## Company Profile Gulf Agency Company (Kuwait) Ltd — local arm of the GAC global shipping & logistics group. Operates in Kuwait as a full‑service freight forwarder and logistics provider (sea/air/road forwarding, project cargo, customs clearance, warehousing and distribution, NVOCC and port agency services). Headed by Managing Director Sudesh Chaturvedi (lead contact). Serves importers of food staples, packaged foods and industrial goods into Kuwaiti ports (Shuwaikh, Shuaiba) and consolidates cargo via regional Gulf hubs (Jebel Ali, Dammam). ## Pain Points 1) Importers face structurally longer transit times and higher freight/war‑risk surcharges due to ongoing Red Sea disruptions (2024–2026). Result: clients need alternative origins and secure, contracted supply — a sourcing channel Tridge Ark can provide. 2) Schedule unreliability and transshipment through UAE/Saudi hubs increases inventory days and working capital for Kuwait importers (especially rice, sugar, packaged foods). Result: forwarders must offer faster supplier-to‑door solutions or consulting that reduces safety‑stock needs. 3) Demand for short‑sea/land‑bridge options and origin diversification requires quick, vetted supplier discovery across Brazil/India/Pakistan/Thailand/Black Sea origins — GAC needs a partner that can provide pre‑vetted exporters and guaranteed delivery capability so GAC can focus on client origination. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. COMMODITY TRENDS – GCC & KUWAIT FOOD IMPORTS (WHEAT, RICE, SUGAR, ORIGIN SHIFTS) === **Kuwait & GCC dependence on imported staples** - Kuwait imports the bulk of its food, with “food” consistently listed among the top import categories alongside construction materials and vehicles.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Kuwait?utm_source=openai)) - For most GCC states, wheat and rice import dependence is close to 100% of consumption; sugar is also almost entirely imported, with small refining capacity in Saudi/UAE primarily using imported raws (no recent Kuwait refining capacity identified). **Kuwait sugar imports – latest quantitative signal** - 2024 refined sugar imports into Kuwait: **90.23 thousand tonnes**, value **$69.15 million**, up from **75.52 thousand tonnes** valued at **$64.65 million** in 2023. That is a **~19% volume increase** year‑on‑year, with only a modest rise in total value (about **+7%**) implying lower or stable unit prices vs 2023.([divercitytimes.com](https://divercitytimes.com/agriculture/trade/kuwait-import-of-refined-sugar?utm_source=openai)) - This suggests: - Solid growth in downstream demand (soft drinks, confectionery, bakery) despite a weak macro backdrop. - Importers are likely diversifying suppliers and capturing softer world sugar prices seen after the 2023–early‑2024 spike. **Origins & shifting trade patterns (wheat / rice / sugar, GCC focus)** (Recent Kuwait‑specific HS‑level origin splits for wheat and rice are not publicly broken out in the past 90 days; below are GCC‑wide and directional signals, with Kuwait typically following regional sourcing patterns.) - **Wheat**: - GCC wheat import origins have, since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, tilted more toward **Russia and the Black Sea**, with ongoing participation from **Australia, EU (esp. Germany/France), and North America**. Recent agriculture and shipping commentary indicates that by 2024–25, **Russia has become a leading supplier of milling wheat into MENA and the Gulf**, often undercutting European origins on FOB price.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For 2025–26 deliveries, traders report: - More use of **flexible Black Sea supply (Russia, Romania, Bulgaria)** into Jebel Ali, Jeddah and other Gulf hubs, then regional redistribution. - Gulf buyers (including Kuwait) staggering tenders and sometimes extending lead times due to Cape‑of‑Good‑Hope routing, which adds ~10–14 days and raises freight costs (see Dimension 2/3). - **Rice**: - GCC rice imports continue to be dominated by **India, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam**. - After India’s 2023‑24 export restrictions on non‑basmati rice, Gulf buyers **shifted more volume into parboiled and basmati segments out of India** and increased purchases from **Pakistan and Thailand**. Though India partially relaxed restrictions, importers have kept a more diversified origin mix to hedge policy risk. - **Sugar (raw & refined)**: - Gulf (and Kuwait) refined sugar imports are primarily from **Brazilian raw sugar that is refined in Gulf or Asian refineries**, plus direct refined imports from **UAE, Saudi Arabia, and sometimes EU suppliers**. - The 2024 Kuwait refined sugar import growth suggests: - Either increased **direct imports of refined sugar from regional refineries** (e.g., Jebel Ali) or - Higher **re‑exports via Kuwaiti trading firms** into Iraq/Iran, boosted by arbitrage created by Red Sea‑related freight distortions. **Macro trade context for Kuwait** - Total Kuwaiti imports hit **KWD 3.53 billion** in Q4‑2025, an all‑time high, versus a long‑run quarterly average of ~KWD 1.63 billion, pointing to strong import growth and likely increased food import bills in nominal terms.([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/kuwait/imports?utm_source=openai)) - China and Saudi Arabia have become Kuwait’s largest overall suppliers by value (China ~19.8%, Saudi ~5.2% of 2023 imports), reflecting a broader pivot toward Asian and regional sourcing; although this is all‑goods, the same partners are important in food trade and logistics.([trendeconomy.com](https://trendeconomy.com/data/import_h2/Kuwait?utm_source=openai)) **Forward‑looking implications for 2026** - **Wheat**: Expect **continued heavy reliance on Black Sea / Russian wheat**, with freight premia because of Red Sea issues. Flour mills and traders may increasingly seek **longer‑term supply agreements** out of Russia and possibly Kazakhstan via Gulf ports. - **Rice**: Kuwait buyers likely maintain a **diversified supplier portfolio (India/Pakistan/Thailand/Vietnam)**. Container shipping volatility could push some flows back toward bulk break‑bulk shipments into Gulf hub ports, then overland to Kuwait. - **Sugar**: Rising 2024 import volume plus moderate price environment points to **stable to growing demand** into 2026. Red Sea disruptions raise CIF cost from Brazil/Europe, but proximity to UAE/Saudi refiners helps Kuwait hedge freight risk via regional short‑sea or land‑bridge flows. **Section 1 Sources:** ([divercitytimes.com](https://divercitytimes.com/agriculture/trade/kuwait-import-of-refined-sugar?utm_source=openai)) === 2. DEMAND SIGNALS – CONTAINER RATES & CAPACITY, KUWAIT & MIDDLE EAST (2024–2026) === **Global container rate backdrop (2024–2026 with Red Sea disruption)** - Red Sea attacks from late‑2023 forced **large‑scale diversions away from Suez**, adding ~4,500 nautical miles via the Cape of Good Hope and **~$1 million extra fuel cost per Asia–Europe voyage**, contributing to higher container rates globally.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - UNCTAD analysis found that **spot container rates Shanghai–Europe rose ~256% between Dec‑2023 and Feb‑2024** after the attacks started.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 freight market analysis notes: - Pre‑disruption projections had 2026 Asia–Europe rates returning to **$1,200–$1,500/FEU**. - With Red Sea still effectively closed to most liner traffic, **actual 2026 rates are higher**; the World Container Index (WCI) stood at **$2,172/FEU in March 2026**, above historical norms but below the late‑2024 crisis peaks.([shippingrates.org](https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Persistent Red Sea risk and liner network response (2025–2026)** - By early‑2026, Red Sea disruption has eased from peak crisis but remains a **“manageable, persistently elevated”** risk: - At the height, **around 60% of Asia–Europe container traffic was diverted** via the Cape.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Current (2026) state: many services still **avoid Red Sea/Suez for mainline East–West strings**, though some targeted transits have resumed under naval protection and risk‑priced insurance.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - Overcapacity from new vessel deliveries in 2025–26 is **not fully translating into lower rates** because: - Extra sailing days around the Cape absorb capacity. - Higher fuel and war‑risk insurance costs need to be recovered in tariffs.([shippingrates.org](https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for Middle East & Kuwait trade lanes** While most benchmarks quoted are Asia–Europe, Gulf and Kuwait-bound trades feel these effects via: 1. **Transshipment pattern shifts** - Major carriers (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag‑Lloyd) have **re‑optimized services around Gulf hub ports** (Jebel Ali, Dammam, Jeddah) to handle diverted flows and feeder more cargo into the northern Gulf, including Kuwait’s Shuwaikh and Shuaiba ports.([washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-ship-attacks-pose-longer-term-challenge-regional-security-and-trade-plans?utm_source=openai)) - More cargo for Kuwait is likely **transshipped at UAE/Saudi hubs**, then moved via: - Regional feeders (short‑sea). - Land‑bridge (truck) up the Gulf coast when schedules are disrupted. 2. **Rate differentials & local surcharges** - Even where base Asia–Gulf rates soften slightly compared with 2024 crisis levels, shippers into Kuwait are facing: - **Higher bunker adjustment factors (BAFs)** linked to longer routes. - **War risk and contingency surcharges** for any service still transiting the Red Sea/Suez corridor. - **Congestion or schedule‑reliability surcharges** at hub ports absorbing diverted volumes. - The 2026 analysis stresses that **Red Sea closures remain the “single largest factor” in container rate formation**, outweighing the downward pressure from new vessel supply.([shippingrates.org](https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai)) 3. **Capacity and equipment availability** - During peak diversion phases, capacity to Gulf ports tightened as lines **re‑deployed ships to maintain Asia–Europe loops**, but by 2025–26, with significant newbuild capacity in service, the constraint has shifted more to **schedule reliability and box imbalances** rather than pure slot shortages.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For Kuwait importers using containers for food commodities (rice, sugar, packaged foods): - **Transit times from Asia/Europe extended by ~10–14 days** when routed via the Cape rather than Suez.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - This increases safety stock requirements and working capital needs for importers and distributors. **Demand signals specific to Kuwait & Gulf food flows** - Rising overall Kuwait imports (record Q4‑2025 levels) indicate **strong underlying container demand**, even as freight rates remain elevated.([tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/kuwait/imports?utm_source=openai)) - Growth in refined sugar imports in 2024 (up ~19% by volume) and stable to growing food imports suggest **sticky demand for reefer and dry containers into Kuwait**, particularly on Asia–Gulf lanes.([divercitytimes.com](https://divercitytimes.com/agriculture/trade/kuwait-import-of-refined-sugar?utm_source=openai)) - The continued Red Sea disruption into 2026 implies that **importers are unlikely to see a full reversion to pre‑2023 freight levels**, and may lock in: - Longer‑term contracts with carriers and NVOCCs. - **Alternative routings (e.g., via UAE/Saudi land‑bridge)** to smooth volatility. **Section 2 Sources:** ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) === 3. TIMING SIGNALS – RED SEA SECURITY & IMPACT ON ROUTES / KUWAIT FREIGHT (2024–2026) === **Timeline of Houthi attacks and Red Sea security (2023–2026)** - **November 2023:** Houthi attacks on commercial vessels begin in earnest in the Red Sea/Bab al‑Mandab. Major carriers suspend Suez/Red Sea transits and reroute via the Cape.([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363&utm_source=openai)) - **January 2024:** - UN Security Council adopts **Resolution 2722**, condemning Houthi attacks and affirming freedom of navigation.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - United States leads **Operation Prosperity Guardian**, and the EU launches **Operation Aspides** (Feb‑2024) to protect commercial shipping.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - **Dec 2023–Aug 2024:** A series of high‑profile attacks on container ships, bulkers and tankers — including **Maersk Hangzhou**, **Tutor**, **Verbena**, and **Sounion** (attacked August 21, 2024) — demonstrate Houthi capability to damage or sink vessels despite naval escorts.([washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lethal-attacks-show-strengthened-houthi-control-over-red-sea-transit?utm_source=openai)) - **Dec 2023–Oct 2024 traffic impact:** - Suez Canal transits fall from around **2,068 in Nov‑2023 to about 877 in Oct‑2024**.([washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-shipping-attacks-pose-longer-term-challenge-regional-security-and-trade-plans?utm_source=openai)) - Bab al‑Mandab crude/product flows drop from **6.9 million b/d in 2023 to 2.5 million b/d in 2024** (~64% reduction).([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/070925-factbox-red-sea-transits-in-renewed-focus-following-houthis-first-attacks-in-2025?utm_source=openai)) - By March 2024, more than **2,000 ships have diverted away from the Red Sea**, driving the 256% spike in Shanghai–Europe spot container rates.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - **2025 developments:** - Early‑2025 partial respite: some commercial ships associated with the US/UK cautiously **return to the Red Sea** after the Houthis announce a limited cessation targeting policy, but attacks and threats remain sporadic.([en.wikipedia.org](https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai)) - Suez Canal revenues between July–October 2025 actually **rise 14.2% year‑on‑year**, indicating a partial recovery of traffic, but overall volumes and risk remain below pre‑crisis norms.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Houthi attacks in early‑2025 still force **many ships to continue routing via the Cape**, extending voyage times about **two weeks** vs normal Suez schedules.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/070925-factbox-red-sea-transits-in-renewed-focus-following-houthis-first-attacks-in-2025?utm_source=openai)) - **Early‑2026 status (as of April 2026):** - Situation characterized as **“manageable, but persistently elevated”** risk: large‑scale diversions seen in early 2024 have moderated, but **no credible timeline exists for a full reopening** of Suez to routine container traffic.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Red Sea traffic in January 2026 shows **improvement vs 2024**, but still below pre‑2023 patterns; freight rates remain structurally higher.([isdo.ch](https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Effects on shipping routes to Gulf & Kuwait** - The closure/partial closure of the Red Sea/Suez corridor for many liner services has led to: - **Re‑routing of Asia–Europe strings around the Cape of Good Hope**, extending round‑trip times by ~20–30% and consuming additional vessel capacity.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - Increased strategic importance of **Gulf ports** (Jebel Ali, Dammam, Jeddah, Duqm, Sohar) as: - **Regional consolidation hubs** for cargoes that do transit Suez under escort. - **Waypoints for alternative services** that approach from the Indian Ocean side and then distribute cargo within the Gulf. - For **Kuwait specifically**: - Kuwaiti ports (Shuwaikh, Shuaiba) are **not on the front line of the Red Sea conflict**, but are indirectly affected: - Kuwait‑bound import containers from Europe, Black Sea and Mediterranean are: - Often transshipped at **Jebel Ali or other Gulf hubs** after rerouting. - Or delivered via **Cape‑routed Asia–Europe strings**, then fed to the northern Gulf. - This adds **10–14 days to transit times** and introduces schedule irregularity.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) **Impact on Kuwait freight forwarders and logistics timing** - **Operational changes for Kuwait‑focused forwarders:** - Greater use of **multi‑leg routings** (e.g., Europe → Jebel Ali via Cape → feeder to Kuwait, or Europe/Black Sea → Saudi/UAE → truck to Kuwait). - **Earlier booking windows** and **higher buffer stock** recommendations to importers, especially for: - Temperature‑sensitive foods (oils, dairy, confectionery). - High‑volume staples moved in containers (rice, sugar, flour and packaged foods). - Shift in some contracts from spot to **longer‑term freight agreements** to secure capacity during peak seasons. - **Cost and risk profile:** - Houthi attacks prompted: - **War risk premiums** and elevated P&I/insurance charges on any service transiting the Red Sea/Bab al‑Mandab.([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363&utm_source=openai)) - Higher bunker costs from extended Cape routes; one estimate pegs **additional fuel costs at around $1 million per Asia–Europe trip**, which must be recouped in freight rates passed down to shippers, including Kuwait traders.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 freight market study notes that per‑vessel **war‑risk costs of about $3–3.6 million annually** (assuming 5–6 Asia–Europe round trips with war‑risk premiums) are “meaningful but absorbable” against current earnings; this underpins **sustained, not collapsing, freight levels** through 2026.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Timing signals for 2026 planning** - There is **no indication as of May 2026** that Red Sea security will normalize enough to restore pre‑2023 Suez transits and freight levels in the short term.([themiddleeastinsider.com](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - For Kuwait‑oriented food and agri importers, this implies: - Plan for **structurally longer lead times into at least 2026**, with transit/lead‑time assumptions based on Cape‑routed or hybrid services. - Expect **freight rates to remain above pre‑2023 baselines**, even if somewhat below the 2024 spike, affecting CIF prices for wheat, rice, sugar and processed foods. - Increased value in developing **redundant supply routes** (e.g., sourcing more via Gulf/Indian Ocean orientations, or using regional stockpiles) to mitigate sudden route closures or attack spikes. **Section 3 Sources:** ([eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363&utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Economy of Kuwait https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Kuwait?utm_source=openai • Kuwait Import Volume of Refined Sugar : Key Data and Insights for Global Markets https://divercitytimes.com/agriculture/trade/kuwait-import-of-refined-sugar?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • Kuwait Imports https://tradingeconomics.com/kuwait/imports?utm_source=openai • Kuwait | Imports | ALL COMMODITIES | 2023 https://trendeconomy.com/data/import_h2/Kuwait?utm_source=openai • Kuwait Import Volume of Refined Sugar : Key Data and Insights for Global Markets https://divercitytimes.com/agriculture/trade/kuwait-import-of-refined-sugar?utm_source=openai • Sea lines of communication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Crisis 2026: Why Freight Rates Won't Drop Despite Overcapacity — ShippingRates Blog https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Shipping Disruption 2026: Status & Cost Impact — The Middle East Insider https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/25/red-sea-shipping-disruption-2026/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Crisis 2026: Why Freight Rates Won't Drop Despite Overcapacity — ShippingRates Blog https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai • Houthi Ship Attacks Pose a Longer-Term Challenge to Regional Security and Trade Plans | The Washington Institute https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-ship-attacks-pose-longer-term-challenge-regional-security-and-trade-plans?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Crisis 2026: Why Freight Rates Won't Drop Despite Overcapacity — ShippingRates Blog https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • Sea lines of communication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai • Kuwait Imports https://tradingeconomics.com/kuwait/imports?utm_source=openai • Kuwait Import Volume of Refined Sugar : Key Data and Insights for Global Markets https://divercitytimes.com/agriculture/trade/kuwait-import-of-refined-sugar?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea attacks increase shipping times and freight rates - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363&utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai • Lethal Attacks Show Strengthened Houthi Control over Red Sea Transit | The Washington Institute https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lethal-attacks-show-strengthened-houthi-control-over-red-sea-transit?utm_source=openai • Houthi Shipping Attacks: Patterns and Expectations for 2025 | The Washington Institute https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-shipping-attacks-patterns-and-expectations-2025?utm_source=openai • FACTBOX: Red Sea transits in renewed focus following Houthis' first attacks in 2025 | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/070925-factbox-red-sea-transits-in-renewed-focus-following-houthis-first-attacks-in-2025?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Houthi attacks on commercial vessels https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai • Executive Summary https://isdo.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-The-Red-Sea-Factor.pdf?utm_source=openai • FACTBOX: Red Sea transits in renewed focus following Houthis' first attacks in 2025 | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/070925-factbox-red-sea-transits-in-renewed-focus-following-houthis-first-attacks-in-2025?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea attacks increase shipping times and freight rates - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363&utm_source=openai