## Company Profile COMEXAS SEAFREIGHT N.V. — Belgian ocean freight forwarder within the Comexas Group (Antwerp/Zeebrugge presence). Offers seafreight forwarding, consolidation, project cargo and likely customs/door services for Benelux clients; positions as a regional forwarder serving importers and exporters that use Antwerp–Zeebrugge as their North‑Sea gateway. Scale: small–mid sized regional forwarding business (group office listing shows presence in Belgium as part of broader Comexas network). Website: http://www.comexas.be ## Pain Points 1) Schedule unreliability and extended transit times (Red Sea/Suez rerouting + Cape diversions) are causing rolled cargo, peak yard congestion at Antwerp/Zeebrugge and difficulty securing slots/equipment — COMEXAS’s customers need faster supplier alternatives, capacity guarantees and coordinated end‑to‑end execution. 2) Fertilizer and certain grain buyers face regulatory (CBAM from Jan 2026) and supply risks (Strait of Hormuz) that force earlier purchasing, origin diversification and carbon‑compliant sourcing — clients need a sourcing/delivery channel that can validate origins, flag carbon‑cost exposure and lock-in logistics. 3) Rising Asia–Europe freight rates and intermittent capacity shortages mean lower‑margin agri product shippers may shift modalities or origins; COMEXAS must offer bundled sourcing+logistics value or risk losing clients to integrated digital channels. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] Antwerp–Zeebrugge container volumes, Asia–Europe lane shifts, Red Sea impact on North Sea ports === **Port of Antwerp‑Bruges: latest container volumes (2024–Q1 2026)** - Port of Antwerp‑Bruges (Antwerp + Zeebrugge) handled **266.5 million tonnes** in 2025, **down 4.1%** vs 2024. Overall container throughput **“remained stable”** in tonnage vs 2024 (exact TEU not specified in that release). ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/port-of-antwerp-bruges-cargo-throughput-falls-4-1-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - The port’s own factsheet for **Q1 2026** reports: - **18.5 million tonnes** of containerised cargo. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/INFOGRAPHIC_Kwartaalcijfers_Q1_2026_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) - A separate Q1 2026 factsheet notes **4,738 seagoing vessels**, **‑4.9% YoY** in calls, with commentary that container lines’ route changes (Red Sea/Suez issues) and alliance reshuffles are impacting calls and rotations. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/Jaarcijfers_Q1_2026_Factsheet_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) - In **H1 2025**, port total maritime throughput was **137.2 million tonnes (‑4.3% YoY)**; container throughput for full‑year **2024** was **6.91 million TEU, +3.7% YoY**, and the port’s **market share in the Hamburg–Le Havre range was 30.4% in Q1 2025**. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/Kwartaalcijfers_Q1-2_2025_Factsheet_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) - At terminal level, **DP World Antwerp Gateway** (one of the major deep‑sea container terminals in Antwerp) set a record in **2025**, handling **2,470,700 TEU, +8.6% YoY**, underscoring that container flows are concentrating at efficient hubs despite overall port tonnage decline. ([moveitmagazine.com](https://moveitmagazine.com/2026/03/16/dp-world-antwerp-gateway-sets-teu-record/?utm_source=openai)) **Asia–Europe trade lane shifts and impact of Red Sea security incidents (2025–2026)** - Since late 2023, Houthi attacks in the southern Red Sea/Gulf of Aden have forced major carriers to reroute Asia–Europe vessels via the **Cape of Good Hope**, bypassing Suez. Maersk estimated an **effective capacity loss of 15–20%** on Far East–North Europe and Med services because of longer round‑voyage times and operational disruptions. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 update on the Red Sea crisis notes: - **Container traffic via Suez fell ~75% in 2024 vs 2023**, with many services re‑routed around Africa. - Emissions per voyage increased by about **40%** due to the longer route, with higher speeds adding potentially another **+14%**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - The **Port of Antwerp‑Bruges Q1 2026 factsheet** explicitly links volume patterns to these diversions: - In **2025**, maritime volumes between Antwerp‑Bruges and **Persian Gulf countries past the Strait of Hormuz** were **7.5 million tonnes (2.8% of total throughput)**, mainly liquid bulk imports (energy, chemicals). - It notes that **container exports to the region dropped sharply (‑49%)**, partly because mainline container carriers adjusted networks in response to Red Sea/Suez risks and, more recently, the **Strait of Hormuz crisis from late February 2026**. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/Jaarcijfers_Q1_2026_Factsheet_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) - Industry coverage in early 2026 characterizes **North Sea range ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp‑Bruges, Hamburg, etc.) as “winners” in the short term**, capturing cargo from disrupted Med and Red Sea routings, but with **high schedule unreliability and bunching of calls** as vessels arrive off‑window due to the longer Cape route. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Operational and competitive position of Antwerp‑Zeebrugge within the North Range** - The port’s 2024 ranking moved from **15th to 14th among the world’s largest container ports**, reflecting its role as a key gateway despite macro headwinds. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/Kwartaalcijfers_Q1-2_2025_Factsheet_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) - Within the Hamburg–Le Havre range, the **~30% market share** in early 2025 suggests Antwerp‑Zeebrugge is holding share relative to Rotterdam and others, even as **bulk and energy‑linked cargoes fell**, dragging down total tonnage. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/Kwartaalcijfers_Q1-2_2025_Factsheet_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) - Q1 2025 reporting showed total port throughput down **4% YoY**, but **container volumes up ~4.5% in TEU**, driven by recovery in Asia–Europe trade and extra‑distance routings. ([porttechnology.org](https://www.porttechnology.org/port-of-antwerp-bruges-moves-68-million-tonnes-in-q1/?utm_source=openai)) **Key implications for food/agri supply chains using Antwerp‑Zeebrugge (2025–Q1 2026)** - **Containerised agri‑food and ingredients** moving on Asia–Europe lanes (e.g., coffee, cocoa products, spices, specialty foods, feed additives) are increasingly routed via **North Sea hubs like Antwerp**, benefitting from the port’s relatively stable container growth vs bulk decline. ([moveitmagazine.com](https://moveitmagazine.com/2026/03/16/dp-world-antwerp-gateway-sets-teu-record/?utm_source=openai)) - **Schedule disruption risk** is elevated: fewer but larger Asia–Europe services, longer transit via the Cape, and more bunching at North Sea ports are creating **peaks in yard utilization and truck/rail hinterland flows**, which logistics planners need to factor into safety stocks and lead times. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) Sources: Port of Antwerp‑Bruges quarterly and annual factsheets; DP World Antwerp Gateway throughput report; Red Sea crisis background and impact estimates; recent coverage of rerouting and North Sea port implications. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/INFOGRAPHIC_Kwartaalcijfers_Q1_2026_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) === 2. [COMMODITY TRENDS] Fertilizer and grain import flows to EU/Belgium; disruptions and prices (2025–2026) === **EU cereal imports from Ukraine and broader grain inflows (2025–2026)** - According to UN Comtrade data compiled by Trading Economics, **EU cereal imports from Ukraine in 2025** were valued at **US$2.56 billion**, broken down as roughly: - **Maize (corn): US$1.99 billion** - **Wheat and meslin: US$0.54 billion** - **Barley: US$24.8 million** - **Grain sorghum: US$2.7 million**. ([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/imports/ukraine/cereals?utm_source=openai)) - Ukraine remains a **top external grain supplier to the EU**, alongside Brazil (maize, soy) and other Black Sea exporters. For Belgium specifically, customs data typically show a pattern of **large intra‑EU grain inflows (France, Germany, Netherlands)** and **non‑EU imports (Ukraine, Brazil)** transiting via North Sea ports including Antwerp‑Zeebrugge, though recent 2025‑2026 detailed Belgian‑only data have not yet been finalized for public release. (Inference based on trade structure and port role.) ([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/imports/ukraine/cereals?utm_source=openai)) **Fertilizer trade & regulatory shifts impacting imports into EU/Belgium (2025–2026)** - The EU is structurally **import‑dependent on nitrogen fertilizers and nitrogen feedstocks (ammonia, urea)**, particularly after high gas prices forced partial curtailments of EU ammonia production in 2022–2023. - A European fertilizer market report (ZMP) notes that **from 1 January 2026, imported fertilizers such as urea, ammonia, NPK, DAP, etc. must be “priced based on emissions”** as part of the **CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism)** expansion. This introduces **carbon‑cost pass‑through on imports**, particularly from high‑emission producers, and is a key regulatory change for 2026. ([zmp.de](https://www.zmp.de/en/futures/grains/news/market-report-market-data-analysis-forecasts-fertilizer-market-europe-2026-02?utm_source=openai)) - The same report highlights: - **High inventories from Q4 2025** in Europe, which are dampening immediate CBAM‑driven price spikes. - **Urea prices in early February 2026 down ~€3–6/t** regionally vs January, indicating modest easing despite structural cost pressure. ([zmp.de](https://www.zmp.de/en/futures/grains/news/market-report-market-data-analysis-forecasts-fertilizer-market-europe-2026-02?utm_source=openai)) - A March 2026 Rabobank analysis of global fertilizer markets under the **Middle East conflict / Strait of Hormuz crisis** notes: - Europe entered **2026 with fertilizer affordability at “historically challenging” levels**, after several seasons of high nitrogen prices. - A **~50% spike in Dutch TTF gas prices** at the onset of the Hormuz crisis underlines renewed risk for **European ammonia production costs** and potential **reliance on imported ammonia and nitrogen solutions** if local plants curtail. ([rabobankna.com](https://www.rabobankna.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/RaboResearch_Global-fertilizer-markets-feel-impact-of-conflict-in-the-Middle-East_Taylor_March2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Fertilizer price levels and trends (Europe 2025–early 2026)** - A November/December 2025 European fertilizer market report cites **global urea prices around US$350/t on 4 December 2025** (FOB benchmark), with significant volatility and phosphates up **+36–41% year‑on‑year** vs 2024 on tight supply. ([zmp.de](https://www.zmp.de/en/futures/grains/news/market-report-fertilizer-market-novemberdecember-2025-2025-12-05?utm_source=openai)) - A detailed nitrogen‑fertilizer price analysis (Chemanalyst) for **Q1 2025** describes: - **Diverse trends across nitrogen products in Europe** – with some fertilizers supported by high ammonia costs, while others face downward pressure from **weak agricultural demand and inventory overhang**, leading to a **“mixed pricing environment”**. ([chemanalyst.com](https://www.chemanalyst.com/Industry-data/nitrogen-based-fertilizer-17?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 urea‑price outlook for Europe notes that: - **2025 urea prices in Europe remained elevated vs pre‑2021 norms**, reflecting a structural premium tied to energy costs and local production curtailments. - The **2026 forecast is “steady with mild upside potential”**, contingent on gas prices, global demand swings, and exporting‑country trade policies. ([expertmarketresearch.com](https://www.expertmarketresearch.com/price-forecast/urea-price-trends?utm_source=openai)) - A specialist insight on **urea prices in Europe 2026** stresses strong **seasonality** (pre‑planting run‑up, mid‑year bump, and easing after application season) and highlights the role of **stabilized urea (with NBPT inhibitors) reducing ammonia volatilization by up to 70%**, which is relevant for EU compliance with environmental rules but also adds cost per tonne. ([cerantis.ch](https://www.cerantis.ch/en/insights/harnstoff-preis-europa-saisonale-trends?utm_source=openai)) **NPK and complex fertilizer prices** - An NPK fertilizer pricing report shows **moderate upward momentum in European NPK prices during Q3 2025**, driven by higher **production and logistics costs**, including energy and freight, and by disruptions such as **hurricanes hitting phosphate facilities in Florida** and broader geopolitical issues affecting raw material flows. ([imarcgroup.com](https://www.imarcgroup.com/npk-fertiliser-pricing-report?utm_source=openai)) **Supply disruptions and flows (fertilizers and grain, 2025–2026)** - For **fertilizers**, major 2025–2026 disruption drivers for EU/Belgium include: - **Red Sea / Suez rerouting**, extending voyage times for fertilizers from the Middle East/Asia to North Sea ports and creating intermittent tonnage constraints. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - The **2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis**, which directly threatens exports of **ammonia and urea from Gulf producers** to Europe, raising risk premiums and prompting some **front‑loading of imports in late 2025** as a buffer, as noted by Rabobank. ([rabobankna.com](https://www.rabobankna.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/RaboResearch_Global-fertilizer-markets-feel-impact-of-conflict-in-the-Middle-East_Taylor_March2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For **grains**, Ukraine’s ability to ship via the Black Sea Grain Corridor has improved compared with mid‑2022, and EU imports from Ukraine in 2025 still reached **US$2.56bn**, but exporters and EU traders have diversified into **Danube, Baltic, and overland corridors**, with North Sea ports (including Antwerp‑Zeebruges) acting as key transshipment points for maize and wheat into Benelux and Germany. ([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/imports/ukraine/cereals?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for Belgian/EU agri‑food supply chains (2025–2026)** - **Cost pressure**: Even with some easing, nitrogen and NPK prices remain substantially above 2016–2019 averages; CBAM from **January 2026** adds a carbon‑linked cost component on imports, especially from high‑emission origins. ([zmp.de](https://www.zmp.de/en/futures/grains/news/market-report-market-data-analysis-forecasts-fertilizer-market-europe-2026-02?utm_source=openai)) - **Risk to Q4 2026–2027 fertilizer availability**: If the Hormuz disruption persists, Europe may face **intermittent tightness in ammonia/urea imports** despite high warehouse stocks early in 2026. Procurement strategies are shifting toward **earlier booking (Q3–Q4 2025 for 2026 application)** and **greater origin diversification**. ([rabobankna.com](https://www.rabobankna.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/RaboResearch_Global-fertilizer-markets-feel-impact-of-conflict-in-the-Middle-East_Taylor_March2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Grain import flows**: EU feed and processing industries remain heavily reliant on **Ukrainian and Brazilian maize**, with Belgium acting primarily as a **logistics hub (via Antwerp‑Zeebrugge)**. The main risk in 2026 is **maritime routing and port congestion**, not outright availability, given large crops and competitive Black Sea and South American supplies. ([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/imports/ukraine/cereals?utm_source=openai)) Sources: UN Comtrade via Trading Economics; EU and industry fertilizer market reports (ZMP, Chemanalyst, Cerantis, Expert Market Research); Rabobank fertilizer outlook; NPK price analysis; public port data and Red Sea/Hormuz crisis coverage. ([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/imports/ukraine/cereals?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [DEMAND SIGNALS] Asia–Europe container freight rates, capacity, schedule reliability, blank sailings (2025–2026) === *(Note: precise spot rate indices are proprietary; below I use direction and approximate levels as reported in public commentaries.)* **Asia–Europe container freight rates – 2026 latest** - Industry reporting on Q1 2026 emphasizes that **Asia–North Europe spot rates have risen significantly vs late‑2024** as a direct result of the Red Sea rerouting: - Ports/shipping coverage in Feb 2026 notes **“elevated” Asia–Europe freight rates and surcharges** due to longer Cape of Good Hope voyages and constrained effective capacity, with some lanes seeing **multiples of late‑2024 spot levels during the peak of diversions**. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Public summaries of Drewry’s World Container Index and similar benchmarks (not directly quoted here due to paywall) indicate that **Shanghai–Rotterdam** rates in early 2026 remained **well above 2019–2020 averages**, though below the 2021–2022 extreme peaks; the rate curve shows **a spike in early 2025 with Red Sea escalation, a partial correction mid‑2025, and renewed firming into early 2026** as security incidents persisted. (Inference from aggregate commentary and rerouting impacts.) ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Capacity trends and network configuration (2025–2026)** - The Red Sea/Suez disruptions effectively **removed 15–20% of available capacity on Far East–North Europe and Med trades** due to the longer Cape routing and related inefficiencies, according to Maersk estimates referenced in Red Sea crisis summaries. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - Despite **“record newbuilding deliveries”** entering the global fleet in 2025, much of this extra tonnage is **absorbed by longer round‑trip times and slow‑steaming adjustments**; net effective capacity growth on Asia–Europe is therefore modest, supporting higher rate levels. (Synthesis from industry commentary.) ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - For North Sea ports like Antwerp‑Zeebrugge, this has translated into: - **Larger, less frequent mainline calls** as carriers consolidate services. - Stronger reliance on **feeder and rail/barge connectivity** to smooth inland distribution given bunching of big‑ship arrivals. ([newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com](https://newsroom.portofantwerpbruges.com/hubfs/Jaarcijfers_Q1_2026_Factsheet_ENG.pdf?hsLang=en&utm_source=openai)) **Schedule reliability and vessel delays (late 2025 – early 2026)** - Sea‑Intelligence’s **Global Liner Performance (GLP) November 2025** press release notes that: - The **Gemini Cooperation (Maersk + Hapag‑Lloyd) recorded 88.6% schedule reliability in Sept/Oct 2025**, significantly above the global average, highlighting that **some alliances were approaching pre‑pandemic reliability** on key trades before the worst of the Red Sea escalation. ([sea-intelligence.com](https://www.sea-intelligence.com/images/press_docs/GLP-Nov2025/20251125_-_Sea-Intelligence_GLP_Press_Release_-_November_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Subsequent commentary (Q1 2026) from port and shipping sources indicates that **schedule reliability deteriorated again** on Asia–Europe when widespread Cape rerouting took hold: - Longer voyages, convoying near high‑risk zones and **port congestion at North Sea and Med hubs** resulted in **higher average delays per call** and **more bunching**. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Overall, the pattern is: **reliability improved through most of 2025**, then **slipped in late 2025–early 2026** as geopolitical disruptions intensified. **Blank sailings and capacity management (2025–2026)** - During **early 2025**, carriers used **blank sailings** to manage soft demand and protect rate levels, particularly after the initial Red Sea shock. With demand normalizing and rerouting absorbing capacity, by **late 2025** the focus shifted more toward **reconfiguring rotations** rather than cancelling sailings outright. (Industry synthesis.) ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - By **Q1 2026**, the combination of **longer Cape routes + security‑driven operational buffers** meant fewer “traditional” blank sailings on Asia–Europe but **effective capacity under‑supply**, manifesting instead as **rolled cargo** and **extended transit times**, especially to and from North Europe. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Demand signals relevant for food/agri supply chains using Asia–Europe container services** - **Strong but volatile demand** for containerized shipments (including agri‑food) from Asia into Europe, with: - Higher freight rates and longer transit times **baked into 2026 budgets**. - Some shippers, particularly for lower‑value bulk‑like foods (e.g., rice, sugar), **considering modal shifts** (breakbulk, bulk, or alternative routing) when feasible to mitigate high box‑freight costs. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/red-sea-rerouting-impacts-global-shipping-q1-2026?utm_source=openai)) - For exporters from Europe (including Belgium) to Asia and the Middle East: - **Backhaul rates have risen less sharply** than headhaul, but schedule risk is comparable, which affects **time‑sensitive refrigerated exports** (meat, dairy, fresh produce, chocolate confectionery). - Some carriers have prioritized **reefer equipment repositioning** to maintain service to high‑yield cargoes, but reliability is still below late‑2025 “best case” levels. (Inference from global liner performance trends.) ([sea-intelligence.com](https://www.sea-intelligence.com/images/press_docs/GLP-Nov2025/20251125_-_Sea-Intelligence_GLP_Press_Release_-_November_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Sources: Sea‑Intelligence schedule‑reliability data; Red Sea crisis impact analyses; 2026 coverage of Red Sea rerouting and port impacts; port factsheets and broader shipping commentary on capacity and rates. ([sea-intelligence.com](https://www.sea-intelligence.com/images/press_docs/GLP-Nov2025/20251125_-_Sea-Intelligence_GLP_Press_Release_-_November_2025.pdf?utm_source=openai))