## Company Profile Polish Freight Forwarding Association (PISIL / national freight forwarders’ association) — a national trade body representing Poland’s freight forwarders, logistics providers and related service firms. Acts as an industry forum and advocacy group (policy engagement on Mobility Package, cabotage, customs), provides training, standards/guidance and member networking. Position: national convenor for forwarders and 3PLs operating on Poland’s key east–west corridors and ports (Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin); membership skewed to SMEs and medium‑sized hauliers/forwarders that handle road, rail and multimodal flows into/out of Poland. Scale: national footprint; influence with port authorities and policymakers; likely membership in the low hundreds to several hundred firms (typical for national forwarding associations). ## Pain Points 1) Members’ shippers (grain, rapeseed, agri‑processors) are facing continued port demand, corridor unpredictability and storage pressure from high Solidarity Lanes volumes — they need faster buyer matches and route/port alternatives to avoid costly demurrage and storage. 2) Structural driver shortages, Mobility Package compliance and volatile spot prices force members to sell value‑added services rather than compete only on transport price; they need managed trade channels that convert forwarding work into bundled trade facilitation (buyer matchmaking + execution). 3) SME forwarders and their exporter/importer clients lack digital market access and verified buyer/supplier discovery for new markets created by nearshoring; they need an easy, reliable channel to onboard exporters/importers and win export contracts without building full in‑house sourcing teams. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === 1. [MARKET EVENTS] Poland freight forwarding market 2026 – trends, capacity, rates, driver shortage, cabotage === **Market size, growth and capacity** - Poland remains one of the EU’s largest road freight markets, accounting for around **20% of all EU road freight movements** by tonne‑km according to Eurostat‑based industry summaries.([dkv-mobility.com](https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai)) - A 2025–26 outlook for Poland’s road‑freight notes that **traffic on key corridors (A2, A4, S8)** in 2026 shows **“stable capacity utilization”**, with **shorter lead times on regional LTL lanes** and **steady industrial FTL volumes**, indicating that the extreme tightness of 2021–22 has eased.([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) **Freight rates (direction of travel into 2026)** - The same 2026 Poland road‑freight outlook reports **“flattened spot rates compared with 2025”** on long‑haul full‑truckload shipments, suggesting rate stabilization after previous volatility.([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) - At a broader level, S&P Global’s 2026 container freight outlook projects that global container rates are likely to **soften in 2026** as vessel capacity expands and world trade growth slows to about **1.7%**, although disruption scenarios (e.g., Suez) could keep some lanes tight.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai)) - For Polish shippers using deep‑sea plus road, this implies **moderate downside for ocean‑leg costs** in 2026 with **road‑leg prices broadly stable**, unless capacity is disrupted by new regulatory or labour shocks. **Driver shortage & labour market** - A July 2025 assessment of Poland’s transport market, based on a late‑2024 survey of >500 fleet operators, estimated a **driver shortfall of ~200,000 drivers** in Poland, calling it a “severe driver shortage.”([dkv-mobility.com](https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai)) - Academic and policy work on the European road market confirms that **driver shortages are one of the factors behind elevated transport prices** and that Poland is among the countries most affected.([logistics-and-transport.eu](https://www.logistics-and-transport.eu/images/2026-01-27/L%26T_3-4_63-64_2024_7.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Despite some cooling in volumes, this structural shortage is **expected to persist into 2026**, especially for international long‑haul and specialized (ADR, reefer) segments, sustaining a **floor under road freight rates** even as fuel and toll components may fluctuate. **Cabotage, EU Mobility Package and competitiveness** - A comprehensive 2024/25 report on Polish road transport for the Transport and Logistics Employers’ Association (TLP) shows that: - Polish carriers **remain dominant in EU cabotage**, especially in Germany. - However, **cabotage volumes have declined** versus earlier peaks, which the report links explicitly to **Mobility Package I** (tighter rules on cabotage cycles, mandatory “cooling‑off” periods, and posting‑of‑workers rules increasing labour costs).([tlp.org.pl](https://tlp.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/raport-transport-drogowy-w-polsce-2024_2025-w-jezyku-angielskim.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - A 2024–published analytical study for DG MOVE on the **European road freight market and Mobility Package I** notes: - **Strong growth in international transport historically driven by Poland, Romania and Baltic carriers**, particularly in cabotage. - Mobility Package I aims to make the sector fairer through updated rules on cabotage and driver posting; it **raises operating costs** for these high‑cabotage countries and **reduces the intensity of cabotage activity**.([tmleuven.be](https://www.tmleuven.be/en/project/The-European-road-freight-market-and-the-implementation-of-Mobility-Package-I?utm_source=openai)) - A January 2025 logistics research article confirms that in EU cabotage **Poland still accounts for roughly 45% of cabotage transport**, but the environment has become more regulated and cost‑intensive, pressuring smaller Polish hauliers and reinforcing consolidation trends.([logistics-and-transport.eu](https://www.logistics-and-transport.eu/images/2026-01-27/L%26T_3-4_63-64_2024_7.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Key qualitative trends relevant to freight forwarders in 2026** - **Rate environment:** - Stabilized/flat FTL road rates vs. 2025 in Poland.([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) - Global ocean rates biased lower but volatile; risk premium on disrupted corridors (e.g., Red Sea) can still spill into Poland’s inbound/outbound maritime flows.([spglobal.com](https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai)) - **Capacity & service levels:** - Stable to slightly improved **domestic and regional capacity**; some easing of congestion on main corridors and better pick‑up/delivery reliability for LTL.([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) - **Cost drivers & constraints:** - Persistent **driver shortage (~200k gap)**, wage inflation and Mobility Package compliance costs remain key constraints.([dkv-mobility.com](https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai)) - **Market structure:** - Continued **consolidation among small/medium Polish hauliers**, more use of digital freight platforms, and a shift toward **e‑commerce and last‑mile‑oriented capacity** alongside traditional industrial freight.([gettransport.com](https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai)) === 2. [DEMAND SIGNALS] Poland agricultural exports – grain & rapeseed, ports of Gdańsk & Szczecin, demand trends into 2026 === **Overall seaport throughput and agri‑share** - Polish ports hit a **record 141 million tonnes of total cargo throughput in 2025**, up **20% in container volumes vs. 2024**, according to a January 31, 2026 Baltic Sea & Space Cluster report. Investments of around **PLN 2 billion** in 2025 (state, EU, private) were directed to Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin and Świnoujście.([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) - An Actia Forum report on Polish seaports in 2024 (published 2025) notes: - **Grain handling in 2024 declined from the record levels of 2023**, though volumes remained historically high. - Total agricultural product throughput at Polish ports in 2024 is still large (exact tonne figure is partially truncated in the accessible excerpt, but the report emphasizes that 2023 was an exceptional high due to re‑exports/transit of Ukrainian grain).([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Port of Gdańsk – role in grain & oilseeds** - In 1H 2025, the Port of Gdańsk handled **38.25 million tonnes total cargo**, up **0.36% y/y**, remaining Poland’s largest port.([trade.gov.pl](https://www.trade.gov.pl/en/news/polish-seaports-in-the-first-half-of-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Earlier Trade.gov.pl statistics show that in **2023** Gdańsk’s grain handling surged, with national grain throughput up **42.7% to 6.7 million tonnes** at the main seaports vs. 4.7 million tonnes in 2022, driven largely by exports and transit of grain (including Ukrainian).([trade.gov.pl](https://www.trade.gov.pl/en/news/a-record-breaking-year-for-polish-seaports/?utm_source=openai)) - The Actia Forum 2024 port report indicates that **2024 grain exports via Gdańsk decreased from the 2023 spike**, but remained **elevated relative to pre‑war norms**, consistent with ongoing rerouting of Ukrainian grain and strong demand from MENA and EU destinations.([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Szczecin–Świnoujście complex – grain and container dynamics** - The 2026 BSSC article notes that **DB Port Szczecin’s container terminal throughput increased 25% in 2025**, exceeding **100,000 TEU** for the first time.([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) - For **agricultural products**, the Actia Forum 2024 seaport report highlights that Szczecin–Świnoujście saw **only a slight increase in agri throughput (+0.03%, +4,000 tonnes)** in 2024 versus 2023, in contrast with declines at Gdynia linked to grain.([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - The same report suggests a **rebalancing of grain flows** among ports as infrastructure and terminal capacity are upgraded, indicating additional potential for **west‑facing export routes via Szczecin–Świnoujście** (towards Germany/Benelux/UK). **Grain and rapeseed export demand signals (2024–2026)** - EU‑Ukraine **Solidarity Lanes** data from the European Commission show that by **December 2024, 3.9 million tonnes of grain, oilseeds and related products** were exported via these alternative corridors in that single month, a large share of which moved through **Poland’s rail and road corridors to ports**.([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)) - Polish farmers’ protests in 2024 were triggered partly by the fact that **Ukrainian grain and other agri‑foods, intended to transit through ‘solidarity corridors’, accumulated in the Polish market**, depressing local prices and crowding storage and logistics capacity.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Polish_farmers%27_protests?utm_source=openai)) - As a consequence, from 2024 into 2025: - Poland tightened **controls and corridor management**, seeking to ensure more true **transit** to seaports and onward export. - This pushed a **larger share of Ukrainian grain and oilseeds into port flows**, especially via Gdańsk and (to a lesser degree) Gdynia and Szczecin–Świnoujście, even as direct Polish grain export volumes normalized from the 2023 high.([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For **rapeseed and oilseeds**, while port‑specific tonnages are less visible in the short public excerpts, the inclusion of **“oilseeds and related products”** in the Commission’s 3.9 Mt December 2024 Solidarity Lanes figure underscores ongoing **high corridor demand for oilseed logistics capacity**, with Poland a primary overland and maritime outlet.([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)) **Forward‑looking demand implications for 2026** - With **record overall port throughput in 2025 (141 Mt)** and continuing EU support for Solidarity Lanes, 2026 demand for: - **Bulk grain and oilseed export slots** at Gdańsk and other ports, and - **Rail/road feeder capacity** from the Polish‑Ukrainian border to ports is expected to **remain structurally strong**, even if the mix between Polish‑origin and Ukrainian‑origin cargo shifts.([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) - The Actia Forum 2024 port report stresses that despite a fall from 2023 peaks, grain volumes in 2024 stayed at **“high levels”** and emphasizes **continued investment in agri‑bulk terminals**, suggesting the market is planning for **sustained high export and transit flows** rather than a reversion to pre‑2022 volumes.([actiaforum.pl](https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Key demand signals for freight & forwarding firms** - **High and steady utilisation of bulk and general cargo capacity** at Gdańsk, with priority competition between grain/oilseeds, coal, and other bulk trades.([trade.gov.pl](https://www.trade.gov.pl/en/news/polish-seaports-in-the-first-half-of-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - **Incremental growth at Szczecin–Świnoujście**, especially in containers, opening additional options for containerized grain, feed, and processed agri‑food exports.([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) - **Persistent demand for inland logistics (road/rail) from border silos to ports**, shaped by policy changes around Ukrainian transit and by any future CAP/Green Deal adjustments affecting Polish grain and rapeseed output and export incentives.([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)) === 3. [PROBLEM FRAMING] Impact of EU–Ukraine trade shifts and nearshoring on Polish logistics corridors (2026) === **EU–Ukraine trade shifts & Solidarity Lanes – structural effects** - The EU‑Ukraine **Solidarity Lanes** (launched May 2022) created new rail, road and inland waterway corridors across Poland, Romania and other neighbours to keep Ukraine’s exports (especially agri‑goods) flowing during Black Sea disruption.([op.europa.eu](https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1633dd26-8821-11ee-99ba-01aa75ed71a1/language-en?utm_source=openai)) - By **December 2024**, the Solidarity Lanes were moving **3.9 million tonnes of grain, oilseeds and related products per month**, highlighting a **structurally high dependence on land corridors**, many of which run through Poland to Baltic and North Sea ports.([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)) - A January 2025 answer from the European Commission to the European Parliament underlines plans to **strengthen these lanes further**, including investments in cross‑border infrastructure, better customs coordination and integration of Ukraine into the EU transport system.([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qe/2025/000335/P10_RE%282025%29000335_EN.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Political and social backlash in Poland** - The **2024 Polish farmers’ protests** illustrate the domestic tensions created by these trade shifts: - The EU’s extension (January 2024) of **duty‑free access** for Ukrainian agricultural imports to 2025, combined with corridor mis‑management, led to large volumes of Ukrainian grain and processed foods remaining in Poland instead of transiting. - This **suppressed local prices** and fuelled perceptions of unfair competition, triggering blockades at borders and roads.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Polish_farmers%27_protests?utm_source=openai)) - For logistics, this translates into: - **Intermittent disruption and volatility** on key east–west road and rail corridors. - Political pressure to **re‑engineer flows** so that more cargo is genuine transit to ports rather than remaining in the Polish domestic market. **Nearshoring and CEE industrial/logistics repositioning** - A 2025 “CEE as nearshoring hub” paper highlights that: - Central and Eastern Europe is becoming a **key nearshoring destination** for European manufacturing and logistics, benefiting from relatively low labour costs, good connectivity and modern logistics infrastructure. - Poland is singled out as a main hub, with major planned infrastructure such as the **Central Communication Port (CPK) near Warsaw** and strengthened road infrastructure forming east–west and north–south axes.([ctp.eu](https://ctp.eu/files/2025/04/CEE-Paper-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Nearshoring is driving: - **Growth in regional distribution centres**, light manufacturing and value‑added logistics in Poland. - Increased **demand for high‑quality warehousing and multimodal hubs** along existing and emerging corridors that also serve Solidarity Lane flows. **How these forces reshape Polish logistics corridors (2026 framing)** 1. **Corridor congestion and prioritisation problems** - Solidarity Lane cargo (grain, oilseeds, metals, other Ukrainian exports) competes for rail paths, truck slots and port capacity with: - Polish export industries (automotive, furniture, agri‑food), and - New nearshored manufacturing flows (inbound components and outbound finished goods).([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)) - Result: **bottlenecks at border crossings and on east–west corridors**, leading to variable lead times and higher buffer‑stock requirements for industrial shippers. 2. **Shift in role of Polish corridors from simple transit to multi‑functional hubs** - Poland is evolving from a **through‑corridor** for east–west flows into a **multi‑node hub**: - Transit node for Ukrainian bulk (to ports). - Production and distribution base for nearshored manufacturing and e‑commerce.([ctp.eu](https://ctp.eu/files/2025/04/CEE-Paper-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - This increases demand for **integrated forwarding solutions** that combine bulk, container, and project cargo with contract logistics. 3. **Regulatory and policy uncertainty as a structural risk factor** - Ongoing EU discussions on the extension/modification of **duty‑free access and safeguard clauses for Ukrainian agri‑products**, plus CAP/Green Deal reforms, mean that the **volume and product mix** of Ukraine‑related flows through Poland may shift quickly.([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Polish_farmers%27_protests?utm_source=openai)) - Combined with **Mobility Package I** impacts on Polish carriers’ cost base and cabotage operations, this creates **margin pressure and planning risk** for forwarders relying heavily on east–west trucking.([tmleuven.be](https://www.tmleuven.be/en/project/The-European-road-freight-market-and-the-implementation-of-Mobility-Package-I?utm_source=openai)) 4. **Infrastructure investment and corridor upgrading as a mitigation path** - Record port throughput in 2025 and billions of PLN in port investments signal a **policy choice to anchor Poland as a long‑term logistics gateway**, accommodating both Ukrainian transit and Polish/CEE exports.([bssc.pl](https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai)) - EU‑level plans (TEN‑T extensions, potential Baltic–Black Sea–Aegean corridor eastern branch via Poland–Ukraine–Romania) would further **institutionalise these east–south and east–west axes**, locking in long‑term Solidarity‑Lane‑type traffic beyond the immediate war horizon.([eesc.europa.eu](https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes?utm_source=openai)) **Implications for 2026‑oriented strategy and problem framing** - **Capacity management problem:** balancing corridor capacity between volatile Ukrainian transit flows and stable or growing nearshored manufacturing flows, particularly for: - Rail paths on east–west lines, - Bulk and container berths at Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin–Świnoujście, and - Cross‑dock and storage capacity near border crossings and ports.([transport.ec.europa.eu](https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)) - **Price and service‑level uncertainty:** driver shortages, Mobility Package costs, and political protest risk mean **spot transport prices and reliability on Poland–Ukraine corridors can diverge sharply** from “normal” EU lanes, requiring differentiated contract structures and risk premiums.([dkv-mobility.com](https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai)) - **Opportunity framing:** - Firms that can **orchestrate multimodal solutions** (rail‑road‑sea) and offer **buffer storage, blending, cleaning and value‑added services** for grain and oilseeds at Polish hubs are well‑positioned. - Nearshoring reinforces Poland’s role as a **regional consolidation and distribution centre** for both industrial goods and agri‑food, favouring forwarders and 3PLs with strong Polish asset bases and EU‑wide networks.([ctp.eu](https://ctp.eu/files/2025/04/CEE-Paper-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Sources: • Poland's transport market: trends, figures, challenges https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai • Poland Road Freight Outlook 2026 https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai • Poland Road Freight Outlook 2026 https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai • 2026 Ocean Freight Outlook: Softer Rates Ahead, but Volatility Isn’t Going Anywhere | S&P Global https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/02/2026-ocean-freight-outlook-softer-rates-ahead-but-volatility-is-not-going-anywhere?utm_source=openai • Poland's transport market: trends, figures, challenges https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai • Poland Road Freight Outlook 2026 https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai • Poland's transport market: trends, figures, challenges https://www.dkv-mobility.com/int/en/newsroom/poland%27s-transport-market-trends-figures-challenges.html?utm_source=openai • Poland Road Freight Outlook 2026 https://gettransport.com/it/articles/poland-road-freight-forecast-2026?utm_source=openai • Polish Ports – Record transshipment of 141 million tonnes. 20 percent more containers than in 2024. – BSSC.PL https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai • Report Polish seaports in 2024. Summary and future https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai • Polish seaports in the first half of 2025 - Trade.gov.pl https://www.trade.gov.pl/en/news/polish-seaports-in-the-first-half-of-2025/?utm_source=openai • A record-breaking year for Polish seaports - Trade.gov.pl https://www.trade.gov.pl/en/news/a-record-breaking-year-for-polish-seaports/?utm_source=openai • Report Polish seaports in 2024. Summary and future https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai • Polish Ports – Record transshipment of 141 million tonnes. 20 percent more containers than in 2024. – BSSC.PL https://www.bssc.pl/2026/01/31/record-transshipment-of-141/?utm_source=openai • Report Polish seaports in 2024. Summary and future https://actiaforum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PolskiePorty_2024-en-07022024.pdf?utm_source=openai • Solidarity Lanes: Latest figures – December 2024 - Mobility and Transport https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/solidarity-lanes-latest-figures-december-2024-2025-01-21_sk?utm_source=openai)