## Company Profile Rosenthal International Logistics Ltd. — Israeli freight forwarder (website: http://www.rosenthal-logistics.com). Listed on ForwardersPages; Commercial Director: Nadav Rosenthal. Publicly available information is limited; appears to be a small‑to‑medium domestic forwarder offering sea, air and land forwarding, customs clearance and related logistics services out of Israeli ports (Haifa/Ashdod/Tel Aviv). Likely serves exporters of general cargo and refrigerated agrifood (avocado, citrus, other horticulture) given Israel’s export mix and the company’s location. No public data found on turnover or employee count. ## Pain Points - Elevated and volatile container/reefer rates plus war‑risk surcharges: Rosenthal's exporter clients face higher landed costs and booking uncertainty for EU/Asia programs, risking lost promotions or contract penalties. - Tight reefer capacity at peak avocado/citrus seasons and limited alternative routings to Asia: customers need guaranteed execution (on‑time, temperature‑controlled) and quick buyer diversification — but Rosenthal may not have in‑house market‑intel/resources to source buyers and run promotions abroad. - Need to offer higher‑value services without scaling sales/market‑intelligence teams: Rosenthal must deepen client relationships (market access, buyer matching, contract fulfillment) to retain/exporter customers under stressed logistics economics. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. MARKET EVENTS – ISRAEL EXPORT CORRIDORS & RED SEA / SUEZ DISRUPTIONS (2026) === **Baseline context** - Houthi attacks starting November 2023 drove a massive diversion of Asia–Europe traffic away from the Red Sea/Suez. By early 2024, Suez traffic had reportedly fallen by about 90% from normal levels, with most large carriers routing via the Cape of Good Hope, adding ~10–14 days and roughly US$1 million in extra fuel per voyage. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - A 2024 Bank of Israel study concluded that, despite the Red Sea rerouting, Israel’s aggregate foreign trade volumes did *not* show an exceptional decline relative to peers, because much of its trade was already via Mediterranean ports rather than Eilat/Red Sea. ([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/research-policy-analysis/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception-exception/?utm_source=openai)) **Status of Suez / Red Sea in early–mid 2026** - S&P Global (Feb 2026) notes a partial “reopening” of Red Sea container traffic but with persistent risk: east‑to‑west flows via Suez were still only about 18.7% of their pre‑crisis share (vs ~80% before), reflecting that many lines continue to use Cape or alternative routings. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) - An early‑2026 geopolitical review estimates Red Sea/Suez disruptions directly increased container shipping costs on affected lanes by triple‑digit percentages (124–339%) vs pre‑crisis baselines, and while some rate normalization is occurring, the recovery of volumes through the corridor remains “partial and fragile” as of January–March 2026. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) **Israel‑relevant corridor and infrastructure developments** 1. **Closure of Eilat and shift to Mediterranean / land options** - Port of Eilat (Israel’s only Red Sea port) has effectively ceased activity and is listed as closed from 2024, eliminating Israel’s direct Red Sea gateway. Historically it carried only ~5% of Israel’s trade, so the macro impact on total exports is modest, but it removes a flexible option for direct Asia–Israel trade that bypassed Suez. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Eilat?utm_source=openai)) - A Bank of Israel / policy analysis on the Houthi attacks underscores that Israel’s trade was less exposed than many states precisely because most flows were already using Mediterranean ports (Haifa, Ashdod, Ashkelon) rather than Eilat. ([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/research-policy-analysis/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception-exception/?utm_source=openai)) 2. **UAE–Saudi–Jordan–Israel land corridor** - A UAE–Israel “land bridge” corridor (containers by sea to UAE, then by truck through Saudi Arabia and Jordan into Israel, and vice versa) began operating during the earlier phases of the Red Sea crisis and has continued despite the Gaza conflict, according to logistics and media reports. It offers a faster and often cheaper alternative than routing Israel‑bound cargo via Suez + Mediterranean, particularly for high‑value and time‑sensitive goods. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/18kb8ul?utm_source=openai)) - Broader corridor concepts (sometimes referred to as part of an “India–Middle East–Europe” multimodal network) envision flows India → UAE/Saudi → overland via Jordan/Israel → European Mediterranean ports (e.g., Greece, Italy). A May 2026 logistics analysis stresses that while full-scale implementation is still emerging, political momentum is strong and long‑term contracts (10–20 years) are expected once route alignments and financing are locked in. ([fairwayeta.com](https://www.fairwayeta.com/insights/friction-redistribution-hormuz-bypass-corridors-may-2026?utm_source=openai)) 3. **Egyptian Red Sea–Mediterranean land bridge and transshipment focus** - Egypt has been rapidly upgrading *Ain Sokhna* on the Red Sea and *Damietta/Alexandria* on the Mediterranean, creating a national “land bridge” where containers can move 23–33 km by rail/road across Egypt between Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts. Ain Sokhna’s capacity was certified in Oct 2025 to handle the largest global vessels, with expanded berths and 8.6 million m² of yards, while new semiautomated terminals at Sokhna (Jan 2026) and Damietta (Feb 2026) are explicitly aimed at capturing diverted Asia–Europe volumes. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) - For Israeli exporters, this makes **Israel–Egypt–Europe** combinations (e.g., truck/rail to Egyptian ports, then deep‑sea to Europe or Asia) more commercially viable, although concrete Israel–Egypt container service deals are still limited in public reporting. 4. **Cape of Good Hope detours and their cost/time implications** - Many Asia–Mediterranean services calling at Israeli ports have, since late 2023, been routed via the Cape of Good Hope instead of Suez. This adds roughly 10–14 days to Asia–Europe/Med transit and significantly higher bunker and insurance costs (estimates of an extra US$1m per round trip). ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 macro logistics report advises shippers to treat the “Cape premium” as the new baseline rather than temporary, indicating that even if partial Suez traffic resumes, many carriers will maintain higher rate structures, and some shipping contracts for 2026–27 assume continued Cape routing for risk mitigation. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) 5. **Prospective Eastern Mediterranean “land bridge” role for Israel** - Strategic analyses of post‑Hormuz/Red Sea disruption corridors highlight an emerging “Eastern Mediterranean land bridge” concept linking Gulf exporters to European markets via Israel and Jordan, complementing Egypt’s Suez‑based role. Israel’s ports (Haifa, Ashdod) would act as Mediterranean gateways for overland flows from the Arabian Peninsula. ([marketanalysis.com](https://marketanalysis.com/a-map-without-hormuz-rewiring-global-oil-flows-through-fragmented-corridors/?utm_source=openai)) - These are still largely prospective, but they are relevant to long‑run Israeli export corridor planning: if implemented, fresh‑produce exports could move by truck from Israel to hubs feeding into European short‑sea networks, reducing exposure to Red Sea security risks. **Implications for Israel’s export logistics (2026)** - **Routing mix:** For 2026, the most likely operating pattern for Israel’s exports (including agrifood) is: - Primary: Mediterranean deep‑sea services to Europe (no Red Sea leg), and to some extent to North America. - Asia: either via Mediterranean services that still use Suez (limited but slowly increasing) or via Cape‑routed loops with higher lead times and costs; for urgent/seasonal goods, some share may use the UAE–Saudi–Jordan–Israel land bridge or airfreight. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) - **Risk profile:** Continuing threat levels in the Red Sea (Houthi attacks) mean that a full normalization of Suez traffic to pre‑2023 levels is unlikely in the near term, and carriers serving Israeli ports in particular may remain more conservative given political targeting risks. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) --- === 2. DEMAND SIGNALS – ISRAEL FRESH PRODUCE EXPORTS (AVOCADO, CITRUS) TO EUROPE & ASIA (FOCUS 2025–26) === **Macro export context** - Israel’s total goods exports (excluding diamonds) in 2025 reached 188.3 billion shekels (~US$59 bn). Exports to Europe fell by 14.7% year‑on‑year, to the Americas by 10.3%, and to “rest of world” (including Asia) by 5.9%, reflecting war‑related and logistics disruptions as well as weaker global demand. ([israel.com](https://israel.com/business/israels-exports-of-goods-totaled-59-billion-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Despite this, horticultural exporters report maintaining key fresh‑produce programs, especially to Europe, with some shifts in variety, timing and market mix. **Avocado – production and export orientation** - According to 2025 reporting based on official data, Israel produced around **250,000 tonnes of avocados in 2024**, up from about 220,000 tonnes in 2022. Roughly **95% of the crop is exported to Europe**, highlighting an extremely export‑oriented sector. ([israeleconomico.com](https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai)) - Global outlook: OECD‑FAO’s 2025–2034 outlook notes that global avocado exports grew about **2% in 2024 to ~2.8 million tonnes**, with Israel among the expanding exporters (alongside Kenya and South Africa). Avocado is on track to become the most traded major tropical fruit by volume. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_3eb15914/601276cd-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Avocado – market and destination signals (Europe vs Asia)** - Major Israeli avocado exporter Galilee Export (second‑largest fresh‑produce exporter in Israel) lists Europe (including Russia & Eastern Europe) as its core avocado market, with product lines including green‑skin and Hass varieties. ([galilee-export.com](https://galilee-export.com/?utm_source=openai)) - Trade press through 2024–25 (FreshPlaza and others, as summarized in secondary coverage) describes: - **Europe** as still absorbing the bulk of Israeli avocado exports (by value and volume), particularly in Western Europe and Russia/Eastern Europe. - **Asia** emerging as a growth market but from a low base: Israeli exporters have sought to increase shipments to markets like Japan, South Korea and some Southeast Asian destinations to diversify away from EU market saturation and price competition from Latin American suppliers. However, quantitative data for 2025–26 Asia volumes remain sparse; available commentary suggests Asia may still account for **low‑teens % or less** of Israel’s avocado export volume, with Europe taking the overwhelming majority. (This share is an inference based on the 95%‑to‑Europe figure cited for 2024 exports and lack of evidence of a major pivot since.) ([israeleconomico.com](https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai)) **Citrus – export orientation and destinations** - Israel has a long‑established citrus export sector (easy peelers, grapefruits, oranges, lemons). While up‑to‑the‑minute 2026 citrus statistics are not yet fully published, pre‑war patterns and partial 2024–25 trade data indicate: - The **EU and UK** remain the primary markets for Israeli citrus, especially for premium easy‑peelers (Orri, etc.) and grapefruits. - **Russia/Eastern Europe** and **North America** provide secondary outlets. - **Asia** (e.g., China, Japan, South Korea) is targeted for higher‑value niches, but volumes are still modest relative to Europe, partly due to phytosanitary access constraints and competition from Mediterranean and Southern Hemisphere suppliers. ([galilee-export.com](https://galilee-export.com/?utm_source=openai)) - Anecdotal trade‑press coverage through the 2024/25 season (not all in English and often behind paywalls) points to: - Some **compression of EU citrus prices** due to competing Spanish/Moroccan/Egyptian supplies and consumer demand uncertainty. - Israeli exporters responding by emphasizing **premium branding**, varietal differentiation (seedless, late‑season varieties) and by exploring **Asia and Gulf markets** where price sensitivity is lower for high‑quality fruit. **War and logistics effects on fresh‑produce flows** - Houthi‑related disruptions increased transit times and freight costs on Asia–Mediterranean lanes, but most Israel–EU citrus and avocado exports move on **short‑sea / intra‑Med** or North Europe loops that do *not* require a Red Sea leg; thus the direct impact on EU‑bound fresh produce has been more about: - Carrier capacity availability and schedule reliability at Israeli ports. - War risk premiums and insurance surcharges on vessels calling Israeli ports. ([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/research-policy-analysis/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception-exception/?utm_source=openai)) - Exporters have also indicated (per 2025 Spanish‑language coverage) that to maintain a **year‑round market presence**, Israeli companies are **expanding avocado production abroad** (e.g., in Latin America or Africa) and marketing it alongside Israeli fruit under the same brands. That reduces seasonal gaps but dilutes the strict link between Israeli origin and brand presence in European and Asian shelves. ([israeleconomico.com](https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai)) **Quantitative gaps and what can be inferred for 2026** - Within the last 90 days, **no official, detailed 2025–26 HS‑level statistics by destination and product (avocado vs citrus) for Israel** have yet been published open‑access; most current sources focus on total goods exports or on global avocado trends. ([israel.com](https://israel.com/business/israels-exports-of-goods-totaled-59-billion-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Based on the latest available data and consistent reporting: - **Avocado (2024 baseline, indicative for 2025/26):** - Production: ~250,000 t - Exports: likely >200,000–230,000 t (if ~95% of crop is exported). - Destination mix by volume: - Europe (incl. Russia/Eastern Europe): ~90–95% - Asia + other: low‑single‑ to low‑teens % at most. - **Citrus:** - Europe remains the dominant destination; Asia is still marginal but strategically important for diversification. - Given Israel’s total export contraction to Europe in 2025 (‑14.7% across all goods), citrus and avocado may have seen **flat to slightly lower volumes but higher unit values** in some niches, although specific percentages by commodity are not yet formally disclosed. ([israel.com](https://israel.com/business/israels-exports-of-goods-totaled-59-billion-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) For actionable planning, these signals suggest Europe will continue to be the main sink for Israeli fresh produce in 2026, with Asia as a longer‑term diversification play constrained by logistics, access, and competition. --- === 3. COMMODITY TRENDS – CONTAINER & AIR FREIGHT RATES (MEDITERRANEAN–EUROPE, ISRAEL 2026 Q1–Q2) === **Ocean container – Asia–Europe and Mediterranean baselines (context for services calling Israel)** - S&P Global’s Q1 2026 “Containers Quarterly” reports that the **Asia–North Europe** and **Asia–Mediterranean** trades entered 2026 with relatively firm spot rates driven by pre–Lunar New Year demand and delayed general rate increases (GRIs). ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - For early January 2026, **Platts Container Rate 3 (PCR3)** – a benchmark for Asia–Mediterranean westbound spot rates – was around **US$4,200 per FEU**, softening by about US$200 from a prior spike but still significantly above pre‑crisis levels. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - Long‑term contract rates (Platts Long Term Container Rate 1, PLCR1 – Asia–Europe) were roughly **US$1,700/FEU** and relatively stable, underscoring the gap between short‑term spot volatility and more cautious contract pricing for 2026. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) **Mediterranean–Europe regional container flows** - The Med–North Europe leg is often part of broader Asia–Med–Europe strings, but for purely intra‑Med or Med–North Europe moves (e.g., Israel to Italy/Greece/Spain or Benelux/UK via transshipment), market commentary suggests: - Spot rates for **short‑sea Mediterranean–Europe** are materially lower than Asia–Europe benchmarks but have nonetheless carried a **sustained premium** vs pre‑Red Sea crisis, driven by higher vessel time costs and tight capacity due to detours. - The January 2026 IMF Red Sea impact update notes that Europe/Mediterranean–China route costs had seen large increases relative to historical baselines, and that **freight rate inflation often persists even as physical disruption partially eases**, due to carrier pricing power and structural cost increases. ([imf.org](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/MCD-CCA/2024/Update/January/English/text.ashx?utm_source=openai)) **Specific indications for Israeli ports (Haifa/Tel Aviv/Ashdod)** - There are no public, standardized indices solely for “Tel Aviv port” or “Israel–Europe” container rates, but given: - Continued war‑risk surcharges for calls at Israeli ports. - The need for schedule padding and possible deviations for security reasons. it is reasonable (and consistent with freight‑forwarder commentary through late 2025/early 2026) to infer **Israel‑related ocean freight rates track the upper end of Eastern Med benchmarks**, with a further **war‑risk premium** that may add several hundred dollars per FEU depending on the carrier and lane. (This is an inference supported by broader Red Sea disruption analyses and not backed by a single explicit “Tel Aviv index”.) ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) **Q1–Q2 2026 trend direction (ocean)** - From January to around April 2026: - Asia–Europe spot rates eased somewhat from early‑January peaks as post–Lunar New Year demand normalized, but **remained well above pre‑2023 averages** due to continued use of Cape routes and security risk pricing. - Structural uncertainty (Red Sea, war in Gaza, elevated geopolitical risk) is cited by S&P Global as a core reason carriers maintain higher rate floors and cautious capacity deployment into the Mediterranean. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - For exporters in Israel, this implies: - **Eastbound to Asia:** still expensive, with rate levels heavily influenced by whether the service uses Suez or Cape, and by transshipment arrangements. - **Westbound to Europe:** more moderate but still structurally higher than 2019–22 norm, particularly on premium/reefer bookings needed for fresh produce. **Airfreight – global and Israel‑relevant dynamics (2026)** - A 2026 air‑freight pricing analysis (Jan–Apr 2026) indicates: ([mobidato.com](https://mobidato.com/insights/2026-air-freight-pricing-analysis-regional-trends-and-capacity-shifts?utm_source=openai)) - Global air cargo rates have **softened from their 2022–23 peaks** but remain above 2019 pre‑COVID levels in many corridors. - **Middle East–Europe** lanes show mixed trends: some softening due to additional belly capacity, but pockets of strength where shippers have shifted from ocean to air because of Red Sea uncertainty and to mitigate extended lead times from Cape routings. - **Europe–North America** has seen rate deflation as passenger airlines maximize cargo capacity to offset operating costs, illustrating how increased capacity can cap rates even amid geopolitical risk. - The report does not provide a Tel‑Aviv‑specific index, but given: - Israel’s heavy reliance on belly cargo from passenger flights plus some dedicated freighter services. - The combination of security protocols and war‑risk insurance. one can infer that **airfreight ex‑Israel to Europe** is priced at a premium to generic Middle East–Europe lanes, especially for refrigerated/fresh‑produce traffic. Forwarders historically reported **per‑kg rates from Tel Aviv to major EU hubs** tracking at the high end of intra‑regional benchmarks when security conditions tighten. **Relative positioning of air vs ocean for fresh produce in 2026** - With Asia–Europe ocean rates elevated and transit times extended via Cape, certain **high‑value, highly perishable or promotional shipments** (e.g., early‑season or premium‑grade fruit) from Israel to distant markets may increasingly use airfreight despite its higher nominal cost, because: - Value density of the cargo justifies air (e.g., premium Medjoul dates, specialty fruits, or urgent supermarket programs). - Ocean schedules into Asia are less reliable; the opportunity cost of missed promotions can exceed the air premium. - Conversely, for bulk commercial volumes of avocados and citrus into Europe: - **Reefer containers** remain the primary mode, with contracts increasingly factoring in: - Surcharges related to Red Sea / Cape routing risk. - Higher bunker adjustment factors (BAFs). - Possible late‑booking penalties given tight reefer capacity. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) **Key numeric reference points (Q1–Q2 2026)** - Asia–Mediterranean (PCR3) **spot**: around **US$4,200/FEU in early Jan 2026**, ~US$200 below peak but still elevated. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - Asia–Europe **long‑term contracts (PLCR1)**: ~**US$1,700/FEU** in early 2026, relatively stable. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - Suez‑related detours vs pre‑crisis: **124–339% freight rate increases** on impacted lanes at peak disruption; partial normalization but persisting structural premium into 2026. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - Airfreight: global and Middle East–Europe rates down from 2022–23 highs but still **above 2019 baselines**, with pockets of firmness where shippers are hedging sea‑freight risk; Tel Aviv‑specific figures are not openly indexed but expected to track **upper‑quartile Middle East–EU rates**. ([mobidato.com](https://mobidato.com/insights/2026-air-freight-pricing-analysis-regional-trends-and-capacity-shifts?utm_source=openai)) These trends collectively indicate that, through at least mid‑2026, Israeli exporters—especially of refrigerated fresh produce—face structurally higher and more volatile logistics costs to both Europe and Asia compared with the pre‑2023 period, incentivizing diversification of corridors (land bridges, transshipment strategies) and more selective use of airfreight for high‑value segments. Sources: • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • The Impact of Houthi Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception Exception? | בנק ישראל - הבנק המרכזי של ישראל https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/research-policy-analysis/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception-exception/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Sea lines of communication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai • Port of Eilat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Eilat?utm_source=openai • The Impact of Houthi Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception Exception? | בנק ישראל - הבנק המרכזי של ישראל https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/research-policy-analysis/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception-exception/?utm_source=openai • UAE-Israel land corridor operating despite war https://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/18kb8ul?utm_source=openai • The Friction Doesn't Disappear — It Just Moves | Fairway ETA https://www.fairwayeta.com/insights/friction-redistribution-hormuz-bypass-corridors-may-2026?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Shipping Crisis 2026: Impact on Rate… | Suaid Global https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai • A Map Without Hormuz: Rewiring Global Oil Flows Through Fragmented Corridors | Market Analysis https://marketanalysis.com/a-map-without-hormuz-rewiring-global-oil-flows-through-fragmented-corridors/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Israel’s Exports of Goods Totaled $59 Billion in 2025 https://israel.com/business/israels-exports-of-goods-totaled-59-billion-in-2025/?utm_source=openai • En medio de la guerra y las tarifas, Israel exporta miles de toneladas de aguacate https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai • OECD‑FAO Agricultural Outlook https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_3eb15914/601276cd-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Home - Galilee | Direct from the field https://galilee-export.com/?utm_source=openai • En medio de la guerra y las tarifas, Israel exporta miles de toneladas de aguacate https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai • Home - Galilee | Direct from the field https://galilee-export.com/?utm_source=openai • The Impact of Houthi Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception Exception? | בנק ישראל - הבנק המרכזי של ישראל https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/research-policy-analysis/the-impact-of-houthi-attacks-on-international-trade-is-israel-an-exception-exception/?utm_source=openai • En medio de la guerra y las tarifas, Israel exporta miles de toneladas de aguacate https://www.israeleconomico.com/economia-y-empresas/en-medio-de-la-guerra-y-las-tarifas-israel-exporta-miles-de-toneladas-de-aguacate/?utm_source=openai • Israel’s Exports of Goods Totaled $59 Billion in 2025 https://israel.com/business/israels-exports-of-goods-totaled-59-billion-in-2025/?utm_source=openai • Israel’s Exports of Goods Totaled $59 Billion in 2025 https://israel.com/business/israels-exports-of-goods-totaled-59-billion-in-2025/?utm_source=openai • CONTAINERS QUARTERLY: Asia-Europe enters 2026 with seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai • CONTAINERS QUARTERLY: Asia-Europe enters 2026 with seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai • JANUARY 2024 https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/MCD-CCA/2024/Update/January/English/text.ashx?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • CONTAINERS QUARTERLY: Asia-Europe enters 2026 with seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai • CONTAINERS QUARTERLY: Asia-Europe enters 2026 with seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai