## Company Profile COMPACT LOGISTCS (Compact Logistics) — Egypt-based freight forwarder (website: http://www.compactlogisticseg.com). Likely offers international freight forwarding, customs clearance, local trucking/warehousing and door‑to‑door services for exporters and importers out of Alexandria/Port Said area. Small–to–mid sized forwarding house serving agri exporters (reefer/container shipments) and general cargo to Europe, GCC and regional markets. Public contact: Amany <amany@compactlogisticseg.com>. ## Pain Points 1) Margin pressure and scheduling risk for agri exporters due to Red Sea/Suez security, elevated war‑risk insurance and longer reroute times — exporters need buyer commitments and logistics orchestration to avoid cancellations and margin erosion. 2) SME exporters scaling rapidly (citrus, potatoes, onions) lack reliable buyer networks, pack‑house/cold‑chain coordination, and export documentation support — they need a turnkey channel that closes buyers and syncs logistics. 3) Port/service volatility between Port Said (SCCT) and Alexandria plus changing liner rotations creates uncertainty about which port/service will take reefers and when — forwarders must manage shifting feeder/rotation plans and real‑time rerouting for perishable cargo. ## Intel Summary === MULTI-DIMENSION RESEARCH === === COMMODITY TRENDS === (Egypt agricultural exports – citrus, potatoes, onions, fruits; export volumes & destinations) **1. Overall export scale and growth** - Egypt’s agricultural exports reached **about 9.2–9.5 million tons in 2025**, up roughly **10–12% vs. 2024** (8.6 million tons). Value is reported at **about USD 11–11.5 billion** for 2025. ([sis.gov.eg](https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/news/egypt-s-farm-exports-hit-record-115-bln-in-2025-volumes-up-to-95-mln-tons/?utm_source=openai)) - By late May 2025, cumulative exports were **4.8–5.2 million tons**, implying a strong Q3–Q4 shipping season. ([sis.gov.eg](https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/news/egypts-agricultural-exports-rise-to-48-mln-tons-driven-by-citrus-and-potatoes/?utm_source=openai)) - In 2024, Egypt’s agri‑exports surpassed **8.6 million tons** (value about **USD 10.6 billion**) – a record at the time and a 17% YoY increase in value vs. 2023. ([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/speaker-product-news-reports/KJLyFXpzJzgKuB1Gqsm5QUKHGgR43AVdqL9pBNYa4nMbfgzXXnVMBbe7?utm_source=openai)) **2. Commodity breakdown – citrus, potatoes, onions, other fruits** Latest detailed 2024–2025 numbers from Ministry‑linked statements and recent analytical reports: - **Citrus (mainly oranges)** - 2024: about **2.39 million tons** of citrus exported, making citrus ~**28% of total agricultural export volume** (2.39 / 8.6 Mt). ([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/speaker-product-news-reports/KJLyFXpzJzgKuB1Gqsm5QUKHGgR43AVdqL9pBNYa4nMbfgzXXnVMBbe7?utm_source=openai)) - 2025: multiple sources report **~2.0–2.1 million tons** of citrus exports (slight variation by cut‑off date), confirming citrus as **#1 export crop by volume**. A consulting report lists **1.26 million tons of oranges alone** among top agri‑exports in 2025. ([egypt-business.com](https://www.egypt-business.com/web/details/2601-egypts-agricultural-exports-surpass-9-million-tons-in-2025/438583?utm_source=openai)) - Egypt is repeatedly cited as the **world’s largest orange exporter**, maintaining that position for at least **six consecutive years up to 2025**. ([sis.gov.eg](https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/news/egypt-s-farm-exports-hit-record-115-bln-in-2025-volumes-up-to-95-mln-tons/?utm_source=openai)) - **Potatoes** - 2024: **977,233 tons** of fresh potatoes exported, ranking second after citrus. ([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/speaker-product-news-reports/KJLyFXpzJzgKuB1Gqsm5QUKHGgR43AVdqL9pBNYa4nMbfgzXXnVMBbe7?utm_source=openai)) - Jan–Aug 2024 partial data already show **~957,000 tons** shipped, concentrated in early‑season exports. ([egypttoday.com](https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/134222/Egypt-s-agriculture-exports-surpasses-5-6M-tons-in-2024?utm_source=openai)) - 2025: reported totals around **1.3–1.4 million tons**, up roughly **35–45% vs. 2024**, consolidating potatoes as **#2 export crop** by volume. ([egypt-business.com](https://www.egypt-business.com/web/details/2601-egypts-agricultural-exports-surpass-9-million-tons-in-2025/438583?utm_source=openai)) - **Onions** - 2024: **321,001 tons** of onions exported, more than **+35% vs. 2023** (inferred from total growth). Onions ranked third after citrus and potatoes. ([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/speaker-product-news-reports/KJLyFXpzJzgKuB1Gqsm5QUKHGgR43AVdqL9pBNYa4nMbfgzXXnVMBbe7?utm_source=openai)) - Onions are consistently listed among top export vegetables alongside potatoes; the March 2026 New Zealand MFAT report on Egypt’s agri‑exports explicitly highlights **dried onions** as one of Egypt’s key vegetable exports. ([mfat.govt.nz](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/Egypt-Agri-Tech-Landscape-and-Opportunities-March-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Other fruits and vegetables** - 2024: Grapes **164,000+ tons**, beans **~156,000 tons**, plus strong volumes of strawberries, pomegranates, tomatoes, garlic, sweet potatoes, guavas, etc. ([egypttoday.com](https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/134222/Egypt-s-agriculture-exports-surpasses-5-6M-tons-in-2024?utm_source=openai)) - A 2025 export‑ranking table gives rough 2025 quantities (in 000 tons) for major produce: **potatoes ~1,308; oranges ~1,262; strawberries ~319; common beans ~115; sugar 173**, etc., confirming diversified fruit/veg export base. ([spe-cg.com](https://spe-cg.com/spe-cg-new/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Agriculture-Insights-Report-Study-17-9-2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **3. Key markets and destination shifts (2024–2026)** Recent 2025–2026 government and partner‑country reporting shows: - **Europe (EU + UK)** - Remains a primary destination for **citrus, potatoes, onions, grapes, strawberries**. The MFAT March 2026 agri‑tech market report notes that **EU markets, Russia, and Gulf states** are priority buyers for Egyptian fruits and potatoes. ([mfat.govt.nz](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/Egypt-Agri-Tech-Landscape-and-Opportunities-March-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Quality and phytosanitary compliance (especially for citrus MRLs and potato brown‑rot controls) are emphasized as conditions for continued access. ([amchamegyptinc.org](https://www.amchamegyptinc.org/bic/tenders/Q_Reports/Q1_2024_Agriculture_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) & wider MENA** - **Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, and Iraq** are consistently identified as major buyers of fresh citrus, potatoes, onions, and table grapes, absorbing a large share of winter‑season shipments. ([egyptexporting.net](https://www.egyptexporting.net/blog/22?utm_source=openai)) - **Russia & Eastern Europe** - Remain **critical volume destinations** for oranges and potatoes; several 2024–2025 trade briefings point to Russia as one of the largest single markets for Egyptian citrus and potatoes. ([insights.tridge.com](https://insights.tridge.com/speaker-product-news-reports/KJLyFXpzJzgKuB1Gqsm5QUKHGgR43AVdqL9pBNYa4nMbfgzXXnVMBbe7?utm_source=openai)) - **Asia & Africa (diversification)** - The Ministry of Agriculture has tracked new market openings in **East Asia, Latin America, and Sub‑Saharan Africa** for citrus and table grapes, part of a strategy to reduce concentration risk on EU and Russia. ([en.amwalalghad.com](https://en.amwalalghad.com/egypts-agricultural-exports-top-5-8m-tons-minister/?utm_source=openai)) **4. Policy and regulatory context for exports (2024–2026)** - **Export controls / bans** - Egypt has intermittently applied **export bans or restrictions on strategic food commodities** (wheat, maize, lentils, flour, sugar, onions, cooking oils) to manage domestic inflation and food security, particularly in 2022–2024; OECD’s 2024 Egypt survey flags such measures. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/02/oecd-economic-surveys-egypt-2024_ad9fc8a4/af900de2-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - For 2024–2025, no broad bans on citrus or potatoes were reported, but onions have periodically faced **temporary export restrictions** in years of domestic price spikes; OECD notes the government’s increasing reliance on such measures. - **Market access and SPS** - Export expansion relies heavily on the **Central Administration of Agricultural Quarantine**, which has tightened traceability, pesticide‑residue monitoring, and pack‑house certification for citrus and potatoes. ([sis.gov.eg](https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/news/egypt-s-farm-exports-hit-record-115-bln-in-2025-volumes-up-to-95-mln-tons/?utm_source=openai)) - The March 2026 MFAT report highlights **ongoing upgrades to cold‑chain, pack‑houses, and residue‑testing labs**, often backed by EU and development‑partner funding, to sustain export growth and compliance with EU/UK, Gulf, and Russian SPS requirements. ([mfat.govt.nz](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/Egypt-Agri-Tech-Landscape-and-Opportunities-March-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **5. 2026 outlook (directionally)** - Market‑forecast material incorporated in a 2026 manufacturing‑hub study and the March 2026 agri‑tech report indicates: - Expected continued **volume growth in high‑value fruits and vegetables**, with citrus and potatoes staying dominant. - Focus on **value‑addition and tech (precision irrigation, digital traceability, pack‑house automation)** to defend EU and Gulf market share and reduce logistics exposure. ([amcham.org.eg](https://www.amcham.org.eg/bic/pdf/EgyptAManufacturingHub2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **Net takeaways for citrus/potatoes/onions & fruits, 2024–2026** - Citrus is structurally **~25–30% of agricultural export volume**, anchoring Egypt’s FX earnings. - Potatoes have grown rapidly to around **1.3–1.4 Mt in 2025**, emerging as a close second to citrus. - Onions, grapes, strawberries, and beans provide **diversification**, with onions particularly important in MENA and some EU markets. - Export growth is robust despite domestic food‑security pressures, supported by SPS upgrades and ongoing destination diversification – but logistics and risk‑premium shocks from the Red Sea remain key downside risks (see next section). **Sources – Commodity Trends**: ([sis.gov.eg](https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/news/egypt-s-farm-exports-hit-record-115-bln-in-2025-volumes-up-to-95-mln-tons/?utm_source=openai)) === MARKET EVENTS === (Red Sea security 2026 – impact on Suez Canal transits, insurance, rerouting via Cape of Good Hope) **1. Security situation and traffic recovery as of early 2026** - After intense disruption beginning late 2023, **container vessel traffic through the Suez/Red Sea corridor fell by roughly 70–75% in 2024 vs. 2023**, as ships diverted around the **Cape of Good Hope**. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - Reporting in early **January–February 2026** indicates a **partial normalization**: - Major carriers such as **Maersk and CMA CGM** announced that they were **resuming at least some transits through the Red Sea/Suez** following a de‑escalation agreement in late 2025. - However, total Red Sea/Suez traffic remains **“sharply below” pre‑crisis levels**, with a significant fraction of Asia–Europe routes still using the Cape of Good Hope. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) - The Suez Canal Authority’s **2025 annual navigation report**, released in early 2026, shows: - Overall **cargo and ship numbers down vs. 2023**, with **container‑ship cargo around 6.6 million tons** recorded (this reflects a depressed 2025 base due to rerouting). ([suezcanal.gov.eg](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **2. Insurance premiums and cost structure** - During 2024–2025, **war‑risk insurance premiums** for Red Sea/Suez transits: - Rose from **well below 0.1%** of hull value pre‑crisis to **around 1%** of vessel value at peaks, adding **hundreds of thousands of USD per transit** for large container ships or tankers. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) - Premiums eased somewhat when attacks temporarily subsided but **spiked again in late 2025**, reflecting renewed drone/missile incidents near Yemen; as of early 2026, premiums remain **elevated, closer to 1% than to pre‑crisis norms**. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) - These higher premiums combine with: - **Longer detours** via the Cape of Good Hope (typically **+10–14 days**, +4,500–5,000 nautical miles on key Asia–Europe routes, ~50–60% longer distance). ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - **Higher bunker fuel costs** and opportunity cost of tied‑up vessel capacity, effectively reducing global container‑shipping capacity by up to **~15%** according to disruption‑modelling exercises. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/freightforwarding/comments/1li8ev8?utm_source=openai)) **3. Rerouting patterns – Cape of Good Hope vs. Suez Canal** - At the height of the crisis (2024–mid‑2025): - A **majority of container traffic that would normally transit the Suez Canal** was rerouted around the Cape, as per shipping‑data compilations. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) - The result was a **>3× increase in container freight rates** on certain Asia–Europe services versus pre‑disruption levels (early‑2024 benchmark), as flagged in macro/freight market commentary citing ING and other analysts. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/stocks/comments/1al45qy?utm_source=openai)) - In **early 2026**: - Carriers are **splitting exposure** – some services restored to Red Sea/Suez, others still using the Cape for risk management, with a bias to send **higher‑value or time‑sensitive cargoes** via Suez as security improves. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) - This suggests that **Suez volumes are recovering but not yet fully normalized**, and freight‑rate volatility remains above historical norms. **4. Macro impact on Egypt and agri‑trade** - For Egypt, the Red Sea/Suez disruption hits: - **Transit toll revenue** (major source of FX): SCA statistics for 2025 show both **ship numbers and cargo tonnage materially down** vs. 2023, even as toll rates were hiked to partially offset volume losses. ([suezcanal.gov.eg](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - **Competitiveness of Egyptian exports/imports**: - Egyptian citrus/potato/onion exports to EU, Russia, and Gulf states either **face higher freight and insurance costs** or, in some cases, **longer transit times** when vessels reroute via the Cape. - This compresses exporter margins unless **FOB prices rise** or buyers share transport cost increases; in practice, some of the cost has been passed through in higher CIF prices, especially at 2024–2025 peaks. (Inference based on freight‑cost vs. delivered‑price dynamics.) ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - **Import costs** for fertilizers, feed grains, and inputs also rise due to increased freight and insurance, feeding into local price pressures – aligning with OECD’s concerns about food‑price inflation and the government’s frequent use of export bans on key staples. ([oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/02/oecd-economic-surveys-egypt-2024_ad9fc8a4/af900de2-en.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **5. 2026 risk outlook** - Even with a **partial return of liner services to the Red Sea**, the risk profile for 2026 remains: - **Security: medium–high** – incidents have decreased vs. 2024 peaks but could flare up, keeping war‑risk cover expensive. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1q7rtb4/red_sea_shipping_resumes_trade_routes_reset/?utm_source=openai)) - **Cost: structurally above pre‑crisis** – markets expect **persistently higher freight and insurance costs** for Red Sea/Suez routes vs. pre‑2023, which will continue to affect **Egypt’s Suez Canal revenues** and the cost base of its export sectors, including agriculture. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) **Sources – Market Events (Red Sea / Suez)**: ([suezcanal.gov.eg](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) === DEMAND SIGNALS === (Egypt container throughput 2026 – Alexandria, Port Said, Suez Canal; container volumes & freight‑rate trends) **1. Suez Canal / Port Said: container throughput** - **Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT), Port Said East** – key transshipment hub at the Canal’s northern entrance: - Handled **5.57 million TEU in 2025**, up from **3.94 million TEU in 2024** – an increase of roughly **+41% YoY**. ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/suez-canal-container-terminal-increases-teu-traffic-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - COSCO/Ports Europe note that **Q1 2025 throughput was 1.03 million TEU vs. 1.01 million TEU in Q1 2024**, indicating that most of the 2025 growth was in later quarters as carriers adjusted services and possibly consolidated calls at SCCT. ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/suez-canal-container-terminal-increases-teu-traffic-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Context: even with this growth at SCCT, **overall Suez Canal ship and cargo counts for 2025** in SCA reports remain below 2023 levels due to ongoing diversions – implying that **SCCT is gaining share within a smaller pie**, likely as a preferred hub for the services that continue to use Suez. ([suezcanal.gov.eg](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) **2. Alexandria Port – available signals** - Publicly accessible, up‑to‑date TEU data for **Alexandria Port** itself is limited; widely cited figures are historical (e.g., **~1.44 million TEU in 2012**). ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexandria_Port?utm_source=openai)) - However, multiple 2024–2025 trade and investment reports on Egypt’s port sector (including AmCham sector reports and the March 2026 MFAT agri report) note: - **Ongoing capacity expansions and terminal upgrades** in Alexandria and Dekheila, including additional container‑yard space and modernized equipment. ([amchamegyptinc.org](https://www.amchamegyptinc.org/bic/tenders/Q_Reports/Q1_2024_Agriculture_Report.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - A **shift of some domestic import/export cargo away from pure transshipment hubs like Port Said** toward Alexandria/Dekheila, especially for **agri‑food, fertilizers, and manufactured goods** destined for the Nile‑Delta consumption belt. (This is directional/inferred from investment and traffic descriptions rather than hard TEU counts.) ([mfat.govt.nz](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/Egypt-Agri-Tech-Landscape-and-Opportunities-March-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Given the lack of recent hard TEU time‑series for Alexandria in the public domain, any quantitative 2025–2026 throughput number would be speculative; the reliable quantitative signal for 2025 is on Port Said/SCCT. **3. Port Said (wider context, beyond SCCT)** - Port Said overall is historically Egypt’s **busiest container port**, with older references citing **3.47 million TEU (2009)**; recent SCCT numbers (5.57M TEU in 2025) suggest: - **Substantial long‑term growth** in Port Said’s container role, driven by SCCT as a transshipment hub for East Med / Asia–Europe services. ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/suez-canal-container-terminal-increases-teu-traffic-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Concentration of **hub‑and‑spoke feeder traffic**, including some of Egypt’s own agricultural exports shipped via reefer containers. **4. Suez Canal – total container and cargo trends** - The **2025 SCA annual report** (published ~April 2026) shows: - **Container‑ship cargo: ~6.6 million tons** recorded for the year (for container vessels category), down vs. 2023, consistent with diversions; note this is tons of cargo, not TEU. ([suezcanal.gov.eg](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - A continued **reliance on higher toll rates** and surcharges to partly offset lower volumes. **5. Freight‑rate trends into/out of Egypt (2024–2026)** - **2024–mid‑2025**: - Asia–Europe and Asia–Med freight rates **more than tripled vs. early‑2024 baselines** at the height of Red Sea disruptions, according to market commentary summarizing ING and other analysts. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/stocks/comments/1al45qy?utm_source=openai)) - Spot rates on key lanes (e.g., Shanghai–Rotterdam, Shanghai–Mediterranean) reflected: - Added **10–14 days transit** via Cape, higher bunker costs, and elevated war‑risk insurance. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea?utm_source=openai)) - **Late 2025–early 2026**: - As some services returned to the Red Sea, **freight rates eased from peak levels** but remained **well above pre‑crisis averages**: - War‑risk premiums remain at or near **1% of vessel value** for voyages transiting high‑risk segments, preventing a full reversion to pre‑2023 costs. ([reddit.com](https://www.reddit.com/r/NoSpinMedia/comments/1py1z1d/red_sea_shipping_insurance_costs_surge_again/?utm_source=openai)) - Red Sea–related cost adder for an Egypt‑bound container (whether to Alexandria or Port Said) still includes **higher insurance and some residual schedule unreliability**, which translates into: - Higher **CIF prices** for imported inputs (grains, oils, feed) - **Tighter margins for exporters**, especially for lower‑value bulk or non‑reefer goods. - For **Egypt‑origin exports**, including agricultural products: - Liner networks have in some cases **reconfigured rotations** to keep Egypt on services that can safely traverse the Red Sea while optimizing Cape detours on other strings, which may **shift Egyptian cargo volumes between Alexandria and Port Said/SCCT** depending on the service. (This is inferred from SCCT growth and the broader Red Sea narrative.) ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/suez-canal-container-terminal-increases-teu-traffic-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) **6. Demand‑side implications for 2026** - Rising SCCT throughput in 2025 despite overall Suez weakness signals **resilient demand for East‑Med transshipment** and a **strategic role for Port Said as a hub**, including for reefer traffic linked to agri‑exports. ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/suez-canal-container-terminal-increases-teu-traffic-in-2025/?utm_source=openai)) - Capacity expansion and modernization in **Alexandria/Dekheila** point to expectations of **continued growth in Egypt‑bound and Egypt‑origin container volumes**, particularly for: - Agricultural inputs and food imports (wheat, oils, feed) - High‑value exports (fruits, vegetables, processed foods, fertilizers, manufactured goods). ([mfat.govt.nz](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/Egypt-Agri-Tech-Landscape-and-Opportunities-March-2026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) - Freight‑rate and insurance‑cost normalization is **partial, not complete**, so 2026 logistics costs into/out of Egypt are likely to remain: - **Below 2024–25 peak levels**, but - **Above pre‑2023 baseline**, implying **structurally higher delivered‑cost floor** for both imports and exports. **Sources – Demand Signals (Ports & Freight)**: ([portseurope.com](https://www.portseurope.com/suez-canal-container-terminal-increases-teu-traffic-in-2025/?utm_source=openai))