## Company Profile ADECON SP. ZO. O. SP. K. is a Poland-based freight forwarder providing sea, air and rail transport services (sales contact: Adam Cozaś, Sales team - Sea Transport, Air Transport, Rail Transport). Public contact pages list multimodal forwarding and contact points for international shipments. Company appears positioned to serve containerized import/export flows and cross-border logistics on Polish corridors (Gdańsk/Gdynia/Szczecin, rail gateways such as Małaszewicze). No public consolidated scale metrics were available in the brief website snippet; profile fits a national/mid‑tier forwarder focused on Europe–Asia/Europe–intra‑EU lanes. ## Pain Points 1) Rapidly changing modal demand on China–EU lanes: Q1‑2026 rail volumes rebounded and Poland handles ~94% of eastbound China–EU rail, creating spikes in inbound TEU and downstream trucking/warehousing needs. ADECON likely struggles to convert ad‑hoc rail/sea demand into repeat freight volumes without a consistent pipeline of exporter/importer clients. 2) Agricultural market volatility from Black Sea corridor shifts: the re‑establishment of Black Sea seaborne exports cut Ukrainian grain rail transit to Poland (grain wagons to Poland fell ~77% in 2025), but ongoing Black Sea risk keeps buyers seeking reliable alternative origins (Polish rapeseed/rapeseed oil). ADECON’s agri customers (processors, traders) need faster access to verified suppliers and buyers when supply shifts — something a sourcing/demand channel could supply. 3) Capacity & routing contingency at Polish nodes: heavy concentration at Małaszewicze (handles ~90% of China–EU trains) and port capacity surges (Poland recorded record 141m t throughput in 2025, containers +20% y/y) create bottlenecks and last‑mile shocks. ADECON must offer multimodal contingency routing and quicker customer onboarding to capture and manage these variable flows. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] Poland export–import trade flows 2026, by mode and corridors (sea/air/rail; China, EU, UK, Ukraine; key ports Gdansk/Gdynia/Szczecin‑Świnoujście) === **Overall trade & partner structure (context for 2026)** - Poland remains highly EU‑centric: Germany is still the top partner on both export and import sides; China is a top‑3 extra‑EU import source but far smaller as an export destination. 2025 data are not fully closed yet, but no structural reversal is reported in early‑2026 commentary – rather a consolidation of Poland as an EU/Ukraine logistics hub and energy gateway. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - Ukraine: Poland is confirmed as **Ukraine’s largest export partner and second‑largest import source** as of early 2026, underlining the scale of over‑border flows (fuels, electricity, food, construction materials, aid/dual‑use cargo). ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) --- #### Seaborne trade – main ports and 2025 performance feeding into 2026 **Aggregate Polish ports performance** - A 2026 Baltic Sea & space cluster review notes **record throughput of ~141 million tonnes in 2025 for Polish seaports**, with container volumes up **about 20% vs 2024**. ([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) - This follows a weaker 2024 when total seaport turnover fell **8.9% y/y to 124.2m t**, with declines in dry bulk and containers at Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin, and growth only in Świnoujście (+3.5%) and Police (+39.2%). ([transportcorridors.com](https://www.transportcorridors.com/12926?utm_source=openai)) - A separate 2024 ports study confirms that by 2024‑25, **containerized cargo already represented >90% of general cargo in Gdańsk** and **34.3% in Gdynia** (up 5.8% y/y), while Szczecin‑Świnoujście saw a **+135.8% jump in containerized general cargo** vs 2023, from a very low base. ([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Port of Gdańsk – energy and container hub** - 2025: Gdańsk’s Naftoport processed **37.4m t of crude oil**, up from 36.6m t in 2024 (new record), reinforcing the port’s role as Poland’s and the region’s energy security hub. ([polandatsea.com](https://www.polandatsea.com/port-of-gdansk-delivers-impressive-2025-performance/?utm_source=openai)) - Coal throughput at Gdańsk fell **10.8% y/y in 2025 to just under 7m t**, roughly half its 2022 level – a structural reduction in seaborne coal imports. ([polandatsea.com](https://www.polandatsea.com/port-of-gdansk-delivers-impressive-2025-performance/?utm_source=openai)) - Container side: after capacity upgrades, Gdańsk’s container terminal has a **declared handling capacity of ~4.5m TEU**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Gda%C5%84sk?utm_source=openai)) - Directionally, 2025 and early 2026 commentary frames Gdańsk as: - Import gateway for crude and fuels (Russia substitution, diversification via seaborne crude/fuels from non‑Russian origins). ([polandatsea.com](https://www.polandatsea.com/port-of-gdansk-delivers-impressive-2025-performance/?utm_source=openai)) - Container gateway for **Asia–EU deep‑sea trade**, including China and other Far East origins; exact share of China‑related boxes is not given but Chinese mainline services are highlighted across industry press (CMA CGM/MSC/OOCL, etc., calling at Gdańsk). ([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Szczecin–Świnoujście complex** - 2025: total throughput **34.79m t, +7.5% vs 2024**; container throughput rose strongly and the Szczecin terminal surpassed **100,000 TEU for the first time**, on the back of new short‑sea services (e.g., Eimskip’s Świnoujście–European ports link). ([marinepoland.com](https://www.marinepoland.com/ports-of-szczecin-and-swinoujscie-close-2025-with-strong-growth-and-signal-readiness-for-the-challenges-ahead-2294?utm_source=openai)) - The complex is positioning for **a deep‑water container terminal at Świnoujście**, aimed at capturing more North Europe–Asia and Baltic feeder flows in the late‑2020s. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/1i2ml7o?utm_source=openai)) **Shifts in maritime flows related to Ukraine & Black Sea** - A 2026 Warsaw Enterprise Institute report notes that **re‑establishment of the Ukrainian Black Sea maritime corridor from late‑2023** significantly changed patterns: - Bulk rail transshipment of Ukrainian grain to Poland dropped **77% y/y in 2025** (grain wagons to Poland), as more grain again moved by sea from Odesa region ports. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - Nonetheless, due to ongoing security risks, **Polish ports remain a critical contingency/export option** for Ukrainian cargoes (grains, veg oils, fuels), sustaining a higher baseline of transit business than pre‑war. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **Trade with UK & non‑EU by sea** - Detailed 2025‑26 port statistics by partner are not yet consolidated in open sources, but 2024 port‑monitor data show expanding **short‑sea container services linking Gdynia and Szczecin‑Świnoujście with Scandinavia and North Sea ports**; UK container and ro‑ro flows are usually embedded in this North Sea network rather than reported separately. ([tu.swinoujscie.pl](https://tu.swinoujscie.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Port-Monitor-Baltic_ports_2024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) --- #### Rail freight – China/EU/Ukraine flows via Poland **China – EU rail via Poland (market share and volumes)** - 2025 analysis of China–EU rail shows: - Total China–EU rail freight volume **310,579 TEU in 2025, –14.1% y/y**, with a steeper fall on the China→EU leg (–17.7% to 272,157 TEU) and Europe→China at **38,422 TEU (–22.7%)**, a historic low. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - At the **EU border**, Poland’s share of eastbound traffic (China→EU) rose to **93.4% in H1‑2025 and 94% for full‑year 2025**. The Małaszewicze hub alone handled about **90% of China–EU trains**, underscoring that nearly all westbound China–EU rail still enters via Poland despite the overall volume dip. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - A two‑week shutdown of the Poland–Belarus border (12–25 Sept 2025) “blocked around 90% of trains”, highlighting the corridor’s concentration risk. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/notizie/ferrovia/cambiano-nel-2025-i-flussi-ferroviari-dalla-cina/?utm_source=openai)) These data indicate a **modest contraction in total China–EU rail TEU, but increased concentration through Poland**, not a diversion away from Poland. **Ukraine‑related rail flows** - The same 2026 WEI report indicates: - As Black Sea maritime exports from Odesa recovered, **grain rail flows into Poland fell 77% in 2025**, heavily reducing bulk rail transshipment volumes at the Polish‑Ukrainian border. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - Poland remains a major overland corridor for **non‑grain Ukrainian exports and imports** (metals, products, fuel, electricity, humanitarian cargo), supporting sustained rail and road volumes despite the decline in grain wagons. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) --- #### Air cargo - Recent, detailed 2025‑26 air‑cargo statistics by partner (China, UK, EU) via Polish airports are not yet in the public domain. Industry commentary points to: - **Some shift of high‑value China–EU freight back to air** in 2024–25 when spot ocean rates spiked and rail corridor security was uncertain, but 2025‑26 macro reports still describe rail and sea as the primary modes for China–Poland trades. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Major gateways: Warsaw Chopin and Katowice for belly and freighter traffic; Poznań and Łódź for integrators. No Poland‑specific modal share %s vs sea/rail were identified in the last 90 days. --- #### Key directional “latest shifts” into 2026 1. **Seaborne cargo rebounded strongly in 2025** after a weak 2024, led by liquid fuels at Gdańsk and containerization growth at all three main port systems (Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin‑Świnoujście). ([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) 2. **Coal imports by sea are structurally down**, particularly via Gdańsk (–10.8% y/y in 2025; about half 2022 volume), as Poland diversifies energy and reduces coal‑fired power. ([polandatsea.com](https://www.polandatsea.com/port-of-gdansk-delivers-impressive-2025-performance/?utm_source=openai)) 3. **China–EU rail volumes dipped in 2025 but remain extremely concentrated into the EU via Poland**, which handles ~94% of eastbound flows and ~90% of trains via Małaszewicze. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) 4. **Ukraine grain rail transit through Poland dropped sharply** (–77% grain wagons in 2025) as the Black Sea seaborne corridor recovered, but Poland’s role as Ukraine’s primary export partner and logistics gateway for non‑grain cargo is reinforced. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Market events section):** ([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) --- === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] China–Europe rail freight demand 2026 via Poland (volumes, routes, transit times, capacity) === **Macro demand trend into 2026** - System‑wide China Railway Express (CRE) performance: - In Q1‑2026, CRE reportedly handled **5,460 train trips** moving **546,000 TEU**, up **29% (trains)** and **22% (TEU)** year‑on‑year vs Q1‑2025. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/Sino/comments/1szxt5m/the_chinaeurope_railway_express_handled_a_total/?utm_source=openai)) - Cumulatively since inception, the network had reached **120,000 trips by 19 March 2026**, with total cargo value above **US$490bn**. ([logifie.com](https://www.logifie.com/blog/china-europe-rail-freight-surge-2026-road-freight-impact?utm_source=openai)) - A 2025 Europe‑focused rail market insight states that, despite a 14.1% fall in China–EU rail TEUs in 2025, **border‑crossings into the EU have become even more concentrated in Poland (94% share of eastbound volumes)**. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) **Poland gateway role and Malaszewicze** - In 2025: Poland captured **93.4% of eastbound China–EU rail flows in H1‑2025, rising to 94% by year‑end**; Małaszewicze alone handled **about 90% of trains**. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - A border closure of the Poland–Belarus crossing in Sept 2025 (12–25 September) effectively **halted ~90% of CRE trains** during that period, illustrating the system’s dependence on the Polish gateway and incentivising investments in capacity and alternative routings. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/notizie/ferrovia/cambiano-nel-2025-i-flussi-ferroviari-dalla-cina/?utm_source=openai)) **2026 demand signals: modal shift and regulatory support** - A March 2026 analysis of China–Europe rail freight highlights: - A **“surge” in rail demand in early 2026**, driven by shippers hedging against volatile Red Sea/ocean routes and seeking resilience. ([logifie.com](https://www.logifie.com/blog/china-europe-rail-freight-surge-2026-road-freight-impact?utm_source=openai)) - On **30 March 2026, new EU multimodal aid rules** take effect, increasing modal‑shift aid ceilings from **50% to 90% of eligible costs**. This significantly strengthens financial incentives for forwarders to route long‑haul trunk volumes by rail (including via Poland) while using road for first/last mile. ([logifie.com](https://www.logifie.com/blog/china-europe-rail-freight-surge-2026-road-freight-impact?utm_source=openai)) - The piece notes a **“truck‑demand shock” at terminal nodes** in Poland, Germany, Benelux, etc., due to higher rail‑delivered volumes needing local distribution capacity – an indirect but strong signal that rail flows via hubs like Małaszewicze are ramping. ([logifie.com](https://www.logifie.com/blog/china-europe-rail-freight-surge-2026-road-freight-impact?utm_source=openai)) **Routes and network configuration through Poland** - Typical high‑volume China origins mentioned for 2025–26 services include **Chengdu, Xi’an, Chongqing, Wuhan and Zhengzhou**, with Poland‑bound or Poland‑transit trains then feeding into: - **Małaszewicze → Poznań / Łódź → Germany (Duisburg), Benelux, Scandinavia, Central Europe**, using Polish domestic rail plus cross‑border links. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - The March 2026 article specifically calls out the **Chengdu–Poland service** that marked the 120,000th CRE trip, indicating that direct China–Poland branded services remain a flagship part of the network. ([logifie.com](https://www.logifie.com/blog/china-europe-rail-freight-surge-2026-road-freight-impact?utm_source=openai)) **Transit times & service profile** - While precise Poland‑specific transit times are not given in the last‑90‑day sources, recent rail‑freight marketing material and market commentary continue to benchmark: - **China (central/western) to Poland in roughly 12–16 days**, depending on origin, routing (Belarus vs alternative corridors), and customs/terminal dwell; end‑to‑end China‑to‑Western Europe typically **15–20 days**, positioning rail between ocean (30–45+ days) and air. This aligns with 2024–25 data and is implicitly referenced in 2026 modal‑shift discussions. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) **Capacity and bottlenecks** - Capacity at Małaszewicze and the broader Polish border section is a key strategic issue: - 2025 reports describe Małaszewicze as a **“critical bottleneck”**, handling ~90% of trains and vulnerable to both infrastructure saturation and political disruptions (sanctions, protests, border closures). ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/notizie/ferrovia/cambiano-nel-2025-i-flussi-ferroviari-dalla-cina/?utm_source=openai)) - EU and Polish authorities are pushing expansion projects (the “Dry Port” / Małaszewicze hub upgrade and line‑capacity enhancements) to increase throughput and reduce dwell times, though specific TEU or train‑per‑day expansion figures are not clearly quantified in the latest open‑source market reports. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/notizie/ferrovia/cambiano-nel-2025-i-flussi-ferroviari-dalla-cina/?utm_source=openai)) **Net read‑through for demand via Poland in 2026** - Despite the **2025 volume dip** in China–EU rail TEU, early‑2026 evidence (Q1 CRE growth +22% TEU y/y, EU aid reform, and anecdotal capacity strain at Polish terminals) indicates: - **Renewed growth momentum in CRE volumes**, likely restoring or surpassing 2023 levels during 2026 if trends persist. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/Sino/comments/1szxt5m/the_chinaeurope_railway_express_handled_a_total/?utm_source=openai)) - An even stronger **centrality of Poland as the de‑facto EU gateway**, with limited diversion so far to alternative entry points (e.g., Kaliningrad, Baltic states, Southern routes). ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Rising **downstream trucking, warehousing and customs‑broker demand** around Polish nodes (Małaszewicze, Łódź, Poznań, Silesia), as noted by 2026 logistics industry commentary. ([logifie.com](https://www.logifie.com/blog/china-europe-rail-freight-surge-2026-road-freight-impact?utm_source=openai)) **Sources (Demand signals section):** ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/rail-freight-flows-from-china-shift-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) --- === 3. [COMMODITY TRENDS] Poland agricultural exports 2026 – grains, rapeseed, sunflower oil; impact of Black Sea grain corridor & demand for Polish origin === **EU‑level context for 2025/26 grains & oilseeds** - The European Commission’s short‑term outlook (summer 2025 edition) projects for **EU‑27 in 2025/26**: - Cereals production **+4.1%**, with exports **+26%** and imports **–19%** vs the prior season, easing internal balances. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/short-term-outlook-eu-agricultural-markets-resilience-amid-geopolitical-instabilities-and-climatic-2025-07-28_en?prefLang=et&utm_source=openai)) - Oilseeds production up **12%**, driven mainly by **rapeseed and sunflower seed**, leading to **+6% in vegetable oil output**. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/short-term-outlook-eu-agricultural-markets-resilience-amid-geopolitical-instabilities-and-climatic-2025-07-28_en?prefLang=et&utm_source=openai)) - A more recent (April 2024 minutes, still used in 2025‑26 policy discussions) notes that the **Black Sea corridor remains the core route for Ukrainian exports**, and warns of **price pressure on EU rapeseed producers** from competitive imports, especially Ukraine. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ae64e129-916b-453c-9ba6-bb3eaeb6dc52_en?filename=cmo_2024-04-03-minutes_en.pdf&utm_source=openai)) Although Poland‑specific 2025/26 figures are not yet fully published, as one of the EU’s large producers of wheat, rye, and rapeseed, Poland is part of this broader expansion trend. --- #### Impact of the Black Sea corridor on Polish grain & oilseed trade flows - After Russia’s suspension of the original Black Sea Grain Initiative in mid‑2023, Ukraine opened an alternative **“new Black Sea corridor” from Greater Odesa in September 2023**, which steadily gained volume through 2024. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) - An OSW report (Dec 2025) notes that with this corridor functioning, **EU imports of Ukrainian grain once again occurred “almost exclusively by sea”**, reducing reliance on overland solidarity corridors. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) - The 2026 WEI study quantifies the Polish side: by 2025, **grain wagons delivered from Ukraine to Poland fell 77%** vs prior peaks, as flows shifted back to the Black Sea route. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for Polish origin grain exports:** - The earlier 2022‑23 spike in Ukrainian overland grain and oilseed flows into the Polish market had depressed local prices and triggered farmer protests; 2024 protests continued as the EU prolonged duty‑free access for Ukraine until 2025, even as corridor conditions improved. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Polish_farmers%27_protests?utm_source=openai)) - As more Ukrainian grain moves by sea again (2024–25), **direct competition in the Polish land market eases**, allowing: - Some **re‑normalisation of Polish export flows via Baltic ports**, as domestic infrastructure is less clogged by Ukrainian transit. - A slight **tightening of local supply** vs the protest years, which, combined with good EU harvests, supports “normalized but not depressed” price levels for Polish wheat/rapeseed vs the extreme volatility of 2022–23. No single source gives a Poland‑only export tonnage for 2025/26 yet, but based on EU‑level trends and corridor normalisation, it is reasonable to infer that **Poland resumes its role as a mid‑tier cereal exporter (especially wheat, rye, triticale) within the EU and to nearby third markets, with fewer displacement effects from Ukrainian land shipments.** --- #### Rapeseed and rapeseed oil: competitive landscape & Poland’s positioning - OSW data show that **Ukraine’s rapeseed exports to the EU remained remarkably stable at ~2m t annually between 2020 and 2023**, despite the war. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) - Ukraine has also significantly expanded oilseed processing and is now a key supplier of **rapeseed and sunflower oil** to the EU; in **2024, Poland accounted for 36% of Ukraine’s rapeseed‑oil exports to the EU**, making it the **largest EU buyer of Ukrainian rapeseed oil**. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) - A 2025/26 Black Sea–Danube oilseed market report notes: - Low sunflower yields in Ukraine and Russia and an export duty on Ukrainian rapeseed create **uncertainty on Black Sea rapeseed and oil supply**, while Poland and Serbia are described as “relatively stable” rapeseed producers in the region. ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/ukrainian-rapeseed-in-202526-from-exports-to-ixzmdo?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for Polish rapeseed and oil exports:** - Poland is both a **large rapeseed grower and a big buyer of Ukrainian rapeseed oil**. With uncertain Ukrainian supply and slightly firmer EU demand for non‑Russian veg oils: - There is **strong incentive for Polish crushers to run at high utilisation**, processing domestic and imported seed to supply both internal consumption and exports to EU neighbours. - Regional analysts flag **opportunities for Polish rapeseed and rapeseed‑oil exports to fill gaps** when Ukrainian availability dips; this is especially relevant for short‑sea exports from Gdańsk/Gdynia to Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux. ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2025-12-03/large-volumes-limited-significance?utm_source=openai)) --- #### Sunflower oil and veg‑oil balance - Pre‑war, Ukraine was a dominant supplier of sunflower oil to the EU; after heavy 2022 disruptions, a 2025 Black Sea veg‑oil report notes that **2024 sunflower seed supply was constrained but crushing and SFO (sunflower oil) market shares remained firm**, with sunflower oil still trading at a **premium** due to supply risk from Ukraine/Russia. ([ukragroconsult.com](https://ukragroconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/blackseavegoil_39.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - EU‑level analysis from 2024‑25 suggests that **rapeseed and sunflower seed expansion in the EU‑27** (including Poland) partly compensates, but not fully, for Black Sea risk, supporting relatively high veg‑oil price levels by historical standards even as the early‑2020s price spike moderates. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/short-term-outlook-eu-agricultural-markets-resilience-amid-geopolitical-instabilities-and-climatic-2025-07-28_en?prefLang=et&utm_source=openai)) **For Polish origin specifically:** - Poland is not a leading sunflower‑oil exporter, but as a **large rapeseed grower with increasing oilseed processing capacity**, it can: - Export **rapeseed oil and blended veg oils** into EU markets that are diversifying away from volatile Black Sea supplies. - Capture **additional margin in crush & refining** rather than exporting raw seed, particularly when Ukrainian SFO is tight or logistically challenged. --- #### Net demand for Polish origin grains & oilseeds in 2026 Combining EU, Black Sea and corridor dynamics, demand signals in 2025‑26 point to: 1. **Cereals (wheat, barley, maize)** - With EU cereals output +4.1% and EU exports +26% projected in 2025/26, Poland’s export opportunities depend more on **intra‑EU competition and world prices** than on Ukraine corridor shocks. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/short-term-outlook-eu-agricultural-markets-resilience-amid-geopolitical-instabilities-and-climatic-2025-07-28_en?prefLang=et&utm_source=openai)) - The shift of Ukrainian flows back to sea eases congestion and political pressure within Poland, but Ukrainian seaborne grain still competes with Polish grain in North Africa and the Middle East. Net impact for 2026 is **“normalised but still competitive”** export conditions for Polish wheat, with no 2022‑style windfall. 2. **Rapeseed & rapeseed oil** - EU oilseed production growth (+12%) and veg‑oil output (+6%), coupled with: - Stable Ukrainian rapeseed exports (~2m t) but - Increased Ukrainian processing and export duties on rapeseed, - Poland being the **top buyer of Ukrainian rapeseed oil**, collectively point to **continued strong demand for Polish rapeseed and rapeseed oil**, both domestically (for biofuel/food) and in nearby EU markets seeking diversified supply. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/short-term-outlook-eu-agricultural-markets-resilience-amid-geopolitical-instabilities-and-climatic-2025-07-28_en?prefLang=et&utm_source=openai)) 3. **Sunflower oil / veg‑oil complex** - Persistent geopolitical risk in the Black Sea keeps **sunflower oil priced at a premium**, indirectly supporting prices for rapeseed oil and other EU veg oils, including Polish origin. ([ukragroconsult.com](https://ukragroconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/blackseavegoil_39.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Poland benefits more via **processing and substitution** (rapeseed oil into food and biodiesel chains) than as a direct sunflower‑oil exporter. Overall, heading into the 2025/26 marketing year and calendar 2026, the data indicate **steady to firm demand for Polish origin rapeseed and rapeseed oil**, **normalising but competitive grain‑export conditions**, and **indirect price support from a still‑fragile Black Sea veg‑oil supply situation.** **Sources (Commodity trends section):** ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/short-term-outlook-eu-agricultural-markets-resilience-amid-geopolitical-instabilities-and-climatic-2025-07-28_en?prefLang=et&utm_source=openai))