## Company Profile ARES Uluslararası Nakliyat ve Dış Tic. Ltd. Şti. — Turkey-based freight forwarder (website: areslogistics.com.tr). Likely a small-to-mid sized NVOCC/forwarder offering ocean, road and customs clearance services out of Turkey’s Marmara/Mediterranean gateway ports (Istanbul/Ambarlı, Tekirdağ/Asyaport, Mersin/Iskenderun). Serves exporters of perishable and packaged agricultural commodities (hazelnuts, citrus, tomatoes, olive products) and general cargo to EU, Middle East and CIS markets. Public scale metrics not available; positioning appears regional with capability to handle export consol, customs paperwork and multi-modal routing. ## Pain Points 1) Routing & rate volatility: Continued Red Sea risk plus partial re‑routing to Cape or Middle Corridor leaves forwarders managing unpredictable transit times, carrier surcharges and contract vs spot mismatches. This increases booking complexity and weakens forwarder margins unless balanced by better buyer‑side demand visibility. 2) Regulatory friction for agri exporters: High RASFF alert share (≈9% of 2024–25 alerts linked to Turkish products) and rising EU BCP audits are causing more inspections, lab tests, border holds and rejections — creating direct cost (testing, demurrage) and indirect revenue loss when EU buyers reduce volumes. 3) Market & product concentration risk: Key Turkish export commodities (hazelnuts, olive products, citrus, tomatoes) face supply shocks or policy constraints (olive oil export caps, hazelnut shortfalls), forcing exporters to find new buyers/markets and forwarders to offer market‑access services they may not have capacity for. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – TURKEY FREIGHT FORWARDING & CORRIDOR SHIFTS (2024–2026, WITH 2026 SIGNALS) === **Turkey container volumes & port dynamics** - Turkish ports handled about **13.5 million TEU in 2024**, roughly flat to modestly higher vs 2023, confirming Turkey’s role as a regional hub between the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Middle East.([container-news.com](https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - Within this, key export / transshipment hubs: - **Ambarlı / Istanbul cluster (Marmara)** remains Turkey’s largest container gateway (around **1.9 million TEU in 2024**, +19.5% YoY) with dense mainline and feeder calls to Europe and the Med.([shiphub.co](https://www.shiphub.co/ports-in-turkey/?utm_source=openai)) - **Tekirdağ / Asyaport (Sea of Marmara)** handled **~2.0–2.03 million TEU in 2024**, making it Turkey’s top container port by volume and the **15th busiest in Europe**. Asyaport alone moved **1.17 million TEU of transit containers**, equal to **44% of Turkey’s total transit container traffic** in 2024 – underscoring its role as a relay hub for East Med–Black Sea and Asia–Europe flows.([worldports.org](https://www.worldports.org/asyaport-became-turkeys-highest-container-handling-port/?utm_source=openai)) **Corridor shifts: Red Sea / Suez vs alternatives (2024–2026)** - The **Red Sea crisis** that began in late 2023 pushed most Asia–Europe container services off the Suez route and around the **Cape of Good Hope**, adding **7–10 days transit** and thousands of nautical miles to Asia–Europe loops.([seagatelogistics.org](https://seagatelogistics.org/news/container-transportation-key-trends-shaping-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - In 2024, container vessel traffic through the **Suez Canal declined by about 75%** vs 2023 as major carriers (MSC, Maersk, etc.) avoided the Red Sea; Suez-related trade fell by roughly **50% YoY in early 2024**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - These diversions temporarily absorbed the global overcapacity in container shipping, boosting TEU‑mile demand and pushing Asia–Europe spot rates up to **USD 8,000–10,000/FEU at peaks in 2024**, with a new “elevated floor” of **USD 3,000–5,000/FEU** during soft demand periods that year.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai)) - By **early 2026**, some liners have **partially resumed Red Sea/Suez transits**, but traffic remains “sharply below” pre‑crisis levels. Global container volumes show modest growth and **freight rates have started to stabilize in Q1 2026**, though they remain structurally influenced by earlier diversions.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for Turkey‑linked corridors** - **Asia–Turkey–Europe via Suez**: - Asia–East Med / Black Sea services calling Turkish ports (Marmara, Izmir, Mersin, Iskenderun) have alternated between Suez and Cape routings. With partial Red Sea normalization, carriers are cautiously re‑activating some Suez routings, but risk premia and surcharges remain in 2026.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - For forwarders, this means **continued routing uncertainty** and contract–spot disconnect: S&P Global’s long‑term Asia–Europe index (PLCR1) sat near **USD 1,700/FEU for 2026 contracts**, while spot rates were substantially higher into early 2026 due to GRIs and residual risk surcharges.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai)) - **Middle Corridor / Trans‑Caspian (China–Central Asia–Caspian–Caucasus–Turkey–EU)**: - Cargo volumes along the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) grew from **0.8 million tons in 2020 to 4.5 million tons in 2024** – a **~6× increase in five years**.([mezha.net](https://mezha.net/eng/mysli/transkaspian-pislia-viiny/?utm_source=openai)) - 2024 alone saw **62% YoY growth** to **4.5 million tons**; container traffic surged **2.6× to 50,500 TEU** in the first 11 months of 2024.([eias.org](https://eias.org/policy-briefs/the-middle-corridors-reality-check-advancements-and-challenges-in-port-infrastructure-in-the-greater-caspian-region/?utm_source=openai)) - The **Organization of Turkic States** projects Middle Corridor transit volumes reaching **~5 million tons in 2025** and growing **~10% further in 2026**, explicitly linking this growth to sanctions on Russia and continued Red Sea instability.([thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-middle-corridor-in-an-era-of-supply-chain-disruption/?utm_source=openai)) - EU committed **€30 million** to TITR‑related infrastructure at the November 2025 Tashkent forum; analysts note this is modest relative to multibillion‑euro needs, but 2026 priorities include **BTK railway upgrades, Caspian port storage/handling expansion, and better customs interoperability along Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey.([caucasusbusinessjournal.com](https://caucasusbusinessjournal.com/news/caspian-corridor-capacity-strain-middle-route-trade-volumes?utm_source=openai)) - **Black Sea & regional shifts**: - Russian invasion of Ukraine and Black Sea security concerns have depressed some north Black Sea volumes and pushed additional Asia–Europe traffic onto **South Black Sea / Turkish Straits** and **Middle Corridor** routings via Turkey and Georgia. UN/Allianz analysis shows declining cargo through Black Sea chokepoints and Suez since 2022, with increased use of alternative routes.([allianz.com](https://www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/economic-research/publications/specials/en/2024/november/14112024-geoeconomic-playbook-global-trade.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Ports like **Constanţa (Romania)** and Turkish Marmara/Black Sea gateways have been absorbing redirected flows (grain, containers), bolstering Turkey’s role as a **transit and consolidation node for Ukraine‑related traffic**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Constan%C8%9Ba?utm_source=openai)) **2026 freight rates ex‑Turkey – direction of travel** - Global context: By March–April **2026**, container freight rates are **stabilizing but still elevated** relative to pre‑crisis baselines, with new pressures from higher fuel costs (e.g., Hormuz disruptions) replacing some of the earlier Red Sea premium. Asia–Europe rates eased a few percent in late April 2026 but remain above historic lows.([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/chicago/news/global-container-freight-rates-stabilize-amid-evolving-red-sea-dynamics-q1-outlook-positive?utm_source=openai)) - Hapag‑Lloyd’s April 2026 tariff notice for Far East–Europe shows FAK rates to **East Mediterranean & Black Sea (incl. Turkey)** at **USD 3,100/TEU (20’) and USD 4,600/FEU (40’ dry/HC/reefer)** effective **15 May 2026**, confirming a still‑firm rate environment on the Asia–East Med / Black Sea leg used heavily for Turkey export/import flows.([hapag-lloyd.com](https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/services-information/news/2026/04/shipping-between-far-east-and-europe--a-price-announcement-is-av.headless.html?utm_source=openai)) - Forwarder commentary in March 2026 suggests some **“Red Sea surcharge” spill‑over** even on lanes not directly transiting Suez (e.g., trans‑Pacific), highlighting that risk pricing and carrier yield management remain aggressive; for Turkey exporters, this translates into **sensitive all‑in rate negotiations and the need to challenge non‑cost‑justified surcharges**.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/freightforwarding/comments/1rww0lj/is_it_just_me_or_is-the-red-sea_surcharge/?utm_source=openai)) **Take‑aways for Turkey‑focused freight forwarders in 2026** - **Volumes**: Turkey’s container throughput (13.5m TEU in 2024) and especially its **transit share via Marmara ports** are growing, with Middle Corridor traffic and Black Sea re‑routing reinforcing Turkey’s gateway status into 2026.([container-news.com](https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai)) - **Corridor mix**: - Asia–Europe flows are gradually rebalancing: **partial return to Suez**, continued use of **Cape** routing on some loops, and **fast‑growing but capacity‑constrained Middle Corridor rail/sea** via Turkey. - **Rates & capacity**: 2026 is characterized by **structural overcapacity in the fleet** but **persistent geopolitical frictions**, producing **softening trend vs 2024 peaks** yet a rate floor still well above pre‑pandemic. Contracting from Turkey benefits from this – **opportunities to lock in multi‑quarter or annual rates** close to PLCR1 levels while spot remains volatile.([seagatelogistics.org](https://seagatelogistics.org/news/container-transportation-key-trends-shaping-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Sources – Market Events** ([container-news.com](https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [COMMODITY TRENDS] – TURKISH AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (HAZELNUTS, OLIVE OIL, CITRUS, TOMATOES) INTO 2026 === **Macro role of agriculture & export orientation** - Agriculture accounts for **~10% of Turkey’s exports** and **>5% of GDP**. Turkey is the **world’s largest producer of hazelnuts**, major producer/exporter of fruits (citrus, apricots) and vegetables (tomatoes). Most fresh fruit & vegetable exports are oriented toward **EU markets**, with significant flows to the **Middle East and Russia**.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Turkey?utm_source=openai)) #### Hazelnuts **Production & export volumes** - Turkey normally produces **600,000–800,000 tons** of hazelnuts in‑shell annually, supplying **around two‑thirds of global market**.([turkiyetoday.com](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/turkiye-earns-380-million-less-from-hazelnuts-as-exports-drop-26-3212529?utm_source=openai)) - 2023/24 season: Turkey shipped **~303,000 tons** of hazelnuts worth **USD 2.35 billion**.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/turkey-earns-over-2-5-billion-from-hazelnut-exports-23262/?utm_source=openai)) - 2024/25 season (to mid‑2025): exports reached **USD 1.3 billion from 160,412 tons** in the first five months (Sep 2024–Jan 2025), up **13% in volume and 28.7% in value** vs prior year period – indicating strong price gains.([cropgpt.ai](https://cropgpt.ai/turkey-hazelnuts-export-volume-and-revenue-dynamics?utm_source=openai)) - But **calendar‑year 2025** ended with a **26% drop in hazelnut export volume** and **14% drop in export income**, losing about **USD 380 million** vs 2024, due mainly to a **sharp frost‑induced supply shock** that drove prices so high that some demand was rationed out.([turkiyetoday.com](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/turkiye-earns-380-million-less-from-hazelnuts-as-exports-drop-26-3212529?utm_source=openai)) - Recent industry update (Helios, April 2026) estimates **Turkish hazelnut export volumes down ~50% season‑to‑date** (Sep–Mar) at **~105,000 tons vs 206,000 tons last year** (‑50%), confirming ongoing tightness into the **2025/26 marketing year**.([heliosingredients.com](https://heliosingredients.com/hazelnut-market-update-april-2026/?utm_source=openai)) **Prices & demand** - At farm/export level, shelled hazelnut prices effectively **doubled in 2025**, from roughly **USD 9,000/ton to USD 18,000/ton** at the peak, before partially easing.([turkiyetoday.com](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/turkiye-earns-380-million-less-from-hazelnuts-as-exports-drop-26-3212529?utm_source=openai)) - Earlier, March 2025 reports put **11–13 mm natural kernel DDU Europe** at about **USD 8,220/ton (EUR 7,530)**. A January 2026 hazelnut report cites new‑crop (2025 harvest) starting offers around **USD 12,700/ton (EUR 10,310)** for similar sizes, with **total stock (2025 crop + carry‑in)** projected at **570,000–620,000 tons** and **carry‑over to 2026 harvest of 50,000–80,000 tons**, i.e., relatively tight stocks.([arslanturk.com.tr](https://www.arslanturk.com.tr/2026-january-hazelnut-market-report/?utm_source=openai)) - Turkey’s share in global shelled hazelnut exports remained **~62% in 2024** (HS 080222 level), underlining that even with lower volumes, Turkey remains the price‑setter for confectionery and chocolate buyers worldwide.([en.abrams.wiki](https://en.abrams.wiki/blog/2025-05-27/hazelnut-turkey?utm_source=openai)) **Destination markets** - EU (Germany, Italy) remains the **dominant buyer**, but **China** has become a fast‑growing market, importing **8,551 tons worth USD 79.4m** and ranking **9th** among destinations in the latest season.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/turkey-earns-over-2-5-billion-from-hazelnut-exports-23262/?utm_source=openai)) - With supply tight and prices elevated into **2025/26**, demand in price‑sensitive Middle East/Russia segments is at risk of some **down‑trading or product reformulation**, while EU processors are more likely to maintain volumes but adjust origin mix (greater use of Italy, Georgia, Azerbaijan where possible). #### Olive oil **Policy & export controls** - In **August 2023**, Turkey imposed a **ban on bulk/barrel olive oil exports** to protect domestic availability amid high global prices. This was **relaxed from 1 June 2024 to 1 November 2024**, allowing up to **50,000 tons** of bulk/barrel exports during that period.([fas2.stg.platform.usda.gov](https://fas2.stg.platform.usda.gov/data/turkiye-turkiye-provides-temporary-relief-olive-oil-export-ban?utm_source=openai)) - USDA and Turkish government reporting indicate that after Nov 2024, Turkey maintained tight monitoring / registration of olive oil exports, especially bulk, with a policy bias toward **higher value packaged exports** and **domestic price stabilization**.([fas2.stg.platform.usda.gov](https://fas2.stg.platform.usda.gov/data/turkiye-turkiye-provides-temporary-relief-olive-oil-export-ban?utm_source=openai)) **Trade & price environment (2024–2026)** - Poor harvests in Spain and Italy in 2022–2023 had already sent global olive oil prices to record levels. EU DG AGRI trade data show EU olive oil export values up in 2024 (+EUR 1.5bn, +10% vs 2023), reflecting high prices; Turkey participated in this tight global market but constrained its bulk flows via export controls.([agriculture.ec.europa.eu](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/bbe6222f-f660-4271-9dde-214af3dc8f34_en?filename=monitoring-agri-food-trade_oct2024_en.pdf&prefLang=cs&utm_source=openai)) - Industry sources anticipate **“good prospects for the 2025/26 olive oil season”** in Turkey for **table olives** and improved availability compared with the worst drought years, though no precise tonnage is yet given. The **US, UK and Russia** are cited as key markets for Turkish table olives (USA alone ~138,000 tons, one‑third of exports), and these buyers are expected to remain strong through 2026 if prices moderate slightly.([mundus-agri.eu](https://www.mundus-agri.eu/news/olive-oil-good-prospects-202526-season.n35881.html?utm_source=openai)) - Wholesale extra virgin olive oil prices in the broader Med in early 2026 are still elevated (e.g., **Greece ~EUR 5.5/L** wholesale), but significantly below the 2023–24 peaks, suggesting **some easing for 2026 contracts** for Turkish exporters – especially if Turkey’s own crop in 2025/26 normalizes.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/oliveoil/comments/1s5gkdb/is_this-a-good-deal-is-this-good-stuff_20252026/?utm_source=openai)) **Implications** - For 2026, Turkey is likely to **prioritize higher value packaged olive oil exports** and **table olives**, while **bulk exports remain policy‑sensitive**. Buyers in **EU, Middle East and Russia** should expect **continued administrative unpredictability (export registration, caps)** but potentially **better volume availability** vs 2023–24. #### Citrus **Exports & markets** - Turkey is a major citrus exporter (oranges, mandarins, lemons, grapefruits), with primary markets in the **EU (e.g., Romania, Poland), Russia and the broader Middle East**. EU agrifood trade data place Turkey among key citrus suppliers in the “European neighbourhood” cluster.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Turkey?utm_source=openai)) - While up‑to‑date, disaggregated 2025–26 EU import tonnages by product are behind statistical lags, RASFF and parliamentary data show **strong citrus import flows** but also **elevated rejections due to pesticide residues**, especially for **lemons**.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-risks-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)) **Price & demand signals** - EU demand for Turkish citrus into 2025–26 is supported by **competitive pricing vs EU domestic** and **supply gaps from Morocco/Egypt in some windows**, but the **risk of border rejections and heightened testing** is raising compliance and logistics costs for Turkish exporters (more on this under SPS section). - In Russia and Middle East, demand is more **price‑elastic**; high freight rates in 2024–early 2025 eroded some margins, but as 2026 freight stabilizes, **land and short‑sea routes via Turkey’s Med ports** (Mersin, Iskenderun) to Levant and Gulf markets look more attractive again.([container-news.com](https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai)) #### Tomatoes & other vegetables **Trade flows & demand** - Turkey is a leading exporter of fresh tomatoes to the EU and SEE. European Parliament data show **Greek tomato imports from Turkey increased 20% in 2024 to ~29,500 tons**, with Turkey the main origin.([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-001061_EN.html?utm_source=openai)) - Unofficial commentary and trade data indicate that **Romania imported almost EUR 100m of Turkish tomatoes in 2023**, making it Turkey’s top EU tomato market; broader EU continues to rely on Turkish supply to cover seasonal shortfalls.([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskBalkans/comments/1lt2oah/why_turkish_fruits_and_vegetables_especially/?utm_source=openai)) - Middle East (Iraq, Gulf) and Russia also source substantial volumes of Turkish tomatoes and peppers, often overland or via short‑sea Ro‑Ro through Turkish Med and Black Sea ports. **Price & quality issues** - The same European Parliament question notes that **200 tons of Turkish tomatoes were rejected in October 2024** due to banned pesticide residues, highlighting quality/compliance challenges.([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-001061_EN.html?utm_source=openai)) - EU RASFF data (see next section) and media synthesis for 1 Dec 2024–30 Nov 2025 show **9% of all EU food safety alerts linked to Turkish products**, with many involving **green peppers, lemons and pomegranates** – a signal that **input cost pressures and farm‑gate practices** are straining compliance for some export‑oriented growers.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-risks-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)) **2026 outlook – demand by region** - **EU**: Still structurally dependent on Turkish **hazelnuts, tomatoes, citrus**, and increasingly packaged **table olives and olive oil**, but under intensifying **SPS scrutiny**; 2026 demand is likely robust in volume terms but with **tighter supplier selection and more compliance‑driven consolidation**. - **Middle East & Gulf**: Demand for **fruits, vegetables and nuts** remains strong, with Turkey benefiting from **proximity and diverse routing options** (truck via Iraq, Ro‑Ro via Med). Price sensitivity is higher than in the EU; freight normalization in 2026 should mildly support volumes. - **Russia & EAEU**: Despite sanctions on Russia, **agri‑food flows from Turkey to Russia continue**, particularly citrus and some vegetables; the Middle Corridor and Black Sea shipping patterns may affect routing and insurance costs, but overall Russian demand for Turkish foodstuffs into 2026 is expected to remain **high and price‑driven**. **Sources – Commodity Trends** ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Turkey?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – EU SPS CONTROLS & NON‑TARIFF BARRIERS IMPACTING TURKISH FOOD EXPORTS (2024–2026) === **EU SPS framework – baseline** - Imports of food and feed from non‑EU countries (including Turkey) are governed by the **Official Controls Regulation (EU) 2017/625** and associated implementing acts, imposing: - **Pre‑export guarantees** by the non‑EU authority, - **Systematic and risk‑based checks at EU Border Control Posts (BCPs)** on documents, identity and physical parameters, recorded in **TRACES**.([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feed-qas_en?prefLang=es&utm_source=openai)) - For certain “high‑risk food of non‑animal origin” (e.g., specific fruits/vegetables) the EU can impose **increased border controls or emergency measures**, including tightened frequency of physical and laboratory checks.([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feed-qas_en?prefLang=es&utm_source=openai)) **Recent EU decisions & implementation signals (2025–2027 horizon)** - Following an **Implementation Dialogue on 9 December 2025**, the Commission announced measures to strengthen import controls in **2026–2027**, including a **33% increase in audits of EU border control posts**, to improve harmonization and efficiency while remaining risk‑based.([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feed-qas_en?prefLang=es&utm_source=openai)) - Parallel updates to **Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2389** (rules on reduced plant‑health checks) and related plant‑health legislation in 2024 adjust the **frequency of checks for plants and plant products**, which can affect Turkish fruit and vegetable consignments, especially where risk indicators (e.g., pesticide non‑compliance) are high.([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/plants/plant-health-and-biosecurity/trade-plants-plant-products-non-eu-countries_en?utm_source=openai)) **RASFF data – Turkey’s position in EU risk radar** - Analysis of EU RASFF data for **1 Dec 2024–30 Nov 2025** shows: - Total food safety alerts: **5,271**; - **~9% (≈475 alerts)** were linked to **Turkish products**, the **highest share for any single non‑EU supplier** in the report.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-risks-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)) - The majority of these alerts involved **fresh fruits and vegetables**, with **pesticide residues** as the main violation. Repeated cases were reported for **green peppers, lemons and pomegranates**, where consignments were refused at EU borders for containing banned or over‑limit pesticides.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-risks-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)) - A separate media summary on RASFF data for 2025 notes that Turkey was **2nd in the EU for pesticide‑related alerts**, and that **48.5% of alerts involving Turkish products resulted in border rejections** – an unusually high rejection ratio.([turkiyetoday.com](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/lifestyle/turkiye-ranks-2nd-in-eu-pesticide-alerts-nearly-half-of-food-shipments-rejected-repor-3212701?utm_source=openai)) **Parliamentary & political attention** - A **written question to the European Commission (E‑001061/2025)** raises concern about **“agricultural products from Türkiye containing banned pesticides”**, citing: - A **20% increase in Greek tomato imports from Turkey in 2024 to 29,500 tons**, - A specific case where **200 tons of Turkish tomatoes** were found to contain banned pesticide residues and were rejected. The question asks whether the Commission will **increase controls and potentially restrict imports** if non‑compliance persists.([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-001061_EN.html?utm_source=openai)) - This kind of parliamentary scrutiny is a **leading indicator** that certain Turkish products (notably **tomatoes, peppers, citrus**) may face **tighter risk categorization**, higher sampling rates and, in worst cases, **emergency measures** if incident trends do not improve. **Practical SPS / customs impacts for Turkish exporters in 2026** 1. **Higher inspection frequencies & delays** - Products frequently flagged in RASFF (Turkish **peppers, lemons, pomegranates, tomatoes**) are likely classified at **higher risk levels**, triggering: - **More frequent physical inspections (up to 50–100% of consignments)** at some BCPs, - Additional **laboratory testing for pesticide residues**, extending clearance times from **hours to several days**. - While precise current check frequencies are defined in commodity‑specific implementing acts (not all publicly summarized by origin), the trend in 2024–25 RASFF data and the 33% audit increase for 2026–27 strongly suggest **no relaxation for Turkish produce in the near term**.([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feed-qas_en?prefLang=es&utm_source=openai)) 2. **Cost implications** - **Direct costs**: Official control fees at EU BCPs (fixed and variable per consignment), plus **laboratory analysis charges** when sampling rates are high; these can add **tens of euros per ton** for commodity shipments. - **Indirect costs**: - Demurrage/detention when trucks or containers are held pending lab results, - Increased **working capital requirements** and risk of stock‑outs for EU buyers, - **Higher insurance and compliance costs** (third‑party testing in Turkey, certification, GAP audits). - For Turkish exporters operating on thin margins (e.g., **fresh vegetables to Eastern EU**), high rejection risk can translate into **discounted fob prices and more conservative purchase volumes** from EU importers. 3. **Regulatory uncertainty & non‑tariff barrier perception** - From the Turkish exporter’s viewpoint, the combination of: - high RASFF hit rate, - parliamentary scrutiny, and - intensified 2026–27 border audits is perceived as a **non‑tariff barrier (NTB)**, even though it is framed as risk‑based food safety policy. - Medium‑term, this may: - Encourage **diversification toward Middle East and Russian markets**, where SPS regimes are perceived as less stringent (though not necessarily less complex); - Drive **consolidation among Turkish exporters** toward those who can consistently meet EU MRLs and invest in traceability and pre‑export testing.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-risks-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)) 4. **Interaction with UK & other markets** - Although not directly about Turkey, a July 2025 Commission communication on SPS arrangements with the **UK** references **postponement of medium‑risk fruit & vegetable checks until January 2027**, indicating that full SPS tightening is a **multi‑year process** and that EU authorities are conscious of trade‑cost impacts.([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2025/0408/COM_COM%282025%290408_EN.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For Turkey, this is a reminder that **regulatory timelines are fluid**; exporters need structured monitoring of **EU implementing regulations & BCP guidance** rather than relying on static assumptions. **Strategic response signals from EU & Turkey** - EU: Trend is toward **more data‑driven, harmonized controls** (TRACES, surveillance, plant‑health check regulation), with political willingness to **raise controls on problematic origins/products**.([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feed-qas_en?prefLang=es&utm_source=openai)) - Turkey: Growing domestic media coverage of high RASFF rejection rates and reputational risks is putting pressure on Turkish authorities to: - Strengthen **domestic pesticide regulation and MRL enforcement**, - Expand **residue monitoring programs for export farms**, - Enhance **pre‑export testing and certification** for EU‑bound shipments.([paturkey.com](https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-ris-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for 2026 demand** - **EU demand** for Turkish agri‑food remains structurally strong (especially hazelnuts, fruits/vegetables, olive products), but: - **Non‑compliant suppliers are likely to be squeezed out or redirected to non‑EU markets**, - Large EU buyers (retailers, processors) will **prefer Turkish exporters with robust SPS compliance systems** and transparent residue controls, - **Price differentials** may emerge between **“EU‑grade” compliant Turkish product** and **“regional‑grade” product** for less stringent markets. **Sources – Demand Signals / SPS & NTBs** ([food.ec.europa.eu](https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feed-qas_en?prefLang=es&utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Turkish ports record 13.5 million TEUs in 2024 - Container News https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai • Largest seaports in Turkey – top 5 ports | ShipHub https://www.shiphub.co/ports-in-turkey/?utm_source=openai • Asyaport became Turkey’s highest container handling port | World Ports Organization https://www.worldports.org/asyaport-became-turkeys-highest-container-handling-port/?utm_source=openai • Container Transportation: Key Trends Shaping 2026 https://seagatelogistics.org/news/container-transportation-key-trends-shaping-2026/?utm_source=openai • Red Sea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai • FREIGHTOS WEEKLY UPDATE - November 25, 2025 | Excerpt: “…US could enter a restocking cycle in 2026 as frontloaded inventories wind down. This restocking could mean stronger freight demand than some have anticipated for next year.” https://www.reddit.com/r/zim/comments/1p6jo8v/freightos_weekly_update_november_25_2025_excerpt/?utm_source=openai • 🚢 Red Sea Shipping Resumes: Trade routes reset 👇 https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai • CONTAINERS QUARTERLY: Asia-Europe enters 2026 with seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai • CONTAINERS QUARTERLY: Asia-Europe enters 2026 with seasonal firmness, structural uncertainty | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/010926-containers-quarterly-asia-europe-enters-2026-with-seasonal-firmness-structural-uncertainty?utm_source=openai • Transcaspian after the war | Ukraine news - #Mezha https://mezha.net/eng/mysli/transkaspian-pislia-viiny/?utm_source=openai • The Middle Corridor’s Reality Check: Advancements and Challenges in Port Infrastructure in the Greater Caspian Region – EIAS https://eias.org/policy-briefs/the-middle-corridors-reality-check-advancements-and-challenges-in-port-infrastructure-in-the-greater-caspian-region/?utm_source=openai • The Middle Corridor in an Era of Supply Chain Disruption – The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-middle-corridor-in-an-era-of-supply-chain-disruption/?utm_source=openai • Caspian Corridor Faces Capacity Strain as Middle Route Trade Volumes Rise https://caucasusbusinessjournal.com/news/caspian-corridor-capacity-strain-middle-route-trade-volumes?utm_source=openai • Allianz Trade 14 November 2024 05 US vs. China: a https://www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/economic-research/publications/specials/en/2024/november/14112024-geoeconomic-playbook-global-trade.pdf?utm_source=openai • Port of Constanța https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Constan%C8%9Ba?utm_source=openai • Global Container Freight Rates Stabilize Amid Evolving Red Sea Dynamics, Q1 Outlook Positive - Ports Directory https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/chicago/news/global-container-freight-rates-stabilize-amid-evolving-red-sea-dynamics-q1-outlook-positive?utm_source=openai • Shipping between Far East and Europe? A price announcement is available - Hapag-Lloyd https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/services-information/news/2026/04/shipping-between-far-east-and-europe--a-price-announcement-is-av.headless.html?utm_source=openai • Is it just me, or is the "Red Sea surcharge" becoming the new "Peak Season" excuse for everything? https://www.reddit.com/r/freightforwarding/comments/1rww0lj/is_it_just_me_or_is-the-red-sea_surcharge/?utm_source=openai • Turkish ports record 13.5 million TEUs in 2024 - Container News https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai • Container Transportation: Key Trends Shaping 2026 https://seagatelogistics.org/news/container-transportation-key-trends-shaping-2026/?utm_source=openai • Turkish ports record 13.5 million TEUs in 2024 - Container News https://container-news.com/turkish-ports-record-13-5-million-teus-in-2024/?utm_source=openai • Agriculture in Turkey https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Turkey?utm_source=openai • Türkiye earns $380 million less from hazelnuts as exports drop 26% - Türkiye Today https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/turkiye-earns-380-million-less-from-hazelnuts-as-exports-drop-26-3212529?utm_source=openai • PA Turkey https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/turkey-earns-over-2-5-billion-from-hazelnut-exports-23262/?utm_source=openai • Turkey – Hazelnuts: Export Volume and Revenue Dynamics https://cropgpt.ai/turkey-hazelnuts-export-volume-and-revenue-dynamics?utm_source=openai • Türkiye earns $380 million less from hazelnuts as exports drop 26% - Türkiye Today https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/turkiye-earns-380-million-less-from-hazelnuts-as-exports-drop-26-3212529?utm_source=openai • PA Turkey https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/eu-food-safety-system-flags-sharp-rise-in-risks-linked-to-turkish-exports-25904/?utm_source=openai)