202025%20-%20CAA%20Israel.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Perishable cargo risk** - For Israel’s **fruit & vegetable exports**, expanded transit times and uncertainty on Suez/Cape routing materially raise **quality‑loss and expiry risk** for EU/UK shipments. Exporters and their forwarders must: - Negotiate **priority berthing and fast reefer handling** at origin and transshipment ports. - Invest in **higher‑spec cold‑chain equipment** and more frequent temperature logging to satisfy EU retailers and insurers. - Consider **airfreight for high‑value, short‑shelf‑life items** when sea transit time and risk profile become unacceptable – but at a much higher cost. ([mordorintelligence.com](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/israel-fruits-and-vegetables-market?utm_source=openai)) - Import‑side perishables (meat, dairy, off‑season produce) face similar challenges: any customs, veterinary or phytosanitary delay translates quickly into **quality degradation, shortened remaining shelf life, and potential claims** against forwarders and carriers. ([ers.usda.gov](https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/outlooks/113817/OCE-2026-1.pdf?v=83882&utm_source=openai)) **E‑commerce cross‑border specifics** - Israel has a vibrant **cross‑border e‑commerce market** with consumers heavily using platforms that ship small parcels by air. CAA and customs documents emphasize a large volume of **small consignments** moving via express/courier channels through Ben Gurion. ([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/current-situation/en/Conflict%20Update%20-%20May%2028th%202025%20-%20CAA%20Israel.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Pain points for freight forwarders and integrators in this space: - Managing **frequent changes to low‑value exemption thresholds and VAT collection rules**, requiring constant IT updates and shipper education. - Handling **returns and undeliverables** under tight cost constraints, especially when airfreight costs are elevated due to regional security risks. - Ensuring **accurate, structured electronic data** (HS classification, value, consignee details) at parcel level to allow automated risk‑based clearance and avoid manual inspection queues. (These are widely reported issues in cross‑border e‑commerce regimes globally and align with Israel’s shift toward risk‑based targeting described by OECD.) ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Compliance and operational pain points for freight forwarders / customs brokers** 1. **Dynamic sanctions and security lists** - 2026’s Iran–Hormuz crisis and ongoing Gaza/Red Sea tensions mean **rapidly evolving sanctions, boycotts, and shipping‑restrictions**, especially for entities linked to Iran, Yemen (Houthis) and certain Lebanese actors. Forwarders in Israel must continuously screen **vessels, counterparties and cargoes** against updated lists, adding compliance workload and occasional last‑minute routing changes. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis?utm_source=openai)) 2. **War‑risk premiums and surcharges** - Carriers and insurers maintain elevated **war‑risk premiums** on Red Sea/Suez and, since February 2026, on Hormuz transits; forwarders report double‑digit percentage rate increases even on lanes not physically using those routes, as carriers apply generalized “Red Sea surcharges.” This creates **pricing opacity** and friction with shippers. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) 3. **Multi‑agency coordination and transparency** - OECD’s 2025 survey points out that while Israel has made progress on trade facilitation, **remaining non‑tariff barriers and complex administrative requirements** (especially for agriculture and standards‑controlled goods) still burden importers. Brokers often face **unclear processing timelines**, making it hard to guarantee delivery dates to clients. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) 4. **Data quality and HS classification** - As Israel opens to more diverse food and consumer‑goods origins, forwarders receive documents from less experienced exporters, increasing the risk of **incorrect HS codes, incomplete certificates and value declarations**, which in turn drive audits, reclassification and delay. This is especially acute for mixed‑content e‑commerce parcels and complex agri‑food items with strict quota or SPS rules. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Overall, **the 2026 operating environment for freight forwarders and customs brokers in Israel is characterized by**: - Elevated and volatile **route and security risk** (Red Sea, Suez, Hormuz) feeding into freight rates and insurance. - Persistent **regulatory complexity** in agri‑food and pharma, where phytosanitary, veterinary, and technical standards drive clearance risk. - Rising **operational risk for perishables** because of longer or less‑predictable transits. - Increasing **data and compliance workload**, especially for cross‑border e‑commerce and high‑risk cargoes. **Sources (Dimension 3)**: ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai))