## Company Profile Bollore Logistics Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd is the Pakistan subsidiary of Bolloré Logistics, a major global freight‑forwarder and integrated logistics provider. In Pakistan it offers international freight forwarding (ocean, air, road), customs clearance, warehousing/contract logistics, project cargo handling, and end‑to‑end supply‑chain services for exporters and importers. As part of the Bolloré network it serves exporters in textiles, food/agri (rice, mango), and industrial goods, acting as a local O/D agent for global liners and as a solutions provider for export documentation and cross‑border distribution. Public local scale data is limited, but its role is primarily as a national arm of a large global logistics group serving medium‑to‑large exporters through Karachi and Port Qasim operations. ## Pain Points 1) Clients facing volatile ocean schedules and higher freight/insurance costs due to the Red Sea security situation — Bollore struggles to offer commercial solutions that convert route disruption into retained export orders (time‑critical apparel and perishables are especially at risk). 2) Exporters (rice, basmati, mango, garment exporters) need faster buyer discovery, price intelligence and alternative markets because of sudden volume swings (e.g., sharp Q1 2026 basmati rebound) and margin pressure from freight inflation — Bollore lacks an owned digital channel to generate new export business for its logistics services. 3) Seasonal/reefer complexity for mango and chilled food exports requires quicker matching to buyers and coordinated sea‑air options; without a buyer‑sourcing channel Bollore loses opportunity to upsell end‑to‑end refrigeration and value‑added services. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] – Pakistan exports 2026: textiles, rice (incl. basmati), mangoes and impact on shipping volumes === **Overall export environment (FY2024–25 into FY2025–26)** - SBP data show Pakistan’s total merchandise exports grew from **US$30.7bn in FY24 to US$32.0bn in FY25 (+4.4%)**, driven mainly by textiles and some non‑textile manufactures. Textiles rose from **US$16.7bn to US$17.9bn (+7.4%)**, while non‑textile exports were broadly flat at **~US$14.0–14.2bn (+0.96%)**. Within food exports, **rice exports fell 14.7% YoY in value in FY25 (US$3.93bn → US$3.35bn)**. ([sbp.org.pk](https://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/aarFY25/Complete.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Provisional BoP data for **February 2026** show total exports at **US$2.48bn**, with **textiles and textile articles contributing US$1.36bn (~56% of exports)**. The note attributes part of the monthly export strength to “sustained international demand for Pakistani rice,” suggesting some recovery at the turn of 2025–26 despite earlier weakness. ([kse.com.pk](https://kse.com.pk/pakistan-records-2-5-billion-in-exports-for-february-2026/?utm_source=openai)) --- #### Textiles (2025–26 trend and implications for shipping) - Pakistan’s textile exports for **July–March FY2025–26 (9M FY26)** were **US$13.545bn, down 0.5% YoY**. March 2026 textile exports were **US$1.328bn, -7.1% YoY but +1.4% MoM versus February 2026**, indicating a softening trend into Q1 2026. ([textalks.com](https://textalks.com/pakistans-textile-exports-slip-in-9mfy26-as-garment-growth-fails/?utm_source=openai)) - Given that textiles historically represent **~55–60% of Pakistan’s export receipts** and are predominantly containerized, even a **0–1% contraction in value at broadly stable unit prices** implies **flat to slightly lower TEU volumes** through Karachi/Port Qasim for textile cargoes in early 2026 versus the prior year. Combined with rerouting around the Cape (see Dimension 3), overall **shipping days on the water per container are rising**, but Pakistan‑origin textile TEU counts appear roughly **flat to marginally negative YoY** in 9M FY26. - Within textiles, SBP’s FY25 breakdown shows: - **Apparel (knitwear + garments)**: **US$9.14bn in FY25, +14.7% YoY**. - **Home textiles (bedwear + towels)**: **US$4.20bn, +8.8% YoY**. - **Cotton yarn** exports dropped **28.7% YoY (US$956m → US$681m)** and raw cotton exports collapsed. ([sbp.org.pk](https://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/aarFY25/Complete.pdf?utm_source=openai)) This continuing shift from yarn/low‑value bulk to higher‑value finished textile exports **increases value/TEU** but can be **neutral or even negative for total weight shipped**, since more processing is done domestically before export. **Implications for 2026 logistics:** - Apparel and home textile share is rising within the textile basket; these move almost entirely in **40’ HC containers**, typically on **Far East–Europe and Far East–US East Coast strings** that are now being rerouted around the Cape (see Dimension 3). - The mix shift + soft aggregate value suggests **no structural collapse in Pakistan’s 2026 export shipping volumes**, but **exporters are facing higher ocean freight and longer transit**, not higher TEUs. --- #### Rice exports, with focus on basmati (2024/25 – early 2026) **Macro rice export performance:** - USDA FAS (Islamabad) estimates Pakistan’s **2024/25 rice exports at 5.2 million tons, ~20% lower YoY**. ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Update_Islamabad_Pakistan_PK2025-0020.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - SBP FY24→FY25 data show **rice export value falling 14.7% (US$3.93bn → US$3.35bn)**, with: - **Basmati**: **US$877m → US$831m (-5.3%)** - **Non‑basmati**: **US$3.06bn → US$2.52bn (-17.4%)** ([sbp.org.pk](https://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/aarFY25/Complete.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - PACRA’s October 2025 sector study notes that **non‑basmati average export prices fell ~13.7% YoY (US$583/MT → US$504/MT in FY25)**, signalling an environment of **price‑led pressure** even where volumes may have held up. ([pacra.com](https://www.pacra.com/view/storage/app/PACRA%20Research%20-%20Rice%20-%20Oct%2725_1762424542.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **FY2025–26 (H1 and early 2026):** - Pakistan Today/INP reports that in **H1 FY2025–26 (Jul–Dec 2025)**: - **Total rice exports value declined ~49.6% YoY to US$405m**, from ~US$805m in H1 FY25. - **Basmati shipments by value fell 53%**, and one variety (IRRI‑6) dropped 22%, as competition from India and price softness weighed on demand. ([profit.pakistantoday.com.pk](https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/01/27/pakistans-rice-exports-slump-nearly-50-in-h1-fy26-as-trade-deficit-widens-past-19-billion/?utm_source=openai)) - However, DAWN reporting for **Jan–Feb 2026** shows a sharp **rebound in basmati volumes**: - Pakistan exported **250,269 tonnes of basmati in Jul–Dec 2025**, - But **258,835 tonnes in just Jan–Feb 2026**, effectively **matching the prior six months’ tonnage in two months**. ([dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/1986688?utm_source=openai)) **Interpretation for shipping volumes:** - H1 FY26 saw a **collapse in rice export value (~‑50% YoY)** and significantly weaker volumes, likely translating into **substantially lower bulk and container shipments (for bagged rice) out of Karachi/Port Qasim in H2 2025**. - By early 2026, **basmati volumes rebounded sharply**, implying: - A **QoQ spike in rice‑related export tonnage and vessel loadings** in Q1 2026, especially on South Asia–Middle East and South Asia–EU lanes. - Given that basmati is higher value and often containerized (bags in boxes) especially for retail markets, **TEU counts for foodstuff exports likely rose meaningfully in Q1 2026 versus H2 2025**, even if average price/ton remained under pressure. --- #### Mango exports (2025 season and early signals for 2026) Recent trade and horticulture reports (late 2025/early 2026) indicate: - Pakistan typically ships **~100–125k tonnes of mangoes annually** in good seasons, heavily concentrated in **May–August** for sea shipments (primarily to the Middle East, EU and some Far East markets). - 2025 season commentary from provincial agriculture departments and exporters’ associations (cited in local press) pointed to: - **Weather‑induced yield variability** but relatively **stable export tonnage YoY**, - Continued reliance on **air freight for premium markets (GCC, UK)** and **reefer containers** for bulk shipments regionally. (Precise 2025/26 mango export volumes are not yet in consolidated PBS/UN Comtrade tables; most references are trade‑association estimates and should be treated as indicative rather than final.) **Implications for 2026 shipping:** - Mango exports are **strongly seasonal** and modest in total tonnage relative to rice or textiles, but high in **logistical complexity** (cold chain, time sensitivity). - Assuming similar crop and export targets for **summer 2026**, expect: - **Steady if not slightly higher reefer container demand** on Karachi–Jebel Ali/Dammam and Karachi–Europe lanes. - Potential **modal shifts toward sea‑air routings via Dubai** if Red Sea risks persist (see Dimension 3), allowing exporters to combine shorter sea legs with regional air distribution. --- #### Net impact on Pakistan’s 2026 export shipping volumes (textiles + rice + mangoes) Pulling the strands together: 1. **Textiles 9M FY26**: values are **broadly flat (‑0.5% YoY)** with a shift to higher value apparel/home textiles → **TEU volumes roughly flat** YoY, but more exposure to long‑haul Asia–Europe and Asia–USEC lanes subject to Red Sea disruptions. ([textalks.com](https://textalks.com/pakistans-textile-exports-slip-in-9mfy26-as-garment-growth-fails/?utm_source=openai)) 2. **Rice**: a **sharp decline in FY25 and H1 FY26**, then a **Q1 2026 rebound in basmati tonnage**: - 2024/25 exports at **5.2m tons (‑20% YoY)** and **FY25 export value ‑15%** → **lower bulk/box volumes in late 2024 and most of 2025**. ([apps.fas.usda.gov](https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Update_Islamabad_Pakistan_PK2025-0020.pdf&utm_source=openai)) - But **Jan–Feb 2026 basmati tonnage equals prior 6 months** → **step‑up in early‑2026 rice shipping volumes**, partly offsetting earlier declines. ([dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/1986688?utm_source=openai)) 3. **Mangoes**: expect **broadly stable seasonal reefer volumes** into mid‑2026, with routing and modality sensitive to the Red Sea/security situation and UAE hub options. In aggregate, the data point to **no structural collapse in Pakistan’s 2026 export shipping volumes**, but a **rebalanced and more volatile mix**: - **Textiles**: value‑dense, route‑risk‑exposed. - **Rice**: recovering tonnage from a low base, sensitive to prices and competitor (India) policy. - **Horticulture (mangoes)**: niche but logistics‑intensive, potentially experimenting with **alternative routings via Gulf hubs**. **Sources (Dimension 1):** ([sbp.org.pk](https://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/aarFY25/Complete.pdf?utm_source=openai)) --- === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] – Karachi Port & Gwadar throughput; UAE/Dubai transshipment trends (2025–2026) === *(Note: Official, disaggregated 2025–26 TEU statistics for Karachi and Gwadar are not yet fully published; most current insight comes from operator statements, business press, and UAE port releases.)* #### Karachi Port and regional container flows - Karachi Port Trust and associated terminals (KPT berths + Karachi Gateway Terminal, SAPT) jointly handle the bulk of Pakistan’s containerized trade. Public summaries still cite **baseline throughput in the 2–3+ million TEU range annually**, but **2025–26 figures are not yet formally updated** in public KPT statistics. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karachi_Port_Trust?utm_source=openai)) - During 2024–25, multiple global carriers diverted Asia–Europe strings around the Cape, re‑timing but **not eliminating Pakistan port calls**. Pakistani export volumes (see Dimension 1) stayed relatively stable in textiles and were volatile in rice; this implies **Karachi’s 2025–26 TEU volumes are being driven more by Pakistan’s own trade flows than by transshipment**. - The stronger **Q1 2026 basmati export tonnage** (equal to the entire Jul–Dec 2025 tonnage) implies: - A **notable short‑term uplift in container demand for bagged rice exports** from Karachi/Port Qasim in early 2026, especially on services to **Jebel Ali, Salalah, Port Said and EU**. ([dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/1986688?utm_source=openai)) Given the lack of fresh KPT TEU statistics, the best inference from export data is that **Karachi’s outbound laden TEUs in early 2026 are modestly higher than H2 2025**, led by basmati and steady textiles, but total port throughput (laden + empty, import + export) remains constrained by Pakistan’s weak import demand and currency/FX conditions. --- #### Gwadar Port (2025–2026 status) - Public sources still characterize **Gwadar as under‑utilized**, with activity dominated by **bulk commodities, limited container movements, and project cargo** under CPEC rather than regular, high‑frequency container line calls. - No reliable public data for 2025–26 show a step‑change in **container throughput**; rather, reports continue to describe **logistical bottlenecks, hinterland connectivity issues, and competition from established ports (Karachi, Port Qasim)**. Inference: For 2025–26, **Gwadar contributes negligible container throughput compared to Karachi and Port Qasim**, and **does not yet register as a major demand signal for global liner networks**. --- #### UAE/Dubai transshipment and hub dynamics (Jebel Ali, Khalifa, AD Ports) - **AD Ports Group** (Abu Dhabi) reported that **total container throughput rose 23% YoY in 2025 to 7.7m TEU**, with **CMA Terminals Khalifa Port** alone handling **>1.3m TEU in its first full commercial year (2025), at 74% utilization**. ([porttechnology.org](https://www.porttechnology.org/news/ad-ports-container-throughput-rises-23-per-cent-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - **Jebel Ali Port (DP World)** announced **record container throughput in 2025**, reinforcing Dubai’s role as a **regional transshipment and distribution hub**. While the article headline highlights a record, absolute TEU not given there can be cross‑checked against Jebel Ali’s previously reported **~13.7m TEU in 2021 (+1.9% YoY)**, suggesting that **by 2025 Jebel Ali is above that level**. ([ports.marinelink.com](https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/tacoma/news/jebel-ali-port-achieves-record-2025-container-throughput-boosts-automation-investment?utm_source=openai)) - Shipping and logistics commentary around the Red Sea crisis consistently identify **Jebel Ali and other UAE ports as key pivot points** for: - **Sea‑air routings** (Asia → Jebel Ali by sea; Jebel Ali → Europe/Africa by air). - **Transshipment for services avoiding Suez**, where carriers restructure rotations and hub‑and‑spoke patterns. **Link back to Pakistan:** - Pakistan’s main export lanes (textiles, rice) heavily utilize **UAE hubs for both direct delivery to GCC and transshipment onward to Europe, Africa, and the Americas**. - With **AD Ports and Jebel Ali both growing TEUs solidly in 2025**, while Pakistan’s own export volumes are flat‑to‑volatile, the **incremental demand signal is that more Asia–Europe and intra‑Gulf flows are being consolidated via the UAE**: - For Pakistani shippers, this likely manifests as **stable to slightly rising Feeder/relay volumes between Karachi and UAE ports**, especially for: - **Textile cargoes** bound for Europe/US via mainline vessels calling at Jebel Ali/Khalifa. - **Rice and foodstuffs** destined for GCC, North Africa and beyond. - Given the **under‑utilization of Gwadar** and the **capacity expansion at UAE hubs**, the regional network is clearly **tilting further toward UAE as the dominant transshipment hub**, while Pakistani ports remain primarily **origin/destination (O/D) ports** rather than large‑scale transshipment centers. **Sources (Dimension 2):** ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karachi_Port_Trust?utm_source=openai)) --- === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] – Red Sea security 2026; Houthi attacks, rerouting, and effects on Pakistan routes & freight rates === #### 2026 security picture and continuity of Houthi risk - Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden began in **late 2023** and have persisted, with **peaks and lulls**, into **2026**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai)) - Key recent developments: - **Maersk resumed some Red Sea transits in January 2026**, after a period of full avoidance, following “successive successful trans‑Suez crossings” – a sign of **partial normalization**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai)) - However, in **February–March 2026**, in the context of the **2026 Iran war**, the Houthis threatened to **escalate attacks and potentially close Bab el‑Mandeb again**, causing renewed uncertainty. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) - S&P Global (Feb/March 2026) notes that major carriers (e.g., **CMA CGM**) are still **prepared to revert to Cape of Good Hope routings** for Asia–Europe services due to the “complex and uncertain international context,” even after some traffic briefly returned via Suez. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/red-sea-shipping-reopens?utm_source=openai)) - A January 2026 research note on the Red Sea crisis estimates that: - **Container ship traffic through Suez fell by ~90% in 2024** compared with pre‑crisis levels, as carriers rerouted around the Cape. ([bcm.nacm.org](https://bcm.nacm.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Houthi-attacks-in-the-Red-Sea-why-maritime-trade-is-still-not-smooth-sailing.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Overall framing: **As of early–mid 2026, the Red Sea route is open but strategically fragile**; carriers dynamically toggle between Suez and Cape routings, heavily influenced by risk assessments and insurance conditions rather than purely by cost. --- #### Freight rate and transit‑time impacts - With most Asia–Europe container traffic avoiding Suez for long stretches: - Voyages via the **Cape of Good Hope** increase transit times by **10–14 days** on typical Asia–Europe rotations, depending on service speed. Industry and consulting analyses (e.g., BCG’s scenarios paper) show that, even when some capacity is added (speed increases, additional ships), **effective supply (TEU‑miles/week) drops**, putting **upward pressure on freight rates**. ([media-publications.bcg.com](https://media-publications.bcg.com/Scenarios-for-Container-Shipping-in-the-Red-Sea-Crisis.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - A logistics advisory published in early 2026 characterizes the **impact on freight rates** as: - **Elevated but below pandemic peaks** – rate multipliers on key FE–EU trades remain **above pre‑crisis baselines**, but not at 2021–22 extremes. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - Insurers often **refuse to cover standard policies through the Red Sea at normal premiums**, forcing either **war‑risk surcharges** or **rerouting**, both of which raise total delivered cost. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - The January 2026 economic analysis of the Red Sea attacks points to a **1.3% decline in global trade between November–December 2023** attributable to the initial shock, and stresses that **higher freight costs and delays have become a semi‑permanent feature** so long as the security situation remains unstable. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis?utm_source=openai)) --- #### Specific implications for Pakistan’s shipping routes **1. Route choices and service patterns** For Pakistan–Europe and Pakistan–US East Coast trades: - Pre‑crisis, most mainline services from **Karachi/Port Qasim** to **Europe and US East Coast** transited **Arabian Sea → Gulf of Aden → Red Sea → Suez Canal**. - Since late 2023 and continuing well into 2025, **major carriers have systematically re‑routed via the Cape** for Asia–Europe trade lanes, which include **Pakistan calls as part of South Asia strings**. ([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/03/middle-east-war-impacts-container-shipping?utm_source=openai)) For Pakistan exporters, this implies: - **Longer transit times**: - To **Northern Europe**: typically **+10–14 days vs pre‑crisis schedules**. - To **East Mediterranean**: similar or slightly shorter additional days, depending on rotation. - **Greater schedule unreliability**: carriers “flip” between Suez and Cape depending on security windows and insurance cover, complicating Pakistani exporters’ lead‑time planning. **2. Freight rates for Pakistan cargo** Although there are no Pakistan‑specific spot rate indices published in the cited sources, the following broad effects are relevant: - Pakistan’s **textile and rice exports** to Europe/US are largely carried on the same South Asia–Europe strings as Indian and Bangladeshi cargo, meaning: - **Freight rate surcharges and GRIs applied to the broader FE–EU corridor also hit Pakistan**. - Advisories describe rate uplifts of **2–3x above pre‑crisis lows** for some Asia–Europe lanes in late 2024–early 2025, softening somewhat but **still structurally higher in early 2026** compared with 2019 benchmarks. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - For lower‑margin commodities (e.g., **non‑basmati rice, bulk grains**), this freight inflation: - **Erodes price competitiveness** versus nearer suppliers (e.g., Eastern Europe, Egypt for some markets). - Helps explain why **Pakistan’s rice export value fell 14.7% in FY25 and nearly 50% in H1 FY26**, alongside competition and price declines (see Dimension 1). Transport cost inflation is one structural headwind in this mix. ([sbp.org.pk](https://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/aarFY25/Complete.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **3. Modal and routing adaptations involving UAE** - Advisory notes on the Red Sea crisis recommend **sea‑air or air‑air alternatives via Dubai and other Gulf hubs** for: - **Time‑critical + high‑value goods** (e.g., some apparel, medical, electronics). Suggested strategies include **switching to air freight or sea‑air via Dubai**, accepting **3–6x ocean rate but reducing transit by 25–35 days** vs long Cape routing. ([suaidglobal.com](https://suaidglobal.com/insights/red-sea-shipping-crisis-2026/?utm_source=openai)) - For Pakistani exporters, particularly in: - **High‑value textiles** (fast‑fashion, replenishment orders), - **Perishables (mangoes, some chilled meat)**, there is a **clear incentive to route via UAE (Jebel Ali, Dubai World Central, Abu Dhabi)** to blend sea and air legs, rather than rely only on long ocean routes via Cape. - This amplifies the **role of UAE ports as Pakistan’s safety valve** during Red Sea disruptions: - **Feeder legs Karachi ↔ Jebel Ali/Khalifa** remain relatively short and outside the Red Sea risk zone. - From the UAE hub, cargo can take **multiple onward options**: Red Sea (when safe), Cape via mainline vessels, or airfreight. **4. Strategic and policy framing for Pakistan** - The **State Bank and trade authorities’ recent analyses** emphasize that: - Export growth is already constrained by **structural supply‑side issues** (energy costs, productivity, limited product diversification). - The **Red Sea/Cape routing shock adds an external, cost‑push constraint**, especially severe for **bulkier, lower‑margin goods** like non‑basmati rice or bulk textiles. ([sbp.org.pk](https://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/aarFY25/Complete.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For Pakistan’s exporters and policymakers, the Red Sea situation frames several strategic questions: 1. **Cost pass‑through vs margin compression:** How much of Cape‑driven freight hikes can Pakistani exporters pass on to buyers in Europe/MENA before losing orders to competitors (India, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey)? 2. **Product mix:** Does persistent high freight accelerate the existing **shift from bulk commodities to value‑dense goods** (apparel, processed foods, branded rice) to maximize value per TEU? 3. **Port and corridor strategy:** With **Gwadar still under‑utilized** and no viable alternate ocean corridor that avoids both Red Sea and Cape, policy attention may pivot to: - **Rail/road + Gulf hub combinations**, - Further integration with **UAE logistics ecosystems**, and - **Domestic efficiency improvements** at Karachi/Port Qasim to offset external freight inflation through lower origin‑side costs and dwell times. In summary: - **Security risk in the Red Sea remains elevated in 2026**, making **Suez transits unpredictable**. - For Pakistan, this translates directly into **higher freight rates, longer lead times, and route uncertainty** on its key textile and rice export corridors. - Exporters are increasingly **leaning on UAE hubs and multimodal options** while gradually re‑balancing toward **higher‑value, value‑dense exports** that can better absorb elevated logistics costs. **Sources (Dimension 3):** ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_commercial_vessels?utm_source=openai))