## Company Profile Round The Clock Logistics Pvt Ltd (RTCL) — India-based freight forwarder operating from the Nhava Sheva / JNPT gateway (company brochure linked in lead memo). Public materials indicate RTCL provides export-focused container forwarding and related services (customs clearance, documentation, container consolidation, and multimodal pickup/ICD feedering for exporters). They appear to be a regional SME forwarder serving Maharashtra and west‑India exporters that ship to MENA and African destinations via JNPT and major feeder hubs. ## Pain Points 1) JNPT terminal congestion and rising transhipment loads: elevated vessel waiting times, yard occupancy and ad‑hoc terminal shuffles at Nhava Sheva are causing longer dwell times and truck turnarounds—this directly drives storage charges, rollovers and unpredictable ETAs for RTCL’s exporters, especially for time‑sensitive agri (rice, spices, reefers). 2) Route volatility and war‑risk surcharges from Red Sea/Houthi disruptions: intermittent rerouting via the Cape or alternative feeder hubs increases transit time, war‑risk surcharges and ad‑hoc modal/land bridging costs—this complicates quoting, margin protection and customer retention for a regional forwarder. 3) Commodity‑level sourcing and regulatory pain for exporters: India’s rice export controls (MEPs, bans) and tighter quality/residue standards for spices force exporters to pivot origins or buyers quickly; RTCL likely lacks an automated buyer‑matching and contracting channel to help clients secure alternative buyers or handle multi‑origin tenders rapidly. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === [MARKET_DYNAMICS] India container export flows 2026 – JNPT/Nhava Sheva congestion and route shifts to Middle East & Africa === 1. Current congestion and operational pressure at JNPT/Nhava Sheva (Q2 2026) - JNPA (Nhava Sheva) handled a record **8.17 million TEU and 102 million tonnes** in FY 2025–26 (April 2025–March 2026), its highest-ever annual throughput, confirming strong export and transhipment flows.([indiaseatradenews.com](https://indiaseatradenews.com/jnpa-achieves-record-cargo-and-container-throughput-in-fy26/?utm_source=openai)) - Live congestion data for 10–16 May 2026 shows **vessel waiting times and yard occupancy above normal seasonal levels** at Nhava Sheva, pointing to ongoing operational stress (vessel waiting-time charts and delay indices are elevated vs 2025 averages).([portcast.io](https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/nhava-sheva?utm_source=openai)) - Market reporting on 19 May 2026 notes “**pressure of terminal congestion at JNPA**” leading carriers to make **ad‑hoc/temporary berthing changes** among terminals (JNPCT, NSIGT, BMCT/PSA, etc.) to manage peaks. Authorities are also in “final stages” of launching **regular DFC rail services** between northern ICDs and JNPA to relieve road congestion and smooth container flows.([ship247.com](https://ship247.com/market-insights/congestion-sees-carriers-make-last-minute-terminal-shuffles-at-jnpa?utm_source=openai)) Key implications: - Export flows are not collapsing – total volume is at record highs – but **berth windows, yard dwell times, and truck turnarounds are under pressure**, which is relevant for time‑sensitive reefer and seasonal agro‑commodity exports. - Capacity additions and rail connectivity (Dedicated Freight Corridor) are being accelerated as a response to congestion. 2. Impact of Middle East/Gulf disruption on India–MENA flows via JNPT - As Red Sea / Gulf access became volatile, **around 3,000 export containers for the Middle East were reported stranded at JNPA in March 2026**, prompting the port to: - Give **storage charge waivers/relief**, - Allow **temporary storage of laden containers from other Indian ports as transhipment cargo**, and - Open **additional storage areas** to keep approach roads uncongested.([indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/mumbai/waivers-additional-storage-ease-exporters-burden-jnpa-chairman-10583706/?utm_source=openai)) - Analysis of network disruption notes that some Gulf‑bound containers from other Asian origins are now being **discharged at Indian gateways (Nhava Sheva and Mundra)** instead of directly at certain Gulf ports, then re‑fed, adding extra volume and complexity to JNPT’s yard/berth planning.([enterpriseam.com](https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai)) - India’s Ministry of Ports has **extended cabotage relief for container transhipment until October 2026**, explicitly citing rerouting of trades linked to Middle East disruption. JNPA is highlighted as a central beneficiary, with **rising transhipment volumes** and use as a buffer for disrupted Middle East‑linked routes.([in-supply.co.uk](https://in-supply.co.uk/india-extends-cabotage-relief-as-transhipment-volumes-rise/?utm_source=openai)) Implications for export flows to Middle East & Africa: - JNPT has shifted further from being primarily a gateway to acting as a **regional transhipment and contingency hub** for Gulf and Red Sea trade. - Exporters (including agri/food shippers) see: - Higher risk of **rollovers and longer dwell** for MENA‑bound boxes, particularly when new surges of delayed vessels arrive. - More use of **multi‑leg routings** (JNPT → hub in Gulf/East Africa → final MENA/Africa port) rather than direct calls. 3. Route and hub shifts affecting India–Africa and India–Middle East flows - Disruption in Middle Eastern hubs has triggered congestion in **Singapore, Port Klang, Tanjung Pelepas**, with a reported **cascading shift of Gulf‑bound containers into Indian hubs, including Nhava Sheva and Mundra**, for re‑routing and re‑consolidation.([enterpriseam.com](https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai)) - New and expanded **feeder/hub services linking Nhava Sheva with Red Sea and East African ports** (e.g., Ain Sokhna, Djibouti, Jeddah) are part of emerging network patterns, though the cited example RESIN service is structurally positioned for India–Red Sea connectivity: route includes **Nhava Sheva – Ain Sokhna – Djibouti – Jebel Ali – Jeddah**, with about **1,000 TEU per voyage capacity**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ain_Sokhna_port?utm_source=openai)) - Policy: Continued **cabotage relaxation** allows foreign‑flag mainline and feeder operators to use Indian ports (notably JNPT and transhipment hubs like Vizhinjam/Colombo) more flexibly for coastal moves and transhipment, supporting hub‑and‑spoke solutions out of Nhava Sheva for MEA corridors.([in-supply.co.uk](https://in-supply.co.uk/india-extends-cabotage-relief-as-transhipment-volumes-rise/?utm_source=openai)) Practical read‑through for 2026: - Exporters from North/West India (using inland ICDs feeding JNPT) are increasingly exposed to: - **Transhipment via Jebel Ali, Sohar, Khor Fakkan, or Red Sea/Egyptian hubs** rather than single‑call services. - More frequent **re‑routing via East Africa or Egypt** when access to main Gulf hubs tightens. - For Africa (East and some West Africa), **hub calls in the Red Sea/Egypt or Gulf, feeding down to African ports**, are becoming more common, with JNPT as key Indian load/export point. Citations for this section: ([portcast.io](https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/nhava-sheva?utm_source=openai)) === [TIMING SIGNALS] Red Sea / Houthi attacks 2026 – impact on shipping routes & freight rates for India–Europe and India–MENA === 1. Status of Houthi/Red Sea disruption as of 2026 - Houthi attacks on commercial shipping through the Red Sea/Bab el‑Mandeb started in late 2023 and led to major diversions around the **Cape of Good Hope**, affecting **Asia–Europe and Asia–US East Coast** trades for over two years.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - A UN/UNCTAD analysis (late 2024, referenced in 2026 overviews) indicated that from Dec 2023–Feb 2024, **spot container rates from Shanghai to Europe rose by ~256%**, largely due to the Red Sea disruption (e.g., Shanghai–Rotterdam FEU rates around USD 5,000, Shanghai–Genoa > USD 6,000).([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - In 2025 there was partial re‑opening and some **return to Suez routings**, but in **early 2026, renewed threats and escalation linked to the 2026 Iran conflict** created fresh uncertainty; Houthis threatened to resume or escalate attacks as of **28 February 2026**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - By February–March 2026, carriers had begun **restarting some services via the Red Sea** but still implemented selective Cape routings depending on risk; CMA CGM, for example, switched some Asia–Europe services *back* to the Cape even after temporary Suez resumption, citing a “complex and uncertain” context.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) Timing signal: As of Q2 2026, **risk is unresolved and episodic** – the market is oscillating between partial Suez use and renewed Cape diversions, limiting visibility on when “normal” flows resume. 2. Freight‑rate environment for India–Europe and India–MENA in 2026 - Pre‑disruption models from S&P Global pointed to a potential **30–35% decline in average container rates in 2026 vs 2025**, implying a return toward **USD 1,200–1,500/FEU** on benchmark Asia–Europe corridors, assuming a full Red Sea normalization.([shippingrates.org](https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Instead, due to continuing Red Sea risk and intermittent attacks, models now suggest that **rates will remain significantly above those targets** through 2026, as carriers retain pricing leverage given longer voyages and uncertain capacity utilization.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - Industry commentary summarizing 2026 conditions argues that despite global vessel overcapacity, **Red Sea/Cape diversions are the single largest factor holding up Asia–Europe and associated corridor rates**, preventing a return to pre‑crisis pricing.([shippingrates.org](https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai)) Approximate differential impacts (directional, not lane‑specific spot quotes): - Asia (incl. India) – North Europe: - With full Cape routing, **voyage distance increases ~30–40%**, adding **10–15 days sailing time** and **USD 800–1,500/FEU in extra cost components** (bunker + war risk + surcharges) vs a stable Suez scenario, based on various 2024–26 analyses.([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - India–MENA (Red Sea / upper Gulf): - Some legs remain Suez‑independent, but **risk surcharges and detours around high‑risk zones** still add **hundreds of dollars per FEU**, especially on lanes directly touching the Red Sea or Yemen‑adjacent waters.([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) 3. Route pattern shifts specific to India–Europe and India–MENA India–Europe: - The same S&P and industry reporting shows that the **Asia–Europe and Asia–Mediterranean corridors remain the most exposed**: a large share (about **30% of Asia–Europe container flows**) normally transits via the Red Sea/Suez.([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - For India, container forecasts for 2026 highlight: - Continued **volatility on India–Europe lanes**, - **Use of Colombo and JNPT transhipment advantages** to consolidate India-origin cargo onto either Suez‑transiting or Cape‑routing services, depending on weekly risk and carrier decisions.([maritimegateway.com](https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai)) - Mixed routing: some India–Europe services have **returned to the Red Sea** under enhanced naval protection, while others retain **Cape routings** or adopt **hybrid loops** (e.g., one phase via Suez, next via Cape) to manage schedule reliability and insurance exposure.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) India–MENA: - For India–Gulf and India–Red Sea: - Greater use of **alternative Gulf hubs** (e.g., Khor Fakkan, Sohar) and **land/feeder combinations** has emerged. One documented example (Austria–Qatar, but mechanism is indicative) shows cargo diverted to **Khor Fakkan, trucked to Abu Dhabi, then re‑feedered to Doha**, adding **USD 3,600–5,000 per container and 1–2 months delay** vs the normal through‑Jebel Ali route.([enterpriseam.com](https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai)) - Similar modal/route substitutions are noted for some India‑Gulf flows, particularly when Jebel Ali or major Gulf hubs face congestion or enhanced security constraints.([enterpriseam.com](https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai)) - For India–East/North Africa: - Increased reliance on **Red Sea/Egyptian hubs** such as Ain Sokhna, linked directly to Nhava Sheva and Jebel Ali, enabling **hub‑and‑spoke into North and East Africa** while bypassing the most exposed segments when necessary.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) 4. Forward‑looking timing signals for the rest of 2026 - Container‑shipping outlooks as of late May 2026 emphasise: - No credible, widely accepted timeline for **full and stable Red Sea normalisation in 2026**; - Even if Houthi attacks were to cease, analysts expect a **“seismic impact” with rapid rate drops** followed by **short‑term congestion spikes** at European hubs due to the sudden re‑concentration of flows through Suez.([maritimegateway.com](https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai)) - Therefore, for planning 2026 India–Europe and India–MENA agri/food exports: - Assume **persistent routing volatility and elevated surcharges** for at least the next 6–9 months. - Any sudden announcements about ceasefires or safe‑corridor arrangements may signal **rapid downward corrections in rates**, but with **temporary port/terminal congestion** along the restored Suez pathway. Citations for this section: ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) === [COMMODITY TRENDS] India rice & spice exports 2026 – demand, pricing, origin diversification in Africa & Middle East === Note: Public 2026‑specific trade statistics are only partially available so far; below blends latest 2025 trade data with 2026 policy/market updates focused on Africa/MENA. Where necessary, I flag extrapolations. 1. India rice exports – policy and volume context into 2026 - India imposed a series of rice export measures from mid‑2022 onward (export duties and then bans on non‑basmati white rice; Minimum Export Price (MEP) and quantitative controls on basmati) to contain domestic inflation. These restrictions, still being adjusted into 2025–26, sharply affected African and MENA buyers that relied heavily on Indian supplies.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Before restrictions, India accounted for **~40% of global rice exports in 2022**; key destinations included **Benin, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Guinea, and other West African markets**, as well as **UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen** for basmati and parboiled rice. (This share is from late‑2024 FAO/UN trade syntheses, still referenced in 2026 analyses).([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - 2025 data (reported in early‑2026 outlooks) show: - **Basmati exports relatively resilient**, with higher unit values but modest tonnage decline vs pre‑restriction period. - **Non‑basmati exports to Africa down sharply** where bans or high floor prices applied; however, some parboiled flows to Africa and MENA continued under specific HS lines not fully banned (e.g., parboiled 100% broken or certain HS 1006.30 categories).([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) 2. Demand and origin diversification – Africa & Middle East rice buyers Africa: - In response to Indian restrictions, many African importers **increased purchases from Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Myanmar** beginning in 2023–24; this trend **continued into 2025 and is still present in 2026** commentaries on global trade resilience.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Several West African countries (Benin, Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire) that previously sourced **60–80% of their imported rice from India** (depending on country and year) have, by 2025, **reduced that dependence by an estimated 10–25 percentage points**, replacing it with Southeast Asian origins. This is based on 2024–25 UN Comtrade patterns discussed in 2026 trade‑risk reviews.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Nevertheless, Indian parboiled rice remains competitive where allowed; **price‑sensitive low‑income consumers in coastal West Africa still show strong preference and demand**, and 2026 procurement tenders continue to request Indian origin when policy windows open (e.g., occasional special permissions for government‑to‑government deals – reported in 2025 and assumed to continue in modified form).([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Middle East: - For premium and fragrant rice, **India remains the dominant supplier of basmati** to Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait) and Iran/Iraq; shares often exceed **70–80% of basmati imports** in individual markets.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - After India’s introduction of a **Minimum Export Price and tight contract registration requirements for basmati**, Gulf buyers diversified partially into **Pakistan basmati and some Thai fragrant rice**, but at generally higher prices and under capacity constraints. - 2026 outlooks for MENA rice demand describe: - **Steady to slightly rising volume demand** due to population and tourism; - Continued **preference for Indian basmati** where available, with willingness to pay a premium vs alternatives.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Pricing: - 2023–24 disruptions saw **Indian 5% broken white rice prices move well above USD 500/tonne** at times, compared with historical norms closer to USD 350–400/tonne. Southeast Asian origins followed suit, with Thai and Vietnamese 5% broken often trading **USD 20–50/tonne above Indian levels** when Indian supply was constrained. - By late 2025/early 2026, international rice prices had eased from their peaks but remained **elevated vs pre‑2022 averages**, with residual volatility linked to Indian policy changes and El Niño weather risks.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) 3. India spice exports – demand trends, pricing, and diversification (Africa & MENA) Volume and product mix: - India is the world’s leading exporter for several key spices (chillies, cumin, turmeric, pepper, cardamom, spice mixes). Africa and the Middle East are significant markets for **chilli, cumin, turmeric, and spice blends/masalas**, both in bulk and value‑added forms. - 2024–25 official and industry data (reported in 2026 outlooks) show: - **Steady year‑on‑year growth in value** of spice exports, driven more by **unit price increases** than large volume growth. - Strong demand in **UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain** (as trading and consumption hubs), as well as **Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania**. Demand and origin competition: - Cumin and chilli: - **India and Syria/Turkey** compete in cumin; political/production instability in non‑Indian origins has helped sustain strong demand for Indian cumin in MENA, even at higher prices. - For chillies, **China and some African producers** are emerging competitors, but Indian chillies still hold a large share in Gulf and North African industrial/retail channels due to consistent pungency, colour, and established brands. - Turmeric and spice blends: - Africa’s processed food and HORECA sectors increasingly use **standardised Indian spice blends**, supporting growth in containerised shipments of **HS 0910/0910.91/0910.99 products** to both West and East Africa. - Some **local blending and packing in UAE and Saudi Arabia** is using imported Indian raw spices, then re‑exporting finished products to Africa, effectively making Gulf hubs intermediaries for Indian origin. Pricing: - 2023–25 saw **multi‑year highs in cumin and chilli prices** due to weather‑related production shortfalls in India and competing origins. Cumin prices at origin in India at times more than **doubled vs 2020–21** levels; chilli prices also rose sharply. - Into 2025–26, some cooling is noted but **price levels remain above historical averages**, especially for premium grades. This sustains **high‑value but more price‑sensitive demand** in African markets. 4. Regulatory and trade‑policy aspects relevant to 2026 flows Rice: - Ongoing **export control regime** on non‑basmati rice from India (bans, duties, minimum prices) continues to be a central risk variable in 2026, shaping how African and MENA importers plan tenders and long‑term supply contracts.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Buyers increasingly **diversify origin portfolios**, often specifying multiple acceptable origins (India/Thailand/Vietnam/Pakistan) in tender docs, whereas pre‑2022 many West African buyers were de‑facto single‑origin (India) for certain parboiled grades. This is described in 2026 “risks and resilience” trade analyses as a structural, not temporary, shift.([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Spices: - Compared with rice, spices face **fewer outright export bans**, but Indian authorities and importing markets have tightened **quality, pesticide, and aflatoxin regulations**. MENA and African buyers (especially those re‑exporting to EU) increasingly demand compliance with EU‑level MRLs, traceability, and steam‑sterilization or equivalent treatments. - Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) markets are aligning some standards more closely with Codex/EU norms, which impacts acceptable suppliers; Indian exporters that can provide **residue‑compliant, treated, and certified spices** will be better positioned, especially for re‑exports via UAE/Saudi to Africa. 5. Synthesis: 2026 commercial signals for India → Africa/Middle East rice & spices Rice: - **Short‑term (2026)**: - Expect **continued policy‑driven volatility** from India, especially on non‑basmati, with knock‑on effects on Africa’s low‑income consumers. - Strong incentive for African and some MENA buyers to **maintain diversified supply** (Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan) even if India partially relaxes controls. - **Medium‑term**: - India likely retains its role as **dominant basmati supplier** to Gulf and parts of North Africa, with premium pricing and strong brand equity. - For non‑basmati, India will compete more intensely with Southeast Asia; its previous near‑monopoly positions in some African parboiled segments may not fully return. Spices: - Structural demand growth in MENA and Africa’s processed food sectors underpins **steady to high‑single‑digit annual growth in value** for Indian spice exports, with: - More **value‑added formats (blends, branded packs)** moving via Gulf hubs into Africa. - Ongoing **competition on quality standards and prices**, but **India remains the default supplier** for many key categories where alternative origins are limited or volatile. Citations for this section: ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) --- If you’d like, I can next translate these findings into concrete implications for a specific product (e.g., parboiled rice, basmati, chillies) or for lane‑level logistics planning ex‑JNPT. Sources: • JNPA Achieves Record Cargo and Container Throughput in FY26 - India Seatrade News https://indiaseatradenews.com/jnpa-achieves-record-cargo-and-container-throughput-in-fy26/?utm_source=openai • Port congestion at Nhava Sheva | Live Delays & Vessel Wait Times https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/nhava-sheva?utm_source=openai • Congestion sees carriers make last-minute terminal shuffles at JNPA - Congestion sees carriers make last-minute terminal shuffles at JNPA https://ship247.com/market-insights/congestion-sees-carriers-make-last-minute-terminal-shuffles-at-jnpa?utm_source=openai • 3,000 export containers stranded at JNPA amid Middle East shipping disruption https://indianexpress.com/article/mumbai/waivers-additional-storage-ease-exporters-burden-jnpa-chairman-10583706/?utm_source=openai • Can the workaround hold if the boxes are drifting? - Logistics https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai • India extends cabotage relief as transhipment volumes rise | IN Supply https://in-supply.co.uk/india-extends-cabotage-relief-as-transhipment-volumes-rise/?utm_source=openai • Can the workaround hold if the boxes are drifting? - Logistics https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai • Ain Sokhna port https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ain_Sokhna_port?utm_source=openai • India extends cabotage relief as transhipment volumes rise | IN Supply https://in-supply.co.uk/india-extends-cabotage-relief-as-transhipment-volumes-rise/?utm_source=openai • Port congestion at Nhava Sheva | Live Delays & Vessel Wait Times https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/nhava-sheva?utm_source=openai • TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai • Risks and Resilience https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Red Sea crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Crisis 2026: Why Freight Rates Won't Drop Despite Overcapacity — ShippingRates Blog https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai • TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Crisis 2026: Why Freight Rates Won't Drop Despite Overcapacity — ShippingRates Blog https://shippingrates.org/blog/red-sea-crisis-freight-rates-2026?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Shipping Crisis 2026: Rates, Reroute… | Suaid Global https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Shipping Crisis 2026: Rates, Reroute… | Suaid Global https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Shipping Crisis 2026: Rates, Reroute… | Suaid Global https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai • Container Shipping Forecast 2026: Rates, Routes & Risk | Maritime Gateway https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Can the workaround hold if the boxes are drifting? - Logistics https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai • Can the workaround hold if the boxes are drifting? - Logistics https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2026/04/23/can-the-workaround-hold-if-the-boxes-are-drifting/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea shipping reopens, but renewed Houthi threats keep route uncertainty high | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai • Container Shipping Forecast 2026: Rates, Routes & Risk | Maritime Gateway https://www.maritimegateway.com/container-shipping-forecast-2026-rates-routes-risk/?utm_source=openai • TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai • Risks and Resilience https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff/1c66c439-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)