## Company Profile ENTERPRISE LOGISTICS SP. Z.O.O. — Poland-based freight forwarder and trucking company. Public website lists forwarding and trucking services (FTL/LTL, cross-border freight, domestic distribution). Managing Director: Maciej Gonerko. Company appears focused on land transport and forwarding from Poland to EU neighbours and regional markets (Germany, Baltic states, Ukraine); scale not publicly disclosed on website. Core services likely include customs clearance support, contract transport, and trucking logistics for agri-food and industrial shippers (per company page: forwarding and trucking). ## Pain Points 1) Exporter capacity & reliability risk: Enterprise’s agri-food and industrial shipper clients (grain, rapeseed, dairy, processed foods) face episodic capacity squeezes and longer lead‑time risk on export corridors (Poland→Germany/Netherlands; Poland→Baltics) when Black Sea or security events reroute cargo by land. They need a delivery channel that can guarantee bookings, alternate routes (rail/intermodal), and buyer matches to avoid missed sales or demurrage. 2) Compliance and reporting burden: New EU/Polish rules (tachograph/posting enforcement, stricter roadworthiness/emissions tests, and the new harmonized GHG accounting regulation) increase administrative and compliance work for carriers and shippers. Enterprise’s clients will prefer partners and channels that simplify documentation, provide emissions transparency and pre-vetted compliant carriers. 3) Price and origin competition for agri commodities: Continued competition from Ukrainian origins and falling grain export volumes in 2025 mean Polish exporters must move cargo competitively to retain buyers. Enterprise’s customers need faster market intelligence and matched logistics to secure buyers when price windows open. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – Poland freight market 2026 (road & rail, cross‑border, rerouting after Black Sea disruptions) === **Overall 2026 road freight conditions** - 2026 road freight in Poland is characterized by **stable-to-soft capacity and flattening rates** versus late‑2025, after two years of volatility linked to Ukraine transit and Black Sea disruptions. A 2026 outlook notes: - Main corridors (A2 east–west, A4 to Germany/Czechia, S8 north–south) show **“stable capacity utilization”** with **shorter lead times** on regional LTL and **flattened spot FTL rates** compared with 2025, as more shippers lock in contracts. ([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Shippers are increasingly favoring **contracted lanes indexed to fuel and tolls**, reducing exposure to spot spikes. ([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) - A Q4‑2025 benchmarking of European road freight rates showed Poland and Germany as key drivers of rate movements: - **Poland–North Sea port routes** (e.g., Warsaw–Rotterdam) saw **contract rates up 17.6 index points QoQ and 33.7 points YoY in Q4‑2025**, reflecting tight export‑linked capacity. National Polish spot rates, however, were **down 17.2 points YoY**, indicating domestic overcapacity. ([trasportoeuropa.it](https://www.trasportoeuropa.it/english/germany-and-poland-drive-road-freight-rates-at-the-end-of-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - That divergence sets the stage for **2026: international export corridors remain relatively firm while purely domestic lanes are more competitive.** **Cross‑border flows – Germany, Baltic States, Ukraine** - **Poland–Germany (westbound and eastbound):** - A 2026 Poland–Germany lane review shows **competitive transit times (2–3 days FTL for main industrial clusters)** and emphasizes **“stable capacity”** on this corridor, with rates now primarily determined by diesel, tolls and driver cost inflation rather than scarcity of trucks. Typical quoted ranges for standard 13.6‑m tautliners are described as **mid‑hundreds of EUR per FTL, with seasonal surcharges**, but the article directs users to exchanges (TimoCom, Trans.eu) for live spot levels rather than publishing a single index. ([trans-road.com](https://www.trans-road.com/en/blog/road-freight-poland-germany?utm_source=openai)) - Temporary Schengen **border checks by Germany** (and Lithuania) are reported as an operational friction rather than a structural capacity loss, adding delays at some crossings but not yet re‑imposing full customs formalities. ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - **Poland–Baltic States:** - The **S61/S8 and Via Baltica corridor** has absorbed flows that previously used Belarus/Russia routes. Reports on March‑2026 disruptions highlight **spot checks at the Polish–Lithuanian border** and note that part of the **available trucking capacity is “drained” by rerouted flows and congestion**, hitting just‑in‑time supply chains. ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Combined with prior EU sanctions on Belarus/Russia, this keeps **northbound lanes to Lithuania/Latvia/Estonia structurally tighter** than pre‑2022, with capacity volatility around political or protest events. - **Poland–Ukraine:** - A 2026 policy report states that **cross‑border rail volumes between Poland and Ukraine grew ~20% in 2024**, as rail and intermodal became “strategic arteries” to offset Black Sea risks. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - The **EU–Ukraine Road Transport Agreement**, temporarily liberalizing bilateral road transport, has been **extended to March 2027**, sustaining high intensity in road freight competition and volumes on Poland–Ukraine lanes. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - However, road border crossings are periodically slowed by: - Polish farmer/haulier protests against Ukrainian competition (noted in earlier 2023–2024 coverage) and - Continuing **security‑motivated closures of 10 secondary road crossings with Belarus and Russia** (maintained by Poland as of March 16, 2026). ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Impact of Black Sea disruptions and rerouting via Poland** - A 2026 analysis of Poland–Ukraine connectivity stresses that **Black Sea security conditions have “temporarily elevated the importance of Polish seaports”** (Gdańsk, Gdynia, Świnoujście) as export gateways. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - The March‑16‑2026 logistics alert notes: - **“Unusually broad” transport disruptions** on all major modes into and out of Poland, with **rerouted flows** draining trucking capacity and affecting manufacturers’ inbound components. ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - This implies **episodic capacity squeezes** on both east–west and north–south corridors whenever Black Sea or regional security events spike and flows swing back onto land routes through Poland. **Rail freight & intermodal** - Since 2024, **cross‑border rail volumes Poland–Ukraine have risen by ~20%**, supported by EU funds and an effort to shift some bulk cargoes (grains, metals, containers) from road to rail/intermodal. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - For 2026, the same report projects that: - **Rail remains capacity‑constrained at transshipment points** due to gauge breaks and terminal bottlenecks, but also - Offers **more predictable lead times** for some bulk/low‑value commodities compared with highly disrupted road crossings. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **Risk / bottleneck summary for 2026** - **Where capacity is tightest:** - Export‑oriented western corridors (Poland–Germany to North Sea ports) and - North‑eastern routes to the Baltics, especially when political/security events trigger additional checks. ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - **Where capacity is looser:** - Purely domestic Polish lanes and some intra‑CEE lanes, reflected in falling domestic spot rate indices at the end of 2025 and “flattened” rates into 2026. ([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) - **Key structural drivers for 2026:** - Ongoing war‑related rerouting from the Black Sea, - Prolonged liberalization of EU–Ukraine road transport until 2027, - Intermittent border checks inside Schengen and continued closures toward Belarus/Russia. **Sources – Dimension 1:** ([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – Poland agricultural exports 2025–2026 (grain, rapeseed, dairy; destinations & origin switching) === **Overall agro‑food export trend** - Poland’s agri‑food exports hit a **record EUR 58.4 billion in 2025**, up **8.6% vs 2024** in value terms. ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) - The official breakdown notes: - **~73%** of exports went to **EU markets**, - **~27%** to **non‑EU destinations** (third countries). ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) - Germany remained the top single buyer, followed by other EU neighbors; outside the EU, key markets include the UK and Ukraine (for selected products). ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) **Grain exports** - For January–November 2025: - Poland exported **7.2 million tonnes of cereals**, **down 25% YoY** (vs ~9.6 Mt in the same 2024 period). ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-exports-fall-by-25-percent-poland-must-vtzzxg?utm_source=openai)) - This included **3.5 Mt wheat** and **2.6 Mt maize**, with the balance in barley and other cereals. ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-exports-fall-by-25-percent-poland-must-vtzzxg?utm_source=openai)) - The National Agricultural Support Center (KOWR) and Ministry of Agriculture attribute the drop to: - **High global stocks and weak demand**, - **Low export prices and strong competition** from major exporters (EU, Black Sea, Americas), and - Polish farmers’ **reluctance to sell at current prices**, holding back physical stocks. ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-exports-fall-by-25-percent-poland-must-vtzzxg?utm_source=openai)) - KOWR stresses that, structurally, **Poland “must export over 10 million tonnes of grain annually”** to maintain market balance, implying that 7.2 Mt in 11 months of 2025 is **below sustainable export potential** and that a rebound in 2026 is likely if prices or logistics improve. ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-exports-fall-by-25-percent-poland-must-vtzzxg?utm_source=openai)) **Rapeseed / oilseeds** - Recent official releases emphasize **rapeseed and vegetable oils as growth segments** within the broader agri‑food export basket, but 2025 statistics are more aggregated (oils/fats, oilseeds) rather than product‑by‑product. The 2025 record export article notes strong growth in: - **“tłuszcze i oleje roślinne” (vegetable fats and oils)** and oilseed products, benefiting from high EU demand for rapeseed oil in food and biofuel uses. ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) - Market commentary for late‑2025 suggests: - Poland remains a **net exporter of rapeseed and rapeseed oil**, but - Trade volumes and flows are influenced by **competition from Ukrainian rapeseed**, which is entering EU markets under preferential access and often rerouted via Poland or neighboring states. (This is an inference based on EU–Ukraine trade liberalization and reported farmer protests rather than a single quantified 2026 data point.) **Dairy exports** - While the March‑2025 KOWR export update aggregates categories, it highlights **milk and dairy products as a key positive contributor** to overall export value growth: - Dairy exports (milk, cheese, powders) are described as **“one of the main drivers”** of the 8.6% increase in 2025 exports, alongside meat and processed foods. ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) - Historically, Poland’s main dairy export destinations include **Germany, Czechia, Italy, the Netherlands, and other EU states**, with some growing third‑country demand in the Middle East and Asia; the 2025 article reiterates EU partners as the core destinations without giving a product‑specific tonnage split. ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) **Destinations and origin‑switching behavior (2025–2026)** - **Destination pattern:** - Around **three‑quarters of Polish agri‑food exports go to the EU‑27**, with Germany dominating; this pattern held in 2025 and is expected to continue into 2026. ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) - Non‑EU growth is seen in **the UK, Ukraine, and selected Asian and MENA markets**, particularly for processed foods and dairy, though precise 2026 breakdowns are not yet published. - **Origin switching / substitution in 2025–2026:** - For **grains**, buyers in some EU and third‑country markets have been **pivoting among EU suppliers and between EU and Black Sea origins** in response to price volatility. The 25% drop in Polish grain exports in 11M‑2025 suggests that some buyers: - Switched to **cheaper Black Sea grain** when available, or - Drew down stocks instead of re‑purchasing at higher logistics costs via Poland. ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-exports-fall-by-25-percent-poland-must-vtzzxg?utm_source=openai)) - Within the EU, **Ukrainian cereals and oilseeds**, enjoying duty‑free/quota‑free access, have increasingly **competed with Polish origin**, leading to farmer protests and calls for safeguard measures (covered extensively in 2023–2024, with effects persisting into 2025–2026). This dynamic implies that **EU buyers may substitute Ukrainian for Polish grain/rapeseed on price**, while still using Polish ports and logistics. - For **dairy**, substitution is more constrained by quality specifications and processing relationships; there is **less evidence of large‑scale origin switching away from Polish suppliers** as of early‑2026, and dairy remains one of Poland’s more resilient export segments. **Key 2026 implications** - If global grain prices recover or logistics constraints ease, Poland likely needs to **raise exports back toward or above 10 Mt/year** to clear domestic surpluses and stabilize farm incomes. ([tridge.com](https://www.tridge.com/news/grain-exports-fall-by-25-percent-poland-must-vtzzxg?utm_source=openai)) - Continued **competition from Ukrainian ag commodities** (under prolonged trade liberalization through at least 2027) will keep pressure on Polish grain and rapeseed exporters in EU markets; this reinforces the importance of: - Efficient access to **Germany and North Sea ports**, and - Competitive inland freight rates from farm to port. **Sources – Dimension 2:** ([gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/rekordowy-eksport-polskiej-zywnosci-2025?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] – EU & Poland transport regulation (2025–2026: driver rules, CO₂/low‑emission zones, customs formalities) === **Driver‑related rules and tachograph / posting framework** - **EU Mobility Package I** continues to govern: - **Driving & rest times** under Regulation (EC) 561/2006, - **Tachograph use and border‑crossing entries** under Regulation (EU) 165/2014, - **Posting of drivers** under Directive (EU) 2020/1057. A 2024–2025 Q&A reiterates that drivers must **manually enter the country symbol after crossing each Member State border** in the tachograph (since 2020/2022, depending on device type). ([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/road/mobility-package-i/tachographs/questions-and-answers-tachograph-provisions-mobility-package-1_en?prefLang=nl&utm_source=openai)) - These rules affect 2026 operations by: - Requiring additional **stops near borders** (e.g., Poland–Germany, Poland–Lithuania) to input the country code, and - Triggering **administrative obligations and wage rules** when drivers are considered “posted” to another Member State, raising operating costs on cross‑border lanes. - **Polish national transport law updates (2025 amendment effective January 1, 2026):** - A 2025 consolidated text of the Polish Road Transport Act (Dz.U.2025.1490) with an amendment effective **1 January 2026** reinforces the **obligation of carriers to equip drivers with all required documents** and clarifies liability for both the transport company and entities performing own‑account transport. ([sip.lex.pl](https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw/transport-drogowy-16915749/art-87?utm_source=openai)) - This heightens compliance risk for missing or incorrect documentation (licenses, attestations, employment documents), particularly on cross‑border trucking. **CO₂ emissions and low‑/zero‑emission vehicle standards** - **EU CO₂ standards for heavy‑duty vehicles:** - In **March 2026**, the Council formally adopted a **targeted amendment of the regulation on CO₂ emission standards for heavy‑duty vehicles**, tightening reduction targets to **‑45% by 2030, ‑65% by 2035, and ‑90% by 2040** versus a 2019 baseline. ([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/road-transport/?utm_source=openai)) - While these targets apply at manufacturer level, they **indirectly influence fleet renewal costs** for Polish hauliers and will gradually push more **zero‑/low‑emission trucks** into the market over the 2026–2030 period. - **Taxonomy and “zero‑emission” definitions from 1 January 2026:** - The EU’s Delegated Regulation on climate‑related taxonomy criteria (updated text effective 1 January 2025) clarifies that from **1 January 2026**, light‑duty vehicles (M1, N1) count as aligned only if **specific CO₂ emissions are zero** (no longer including <50 g/km “low‑emission” vehicles). ([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R2139-20250101&utm_source=openai)) - For heavy‑duty vehicles (N2/N3), **“zero‑emission heavy‑duty vehicles”** are defined in reference to Reg. (EU) 2019/1242, and only such vehicles (or, in some cases, low‑emission HDVs with significantly lower gCO₂/tkm) qualify as sustainable investments. ([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R2139-20250101&utm_source=openai)) - This is important for: - **Public procurement and green finance** for vehicle fleets in Poland and - The design of **low‑emission zones (LEZs)** and access rules in EU cities, which often refer to these definitions. - **Clean Vehicles Directive – shift from low‑ to zero‑emission focus in 2026:** - The Clean Vehicles Directive requires minimum shares of “clean” vehicles in public procurement; guidance specifies: - In the **first period up to 2025**, low‑emission vehicles are acceptable, - From **2026 onward, the focus is exclusively on zero‑emission vehicles** for new procurement targets. ([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/clean-transport/clean-and-energy-efficient-vehicles/clean-vehicles-directive_en?utm_source=openai)) - For Poland, this shapes **municipal bus and service fleets** and may spill over to **urban freight**, as cities align their tendering and zoning with these thresholds, effectively tightening access for older diesel trucks in certain areas over time. - **New EU regulation on the accounting of GHG emissions of transport services:** - In **November 2025**, EU co‑legislators reached a **provisional agreement** on a Regulation for **harmonized accounting of GHG emissions from transport services** (freight & passenger). ([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/05/passenger-and-freight-transport-provisional-agreement-boosts-transparency-and-comparability-of-data-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions/pdf/?utm_source=openai)) - The measure aims to: - Standardize **calculation and reporting methodologies** for CO₂e per tonne‑km, - Improve **transparency and comparability** of emissions data across modes and operators. - Once in force (implementation expected during 2026–2027), Polish and EU hauliers will need robust **data collection and reporting systems**, making emissions performance a more explicit factor in logistics procurement. - **Roadworthiness / emissions testing (“roadworthiness package”) – Council position December 2025:** - In **December 2025**, the Council adopted its position on an updated **roadworthiness package**, including: - New **test methods for gaseous pollutants (NOx, particle number)** and - Extended provisions for temporary certificates when a vehicle fails inspection. ([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/04/council-sets-position-on-updated-eu-rules-on-inspections-of-vehicles-and-their-registration/pdf/?utm_source=openai)) - While not CO₂‑focused per se, stricter emissions and inspection norms will increase **maintenance and compliance costs** and may accelerate **retirement of older diesel trucks** in Poland over the second half of the 2020s. **Weights, dimensions, and intermodal promotion – relevance for cross‑border flows** - A Council working document from **October 2025** on revising **weights and dimensions** rules notes: - The existing **11.5‑tonne maximum axle load** remains a key reference, and - Discussion focuses on **promoting intermodal transport and better utilizing the capacity of low‑ and zero‑emission vehicles** through targeted increases or flexibilities. ([data.consilium.europa.eu](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/WK-14045-2025-ADD-5/en/pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Poland is cited in those debates as advocating to: - **Promote intermodal** solutions that combine road and rail, and - Ensure that any weight/length flexibilities **do not distort competition** in the Single Market. ([data.consilium.europa.eu](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/WK-14045-2025-ADD-5/en/pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For cross‑border trucking Poland–Germany/Baltics/Ukraine, this indicates: - Potential future **changes to maximum permissible weights and dimensions**, especially for zero‑emission vehicles and intermodal operations, which could alter cost per tonne‑km and vehicle choice. **Customs / border formalities impacting cross‑border trucking (2026)** - Within the EU (e.g., **Poland–Germany, Poland–Lithuania**), there are **no customs duties or routine customs declarations** for intra‑EU goods, but: - **Temporary internal border checks** have been reintroduced by some states on security/irregular migration grounds; March‑2026 reporting notes **continued spot checks at Poland’s borders with Germany and Lithuania**, leading to **delays and queuing**. ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - On **external EU borders (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine)**: - Poland maintains **closure of 10 secondary road crossings with Belarus and Russia** (initially closed earlier, still closed as of March 16, 2026), concentrating flows through fewer major crossings and lengthening queues for both customs and security checks. ([visahq.com](https://www.visahq.com/news/2026-03-16/pl/logistics-alert-nationwide-shipping-border-delays-reported-in-poland-on-16-march-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - For **Ukraine**, customs processes remain complex due to war‑related controls and rules of origin checks for goods entering the EU; combined with the EU–Ukraine road transport liberalization (extended to March 2027), this increases **traffic volume through limited border infrastructure**, amplifying the impact of any regulatory or protest‑related disruptions. ([wei.org.pl](https://wei.org.pl/en/2026/news/lwojdygawei-org-pl/report-between-the-border-and-the-single-market-ukraines-eu-integration-and-the-future-of-polish-transport/?utm_source=openai)) **Problem framing for 2026** - For shippers and carriers using Poland as a hub in 2026, regulatory pressure is mounting on three fronts: 1. **Compliance intensity for drivers and vehicles** (tachograph rules, posting, Polish documentation obligations, stricter inspections); 2. **Progressive decarbonization requirements**, which will: - Raise capex for fleets, - Make emissions data and zero‑emission vehicles more central to contract awards and city access; 3. **Border‑related frictions** (Schengen checks, external border closures, Ukrainian war‑related customs/security), which add time variability and may require additional buffer capacity or modal shifts (more rail/intermodal) to maintain service reliability. - These factors together: - **Compress margins** for Polish and foreign hauliers operating through Poland, - Encourage **larger, more compliant fleets** and intermodal operators at the expense of smaller, low‑cost carriers, and - Increase the **value of reliable, emissions‑transparent logistics providers** for agri‑commodity exporters and importers. **Sources – Dimension 3:** ([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/road/mobility-package-i/tachographs/questions-and-answers-tachograph-provisions-mobility-package-1_en?prefLang=nl&utm_source=openai))