## Company Profile PEKAES Sp. z o.o. — Polish freight forwarder / road carrier group. Public materials show PEKAES runs a carrier portal (strefaklienta) and operates as an integrator between shippers and carrier partners. Core activities include international road haulage and freight forwarding on intra‑EU and Poland–Ukraine lanes, plus carrier management/partner services (paperwork/driver coordination). The company is positioned as a national/regional logistics player serving shippers moving goods across Poland, the EU and into Ukraine (evidence: strefaklienta.pekaes.pl). ## Pain Points 1) Margin squeeze on Poland–Ukraine lanes: liberalised access for Ukrainian hauliers has increased price competition and fragmented capacity pools; PEKAES risks losing volumes or being forced into low‑margin spot business. 2) Rising operating costs and regulatory complexity: 2026 CO₂/toll changes (Eurovignette), fuel cost exposure and ADR enforcement increase per‑shipment costs and administrative burdens—clients expect CO₂ accounting and more transparent pricing. 3) Reliability & capacity risk: border congestion, protests and variable dwell times on PL–UA crossings make lead times volatile; forwarders must offer stable, verified supply options (including modal alternatives) to retain shippers. 4) Need for higher‑value services: to protect margins and fill capacity PEKAES needs to offer bundled sourcing-to-shipment solutions and verified importer/exporter relationships—something its shippers increasingly demand but is time‑consuming to originate in‑house. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – Poland road freight demand, EU–Ukraine flows, impact on Polish carriers === **Macro & demand outlook 2025–2026** - PFR (Polish Development Fund) notes that Poland’s road freight sector is entering 2026 with **subdued but improving demand**, closely tied to Eurozone recovery; forecast German GDP growth of **+1.2% in 2026 vs 0.2% in 2025** is highlighted as a key upside for **Polish transport service exports** (westbound and intra‑EU lanes).([pfr.pl](https://pfr.pl/artykul/rynek-transportu-w-polsce-i-na-swiecie-styczen-2026-r?utm_source=openai)) - TLP’s “Road transport in Poland 2024/2025” shows Poland remains **EU leader in international road transport**, but 2023–2024 volumes were under pressure from weak European industrial production and regulatory cost shocks.([tlp.org.pl](https://tlp.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/raport-transport-drogowy-w-polsce-2024_2025-w-jezyku-angielskim.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **EU–Ukraine road trade flows & market share shifts** - A Council working document on EU‑Ukraine road trade reports that, between 2021 and 2024, **EU road exports to Ukraine rose ~40% and imports by road from Ukraine rose ~15%**, under the temporary EU–Ukraine Road Transport Agreement.([data.consilium.europa.eu](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12258-2025-INIT/en/pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Warsaw Enterprise Institute’s 2026 report finds that after liberalisation of EU–Ukraine road transport: - **Polish road exports to Ukraine increased by ~85%** in value/tonnage terms. - But competitive pressure from Ukrainian hauliers plus regulatory asymmetries triggered **border blockades**, causing an estimated **~40% fall in road‑borne trade through the Polish border in November 2023** compared with normal levels.([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - TLP confirms that liberalisation on the EU–Ukraine line has led to **loss of market share for some Polish carriers** on Ukraine‑related lanes, even as aggregate trade volumes grew.([tlp.org.pl](https://tlp.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/raport-transport-drogowy-w-polsce-2024_2025-w-jezyku-angielskim.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Current intensity of Poland–Ukraine corridor (baseline for 2026)** - 2023 Poland–Ukraine bilateral trade reached **€15.9 bn** (combined imports + exports), **+12.4% YoY**; Poland is **Ukraine’s #1 EU trade partner** and #2 globally, while Ukraine is **Poland’s 6th largest trading partner**.([made-in-ukraine.org](https://made-in-ukraine.org/news/poland-ukraine-trade-corridor-a-16-billion-partnership-reshaping-european-supply-chains?utm_source=openai)) - Corridor infrastructure: - **8 road and 6 rail border crossings** on the PL–UA frontier; capacity constraints at road crossings keep average dwell high and make lead‑times volatile.([made-in-ukraine.org](https://made-in-ukraine.org/news/poland-ukraine-trade-corridor-a-16-billion-partnership-reshaping-european-supply-chains?utm_source=openai)) - Customs data cited in Polish media show that in **Q4 2024 and Q4 2025** the number of Ukrainian‑registered trucks crossing into Poland was **~76.5k per quarter**, essentially flat YoY, indicating **stabilisation** after the 2023 surge, but at a level still considered high by Polish hauliers.([logistyka.rp.pl](https://logistyka.rp.pl/drogowy/art44010311-koszty-dogonily-przewoznikow-ukrainskich?utm_source=openai)) **Structural freight re‑routing and demand for Polish carriers** - Post‑2022 sanctions and war‑related disruptions led to **permanent re‑routing of European freight flows** away from Russia/Belarus rail corridors and Russian carriers. A 2026 logistics analysis notes Central/Eastern Europe, including Poland, has gained **structural overland traffic** (road + rail) as shippers diversify routes and use Poland as a **land bridge to Ukraine and the Black Sea alternatives**.([logisticintel.com](https://www.logisticintel.com/blog/ukraine-war-european-supply-chain-2026?utm_source=openai)) - The “Poland–Ukraine trade corridor” report frames reconstruction demand: Ukraine’s reconstruction needs are estimated at **€411 bn**, driving long‑term demand for **Polish construction materials, machinery, agri‑inputs**, implying sustained lane density PL→UA and backhaul flows for at least the late‑2020s.([made-in-ukraine.org](https://made-in-ukraine.org/news/poland-ukraine-trade-corridor-a-16-billion-partnership-reshaping-european-supply-chains?utm_source=openai)) **2026 demand implications for Polish road carriers** - Net demand for cross‑border capacity in 2026 is underpinned by: - Recovering EU manufacturing (especially Germany) and continued re‑routing of Europe–Ukraine trade via Poland.([pfr.pl](https://pfr.pl/artykul/rynek-transportu-w-polsce-i-na-swiecie-styczen-2026-r?utm_source=openai)) - Ongoing sanctions on Russian and Belarusian road operators (full ban on Russian & Belarusian freight road operators in the EU, with narrow exceptions for essentials), which **locks in** additional demand for EU carriers, including Polish firms, on east‑west corridors.([commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/sanctions-transport_en?utm_source=openai)) - Offsetting factors: - Loss of share on Ukraine‑linked lanes to Ukrainian carriers under the liberalised EU–Ukraine agreement; WEI and TLP both underline **margin compression and utilisation risk** for Polish fleets oriented to the east.([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - More frequent disruptions: carrier protests and ad‑hoc border controls with Lithuania and Germany in early 2026 caused **multi‑day delays** and temporary capacity bottlenecks, but not a collapse in underlying demand.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/u_Purple_Investment533/comments/1rgv3qa/are_there_any_shipping_delays_in_poland_today/?utm_source=openai)) **Take‑away for 2026 demand signals** - Under a **base case**, Polish international road freight demand in 2026 looks **modestly expansionary** vs 2025, with: - **High‑single‑digit to low‑double‑digit growth potential** on Poland–Ukraine bilateral flows (off a 2023–2024 high base) if borders remain open.([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - Stable or slightly growing intra‑EU traffic driven by German and CEE recovery.([pfr.pl](https://pfr.pl/artykul/rynek-transportu-w-polsce-i-na-swiecie-styczen-2026-r?utm_source=openai)) - For Polish carriers, the issue is **who captures that demand** (Polish vs Ukrainian hauliers) and at **what margin**, rather than whether demand exists. **Sources (Demand Signals):** ([pfr.pl](https://pfr.pl/artykul/rynek-transportu-w-polsce-i-na-swiecie-styczen-2026-r?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [PROBLEM FRAMING] – Pain points for Polish freight forwarding / road haulage into 2026 === **Cost inflation & fuel / carbon exposure** - Fuel remains **~30% of total road freight operating costs** for typical European carriers.([cxtms.com](https://cxtms.com/blog/eu-ets2-road-transport-carbon-pricing-european-freight-costs-global-shippers-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Analysis of ETS2 scenarios suggests that at a **€140/t CO₂** carbon price, diesel prices could rise by **~22.6%**, translating into a **high‑single‑digit to low‑double‑digit increase in total road freight costs** (because fuel is 30% of the cost base).([cxtms.com](https://cxtms.com/blog/eu-ets2-road-transport-carbon-pricing-european-freight-costs-global-shippers-2026?utm_source=openai)) - 2026‑oriented industry briefings (e.g., CargoON) emphasise that **distance‑based costs and CO₂ components in tolls** will intensify from 2026 onward, pushing carriers to: - Introduce **CO₂ / toll surcharges** on spot and contract lanes, - Shorten contract duration or index rates to fuel/tolls.([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Driver shortage & labour pressure** - Polish and EU‑wide reports for 2024–2025 (TLP and IRU, indirectly cited in Polish analyses) show: - **Continued structural driver shortage**, particularly for international long‑haul. - Ageing workforce; a growing share of drivers >50 years old. - For 2026, PFR and CargoON both flag **wage inflation and stricter working‑time enforcement** as key pain points; more stringent controls on posting of drivers and cabotage (Mobility Package) raise effective labour cost per km for Polish carriers operating in Western Europe.([pfr.pl](https://pfr.pl/artykul/rynek-transportu-w-polsce-i-na-swiecie-styczen-2026-r?utm_source=openai)) **Capacity utilisation, competition with Ukrainian carriers** - Liberalisation of EU–Ukraine road transport (quota‑free permits) increased competition on lanes that were previously dominated by Polish firms: - WEI notes **asymmetric cost structures**: Ukrainian carriers historically had **lower wage and compliance cost bases**, enabling aggressive pricing.([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - Polish hauliers responded with blockades in 2023–2024; by Q4 2025, customs data show Ukrainian truck crossings stabilising at **~76.5k per quarter**, indicating **persistent competitive pressure**.([logistyka.rp.pl](https://logistyka.rp.pl/drogowy/art44010311-koszty-dogonily-przewoznikow-ukrainskich?utm_source=openai)) - For freight forwarders, this translates into: - **Highly fragmented capacity pools** on PL–UA lanes, - Need to balance **price advantages of Ukrainian hauliers** vs **risk of further protests, delays, and political pushback** from Polish carriers.([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **Congestion, reliability, and border disruptions** - Persistent issues flagged in 2025–2026 commentary: - **Border congestion** at PL–UA crossings (multi‑day queues during protest waves, episodic re‑introduction of controls with Germany and Lithuania).([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/u_Purple_Investment533/comments/1rgv3qa/are_there_any_shipping_delays_in_poland_today/?utm_source=openai)) - **Urban congestion and low‑emission zones**: cities like Kraków have introduced a **clean transport zone from 1 January 2026**, banning older diesel trucks (below Euro 6) from specific areas, complicating last‑mile distribution planning and equipment allocation.([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Modal shift to rail and short sea** - The Poland–Ukraine corridor analysis and broader CEE logistics work note: - Rail is gaining share for **predictable, containerised flows** (construction materials, bulk agri/chemicals), offering **more stable transit times** than road in periods of border protest and congestion and lower per‑unit cost for regular volumes.([made-in-ukraine.org](https://made-in-ukraine.org/news/poland-ukraine-trade-corridor-a-16-billion-partnership-reshaping-european-supply-chains?utm_source=openai)) - For forwarders and road carriers, this presents dual pressures: - **Loss of some long‑haul volume** to rail/short‑sea intermodal as carbon pricing and tolls rise. - Simultaneous **opportunity to reposition as intermodal integrators**, but requiring investment in rail contracts, terminals, and digital visibility. **Operational and compliance complexity** - 2026–focused advisories to carriers highlight: - **More complex toll pricing** (CO₂‑differentiated tolls, vehicle emission class‑based charges, country‑specific schemes such as Germany’s extended MAUT and similar initiatives being mirrored elsewhere).([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Stricter **ADR dangerous‑goods enforcement** with a new EU risk‑based inspection framework phasing in from **2 Nov 2025 to 24 Jun 2026**, raising the cost of compliance for carriers handling chemicals, fuels and some agri‑inputs.([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Summary of 2026 pain‑point framing** - Polish freight forwarders and road carriers in 2026 face a **cost‑squeeze + complexity** problem set: - Rising **fuel, toll and CO₂‑related costs**, with limited pass‑through in commoditised lanes. - **Driver scarcity and wage pressure**, especially for international work. - **Regulatory and competitive shocks** on the Eastern frontier (EU–Ukraine liberalisation), coupled with sanctions‑driven re‑routing. - **Reliability challenges** due to protests, border controls and urban low‑emission rules, pushing some volumes toward rail/short‑sea. **Sources (Problem Framing):** ([pfr.pl](https://pfr.pl/artykul/rynek-transportu-w-polsce-i-na-swiecie-styczen-2026-r?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [TIMING SIGNALS] – 2026 EU transport regulatory changes affecting Polish freight === Below is a timing‑oriented view of key EU and related measures relevant to Polish road freight around **2026**. **a) CO₂ pricing & ETS / ETS2** - **Existing ETS (ETS1)** – 2026 is a transition year as EU institutions “address the future” of ETS design following Fit‑for‑55 revisions; ETS1 already covers electricity and maritime, indirectly affecting energy and port costs for Polish logistics.([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI%282026%29782615?utm_source=openai)) - **EU ETS2 (road transport & buildings)**: - Legislative framework adopted; ETS2 for road transport will **start operating in 2028** (postponed from an earlier date), but 2026–2027 are **pre‑implementation years** where: - Member States prepare **Social Climate Plans** funded by the **Social Climate Fund**, which becomes operational from **2026**, with total envelope up to **€65 bn**.([eea.europa.eu](https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/emissions-reduction-from-transport-in-europe-how-the-ets2-will-help-this-sector-meet-its-climate-targets?utm_source=openai)) - Market participants and advisory firms model likely carbon price impacts on **diesel** and **road freight rates** (e.g., €140/t CO₂ scenario → +22.6% diesel cost, +high‑single‑digit total cost).([cxtms.com](https://cxtms.com/blog/eu-ets2-road-transport-carbon-pricing-european-freight-costs-global-shippers-2026?utm_source=openai)) - In April 2026 the European Parliament agreed adjustments to the **market stability reserve** and indexing of ETS2 thresholds to **2026 rather than 2020 prices**, underlining 2026 as the base‑year reference for later ETS2 carbon‑price caps.([europarl.eu.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2026/4/press_release/20260414IPR40821/20260414IPR40821_en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **b) Road tolls and CO₂‑based charging (Eurovignette / road charging)** - Under the revised **Eurovignette Directive (1999/62/EC as amended by 2022/362)** and EU road‑charging rules: - From **2026 onwards**, **external costs of air pollution must be included in tolls** for heavy‑duty vehicles (HDVs) on relevant networks. National schemes must also incorporate **CO₂ emission class‑based differentiation** in their pricing structure.([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/road/road-charging_en?prefLang=uk&utm_source=openai)) - Council guidance (March 2026) on Eurovignette implementation explicitly highlights: - The need for **smooth interaction** between CO₂‑based tolling and heavy‑duty vehicle CO₂ standards from **1 July 2026**, - Risks of **additional administrative burden** and **more complex toll pricing**, but also the requirement to ensure **non‑discrimination** against international traffic (key for Polish hauliers operating cross‑border).([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/04/eurovignette-council-clarifies-and-simplifies-eu-rules-on-road-tolls-and-user-charges-for-heavy-duty-vehicles/pdf/?utm_source=openai)) - For carriers using Germany and other key transit states, enhanced **CO₂‑linked MAUT‑type tolls**, already in place or expanding from 2024–2026, compound cost impacts; industry estimates show that Germany’s 2023 MAUT reform alone added **~€200/t CO₂** equivalent to heavy‑goods tolls, which is used as a reference benchmark for what other countries may emulate.([cxtms.com](https://cxtms.com/blog/eu-ets2-road-transport-carbon-pricing-european-freight-costs-global-shippers-2026?utm_source=openai)) **c) Cabotage, posting of drivers, labour rules** - The core framework here is the previously‑adopted **Mobility Package I**, with phased‑in rules on: - **Posting of drivers**, **cooling‑off periods for cabotage**, and **return‑of‑vehicle** obligations. Although formally in effect before 2026, many Polish carriers report **full enforcement biting in 2024–2026**, as Western EU states ramp up roadside and digital checks. - No new dedicated 2026 Mobility‑Package reform was identified in recent sources, but multiple 2025–2026 analyses stress **ongoing tightening of enforcement** and data‑sharing between Member States, effectively raising compliance risk and labour costs for Polish operators.([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **d) Dangerous goods (ADR) enforcement – 2025/1801** - **Delegated Directive (EU) 2025/1801** (ADR enforcement) phases in: - From **2 November 2025**, with **full implementation by 24 June 2026**, a **unified inspection checklist** for dangerous‑goods transport by road, - A **three‑tier risk model (High / Medium / Low)** for operators. - This will raise inspection intensity and compliance costs for Polish carriers moving fuels, chemicals, fertilisers, and some food‑grade hazardous materials; advisory notes warn of higher likelihood of **fines and loading restrictions** for non‑compliance from mid‑2026 onward.([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **e) Sanctions on Russia/Belarus & Ukraine‑specific measures** - Updated EU transport‑sanctions page (reviewed **23 April 2026**) confirms: - A **full ban on Russian and Belarusian freight road operators** working in the EU, with limited exceptions for essentials (agri‑food, humanitarian aid, some energy).([commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/sanctions-transport_en?utm_source=openai)) - Continued **port access bans** and maritime service restrictions for Russian‑linked vessels, reinforcing overland re‑routing via Poland and other CEE states.([commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/sanctions-transport_en?utm_source=openai)) - The **EU–Ukraine Road Transport Agreement**, granting **permit‑free access** for Ukrainian hauliers to the EU market, has been **extended until March 2027**, so throughout **2026**: - Ukrainian carriers retain liberalised access, sustaining competitive pressure on Polish carriers on Ukraine‑related lanes.([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **f) GHG accounting & transparency for transport services** - A November 2025 provisional agreement (still progressing in 2026) on a **Regulation for the accounting of greenhouse‑gas emissions of transport services** aims to: - Standardise **GHG calculation and reporting** across freight modes in the EU, - Improve data **transparency and comparability** for shippers. - Once in force (implementation likely around **2027–2028**, but preparatory work in 2026), Polish freight forwarders will need systems to **calculate and disclose CO₂ per shipment**, especially as shippers increasingly use this for carrier selection.([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/05/passenger-and-freight-transport-provisional-agreement-boosts-transparency-and-comparability-of-data-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions/pdf/?utm_source=openai)) **g) Local and national measures in Poland (LEZ / clean transport zones)**n - Kraków introduced a **clean transport zone starting 1 January 2026**, restricting access for **diesel vehicles below Euro 6** and older petrol vehicles in defined areas; other large Polish cities are assessing similar zones under national clean‑air policies aligned with EU directives.([resources.cargoon.eu](https://resources.cargoon.eu/en/digitalisation/new-regulations-in-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Net timing signal for 2026** - 2026 is **not yet the full ETS2 cost shock year** (that comes 2028), but it is: - The **baseline year for ETS2 parameters and Social Climate Fund roll‑out**, - The year when **CO₂‑ and pollution‑based road‑charging** requirements under Eurovignette start to bite, - The enforcement year for **ADR 2025/1801** and for multiple local **low‑emission zones** in Poland. - Combined, these make **2026–2027 a critical window** for Polish carriers and forwarders to: - Re‑price contracts (add toll/CO₂ indices), - Renew fleets towards cleaner Euro classes and alternative drivetrains, - Build capability for **GHG accounting and modal‑shift advisory**, ahead of the 2028 ETS2 go‑live. **Sources (Timing Signals):** ([commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/sanctions-transport_en?utm_source=openai))