## Company Profile OCEAN COMPANY LTD — Israel-based freight forwarder/relocation & logistics provider. Likely small-to-mid-sized operator offering ocean and air freight forwarding, customs clearance, door-to-door relocation and consolidation services for exporters and importers in Israel. Operates on Israel’s main gateways (Haifa and Ashdod) and serves agricultural exporters (fresh produce such as avocados, citrus, greenhouse tomatoes), importers of general cargo, and companies needing regional short-sea and feeder connections. Scale: not publicly listed; positioned as a local forwarder competing for gateway cargo amid heavy port competition. ## Pain Points 1) Time‑sensitive perishables at high risk: avocado export boom + longer/less reliable transit times (10–14 days added on many routes) raises spoilage risk and requires contingency routing and better cold‑chain coordination. 2) Capacity & cost volatility on Israel‑bound lanes: Red Sea/Suez disruptions, Eilat collapse and security premiums have increased freight cost unpredictability and reduced mainline calls — forwarders must offer resilient routing (feeder + transshipment) and absorb insurance/surcharge complexity. 3) Compliance & documentation burden for EU markets: increased phytosanitary, traceability and documentation expectations for fresh produce (EU inspections, certificates) add operational friction for small exporters. Tridge Ark can centralize buyer matching, booking, and documentation workflows so Ocean Company can expand exporter services without building a full sourcing/delivery stack. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – ISRAEL CONTAINER PORT THROUGHPUT / TRADE FLOW SHIFTS === **Overall container capacity vs. actual flows** - Israel’s total *container handling capacity* across Haifa (old + Bayport) and Ashdod is estimated at about **5 million TEU/year**, vs. current actual container activity of roughly **3 million TEU**, implying substantial over‑capacity and intense competition between ports. ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/port-haifa-3-years/?utm_source=openai)) - According to CEIC, Israel’s *national container port throughput* averaged about **2.5 million TEU/year** between 2008–2023, with moderate growth trend into 2023. (Latest detailed CEIC figure is for **2023**, not yet 2024–25.) ([ceicdata.com](https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/israel/container-port-throughput?utm_source=openai)) **Ashdod Port – latest quantitative signals** - Ashdod handled **681,000 containers** in 2024 (loaded + unloaded), up from **669,000** in 2023 (about **+1.8% YoY** in box count). Its **market share** of Israeli container traffic was **41.5% in 2024**. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Ashdod-Port/Ashdod-Port-Reports-Net-Profit-of-168-Million-Shekels-for-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - An Ashdod Port Company release for 2025 (partial‑year results) shows further growth: **container segment up 7%** vs. the comparable 2024 period, reaching **728,000 containers vs. 681,000** previously. General cargo rose from **968,000 tons (2024)** to **1,327,000 tons (2025)**, a **37% increase**. ([ashdodport.co.il](https://www.ashdodport.co.il/english/AboutAshdodPort/ashdod-port-news/Pages/news1206.aspx?utm_source=openai)) - This implies Ashdod is regaining volume and likely inching its share slightly higher in 2025, despite war‑related disruptions. **Haifa ports (Haifa + Bayport) – competitive dynamics** - INSS analysis (March 2024) notes that after three years of steady growth at the new Haifa Bayport, the **Gaza war and broader economic slowdown in Israel sharply slowed cargo flows** through Israeli ports in late 2023–early 2024. Nevertheless, **total port capacity (~5m TEU) is far above current demand (~3m TEU)**, so competition among **Bayport, Haifa, and Ashdod** is expected to intensify post‑war. ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/port-haifa-3-years/?utm_source=openai)) - During early phases of the Gaza war, some container imports were **diverted from Ashdod to Haifa** due to higher threat levels and Home Front Command restrictions on hazardous materials at Ashdod. This temporarily shifted some inbound container flows northward. ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai)) - Adani (Haifa Port’s operator) previously reported **~1.1 million tonnes of cargo in October 2023**, slightly above its recent six‑month average, indicating that Haifa initially maintained or even slightly increased throughput despite the onset of conflict. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/u_ITLogisticsNews123/comments/17mqu8l?utm_source=openai)) **Eilat and structural shift of trade flows** - The **Port of Eilat**, Israel’s only Red Sea port, has been hit hardest by the Red Sea crisis: - In **March 2024**, the operator announced plans to lay off **~50% of staff** due to trade collapse from Houthi attacks. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Eilat?utm_source=openai)) - By **July 2024**, Eilat **declared bankruptcy**, citing an **~85% drop in activity** attributed to the Yemeni “blockade” and rerouting of shipping. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - This effectively concentrates almost all of Israel’s seaborne trade (close to **100% of import/export volume by weight**) through the **Mediterranean ports (Haifa + Ashdod)** rather than via Eilat/Red Sea. ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai)) **Mediterranean container reconfiguration and Israel** - A 2025 AIS‑based study of Mediterranean container ports finds that Red Sea/Suez disruptions caused: - About **42% fewer transits** and **~50% drop in tonnage** via the Suez corridor in Jan–Feb 2024 vs. 2023. ([link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai)) - Eastern Mediterranean gateway ports, including **Israel’s ports**, suffered **“significant losses” in deployed TEU capacity** in 2024–25, in contrast to larger Western Med hubs (Tanger Med, Algeciras, Valencia) which saw only **3–6% declines**. ([link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai)) - Nonetheless, Bank of Israel/Haifa research (Dec 2024) concludes that **Israel’s foreign trade volumes did not fall exceptionally** compared with global trade, despite the need to reroute from Red Sea to Cape routes. The study attributes this to global reallocation of shipping capacity to Asia–Europe/Mediterranean lanes. ([papers.ssrn.com](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5130308&utm_source=openai)) **Key 2025–26 market event signals** - Over‑capacity (5m TEU vs. ~3m TEU demand), combined with: - Recovery of Ashdod container volumes (+7% in 2025 YTD), - Haifa’s competitive positioning under Adani, and - Permanent‑looking collapse of Eilat’s role → suggests **intra‑Israel competition for gateway cargo rather than strong overall growth** in total Israeli container flows in 2025–26. - Regional studies show **Israeli ports’ deployed capacity and calls underperforming relative to Western Med hubs**, reflecting both security risk and re‑routed Asia–Europe loops that increasingly **bypass Eastern Med gateways**. ([link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai)) **[MARKET EVENTS – SOURCES]** ([ceicdata.com](https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/israel/container-port-throughput?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – ISRAELI AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (AVOCADO, CITRUS, GREENHOUSE TOMATOES, EU DEMAND) === **Structure of Israel’s agri‑food trade with the EU** - EU is a **key destination** for Israeli agri‑food exports. An EU fact sheet (2024 trade data published 2025) shows: - EU exports to Israel: **€2.9 bn** agri‑food (1.2% of extra‑EU exports). - EU imports from Israel: lower, with Israel an important supplier of **fresh fruit & vegetables and processed fruit/nuts**. ([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/agrifood-israel_en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Israel is among the **main non‑EU suppliers of avocados** to the EU alongside Peru, Colombia, Kenya, South Africa, and Mexico. Recent EU monitoring notes **strong growth in EU avocado imports**, driven by health and convenience trends. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai)) **Avocados – volumes, growth, destinations** - A 2024/25 season review notes that **Israeli avocado production hit a record ~230,000 tonnes in 2024/25**, about **+67% vs. the previous season**, supported by orchard expansion and advanced cultivation. ([cbi.eu](https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai)) - Another official‑data‑based source cites **~250,000 tonnes of avocado production in 2024**, surpassing a previous record of 220,000 tonnes in 2022; historically, **about 95% of Israeli avocado output is exported to Europe.** ([israeleconomico.com](https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai)) - Taking both together, a reasonable 2024–25 export **order of magnitude** is **220–240,000 tonnes**, with **>90% destined to EU markets** (primarily **Germany, France, the Netherlands, UK, and Scandinavia** – as dominant EU avocado importers). ([cbi.eu](https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai)) - OECD‑FAO’s 2025–2034 Outlook estimates **global avocado exports grew ~2% in 2024 to about 2.8 million tonnes**; Israel is cited as one of the producers that expanded exports, reinforcing its **niche but fast‑growing role**. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_3eb15914/601276cd-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **EU demand side for avocados (2025–26)** - Recent EU/CBI market assessments (late‑2024 / early‑2025) highlight that: - EU avocado imports are still on a **rising trend**, though growth has moderated from double‑digit to **mid‑single‑digit annual growth** in tonnage. ([cbi.eu](https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai)) - Supply issues in Peru in 2023–24 opened room for **increased Israeli and South African shipments** into EU, particularly in shoulder seasons (early/late winter). ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai)) - Implication for 2026: **EU seasonal demand window for Israeli avocados remains strong**, with buyers valuing: - High quality and varietal mix (e.g., Hass, Reed, etc.), - Reliable logistics from East Med (despite security premiums), and - Ability to fill **off‑peak gaps** when Latin American supply dips. **Citrus – volumes & destinations** - Israel is a traditional exporter of **oranges, easy peelers, and especially grapefruit and lemons**; most exports target **EU and UK** under preferential trade terms. - Recent EU and OECD updates characterise Israeli citrus exports as **stable to slightly declining in volume** due to: - Water constraints, - Orchard competition from more profitable crops (e.g., avocados), and - Strong competition from **Spain, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey**. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai)) - Ballpark: Israel’s citrus exports have hovered in the **300–400,000 tonne range over recent seasons**, with **>80% shipped to Europe/UK**; however, avocados have become the clearer **growth engine** within Israel’s fresh fruit export portfolio, while citrus is more **mature/flat**. **Greenhouse tomatoes – export signals** - Israel is historically a **notable exporter of greenhouse tomatoes and cherry tomatoes** to EU markets (especially winter supply into **Russia historically and EU/UK**). - Recent trade patterns (2023–25) show: - Ongoing **pressure from low‑cost competitors** (Morocco, Turkey) into the EU market. - A pivot of some Israeli greenhouse production toward **domestic retail and nearby regional markets** rather than long‑haul EU exports, due to freight costs and phytosanitary requirements. - Trade statistics suggest **Israeli tomato export volumes have been declining or flat**, likely in the **low tens of thousands of tonnes per year**, with main EU destinations including **Eastern/Central Europe and niche premium segments in Western Europe**. (This is inferred from EU trade data patterns; Israel is no longer a top‑tier EU tomato supplier by volume.) ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai)) **Overall 2026 demand outlook** - **Avocados**: - Strongest growth signal. Production up **60–70% vs. prior season**, exports >200k t to Europe. - EU demand projected to **continue expanding** through 2030, keeping Israel a **strategic seasonal supplier**. ([cbi.eu](https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai)) - **Citrus**: - Stable/slow‑growing exports; margin pressure from rival Med exporters. EU demand for citrus is mature; gains for Israel will likely be **market‑share battles**, not absolute growth. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai)) - **Greenhouse tomatoes**: - No strong positive demand signal in EU; exports are under structural pressure from cheaper origins and higher logistics costs, especially amid Red Sea/Suez disruptions. - Net: For 2026, **Israel’s fresh‑produce export growth is likely to be avocado‑driven**, with **citrus and greenhouse tomatoes relatively flat or declining in EU share**. **[DEMAND SIGNALS – SOURCES]** ([cbi.eu](https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [TIMING SIGNALS] – RED SEA / SUEZ SECURITY & IMPACT ON MEDITERRANEAN/ISRAEL FREIGHT (2026) === **Red Sea/Suez disruption – magnitude** - Red Sea crisis and Houthi attacks (starting late 2023) caused: - **~75% decline in container vessel traffic through Suez in 2024 vs. 2023**, with many carriers rerouting via the **Cape of Good Hope**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - Rerouting adds **~4,575 nautical miles** and about **12 days** to a Shanghai–Rotterdam voyage; CO₂ emissions are estimated **~40% higher per voyage**, potentially +14% more with speed‑ups. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - A 2025 academic study confirms that in Jan–Feb 2024, Suez transits were down **~42% in vessel count and ~50% in tonnage**, reshaping Mediterranean port calls and deployed capacity. ([link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai)) **Impact on Israel and Eastern Mediterranean ports** - The AIS‑based Mediterranean study finds **gateway ports in Israel and Lebanon have suffered “significant losses” in deployed container capacity** in 2024–25, in contrast with more resilient Western Med hubs whose deployed capacity dropped only **3–6%**. ([link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai)) - Bank of Israel / University of Haifa analysis (Dec 2024) concludes: - Israel’s trade flows that previously used the Red Sea have been **rerouted (via Cape or other arrangements)**. - Despite this, **total Israeli foreign trade volumes did not show exceptional contraction** vs. global trade flows, due to **reallocation of ships and containers** to Asia–Europe/Mediterranean lanes to offset longer voyages. ([papers.ssrn.com](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5130308&utm_source=openai)) **Eilat vs. Haifa/Ashdod – route timing and modal shift** - Security risk in the Red Sea drastically curtailed Eilat operations: - **85%+ drop in activity** and bankruptcy filing in July 2024. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Eilat?utm_source=openai)) - This effectively removed Eilat as a practical southern gateway, forcing **more trade to enter via Mediterranean routes** even for Asia‑origin cargo, despite longer sailing times (via Cape or transshipment hubs). - Meanwhile, **Ashdod and Haifa** remained operational (with periodic diversions between them based on Home Front Command restrictions) and carried **nearly all of Israel’s seaborne trade**, albeit with: - Longer transit times for Asia traffic, - Higher freight rates vs. pre‑crisis, and - Increased schedule unreliability. ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai)) **Freight cost and timing signals** - Freightos data (late 2023) already showed: - Asia–Mediterranean average rates up **~9%** m/m by end‑Nov 2023, while **Asian import rates specifically into Israel rose 16–36%**, reaching about **US$2,000/FEU** on some corridors, reflecting war‑related congestion/security costs at Israeli ports. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/18caplq?utm_source=openai)) - With Suez heavily impaired in 2024 and much of 2025, global analysts estimate: - Sustained **elevated freight rates** on Asia–Europe and Asia–Med lanes vs. a no‑crisis baseline and - Cycle times extended by **~10–14 days** per roundtrip, which is particularly material for **fresh produce and time‑sensitive imports into Israel**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) **Security and 2025–26 timing shocks specific to Israel** - The **Red Sea crisis** entry notes that in March 2024 Israeli media reported **about half of Eilat port workers at risk of layoffs** due to the crisis; by July 2024 the port sought state support after its **85%+ traffic collapse** – a strong signal that the **southern route remained severely impaired well into late 2024**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - In **September 2025**, a Houthi drone attack on Eilat injured 22 people, underscoring persistent regional risk to any future revival of Red Sea trade to/from Israel. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Eilat_drone_attack?utm_source=openai)) - In **May 2025**, Houthis explicitly threatened a **“blockade” on Haifa‑serving shipowners**, increasing perceived risk premia on services directly calling Haifa, though Ashdod and Eilat were not explicitly targeted in that announcement. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/neoliberal/comments/1krpa6l?utm_source=openai)) **2026 trajectory – are routes normalizing?** - Some shipping commentary (early **2026**) suggests **major global carriers began cautiously resuming Red Sea transits in January 2026** after late‑2025 de‑escalation, though **Suez traffic still remained well below 2023 levels** and subject to reversal if attacks resume. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) - For Israel specifically, the combination of: - Eilat’s financial distress and physical vulnerability, - Targeted threats toward Haifa, - Ongoing Gaza‑related regional tensions, implies that **risk premia and timing buffers are likely to remain embedded in logistics planning through at least 2026**, even if nominal route availability improves. **Implications for 2026 freight timing and trade flows** - **Transit times** for Asia‑origin cargo to Israel are likely to remain **10–14 days longer** than pre‑crisis on many routings if carriers continue to avoid Suez or use hybrid routings/slow steaming to manage costs and risk. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - **Capacity deployment** to Eastern Med/Israeli ports is structurally lower than pre‑crisis, meaning: - Less frequent mainline calls, - Greater reliance on **feedering and transshipment** via Western Med or other hubs, - Higher volatility in sailing schedules, which matters for **perishables (e.g., avocados, citrus, greenhouse tomatoes)**. ([link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai)) - **Price signal**: Even if spot freight rates softened somewhat by 2026 as global capacity adjusts, Israel‑bound lanes are expected to **retain a security premium** (war risk surcharges + insurance + re‑routing costs) relative to comparable Med destinations until there is a clear and lasting de‑escalation of Red Sea and regional threats. **[TIMING SIGNALS – SOURCES]** ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Three Years of the Bay Port: A Status Report | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/publication/port-haifa-3-years/?utm_source=openai • Israel Container Port Throughput, 2008 – 2025 | CEIC Data https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/israel/container-port-throughput?utm_source=openai • Ashdod Port Reports Net Profit of 168 Million Shekels for 2024 https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Ashdod-Port/Ashdod-Port-Reports-Net-Profit-of-168-Million-Shekels-for-2024/?utm_source=openai • Record Profits for Ashdod Port Company in 2025 https://www.ashdodport.co.il/english/AboutAshdodPort/ashdod-port-news/Pages/news1206.aspx?utm_source=openai • Three Years of the Bay Port: A Status Report | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/publication/port-haifa-3-years/?utm_source=openai • The War in Gaza: Ports, Shipping, and Overseas Trade | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai • Adani Ports reports 48% YoY cargo growth in Oct https://www.reddit.com/r/u_ITLogisticsNews123/comments/17mqu8l?utm_source=openai • Port of Eilat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Eilat?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • The War in Gaza: Ports, Shipping, and Overseas Trade | INSS https://www.inss.org.il/publication/ports-war/?utm_source=openai • Mediterranean container port reconfiguration under geopolitical disruption: an AIS-based multi-scale analysis | Maritime Economics & Logistics | Springer Nature Link https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai • Mediterranean container port reconfiguration under geopolitical disruption: an AIS-based multi-scale analysis | Maritime Economics & Logistics | Springer Nature Link https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai • The Impact of Houthi Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception? by Haggay Etkes, Nizan Feldman :: SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5130308&utm_source=openai • Mediterranean container port reconfiguration under geopolitical disruption: an AIS-based multi-scale analysis | Maritime Economics & Logistics | Springer Nature Link https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5?utm_source=openai • Israel Container Port Throughput, 2008 – 2025 | CEIC Data https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/israel/container-port-throughput?utm_source=openai • European Commission Directorate-General for Agri https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/agrifood-israel_en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Other products: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034 | OECD https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai • Entering the European market for avocados | CBI https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai • En medio de la guerra y las tarifas, Israel exporta miles de toneladas de aguacate https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai • Entering the European market for avocados | CBI https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai • Entering the European market for avocados | CBI https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai • Other products: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034 | OECD https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai • Other products: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034 | OECD https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai • Entering the European market for avocados | CBI https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai • Other products: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034 | OECD https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_601276cd-en/full-report/other-products_8025a1f2.html?utm_source=openai • Entering the European market for avocados | CBI https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/fresh-fruit-vegetables/avocados/market-entry?utm_source=openai