## Company Profile LIA Logistics (a Logenix company) — freight forwarder operating on Afghanistan corridors. (Lead contact: Mohammad Sulaiman Sarwar, Assistant Manager Business Development). Appears to provide freight forwarding, customs/transit handling and cross-border trucking for Afghan importers/ exporters; likely focused on Pakistan (Torkham, Chaman) and increasingly Iran corridors (Chabahar/Bandar Abbas). Public web presence not provided in lead; evidence link to member profile exists. Scale unspecified (regional forwarder supporting staple-food, fertilizer and humanitarian shipments). ## Pain Points 1) Route volatility: Recurrent closures at Torkham/Chaman create unpredictable lead‑times, higher demurrage/trucking rates, spoilage risk for perishable and humanitarian consignments. 2) Need to operationalize alternate corridors: Chabahar (sea+rail) and Central Asian/Wakhan routes require new supplier contacts, documentation flows, and consolidated multi‑modal planning that many local forwarders lack in scale. 3) Humanitarian & staple demand pressure: WFP cuts and high food insecurity increase commercial demand for low‑cost staples and fertilizer — a logistics gap/opportunity but also a delivery risk that clients need solved quickly. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] Afghanistan trade corridors 2026 – Pakistan, Torkham & Chabahar; trade‑flow shifts === • **Scale and direction of Afghanistan’s trade (2025–26)** – Afghanistan’s foreign trade was reported at **~USD 14 billion in 2025**, with officials and analysts noting a **structural shift away from reliance on Pakistan’s land borders toward Iranian ports (notably Chabahar) and other alternatives**.([en.didpress.com](https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai)) – Major Pakistan crossings **Torkham and Chaman previously handled ~40% of Afghanistan’s official trade**, but recurring closures in late 2024–2025 have pushed traders to diversify routes.([afghanistanpeacecampaign.org](https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai)) • **Pakistan land borders (Torkham, Chaman, others) – volatility and partial normalization** – Pakistan **suspended all Afghan transit cargo on 13 October 2025**, halting movements nationwide; after about ten days, **transit trade was formally resumed in late October 2025**, restoring flows via Torkham and Chaman but with tighter security checks.([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40388815/afghan-transit-trade-back-to-normal?utm_source=openai)) – An ITC Market Access Map notice from late October 2025 recorded that **customs clearance at Chaman was suspended from 15 October 2025**, with **~495 vehicles of Afghan transit consignments queued at Torkham and Chaman** during the disruption.([macmap.org](https://www.macmap.org/OfflineDocument/USADMIN/Measure_Extraordinary_PAK_03.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – In **April 2026**, Pakistani media reported **fresh closure of the Torkham crossing**, clarifying that while the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement itself had not been suspended, but **goods clearance slowed/stopped due to border closure and congestion management**, disrupting both bilateral and transit trade.([tribune.com.pk](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2599723/torkham-crossing-closed-again?amp=1&utm_source=openai)) • **Documented trade shifts away from Pakistan** – Analytical reporting in late 2025 notes that **border shutdowns at Torkham and Chaman throughout late 2024–2025** forced Afghan traders to seek alternatives via **Iran (Bandar Abbas and particularly Chabahar), Central Asian routes, and the China‑linked Wakhan Corridor**.([afghanistanpeacecampaign.org](https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai)) – One Afghan-focused analysis states that, following repeated closures, **bilateral trade with Pakistan—about USD 1 billion in the first half of 2025—declined sharply**, as crossings (Torkham, Chaman, Ghulam Khan) remained closed for extended periods after clashes on 11 October 2025.([irs.org.pk](https://www.irs.org.pk/Spotlight/SP01012026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Chabahar and Iranian corridors – growing role in 2025–26** – The Taliban’s ambassador in Moscow (Dec 2025) described **Iran’s Chabahar Port as “becoming a key route” for Afghanistan’s foreign trade**, with **daily commercial flows increasing** and an explicit political goal to **re‑route trade previously moving via Pakistan toward Chabahar**.([afintl.com](https://www.afintl.com/en/202512085579?utm_source=openai)) – A policy piece (Dec 2025) on Afghanistan’s trade diversification highlights the **Chabahar International Transport and Transit Corridor** as central to new routing, with India’s long‑term investments supporting **Afghan access to Indian Ocean shipping without transiting Pakistan**.([afghanistanpeacecampaign.org](https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai)) – India obtained a **six‑month U.S. sanctions waiver allowing continued operations at Chabahar until at least April 2026**, explicitly framed as necessary to sustain the **India–Iran–Afghanistan transit corridor** established by the 2016 trilateral agreement.([drishtiias.com](https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai)) • **Rail and inland connectivity to Chabahar (2025–26)** – Iran’s **Chabahar–Zahedan railway**—the critical inland link from Chabahar to the national rail network and onward to Afghanistan/Central Asia—was **reported 84% complete as of 25 October 2025**, with Iranian officials targeting completion by **Nowruz (around 20 March 2026)**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chabahar%E2%80%93Zahedan_railway?utm_source=openai)) – Once operational, this line is expected to **cut trucking time and cost for Afghan‑bound cargo via Chabahar**, potentially further eroding the competitive position of **Karachi–Torkham/Chaman** routings for bulk commodities and containerised foodstuffs. • **Other alternative corridors (medium‑term context for 2026)** – The **Wakhan Corridor** toward China is reportedly **~70% complete in basic infrastructure**, with plans to directly connect Afghanistan and China by **2026**, which could open an additional eastbound vector for minerals and some agricultural exports.([en.didpress.com](https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai)) – The **Lapis Lazuli Corridor** (Afghanistan–Turkmenistan–Caspian–South Caucasus–Turkey) remains more medium‑term but is highlighted in Afghan and regional sources as a way to **reduce dependence on Pakistan’s Karachi port**, especially for exports to Europe.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lapis_Lazuli_corridor?utm_source=openai)) • **Implications for agri‑food and fertilizer flows in 2026** – Intermittent **Pakistan border closures raise trucking times, demurrage and spoilage risk** for perishable and semi‑perishable cargo (wheat flour, rice, edible oil, fresh produce), and disrupt the main historical route for **bulk fertilizer imports**. – **Increasing reliance on Iranian ports—especially Chabahar—suggests more seaborne imports trans‑shipped via Iran** for staple foods and inputs, with possible **modal shift (sea + road/rail via Iran) versus traditional sea (Karachi) + road via Pakistan**. – Trade policy research in Pakistan underscores the need for **upgraded infrastructure and confidence‑building at Torkham, Chaman and Ghulam Khan** to retain Pakistan’s share of Afghan transit trade, which has eroded from earlier peaks (Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan previously reached **USD 2.6 billion around 2010–11**, but are now far lower).([file.pide.org.pk](https://file.pide.org.pk/pdfpideresearch/rr-218-pak-afghan-trade-policy-proposals-and-confidence-building-measures-for-institutional-arrangements.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Sources (Market Events): ([en.didpress.com](https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] Afghanistan imports & demand – staple foods, fertilizer, humanitarian aid (2025/26) === • **Macro import dependence & trade structure** – FAO’s GIEWS country brief (Nov 2025) estimates **cereal import requirements (mainly wheat and wheat flour) at ~3.7 million tonnes for the 2025/26 marketing year (July–June)**, reflecting strong structural dependence on grain imports.([fao.org](https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AFG&lang=en&utm_source=openai)) – Trading Economics data show **Afghanistan’s total imports at USD 3.44 billion in Q4 2025**, slightly down from **USD 3.59 billion in Q3 2025**; **food items account for ~14% of total imports** (alongside petroleum at 33% and machinery at 15%).([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/imports?utm_source=openai)) • **Staple foods – wheat & wheat flour** – Afghanistan is consistently described as **one of the world’s largest wheat flour importers**, due to constrained irrigated area and water scarcity limiting domestic wheat output.([ers.usda.gov](https://ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/chart-detail?chartId=77066&utm_source=openai)) – FAO notes that **planting of the 2026 winter wheat crop was completed by November 2025**, and that **cereal harvests in 2025 were near‑average**, but **domestic supply remains insufficient**, sustaining high import demand.([fao.org](https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AFG&lang=en&utm_source=openai)) – Retail **wheat flour prices increased between May–November 2025** in many markets; however, the IPC food‑security analysis for Nov 2025–Mar 2026 notes **some easing of wheat and wheat‑flour prices nationally**, supported by **steady cross‑border imports and a stronger Afghani**, even as rice and vegetable oil prices remain elevated.([ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2025_Sept2026_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Rice, vegetable oil, and other staples** – The IPC report highlights **rice and vegetable oil** as key staples whose **prices stayed high in late 2025**, reflecting both global price levels and import/logistics costs; these are typically supplied via **Pakistan and Iran**, with some Central Asian inflows.([ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2025_Sept2026_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Fertilizer & agricultural inputs** – While recent (2025–26) fertilizer‑specific import tonnages are sparse in open sources, the IPC analysis notes **“high prices of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers” and “trade restrictions”** as factors raising production costs in the 2025/26 season, implying continued **dependence on imported fertilizers and agro‑chemicals**.([ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2025_Sept2026_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – Rising production costs plus constrained farm incomes increase **relative demand for food imports versus domestic output**, especially for wheat, rice, and oilseeds/edible oils. • **Humanitarian food‑aid signals (WFP, IPC) – volumes and targeting** – The IPC Acute Food Insecurity report (Nov 2025–Mar 2026) estimates **~15.8 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3+)**, up from **14.8 million a year earlier**, driven by economic contraction, shrinking aid, and high living costs.([ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2025_Sept2026_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – WFP country updates through May 2026 describe **sharp cuts to humanitarian rations**: • Distribution of specialized foods to prevent malnutrition was **fully halted in May 2025** due to funding gaps. • Subsequent WFP reporting (Dec 2025–Jan 2026) stresses that only a **fraction of food‑insecure households receive full rations**, indicating **unmet demand for imported humanitarian grain, pulses, and vegetable oil**.([wfp.org](https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/afghanistan?utm_source=openai)) – With **external assistance reduced and sanctions constraints on banking**, Afghan households rely more heavily on **commercial imports of low‑cost staples (wheat flour, rice, oil, sugar)**, making demand for these items relatively price‑inelastic. • **Direction of sourcing – Pakistan vs Iran & others** – GAIN’s wheat‑flour and edible‑oil supply‑chain assessment underscores that Afghanistan **“depends substantially on food imports from neighbouring and regional countries”** with Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Iran all key; it also highlights **concentrated brand presence for wheat flour and edible oil/ghee**, implying relatively consolidated import channels.([gainhealth.org](https://www.gainhealth.org/resources/reports-and-publications/wheat-flour-and-edible-oilghee-supply-chain-assessment?utm_source=openai)) – Trade‑route disruptions at **Torkham/Chaman** have motivated importers to re‑route some staple‑food and edible‑oil cargo via **Iranian ports (Bandar Abbas, Chabahar) and Central Asian corridors**, but Pakistan remains important for **overland wheat flour and fresh produce** flows.([afghanistanpeacecampaign.org](https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai)) • **Key demand signals for 2026 (inferred from 2025–26 data)** – **Grain & flour:** Rough order of magnitude **3.5–4.0 million tonnes of annual cereal import demand**, dominated by wheat/wheat flour, remains in place for 2025/26 and likely into 2026/27 barring a major production shock.([fao.org](https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AFG&lang=en&utm_source=openai)) – **Edible oil & rice:** High domestic prices and limited domestic production keep **strong import pull** for vegetable oil/ghee and rice; any logistic or sanction‑driven disruption at Pakistan or Iran routes will **immediately translate into price spikes and humanitarian concern**.([ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2025_Sept2026_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – **Fertilizer:** Elevated global prices and local currency issues imply **continued constrained and price‑sensitive demand**, but Afghan producers must still import core nutrients ahead of the 2026/27 planting seasons; route reliability (Pakistan vs Iran/Central Asia) will heavily influence landed cost and usage rates.([ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2025_Sept2026_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Sources (Demand Signals): ([fao.org](https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AFG&lang=en&utm_source=openai)) === 3. [TIMING SIGNALS] Pakistan–Afghanistan transit, customs/border closures & Chabahar‑route developments (2025–26) === • **Key Pakistan–Afghanistan border events & regulatory timing (late 2024–2026)** – **Late 2024–2025:** Extended shutdowns at **Torkham and Chaman** due to security incidents and disputes over border infrastructure; by Dec 2025 analysis, these two crossings had historically carried **around 40% of Afghanistan’s official trade**, meaning closures had outsized impact on transit timing and costs.([afghanistanpeacecampaign.org](https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai)) – **13 Oct 2025:** Pakistan **suspends all Afghan transit cargo nationwide**, halting movements at **Torkham, Chaman, Ghulam Khan, Angoor Adda and Kharlachi**; official justification cites security concerns.([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40388815/afghan-transit-trade-back-to-normal?utm_source=openai)) – **15 Oct 2025:** Customs clearance operations at **Chaman** officially **suspended**, with **~495 vehicles in transit consignments stranded** between Torkham and Chaman.([macmap.org](https://www.macmap.org/OfflineDocument/USADMIN/Measure_Extraordinary_PAK_03.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – **~23 Oct 2025:** Pakistan **resumes Afghan transit trade after ~10‑day suspension**; flows restart via major crossings, though with **enhanced security checks** and persistent congestion.([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40388815/afghan-transit-trade-back-to-normal?utm_source=openai)) – **Oct–Nov 2025:** Multiple reports highlight that, despite formal resumption, **border crossings experienced intermittent closures and slow processing**, depressing bilateral and transit trade volumes through end‑2025.([irs.org.pk](https://www.irs.org.pk/Spotlight/SP01012026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) – **April 2026:** Pakistani press reports **“Torkham crossing closed again”**, stating that while **the 2010 Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) remains in force**, customs clearance of goods was effectively halted to avoid congestion and in relation to security/stability concerns.([tribune.com.pk](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2599723/torkham-crossing-closed-again?amp=1&utm_source=openai)) • **Implications for transit‑trade timing via Pakistan in 2026** – The pattern from late 2024 through early 2026 is of **recurring, sudden border closures lasting from several days to several weeks**, leading to: • **Unpredictable lead times** for Afghan‑bound cargo routed via Karachi–Torkham/Chaman. • **Higher demurrage and trucking rates** priced in by logistics providers, raising landed costs for staple foods and fertilizer. • **Operational risk for humanitarian shipments**, which often depend on time‑sensitive delivery windows (winter pre‑positioning).([afghanistanpeacecampaign.org](https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai)) • **Regulatory context – APTTA and customs** – The **Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)** itself has **not been formally suspended**, and Pakistani customs officials stress this in 2026 reporting, but the **practical effect of border closures and “non‑processing” of consignments is de‑facto interruption of transit trade**, especially for road cargo.([tribune.com.pk](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2599723/torkham-crossing-closed-again?amp=1&utm_source=openai)) – Policy‑research from Pakistan (PIDE) emphasizes that transit trade overwhelmingly moves via **Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Torkham) and Balochistan (Chaman)**, with **Ghulam Khan** as a secondary node; any regulatory or security‑driven closure of these points directly alters Afghan supply‑chain timing.([file.pide.org.pk](https://file.pide.org.pk/pdfpideresearch/rr-218-pak-afghan-trade-policy-proposals-and-confidence-building-measures-for-institutional-arrangements.pdf?utm_source=openai)) • **Chabahar Port & Iranian routes – timing and policy inflection points** – **2016 trilateral agreement** between India, Iran and Afghanistan created the framework for an **international transport and transit corridor via Chabahar**; operationalization has been gradual but strategically stable.([drishtiias.com](https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai)) – **Mid‑ to late‑2025:** India secures a **six‑month U.S. sanctions waiver for Chabahar operations, running to at least April 2026**, giving a defined window of regulatory certainty for Indian‑linked cargo to Afghanistan via Chabahar.([drishtiias.com](https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai)) – Parallel reporting in Indian and Iranian channels (late 2025–early 2026) shows: • Iran publicly urging India to **revive and adequately fund Chabahar**, calling reduced budget allocations a “disappointment,” while reaffirming Chabahar’s role as an **Afghanistan and Central Asia gateway**.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/u_PapayaClean3988/comments/1rf0od9/iran_calls_indias_chabahar_budget_cut_a/?utm_source=openai)) • Indian policy debates stressing that **exiting Chabahar “is not an option”** because it provides a **sanctions‑waiver‑enabled humanitarian and trade route to Afghanistan**, including **wheat and pesticide shipments** in earlier years.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/GeopoliticsIndia/comments/1qf65k3/india_says_exiting_irans_chabahar_port_is_not_an/?utm_source=openai)) – **Infrastructure timing:** The **Chabahar–Zahedan railway**, 84% complete by **25 Oct 2025** and targeted for completion by **around 20 March 2026**, is a key timing signal: once finished, it should **compress inland transit times** from Chabahar to the Afghan border, improving schedule reliability versus trucking.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chabahar%E2%80%93Zahedan_railway?utm_source=openai)) – Afghan officials in Dec 2025 already describe **daily trade flows via Chabahar as increasing**, indicating that even before full rail completion, **a growing share of Afghan imports/exports is time‑routed through Iran** to hedge against Pakistan risk.([afintl.com](https://www.afintl.com/en/202512085579?utm_source=openai)) • **Other corridor timing – Wakhan and Lapis Lazuli** – The **China–Afghanistan Wakhan Corridor** infrastructure is reported **~70% complete** with connectivity targeted **by 2026**, which, if realized, introduces **a new eastbound corridor** for Afghan exports and some imports; however, full operationalization (customs, logistics services) may lag physical completion.([en.didpress.com](https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai)) – The **Lapis Lazuli Corridor** remains largely strategic/long‑term; while it has political backing as a Pakistan‑bypass route, there are **no major 2026‑specific operational milestones** flagged in the latest open sources.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lapis_Lazuli_corridor?utm_source=openai)) • **Net timing picture for 2026 decisions** – **Near‑term (next 6–12 months)** • Expect continued **stop‑start conditions at Torkham and Chaman**, with high probability of additional closures around security or political flashpoints. • The **U.S. waiver window to April 2026** gives relative short‑term regulatory clarity for Indian‑linked flows via Chabahar, though any shift in U.S. Iran policy thereafter is a key watchpoint.([drishtiias.com](https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai)) • Completion of the **Chabahar–Zahedan railway by early‑ to mid‑2026**, if achieved on schedule, should **improve transit times and predictability** via Iran.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chabahar%E2%80%93Zahedan_railway?utm_source=openai)) – **Medium‑term (through end‑2026)** • If Wakhan connectivity becomes operational and Chabahar rail is fully integrated, Afghanistan’s **modal and corridor choices diversify significantly**, reducing Pakistan’s leverage over timing and volumes.([en.didpress.com](https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai)) • For agri‑food and fertilizer cargos, **logistics planners will increasingly weigh Pakistan’s chronic closure risk against Iran‑route regulatory/sanctions risk** when locking in 2026–27 supply contracts and humanitarian pipelines.([en.didpress.com](https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai)) Sources (Timing Signals): ([brecorder.com](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40388815/afghan-transit-trade-back-to-normal?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Afghanistan’s $14B Trade Shifts from Pakistan Borders to Iranian Ports, Wakhan Corridor – DID PRESS AGENCY https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai • Afghanistan’s Trade Via Alternate Routes Bypasses Pakistan Closures | Afghanistan peace campaign https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai • Afghan transit trade back to normal - Business Recorder https://www.brecorder.com/news/40388815/afghan-transit-trade-back-to-normal?utm_source=openai • NATIONAL October 25, 2025 Pakistan suspends Afghan https://www.macmap.org/OfflineDocument/USADMIN/Measure_Extraordinary_PAK_03.pdf?utm_source=openai • Afghan transit trade back to normal - Business Recorder https://www.brecorder.com/news/40388815/afghan-transit-trade-back-to-normal?utm_source=openai • NATIONAL October 25, 2025 Pakistan suspends Afghan https://www.macmap.org/OfflineDocument/USADMIN/Measure_Extraordinary_PAK_03.pdf?utm_source=openai • Torkham crossing closed again | The Express Tribune https://tribune.com.pk/story/2599723/torkham-crossing-closed-again?amp=1&utm_source=openai • Afghanistan’s Trade Via Alternate Routes Bypasses Pakistan Closures | Afghanistan peace campaign https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai • Afghanistan Trade Diversification in Response to Border Insecurity with PakistanHareem Abid https://file.pide.org.pk/pdfpideresearch/rr-218-pak-afghan-trade-policy-proposals-and-confidence-building-measures-for-institutional-arrangements.pdf?utm_source=openai • Iran’s Chabahar Port Becoming Key Trade Route For Afghanistan, Says Taliban Envoy | Afghanistan International https://www.afintl.com/en/202512085579?utm_source=openai • Afghanistan’s Trade Via Alternate Routes Bypasses Pakistan Closures | Afghanistan peace campaign https://afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2025/12/08/afghanistans-trade-via-alternate-routes-bypasses-pakistan-closures/?utm_source=openai • India Secures Six-Month US Waiver for Chabahar Port https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai • Chabahar–Zahedan railway https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chabahar%E2%80%93Zahedan_railway?utm_source=openai • Afghanistan’s $14B Trade Shifts from Pakistan Borders to Iranian Ports, Wakhan Corridor – DID PRESS AGENCY https://en.didpress.com/25646/?utm_source=openai • Lapis Lazuli corridor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lapis_Lazuli_corridor?utm_source=openai • India Secures Six-Month US Waiver for Chabahar Port https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai • India Secures Six-Month US Waiver for Chabahar Port https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/india-secures-six-month-us-waiver-for-chabahar-port?utm_source=openai • Iran Calls India’s Chabahar Budget Cut a “Disappointment,” Urges Revival of Strategic Port Project https://www.reddit.com/r/u_PapayaClean3988/comments/1rf0od9/iran_calls_indias_chabahar_budget_cut_a/?utm_source=openai)