## Company Profile HAIM NATHANIEL LTD — Israel-based freight forwarder (lead contact: Doron Nathaniel). Public profile data is limited in lead file, but category and location indicate a forwarder operating on Israel’s main container gateways (Ashdod, Haifa) providing sea/air forwarding, local port and customs handling, and inland trucking/container repositioning. Likely client base: importers of consumer goods and food/agriculture (Israel is highly import-dependent), exporters using Asia–Med and intra‑Med trades. Scale: not publicly listed; assumed small-to-mid sized regional forwarder serving Israeli shippers and international carriers via agency/booking relationships. ## Pain Points 1) Short‑term port congestion at Ashdod and carrier port call switches (e.g., Hapag‑Lloyd diverting to Haifa) create sudden operational rework: re‑routing, inland repositioning and cut‑off/documentation changes — HAIM NATHANIEL’s clients need fast alternative routing and booking execution. 2) Persistent Red Sea/Suez security risk and rerouting via the Cape raise transit times, war‑risk/insurance and emergency surcharges — increasing landed cost volatility for agri‑food importers and squeezing forwarder margins. 3) Carrier/labor disruptions (ZIM strike) and unpredictable schedule reliability increase slot risk and roll‑over exposure — forwarders must offer supplier/source flexibility and visibility to retain customers. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] — Israel freight forwarding market, Ashdod/Haifa congestion, supply chain disruptions (2026) === **Port performance & congestion signals (Ashdod, Haifa, other Israeli ports)** - Israel’s ports handled a record **3.445 million TEU** in the latest full year reported (2025 data), up **~12.6% vs 2024**. Ashdod handled **1.248 million TEU**, remaining Israel’s largest container gateway; Haifa handled **676,000 TEU**, with the balance mainly through the newer terminals (Bayport, Southport). ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai)) - Despite Red Sea / Suez disruptions, Israeli port authorities describe overall performance as “resilient,” attributing this to competition and capacity across **five commercial ports**, which helped avoid systemic gridlock even under high geopolitical stress. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai)) **Real-time congestion at Ashdod (Q2 2026)** - Portcast congestion analytics for **Ashdod** in April 2026 show **elevated berth waiting times and yard utilization**, with peak weeks (12–18 April) characterized by **vessel bunching**, weather-related downtime and yard capacity constraints. The platform notes that conditions were volatile week‑to‑week, with some services facing delays of **1–2 days above schedule** on average. ([portcast.io](https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/ashdod?utm_source=openai)) - A March–April 2026 global transportation market update notes “**port congestion**” and **emergency surcharges** affecting several Middle East gateways, including Israel, against a backdrop of sea-air shifts and capacity imbalances driven by the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict. ([pentagonfreight.com](https://www.pentagonfreight.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2025-06-Market-Update-Conflict-in-the-Middle-East.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Carrier actions: Ashdod congestion → temporary Haifa switch** - Hapag‑Lloyd issued a **local news advisory in April 2026** announcing that, due to **congestion in Ashdod**, its **EME service** (Middle East–India–Israel) would **temporarily call Haifa instead of Ashdod**. The carrier initially planned this diversion for **~6 weeks**, but explicitly flagged that the duration is “subject to change” depending on Ashdod’s operational situation. ([hapag-lloyd.com](https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/services-information/offices-localinfo/local-news/2026/04/ashdod-congestion--temporary-port-change-to-haifa-for-eme-servic.html?utm_source=openai)) - This kind of temporary call-switch generally indicates **berth/yard saturation at Ashdod**, forcing carriers and forwarders to: - Re‑route some import/export volumes via **Haifa**, - Use **inland trucking/rail** to reposition containers back to southern/central Israel, and - Adjust cut‑off times and documentation flows for shippers originally booked to/from Ashdod. **Labor-related disruption: ZIM strike and port knock-on effects (Feb 2026)** - In **February 2026**, unionized workers at ZIM escalated a strike linked to **Hapag‑Lloyd’s planned takeover** of the carrier. The action developed into a **full work stoppage**, halting ZIM’s own operations and generating **cargo handling disruptions at Haifa and Ashdod**. ([shipuniverse.com](https://www.shipuniverse.com/news/zim-workers-escalate-strike-over-hapag-lloyd-takeover-disrupting-israel-port-operations-and-deal-confidence/?utm_source=openai)) - While the strikes were targeted at a single carrier, ZIM is a major operator on Israel trades; union actions affected: - **Vessel working and gate flows** at both ports, - Schedule reliability for ZIM‑operated loops (Asia–Med, intra‑Med) and co‑loaded freight, - Short‑term slot availability and roll‑over risk for forwarders relying heavily on ZIM. - For freight forwarders, this introduced **carrier-specific risk** on top of pre‑existing Red Sea / Suez uncertainty, pushing some to diversify volumes toward competing lines calling Ashdod/Haifa. **Freight forwarder margin pressure & volatility heading into 2026** - A 2026 risk assessment for freight forwarders highlights **five major risks** globally, directly relevant to Israel‑linked trades: falling base freight rates, volatile surcharges (war risk, insurance, emergency bunker), geopolitical disruptions, and congestion cycles that can rapidly reverse from under‑utilization to bottlenecks. ([sdcexec.com](https://www.sdcexec.com/safety-security/risk-compliance/news/22957198/ontegos-cloud-5-risks-threatening-margins-for-freight-forwarders?utm_source=openai)) - The report notes that in **2026**, forwarders operate in a context where: - **Container overcapacity** globally is pushing **headline rates down**, - But **geopolitically driven surcharges and schedule unreliability** (including Red Sea risk, port congestion episodes, and labor actions such as the ZIM strike) make end‑to‑end cost prediction difficult. **Summary – implications for Israel freight forwarding in 2026** - Structurally, Israel’s ports increased throughput ~**12–13% YoY** while coping with the Red Sea crisis, but shippers still face: - **Periodic congestion at Ashdod** prompting carrier call switches to Haifa, - **Labor‑driven disruptions** when ZIM workers strike, - A rate environment where **base ocean prices soften** but **risk premia and surcharges** (war risk, congestion, insurance, fuel) keep **all‑in costs and volatility high**. ([portcast.io](https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/ashdod?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] — Israel food & agriculture imports, 2026 trade/logistics context === **Structural reliance on food & ag imports (pre‑ and mid‑war context)** - Israel has long been structurally import‑dependent: in 2021, agricultural imports were about **US$8.8 billion** vs exports of **US$2.45 billion**, underscoring a chronic agri‑food trade deficit. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Israel?utm_source=openai)) - A March 2026 U.S. Department of Commerce/Trade.gov update reiterates that Israel’s domestic agricultural production is constrained by **limited arable land and water**, and that the market is “**heavily reliant on imports**.” ([trade.gov](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai)) - A recent official report for the UN (VNR 2025, published May 2026) highlights that Israel is **heavily reliant on imported animal feed** and exposed to **climate and supply shocks in exporting countries**, making trade flows critical for food security and livestock sectors. ([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/vnr-2025/he/international_relations_vnr-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Regulatory and standards environment shaping import demand** - From **1 January 2025**, Israel adopted the principle **“What is good for the EU is good for Israel”** in food regulation, aligning many standards with the EU. This is intended to streamline imports from EU suppliers and reduce technical barriers to trade. ([trade.gov](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai)) - Around **50% of agricultural imports** have been entering duty‑free in recent years, largely through MFN access and FTAs, and agricultural tariffs overall were cut from **27% to 12% between 2013–2016**, according to the OECD, reinforcing a liberal import stance. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Israel continues to **prohibit imports of non‑kosher meat** under the Law for Prevention of Fraud in Kashrut; imported meat must be certified kosher by the Chief Rabbinate. This channels demand toward kosher‑certified exporters but does not reduce import dependence—rather, it **concentrates sourcing**. ([trade.gov](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai)) **War‑related macro trade shock, then partial recovery** - The Gaza war inflicted a broad trade shock: by late 2024, some estimates indicate **imports fell by ~42%** and exports by **18.3%**, with war‑related costs over 2023–2025 potentially reaching **US$55.6 billion (~10% of GDP)**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_Gaza_war?utm_source=openai)) - Despite this macro contraction, official and multilateral documents in 2025–2026 emphasize that Israel continued to **secure food and feed imports** by re‑routing, diversifying partners and using multiple ports, consistent with the 12.6% TEU growth at Israeli ports mentioned above. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai)) **Specific 2025–2026 demand signals for food & agriculture imports** While granular 2026 HS‑level volumes are still limited in open sources, several directional signals emerge: - **Diversification of supply origins**: OECD and national reporting note efforts to **broaden agricultural import sources** through new or updated trade agreements (e.g., with Asian and Latin American suppliers) to reduce concentration risk and price volatility. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Animal feed & cereals**: - Official reporting stresses “heavy reliance” on **imported feed grains**, which exposes Israel to global price and logistics shocks. ([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/vnr-2025/he/international_relations_vnr-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - The continuing Russia–Ukraine conflict, plus Red Sea disruptions, is flagged in logistics sector commentary as a **driver of global grain and feed route re‑optimisation**, affecting flows into the Eastern Med and Levant; Israel is one of the import‑dependent buyers in this corridor. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/LogisticsSoftware/comments/1sk5vof/impact_of_external_forces_on_the_global_logistics/?utm_source=openai)) - **Higher logistics costs feeding into food inflation**: - Middle East logistics reports in 2026 link **higher bunker, insurance and rerouting costs** to increased landed prices for **bulk grains, edible oils and other staples** imported into the region, including Israel. ([aitworldwide.com](https://www.aitworldwide.com/getContentAsset/eea23826-d4a6-4efe-96a0-d4d8de304c4c/c204d644-0ccb-43d4-a505-69664b0a9bc3/AIT-Global-Transportation-Market-Report-March-2026.pdf?language=en-US&utm_source=openai)) - Economic impact analyses of the Gaza war explicitly warn that **escalating oil prices and shipping risk** are raising import costs for **commodities and food items** for Israel and neighboring economies. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_Gaza_war?utm_source=openai)) - **Modal shifts for high‑value food imports**: - The 2026 Trade.gov agriculture guide notes **air cargo prices surged in 2024** due to reduced airline capacity following the war. While some capacity has returned, the report underscores that high‑value, time‑sensitive food imports (e.g., chilled meat, specialty items) have faced **elevated air freight rates**, encouraging distributors either to **shift to ocean reefer** when feasible or to **raise retail prices**. ([trade.gov](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai)) **Policy and food security framing** - Israel’s 2025 VNR report frames food security as requiring a “**suitable combination of local production and imports**,” but emphasizes that import dependence—especially for **feed and some staples**—remains structurally high and is being managed through **trade diversification and resilience planning**, not through import substitution alone. ([gov.il](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/vnr-2025/he/international_relations_vnr-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for 2026 agri‑food import demand & logistics** - **Volume direction**: After a sharp war‑induced contraction in 2024, early 2025–2026 indicators (port TEUs, government commentary) point to a **rebound in physical import volumes**, including food and feed, even as the broader economy adjusts. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai)) - **Cost & risk**: For importers and forwarders handling food and agri commodities into Israel, **landed costs in 2026 are shaped less by commodity prices per se and more by logistics risk premia**—war risk, rerouting, and congestion surcharges. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - **Supplier positioning**: - Exporters able to **meet EU‑equivalent standards** and **kosher requirements** retain or expand access. - Suppliers with **flexible routing options** (e.g., ability to pivot between Suez and Cape, or offer sea‑air solutions) are better positioned to maintain service levels and capture share in Israel’s structurally import‑dependent food market. ([trade.gov](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] — Red Sea & Suez Canal security in 2026, rerouting impact on Med shipping costs & transit times === **Security situation & traffic patterns (2024–2026)** - Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea beginning in late 2023 led major container lines (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, among others) to **suspend most transits via the Red Sea/Suez** and divert vessels around the **Cape of Good Hope**, particularly on **Asia–Europe, Asia–Mediterranean and Asia–US East Coast** routes. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - Container traffic through the Suez Canal **fell by ~75% in 2024 vs 2023**, reflecting the scale of rerouting away from the Red Sea corridor; about **12% of global trade** normally passes through this route. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - In **early 2026**, some carriers began **selectively returning** to the Red Sea/Suez to reduce transit times, but traffic remained “**sharply below historical levels**” and routing decisions varied by line and service. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) - A May 2026 industry update characterizes the Suez return as **“fragile”**, noting that renewed escalation involving the **US, Iran, Israel and regional proxies** has dampened expectations of a broad, stable re‑opening in 2026. ([metro.global](https://metro.global/2026/05/13/suez-return-remains-fragile-as-carriers-weigh-faster-transit-against-overcapacity/?utm_source=openai)) **Transit time impacts and service design** - Rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope typically **adds ~10–14 days** to a typical Asia–Europe voyage; this rule‑of‑thumb is widely cited from prior piracy and current Red Sea analyses. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 advisory on the Red Sea crisis outlines comparative options: full Cape routing, sea‑air (e.g., via Gulf hubs like Dubai), and split‑mode solutions, with sea‑air combinations able to **cut 25–35 days** versus all‑ocean rerouting for time‑critical cargo, albeit at **3–6x the ocean freight rate**. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Cost impacts: freight rates, surcharges, and bunker/insurance** - Diversion around the Cape has increased **voyage distance and fuel consumption**, pushing up **bunker costs** and justifying carrier implementation of **war risk and emergency surcharges**, particularly on Asia–Europe/Med lanes. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - Global analyses compare this to past Gulf of Aden piracy episodes, when rerouting and risk led to **freight rate increases of 124–339%** on affected lanes; while 2026 conditions differ (due to vessel overcapacity), the mechanism—**higher insurance premia + longer routes = higher all‑in cost**—is analogous. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai)) - A March 2026 S&P Global/TPM26 analysis notes that the Middle East war has **“put to rest” assumptions that Asia–Europe traffic would normalize via Suez in 2H 2026**, and that **elevated oil and bunker prices** are contributing to higher container shipping costs even as base freight rates face pressure from **structural overcapacity**. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) - The March 2026 AIT global transport report confirms that **global freight rates have started trending upwards again** after a period of decline, driven in part by **Mideast security disruptions** and the need to **re‑route via India and other hubs**, which complicate supply chains. ([aitworldwide.com](https://www.aitworldwide.com/getContentAsset/eea23826-d4a6-4efe-96a0-d4d8de304c4c/c204d644-0ccb-43d4-a505-69664b0a9bc3/AIT-Global-Transportation-Market-Report-March-2026.pdf?language=en-US&utm_source=openai)) **Specific implications for Mediterranean trades (incl. Israel)** - For the Eastern Mediterranean—including **Israeli ports Ashdod and Haifa**—Red Sea insecurity affects: - **Asia–Med import flows** (containers with consumer goods, food, inputs), - Some **bulk flows** (grains, fertilizers, fuels) that otherwise would prefer the Suez route. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai)) - Many Asia–Med services have either: - Stayed on **Cape routing**, extending lead times and requiring higher inventory or safety stock, or - Adopted **hybrid patterns** where only some loops tentatively transit Suez, with carriers able to quickly revert to Cape if threat levels rise. ([metro.global](https://metro.global/2026/05/13/suez-return-remains-fragile-as-carriers-weigh-faster-transit-against-overcapacity/?utm_source=openai)) - For Israel specifically, the continued functionality and throughput growth of its ports indicates that **rerouting has raised costs and lengthened lead times but has not choked off volumes**. Importers face: - **Higher landed cost per TEU/ton**, - Greater **transit time variability**, and - Increased reliance on **multi‑port options (Ashdod, Haifa, newer terminals)** and **sea‑air or transshipment via other Med/Gulf hubs** where necessary. ([en.port2port.co.il](https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai)) **Risk and resilience framing for 2026–2027** - Industry commentary going into 2026 describes logistics as “**controlled chaos**,” with delays, reroutes, congestion and carrier reshuffles now a structural feature rather than an exception. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/logistics/comments/1q77cjx/is_anyone_else_feeling_like_logistics_in_2026_is/?utm_source=openai)) - A 2026 maritime/port resilience review emphasizes that port and network resilience increasingly depend on **operational excellence, digital visibility and flexible routing**, as disruptions now emerge from **overlapping geopolitical, climatic and labor risks**. ([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09844?utm_source=openai)) - For shippers using the Red Sea/Suez corridor—including those trading with Israel and the broader Mediterranean—key problem‑framing points in 2026 are: - **Persistent security risk** means no guaranteed return to pre‑2023 “normal” in the short term. ([metro.global](https://metro.global/2026/05/13/suez-return-remains-fragile-as-carriers-weigh-faster-transit-against-overcapacity/?utm_source=openai)) - Even when **headline spot rates soften** due to vessel oversupply, **war risk, insurance and rerouting costs** keep total logistics spend elevated and volatile. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/maersk-faces-a-tougher-2026-as-container-overcapacity-pressures-freight-rates?utm_source=openai)) - Mediterranean and Levant trades must be planned on a **scenario basis** (full Cape, mixed Suez/Cape, sea‑air, multi‑hub transshipment), with **inventory and sourcing strategies adapted** to tolerate 10–20+ day swings in door‑to‑door lead times. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai • Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai • Port congestion at Ashdod | Live Delays & Vessel Wait Times https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/ashdod?utm_source=openai • Classified – External https://www.pentagonfreight.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2025-06-Market-Update-Conflict-in-the-Middle-East.pdf?utm_source=openai • Ashdod congestion: Temporary port change to Haifa for EME service - Hapag-Lloyd https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/services-information/offices-localinfo/local-news/2026/04/ashdod-congestion--temporary-port-change-to-haifa-for-eme-servic.html?utm_source=openai • ZIM Workers Escalate Strike Over Hapag-Lloyd Takeover, Disrupting Israel Port Operations and Deal Confidence – Ship Universe https://www.shipuniverse.com/news/zim-workers-escalate-strike-over-hapag-lloyd-takeover-disrupting-israel-port-operations-and-deal-confidence/?utm_source=openai • 5 Risks Threatening Margins for Freight Forwarders | Supply & Demand Chain Executive https://www.sdcexec.com/safety-security/risk-compliance/news/22957198/ontegos-cloud-5-risks-threatening-margins-for-freight-forwarders?utm_source=openai • Port congestion at Ashdod | Live Delays & Vessel Wait Times https://www.portcast.io/port-congestion/ashdod?utm_source=openai • Agriculture in Israel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Israel?utm_source=openai • Israel - Agriculture https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai • TRANSFORMING RESILIENCE INTO PROGRESS https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/vnr-2025/he/international_relations_vnr-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai • Israel - Agriculture https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai • OECD Economic Surveys: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • Israel - Agriculture https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai • Economic impact of the Gaza war https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_Gaza_war?utm_source=openai • Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai • OECD Economic Surveys: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_18e45b04/d6dd02bc-en.pdf?utm_source=openai • TRANSFORMING RESILIENCE INTO PROGRESS https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/vnr-2025/he/international_relations_vnr-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai • Impact of External Forces on the Global Logistics Industry: A 2026 View https://www.reddit.com/r/LogisticsSoftware/comments/1sk5vof/impact_of_external_forces_on_the-global-logistics/?utm_source=openai • GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION MARKET REPORT https://www.aitworldwide.com/getContentAsset/eea23826-d4a6-4efe-96a0-d4d8de304c4c/c204d644-0ccb-43d4-a505-69664b0a9bc3/AIT-Global-Transportation-Market-Report-March-2026.pdf?language=en-US&utm_source=openai • Economic impact of the Gaza war https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_Gaza_war?utm_source=openai • Israel - Agriculture https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai • TRANSFORMING RESILIENCE INTO PROGRESS https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/vnr-2025/he/international_relations_vnr-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai • Supply Chain Resilience: Israel Ports Break Records Despite Red Sea Tensions https://en.port2port.co.il/article/Sea-Transport/Ports/Supply-Chain-Resilience-Israel-Ports-Break-Records-Despite-Red-Sea-Tensions/?utm_source=openai • TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai • Israel - Agriculture https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-agriculture?utm_source=openai • TPM26: War a problem for container shipping, but not ‘pandemic-scale’: analyst | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai • Red Sea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai • 🚢 Red Sea Shipping Resumes: Trade routes reset 👇 https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai • Suez return remains fragile as carriers weigh faster transit against overcapacity | Metro Global https://metro.global/2026/05/13/suez-return-remains-fragile-as-carriers-weigh-faster-transit-against-overcapacity/?utm_source=openai • Sea lines of communication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_lines_of_communication?utm_source=openai • Red Sea Shipping Crisis 2026: Rates, Reroute… | Suaid Global https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai